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derivative filename/jpeg
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363-08478 to 363-08482.pdf
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Digital Object Identifier
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363-08478 to 363-08482
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Title
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Part three of a five part series on the Vietnam War
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Description
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Original title: "SERIES- article three of five - article series", Keever's title: "U.S. Officials in Saigon Feud with Pentagon Chief [ILLEGIBLE] Use of Combat Troops", Article draft about part three of a five part series on the Vietnam War, for The North American News Alliance
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AI Usage Disclosure
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Draft transcripts were automatically generated via Google Document AI and are currently under review. Please report significant errors to Archives & Special Collections at archives@unl.edu.
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Transcript
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- Page 1
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Beverly Ann Deepe
64A Hong Thap Tu
inigon, Vietna
January 14, 1967
Series article three of five-part series
page I
SAIGON--The moment the first American combat troops set foot on Vietnamese
soil two years ago, fiorce in-fighting simmered within the American establishment
hore on the concept of how they should be used.
The in-fighting and conflicting directions in fact, the strategic dilemma
within the American establishment here continued throughout 1965 end erupted
at the highest level in mid-October, 1966 with a bitter row between Ambassador
Honry Cabot Lodge and Secretary of Defense Robert S. Mollamara during his last
visit to Vietnam, before the Manila Conference.
The in-fighting persisted first as a clash of conflicting concepts within
the American military establishment-between the U.S. Army and the Marines
then within the civilian establishment here, since many of the employees of the
American civilian agencies are either former or detached military officers.
more generally, the in-fighting here is described as military vs. civilian
DIRECTION
conflicts on the approach of the war.
0
But,
The simplified version of the conflict hinged on two points: the Marines
All Ac
civilian vented a de-conventionalisation of the war on the military side and,
in somes cases, a do-Americanization of the war on the political side,
the
direction of the monogonent of the war is now the reserve. Second, to curb the
hit-end hide "strategic mobility" of the Communist Viet Cong guerrille, the
Marine-civilian alliance sought to control, pacify and secure the Vietnamese
population from which they believed the guerrilla gained their strengh; the U.S.
Army wanted to nullify the "strategic mobility" of the guerrille with their own
tactical mobility derived from helicopters, armored personnel cattiers, and
quick-reaction artillery and jet airpower.
The conflict began when the U.S. Marines, the first American combat roun
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Series-article three of five-part sorios
Pa ge 2
unite to land in Vietnam, started to secure the populated areas around the strategic
Danong sirbase, 350 miles north of Saigon.
They employed the "muclear end hold" tootics, in which American Marine
units provided a permanent outer screen around "priority" populated villages,
end then the Vietnamese pare-military units and Vietnamese civilian agencies,
backed by American civilians, would along with the Marines provide civic action
Cull
and pacification activities to or out Communist infra-structure. They assumed
their mein enemy was the Viet Cong guerrilla and political cadre which maintened
control over the villagers; their second enemy was the Viet Cong end North Vietnamese
mein force units of battalions and regiments which abounded in the non-populated
jungles.
The second unit to arrive in Vietnam was the 173rd Airborne Brigade (Seperate)
which was to exemplify the U.S. Army approach to the war. The unit was first
sent to secure the jet-length airbase of Bien Hoa, sipit les nostheitgofrünigon,
but by July, 1965, they used Bien Hoa simply as a staging area for "search and
destroy" operations into the Viet Cong jungled stronghold of D-Zone. The U.S.
Army approach assumed that the primary enemy was the main force units of Viet
Cong battalions and regiments--and now divisions--and that unless they were
eradionted the villages and hemlets would nover maintain enough of their own
security forces to be free of Communist guerrilla hd political cadre and tex
collectors.
In short, the Army approach maintained, as one Army officer explained, "If
we knock out the main force, the guerrilla will get soared and be quiet. The
war is then a manageable problem."
The Merinos said, however, "If we knock out the guerrill/ht
that
control
the population end the villages-ve 11 let the North Vietnamese stay in the
jungle for twenty years, bomb then and hope they get moleris."
(Moro)
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Doopo
series-article three of five-part series
Page 3
units;
al
The Army vi owod the war as more of a convention, or at best sub-
conventional conflict, with American units pitched my versus Communist
the Marines viewed the war as a counter-insurgency effort designed
to secure and then pacify the villages.
Throughout the remainder of 1965 and 1966, the foud continued botwoen
the Army and the Marinos. One one cocasion, for example, the feelings
became so bittor that an American Army colonel rofused to allow a
Marine officer brief Secretary Ma of Defense Robert MoNamara (an Amry
Army general over-ruled the colonel.. The Army is largely in charge of
the joint (that is inter-service) Military Assistance Command, responsible
for running the whole American side of the military war within South Vietnam,
while the Marines are responsible for the five northern provinces known
as I Corps, bordering Laos and the demilitarized zone on the 17th parallel.
By October, 1966-as battle plans were being drawn up for 1967-the
American military staff planners realized that the Army concept & had largely
failed--for while they had killed, captured and wounded tons of thousands
of Communists, the Communist strength continued to mushroom both from
the invisible invasion from North Vietnam as well as from local recruitment
from the village population which the Communists largely controlled.
(More)
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Doope
Sorbes-article three of five-article corios
Page 4
Conversely, however, the Marines algo had failed to achieve any
remarkable successk success, first because during the Buddhist crisis in thei
tactical area it in the spring of 1966, the entire Vietnamese military
organisation and administration had virtually caved in with the removal
of Vietnamese corps commander, General Nguyon Chanh Thi (whom the Marines
liked and respected immensely, but neither the Amorican Army nor civilians
id did). Socond, however, the Communists had moved elements of two
divisions along the demilitarized zone by July and threatened to over-run
the northernmost province of Quang Tri. The U. S. joint command in Saigon
ordered more than a division of U. S. Marines to the DIZ-though the
Maru Marines did not think the Communist throat was that severe--and as a
consequence the villages that the Marines had been protocting outside of
Danang wore spread too thin to maintain adequate security.
By 1966, the American civilian agencies waxx became moro
vocal and, unknowingly, adopted the American Marine viewpoint and formed at
loose conceptual alliance with them. During 1965, the American civilian
agencies-like the Vietnamese governmont and armed forces-ore largoly
on the defensive, watching with astonishmont the American military build-up
and attempting to soften the adverse political-economic-social
ropercussions of the upheaval such as the inflation and housing of the
American troops in the cities.
(More)
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#cope
Borlogartiolo throo of five-artiolo series
Pago 5
In February, 1966, President on Lyndon Johnson dramatically called
the Honolulu Conforanco with leaders of the South Vietnamese government to
launch the "other war," essentially the war of pacification and economic
bottormont for the countryside, under a plan already worked out by Conoral
Nguyen Duo Thang, mini stor of rural reconstruction, The historic announcements,
howevor
moso soon forgotten as the urban population in the northorn provinces
not only)
sparked an uprising which mat nearly toppled the pro-American government of
ignited
Primo Minister guyon Cao Ky, but also spe
the open mutiny of some of the
Vietnamese armed forcon against their own government.
By Gotobor of 1966, with the Monile Conference in the offing, Secretary
Defense Robert Holenara arrived in Saigon and the result was the most
Significant if not
violent confrontation to date between the Army-arine end the civilian-military
conflicto. Lodgo was the exponent of the civilian-orine alliance; ho, bolioving
the most congorous Communist threat comes from the guerrilla and political ondro,
ented a min masinum number of American troops deployed to secure the villagos
from which the Communist infrastructure would be gifted. Molenara and tho Amorican
military lendore wanted the American combat units to be employed in a more
offensive role against the Communist "herd-hat" mein-force units, mostly in the
como of the 90 Communist base areas such as the Junglos of Zone C and D north of
# Saigon.
Reliable sources horo report that the discussion between Lodge and Mollamara
ronchod hos tod proportionat at one time, according to those sources, Lodge
refused to anavor three telophone onllo from Hoon Mollamara, Mollamara loft
Saigon earlier than coheduled, cancelled an airport nows conference, and "in
goneral ho left in a huff and is still in a huff," these sources report.
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Date
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1967, Jan. 14
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Subject
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Vietnam War, 1961-1975
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Location
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Saigon, South Vietnam
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Coordinates
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10.8231; 106.6311
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Size
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20 x 26 cm
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Container
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B118, F6
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Format
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dispatches
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Collection Number
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MS 363
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Collection Title
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Beverly Deepe Keever, Journalism Papers
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Creator
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Keever, Beverly Deepe
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Collector
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Keever, Beverly Deepe
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Copyright Information
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These images are for educational use only. To inquire about usage or publication, please contact Archives & Special Collections.
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Publisher
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Archives & Special Collections, University of Nebraska-Lincoln Libraries
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Language
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English
