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derivative filename/jpeg
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363-05407 to 363-05411.pdf
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Digital Object Identifier
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363-05407 to 363-05411
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Title
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First article about the first American combat troops in Vietnam
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Description
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Original title: "Series - article three of five - part series", Keever's tittle: "U.A. Civilian Officials in Saigon Feud with Pentagon Chief over Best Use of Combat Troops", First article in a series about the first American combat troops to set foot in Vietnam, published for North American Newspaper Alliance
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AI Usage Disclosure
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Draft transcripts were automatically generated via Google Document AI and are currently under review. Please report significant errors to Archives & Special Collections at archives@unl.edu.
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Transcript
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- Page 1
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Beverly Ann Deepe
64A Hong Thap Tu
Snigon, Vietn
January 14, 1967
Series article three of five-part series
page I
SAICON--The moment the first American combat troops set foot on Vietnamese
soil two years ago, fierce in-fighting simmered within the American establishment
hore on the concept of how they should be used.
The in-fighting and conflicting directions in fact, the strategic dilonna
within the American octablishment here continued throughout 1965 and erupted
at the highest level in mid-October, 1966 with a bitter row between Ambassador
Henry Cabot Lodge and Secretary of Defense Robert S. Hollemare during his last
visit to Vietnam, before the Manila Conference.
The in-fighting persisted first as a clash of conflicting concepts within
the American military establishment-between the U.S. Army and the Marines-
then within the civilian establishment here, since many of the employees of the
American civilian agencies are either former or detached military officers.
more generally, the in-fighting here is described as military vs. civilian
DIRECTION
conflicts on the approach of the war.
But,
The simplified version of the conflict hinged on two points: the Marines
All Ance
civilian wonted a de-conventionalisation of the war on the military side and,
in somos cases, a do-Americanisation of the war on the political side, the
these
direction of the nonagonent of the war is now the reserve. Second, to curb the
hit-end hide "strategic mobility" of the Communist Viet Cong guerrille, the
Marine-civil"
0
alliance sought to control, pacify end secure the Vietnamese
population from which they believed the guerrilla gained their strongh; the U.S.
t
Army wanted to nullify the "strategic mobility" of the guerrilla with their own
tactical mobility derived from helicoptors, armored personnel carriers, and
quick-renotion artillery and jet airpower.
The conflict began when the U.S. Marinos, the first American combat
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Sories article three of five-part sorios
Pa ge
units to land in Vietnam, started to secure the populated areas around the strategic
Denong airbase, 350 miles north of Saigon.
They employed the "muclear end hold" tactics, in which American Marine
units provided a permanent outer screen around "priority" populated villages,
and then the Viotnamese pare-military units and Vietnamese civilian agencies,
backed by American civilians, would along with the Marines provide civic action
Cu
and pacification activities to or out Communist infrastructure. They assumed
their mein enemy was the Viet Cong guerrilla and political cadre which maintened
control over the villagers; their second enemy was the Viet Cong end North Vietnamese
nein force units of battalions and regiments which abounded in the non-populated
jungles.
ar
The second unit to arrive in Vietnam was the 173rd Airborne Brigade (Seperate)
which was to exemplify the U.S. Army approach to the war. The unit was first
sent to secure the jet-length airbase of Bion Hon, sipiles northeitgofrieigon,
but by July, 1965, they used Bien Hoa simply as a staging aros for "search and
destroy" operations into the Viet Cong jungled stronghold of D-Zone. The U.S.
Army approach assumed that the primary enemy was the main force units of Viet
Cong battalions and regiments--and now divisions-end that unless they were
eradicated the villages and hemlets would never maintain enough of their own
security forces to be free of Communist guerrilla hd political condre and tex
collectors.
In short, the Army approach meintained, as one Army officer explained, "If
we knock out the main force, the guerrilla will get soared and be quiet. The
wer is then a manageable problem."
The Marines said, however, "If we knock out the guerrilla that control
the population and the villages-ve 11 let the North Vietnamese stay in the
Jungle for twenty years, bomb then and hope they get molorin."
(Moro)
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Doopo
Series-article three of five-part sories
Pago 3
The Army viowod the war as more of a convention, or at best sub-
conventional conflict, with American units pitched a versus Communist
the Marines viewed the war as a counter-insurgency effort designed
units
to secure and then pacify the villagos.
Throughout the remainder of 1965 and 1966, the foud continued between
the Army and the Marinos. Onuar one occasion, for example, the feelings
become no bittor that an American Army colonel refused to allow a
Morine officer brief Secretary Me of Defense Robert MoNamara (an Anry
Army general over-ruled the colonel.. The Army is largely in charge of
the joint (that is, inter-service) Military Assistance Command, responsible
for running the whole American side of the military war within South Vietnam,
hilo the Marines are responsible for the five northern provinces known
as I Corps, bordering Laos and the domilitarized zone on the 17th parallel.
By October, 1966--as battle plans were being drawn up for 1967-tho
American military staff planners realized that the Army concept had largely
failed--for while they had killed, captured and wounded tons of thousands
of Communists, the Communist strength continued to mushroom both from
the invisible invasion from North Vietnam as well as from local recruitment
from the village population which the Communists largely controlled.
(More)
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Doope
Sortes article threo of five-article corios
Pago 4
Convorsoly, however, the Marines also had failed to achieve any
first because during the Buddhist crisis in their
ronarkable successk
success,
tactical area in the spring of 1966, the entiro Vietnamese military
organisation and administration had virtually caved in with the removal
of Vietnamese corps commander, General Nguyon Chanh Thi (whom the Marines
liked and respected immensely, but neither the Amorican Army nor civilians
id did). Second, however, the Communists had moved elements of two
divisions along the demilitarized zone by July and threatened to over-run
the northernmost province of Quang Tri.
ordered more than a division of U.
The U. S. joint command in Saigon
Marines to the D--though the
Mora Marines did not think the Communist threat was that severe--and as a
consequence the villages that the Marines had been protecting outside of
Danang more spread too thin to maintain adequate security.
By 1966, the American civilian agencies waxx became moro
vocal and, unknowingly, adopted the American Marine viewpoint and formed a ±
the American civilian
loose conceal alliance with them. During 1965,
agencies like the Vietnamese governmont and armed forces-ore largoly
on the defensive, watching with astonishmont the American military build-up
and attempting to soften the adverse political-coonomio-social
ropercussions of the upheaval-such as the inflation and housing of the
American troops in the cities.
(More)
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cope
sorios artiolo throo of five-artiolo norios
Page 5
In February, 1966, President on Lyndon Johnson drenatically called
the Honolulu Conforanco with londors of the South Vietnamese government to
launch the "other war," ossontially the war of pacification and ooonomio
bottormont for the countryside,
under a plan already worked out by Conoral
Nguyen Due Thang, minister of rural reconstruction. The historic announcemonts,
however, voro coon forgotton so the urban population in the northorn provinces
not only
oparked an upricing which mad nearly toppled the pro-American government of
ignited
Prime Minister Bouyon Cao Ky, but also stred the open mutiny of como of the
Vietnamese asmod forcon against their own covorment.
By Cotobar of 1966, with the Monile Conference in the offing,
Bofonso Robert flomara arrived in Saigon and the result was the most
Significant if not
Secretary
16loft confrontation to date between the Army-arine end the oivilian-military
conflict. Lodgo mas the exponent of the civilian-orine allianoo; ho, bolioving
the most congorous Communist threat comes from the guerrilla and political ondro,
ented a mim nadmum number of American troops deployed to cooure the villagos
from which the Ccomunist infrastructure would be rifted. McNamara and the Amorican
military londozo wanted the American combat unite to be employed in a more
offensive rolo against the Communist "hord-hat" min-foroo units, mostly in the
como of the 90 Command et base areas such as the jungles of Zone C and D north of
# Saigon.
Beliable couroos horo report that the discussion between Lodgo and Mollomara
roached bestod proportiones at one time, according to these sources, Lodge
rofucod to anotor three telophone onllo from Hoon Mollanora. Mollamara loft
saigon earlier then coheduled, concollod on airport nows conference, and "in
gonoral ho loft in a huff and is still in a huff," thone sources report.
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Date
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1967, Jan. 14
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Subject
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Vietnam War, 1961-1975; United States. Army; Soldiers; Deployment (Strategy)
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Location
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Saigon, South Vietnam
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Coordinates
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10.8231; 106.6311
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Size
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20 x 26 cm
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Container
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B188, F6
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Format
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dispatches
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Collection Number
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MS 363
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Collection Title
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Beverly Deepe Keever, Journalism Papers
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Creator
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Keever, Beverly Deepe
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Copyright Information
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These images are for educational use only. To inquire about usage or publication, please contact Archives & Special Collections.
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Publisher
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Archives & Special Collections, University of Nebraska-Lincoln Libraries
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Language
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English
