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derivative filename/jpeg
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363-08472 to 363-08477.pdf
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Digital Object Identifier
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363-08472 to 363-08477
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Title
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Part two of a five part series on the Vietnam War
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Description
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Original title: "SERIES- article two of five - article series", Keever's title: N/A, Article draft about part two of a five part series on the Vietnam War, for The North American News Alliance,
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AI Usage Disclosure
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Draft transcripts were automatically generated via Google Document AI and are currently under review. Please report significant errors to Archives & Special Collections at archives@unl.edu.
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Transcript
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- Page 1
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Bororly Ann Deepe
64A Hong Thop Tu
Saigon, Vietnen.
January 14, 1967
SERIES--article two of five-article sories
Page 1
SAIGON-The American escalation of the Vietnam war two years ago this
wook signalled an implicit admission of peat strategie failures in countering
the Conrundt revolutionary commonly called the "an "war of the future."
"You lost the revolutionary war, but you hadto bring in conventional
ground combat battalions and bomber squadrons to prevent the Communists from
wanning it," one Western official adminished an Amorionn observer. "You have
to fight a war with the conventional power you have; you can not fight it the
un-conventional troops you don't have."
Dicoussing the arrival of American combat units two years ago, ono
senior Western diplomat explained, "This means the only subversive-guerrilla
America oan win in the future is the one it never has to fight militarily."
American officials-from civilian techniciansto militery tacticians-O
pushing and imploring here-hostly without vain success for a full-conle
reappraisal of the American defonne approach in countering the Communist
revolutionary war, or insurgency as it is often onllod.
(Moro)
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Deepe
3rios article two of five-article peries
Pago 2
As one American civilian who left Viethen after serving four years here
explained, "Even if we lose the war and South Vietnam, yet le rn something
from our mistakes to prevent other Viotams, we will have gained a little.
But, I don't even see that we are doing that."
American officials here, who maintain South Vietnam would have been
lost without American bombing of North Vietnam and the introduction of American
ground troops in south Victnom, say there are three rossone for the escalation.
First, to stop aggression. Though this is the official administration position,
they agree it is the vaguest and least convincing. Second, to stop Comunist
Chinh. This view is widely expressed not only in private conversations with
Amoricen officiels, but also with educated South Vietnamese, who view the
Chinese as a propelling influence between the North Vietnamese infiltration.
Third, and most significent, to counter the Commin Communist revoluta
revolutionary warfare, which has been described as "that unholy trinity of
subversion, terrorien and quorrilla warfare." Communist radio broadcasts
claim to have guerrilla movements in Vonzuola, Colbia, Columbia, Guatemala
and Thailand.
There are some of the praterie romppraisals that American officials,
sporting privately, hope are made in an attempt to prevent future Vietnams:
(More)
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Deepe
Series article two of five-article series
Pago 3
1. A "now look" at the U. S. foreign at economic aid program.
Economists here note American foroign aid program has been unchanged in appronal
noto Am
designed
and concept since its foundings days of the Marghall Plan to
theN
POSSESSED A LA FER
a technologically
rovu rebuild a war-lovastated Europe. But, Europe
sophisticated, middle-class economy with a machine capable of utilising voll the
American aid; in under-developed countries, these sourcen note, thoro is no
such economic mechinery to absorba and utilize well American aid. Those
sources note that more emphasis must bo plav placod on tho rural agricultural
seators of the under-developed economies whore Communist-inspired subversion
and guerrilla warfare generally begins. (In the first five years of
American economic aid to Viotnem,
when the Communist guerrillas were gaining
momentumg in the countryside, only four per cent of the American economic
aid was spent on agriculture although 85 per cent of the population lived
in the countryside).
These sources note that these under-devoloped countries need more
technical seal stance and advice and suggest that future "U. s. strings"
should require American technicians to be coupled with the giving of
American goods and aid. These sources say that ovon with the
Other
officiency and omphasis on agriculture, the underdeveloped countries are
"running on a treadmill" to koop pace with the population explosion-and that
a major break though breakthrough must be found to solve the food crisis.
sources also believe the American economic aid program should atto pt in a b
broader, more systomatic way to train honest, officient government
functionairros and administrators, coonomiota and policemen--a shortcoming
American officials admit they t mado in Vietnam. (More)
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Doepo
Sorios artiole two of five-artiole series
Pago 4
2.
countries.
aystematic review of American military aid to undor-developed
This military aid, under the Military Assistance Program (AP), was
Jw
in the onge of Vietnam-goared tarde building a conventional army organized
into divisions and supported by planes and tanks to fight a a Comunist-inspired
Guerrilla war, rathor than local militis and efficient rural policemont, who would
cull out Communist political subversivos before a guerrilla var could
erupt.
The military assistance Program includes American advisors who are
responsible for the training of troops to uno the American equipment. In 1955,
in Vietnam the American advisory effort began to train a convenion conventional
mirroring the American armed forces; the arrival of American combat forcos
ton years later substantiated that they should have been training local
militiamen as the Vietnamese government initially requested in 1955 when the
Communist insurgency was latent. The final paradox is, hovor, that in 1967,
when the Communist forces had mushroomed into sub-conventional forces,
American and Vietnamese military commands assigned the Vietnames armed forces
to assume the rolf role of villago militiamon, or "to play Boy Scout,"
American advisor explained.
COUERTE
as A Result
the Aer
"Amorica lost tho Vietnamoso guerrilla war because of the conventional
Korean conflict," one high-placed official explained. "America assumed that
Hanoi would invade the South with a conventional anny as the Communists did
in Korea; he ignored the fnot that Hanoi exxx was going to attempt to seize So
South Vietnam via a more subtlo military-political routo."
(More)
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Deope
Borios article two of five-article merios
Prigo 5
U.
By late 1964, the American establishment here regii roalized the Amerienn
military advisory effort to support the Vietnamese armed forces was
grossly inadequate to stop the Communist attempt to seiso military and political
control of the country. By March, 1965, the first American ground combat
troops arrived-yet, even the military build-up revealed a lack of
overall, integrated political-economic-military loadership, which possessed
the vision to anticipate and prevent the critical problems which later
The first American troops
cruptol.
spent American nickels and dimes in
the villages, which signalled to the Vietnamese peasants a la of
CASES
loan of movereignity. In some vague, village chiofs rivalled each other
and vowed to pitch their respective local militia units against each other
in order to get the American currency at favorable black market rates. The
inflationary promuro, which nearly wrecked the Vietnamese coonomy, could have
PARTIATY
boon contained by limiting the amount of ourev currency available, as had been
the case during the U. S. advisory effort, political sources report.
More than that, with the countryside in Communist hands, the
anti-Communist political and military base of support rested in the cities. But,
the arrival of American troops tossed the cities into a crials-bars and
prostitutes openly flourished, which onused politionl oyesores and social
frictions; squabbles oruptod with Vietnamese drives and streot vendors. Housing
ronta roached oxorbitant rates as both American GI's and ref Vietnamese
refugees from flocked to the cition. The result was waves of
anti-Americanism, which the Communists could and did exploit, specifically
during the Buddhist crisis last spring which almost toppled the pro-American
Government. Moro urban disorder is predicted in 1967.
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Тюоре
Sorios rtible two of five-article nories
Pago 6
While major adjustmonts are being made to nolvo those problems, it
political mourdes believe it may be too late to danpon the anti-Americanism
86,
INJECTED
two years after the initial American escalation which ought noorly
400,000 combat troops, the countrysido is still largely in the hands of
the Communists and the oities are in a state of op potentially disasterous
insurrection.
"This mik war will be won by the ride which m kos tho forest mistakes,"
SENIOR
onor estorn officials explained. "So far, the Communists are making
fovor than the Americans."
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Date
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1967, Jan. 14
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Subject
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Vietnam War, 1961-1975
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Location
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Saigon, South Vietnam
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Coordinates
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10.8231; 106.6311
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Size
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20 x 26 cm
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Container
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B118, F6
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Format
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dispatches
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Collection Number
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MS 363
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Collection Title
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Beverly Deepe Keever, Journalism Papers
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Creator
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Keever, Beverly Deepe
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Collector
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Keever, Beverly Deepe
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Copyright Information
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These images are for educational use only. To inquire about usage or publication, please contact Archives & Special Collections.
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Publisher
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Archives & Special Collections, University of Nebraska-Lincoln Libraries
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Language
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English
