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derivative filename/jpeg
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363-05418 to 363-05423.pdf
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Digital Object Identifier
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363-05418 to 363-05423
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Title
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Article about Communist strength within South Vietnam
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Description
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Original title: "Series - article five of five - part series", Keever's tittle: "Two Years of Bimbing North Vietnam Fails to Stop Infiltration into South", Article about Communist strength within South Vietnam in 1967, published for North American Newspaper Alliance
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AI Usage Disclosure
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Draft transcripts were automatically generated via Google Document AI and are currently under review. Please report significant errors to Archives & Special Collections at archives@unl.edu.
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Transcript
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- Page 1
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Beverly Ann Deepe
64A Hong Thap Tu
Sai gon, Vietnam
January 14, 1967
SERIES-Article five of five-article series
Page 1
SAIGON-Since the American bombing raids against North Vietnam were
initiated two years ago this week, Communist strength within South Vietnam
has continued to skyrocket-and is expected to sora soar as dramatically in 1967.
"If the objective of bombing North Vietnam was to slow down the
rate of North Vietnamese infiltration into South Vietnam,
thon this has
certainly failed," one high-ranking source explained this week.
The dramatic incrase in the rate of infiltration from North Vietnam-
an invisible invasion-indicates that more and more of the Communist military
manpower is supplied by North Vietnam rather than local recruitment in South
Vietnam.
In
in early 1965, before
These are the official intelligence estimates:
the rate of infiltration was estimated at 3,000
the bombing of North Vietnam,
a month; following the bombing on February 7, the estimate immediately
jumped to 4,000 a month; two years after the initial bombing the estimates
had soared to a minimum of 10,000 a month-a threefold increase.
contrast the Communist military recruitment within South Vietnam hasremained
relatively constant; at the time of the bombing raids against North Vietnam
the estimate by intelligence sources was 3,000 a month; today, two years later,
the estimate was between 3,500 to 4,000 recruits a month.
(More)
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Doope
sories-article five of five-article series
Page 2
In round numbers, the Communi otz strength on February 7, 1965, whon
the bombing raids bogan, was officially estimated at 117,000. Today, two
years later, the est mate is at loast 280,000-an increase of nearly 240
percent.
American military sources say that obviously more American
and allied troops will be needed to maintain a favorable balance of forces.
Far more worrisome to American military commanders, however, is the
staggering indre increase in the Communist order of battle.
A tenth is
On February 7, 1965, there were no known Communist division headquarters
in South Vietnam; today, two years later, there are nino-seven predominantly
of North Vietnamese origin and two rooruited in South Vietnam.
considered by intelligence sources of being under ofrmatio formation-on the
£ doorstops of saigon city. In 1967, it is officially estimated that
at least 12 Communist division headquarters will fighting in South Vietnam.
In addition, two years ago,
the Communists maintained five known
autonomous regiments; today, they have forty; they are expected to climb
to at least fifty by the end of 1967. Two years ago, the Communist had
formed roughly fifty autonomous mobile battalions; they current confirmed
figure is 180; by the end of 1967, the Communists are expected to have
organized 215.
Equally significant is the dramatic increase of the Communist
heavy weapons battalions-which shoot down American planes and helicopters and
mortar strategio airfields in South Vietnam. On February 7, 1965, six Communist
heavy weapons battalions had been officially confirmed in intelligence cources;
today,
two years later, the number was confirmed to be 70%
the end of 1967 is nearly double-to 135. (More)
the estimate by
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- Page 3
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Deepe
series articlo five of five-article sories
Page 3
Despite heavy Communist casualties inflicted by American and allied
topp troops, the Communist strength, an officially estimated continues
to escalato. In 1965-66, 94,000 Communists were officially listed as killed;
160 16,000 were captured, 31,000 defected to the government side-a minimal
total of 141,000 confirmed losses. Yet they have still shown a not increase
of at least 163,000 men during the past two years.
The Communist escalation has also shown in up in improvements in their
weapons captured
FR
arms, supplies and equipment. Instantm Several years ago,
from the Viet Cong guerrillas were mainly outmoded French rifles, Amorican
weapons; only two percent were from Communist bloc countries.
forces are capturing more and more Che Czeck and Communist Chinese
machineguns, submachineguns and rifles of the so-called SKZ family of weapons-
the weapons
used
now ued to equip the Soviet frontline divisions.
Today, allied
Since the
American bombing of North Vietnam two years ago, allied forces have captured
30,000 Communist weapons--enough to equip nearly three Communist divisions.
the Communists are now able to launch
Yet, for the first time in the war,
mortar barrages k using as many as 500 rounds of ammunition; during 1967,
American field commanders expect the next round of oscalation in weaponry to
include the use of Communist artillery.
(More)
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Doope
Sories article five of five-article series
pago 4
the
In general, while the over-all military situation during 1967 appears
hoaded for the bitterest and bloodiest fighting to date in the war,
military picture from the Communist viewpoint is not quite as favorable as in
late 1964, when at the peak of their st relative strengths they were woll on the
In late 1964, before the arrival
way to soizing power in South Vietnam.
of American ground troops, the Vietnamese government strategio reserve had
the south Vietnamese government
been nibbled away; during fioroc engagements,
forces were unable to send in relief troops even to pick up their own dead.
Western businessmen openly predicted they would wake up some morning "to see the
Viet Cong flag flying over Saigon;" some Western nowemon bogan sending out
the Vietnamese paratroopers had prepared
of country their personal belongingst
maps for the evacuation of Saigon. The build-up of American forces boginning
in March, 1965, halted this systematic advance of the Viet Cong, rea
During late 1964,
reinforced with organized battalions from North Vietnam.
During late 1964,
yet
the Communists were in their final Third Phase of guerrilla warfare; to yo
two years later when nearly 400,000 American troops had hominjanin,
had failed to de-escalate them back into Phase Two, reliable sources report.
(More)
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Doope
sories article five of five-article corios
Pago 5
Throughout 1965 and most of 1966, the Communist deliberately--and
successfully-for the most part laid low while American combat units sought to
make contact with thom. The few bloody, spectacular, too-to-too ong to
engagements were the exception rather than the rule.
Simultaneously,
the
Communist studied American military tactics and bogan to counter as well as to
skirt thom, while the continued to import and recruit in-country enough
Communist fighters to re-establish the balance of forces they had initially
lost with the American build-up.
By mid-1966, North Vietnamese President Ho Chi Minh announced on July
17th the partial mobilization of all civilian and military eloments in North
Vietnam, and three months later, one October 27th, the presidium of the
x National Liberation Front for South Vietnam appealed to all the peope,
cadres and soldiers to launch a total campaign, called the fall-spring
campaign, in order to implement their war of ab attrition and to inflict
enough casualties on the American and allied troops to "break the imperialists
will of aggression."
In this appeal, the presidium defined their strategy during the fall-
spring offensive, which ends in April, 1967:
(More)
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Deope
Series articlo five of five-article series
page 6
1. The Viet Cong-North Vietnamese main forces to sorach soarch out
and engage American-allied main forces fr by using mobile warfare tactics.
2. The Viet Cong regional (provincial) mobile unite to assemble
deeply into the areas contented both by the government and the Viet Cong to
or in the government-controlled areas to attook the American and allied forces
and installations.
3. The Communist guerrilla forces to attack Vietnamese government
pacification programs, which are coreened b American units, and and to
carry sabotage against roads, rivers, bridges and allied installations.
4. The political, economic, cultural and financial Communist cadres living
in the government-controlled areas, particularly the cities, to induce Vietnames
the Vietnamese population, army and government officials to rebel axx against
or to paralyze the Vietnamese government of Prime Minister He Nguyen Cao Ky.
e
On this success or failure of the Communist campaign scheduled to
end in April of this year may well rest the key desks appese assessment
of whether
by American and Vietnamese policy pa policymakers
forces can win this agonizing, which-way war.
-30-
believe the allied
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Date
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1967, Jan. 14
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Subject
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Vietnam War, 1961-1975; Soldiers; Mặt trận dân tộc giải phóng miền nam Việt Nam; Vietnam War, 1961-1975--Participation, Communist
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Location
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Saigon, South Vietnam
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Coordinates
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10.8231; 106.6311
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Size
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20 x 26 cm
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Container
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B188, F6
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Format
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dispatches
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Collection Number
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MS 363
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Collection Title
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Beverly Deepe Keever, Journalism Papers
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Creator
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Keever, Beverly Deepe
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Copyright Information
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These images are for educational use only. To inquire about usage or publication, please contact Archives & Special Collections.
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Publisher
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Archives & Special Collections, University of Nebraska-Lincoln Libraries
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Language
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English
