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derivative filename/jpeg
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363-05412 to 363-05417.pdf
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Digital Object Identifier
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363-05412 to 363-05417
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Title
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Second article about the first American combat troops in Vietnam
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Description
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Original title: "Series - article four of five - part series", Keever's tittle: "U.S. Civilian Officials in Saigon Feud with Pentagon Chief over Best Use of Combat Troops," Second article in a series about the first American combat troops to set foot in Vietnam, published for North American Newspaper Alliance
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AI Usage Disclosure
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Draft transcripts were automatically generated via Google Document AI and are currently under review. Please report significant errors to Archives & Special Collections at archives@unl.edu.
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Transcript
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Boverly Ann Deepe
64A Hong Thap Tu
Saigon, Vietn
January 14) 1967
Sorico article four of five-article series
Pago I
Saigon-The 1967 American-South Vietnamese battle strategy for running the
wer in Victnam calls for more of the same, except for re-emphasis on the ground
instead of political speeches--on the revolutionary development progren,
rov,, dov, as American colonelo call it.
or
The Revolutionery Development progreny the attempt to pacify the rural
population in seleted target areas-is clearly one of the chief berometers of
progress in the current phase of the Vietnam wer; the degree of progrens or
non-progress may well determine the omucial assessment of whether Amoriory and
hor allies can win the war and save South Vietnam from Communist control.
American officials here, speaking in private, concede that the Revolutionary
Development progren will determine American foreign policy within the next six
months and hence probly the future of South Est asia and potentially future
Durovably
insurrections in other under-developed countries. Those officials argue that
if the American-allied forces fail to make substantial progress in the
Rovalutionary Development program, American policy will fail in Vietnam. However
the reverse is not necessarily true, these sources say. If the Revolutionary
Succeeds
Development program superfectly, the country and the war could still
bo lost because the Communists have broadened their base of support in the
urban centers, which are becoming festering sores of anti-Anoricenion.
The mood of uncertainty, if not pessimism, within circles of Americans
fact
here results from the
that the Revolutionary Development is program has
failed to make any progress since it was launched in a spectuouler manner
at the Honolulu Conference attended by President Lyndon Johson and Prime
Minister Nguyen Cao Ky a year ago the month.
The nemo of Revolutionary Development is itself a Madison Avenue-ion a 1r
Vietnam and was born at the Honolulu Conference..
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Despe
Seriosrticle four of five-article series
Page 2
are
The words Revolutionary Development on
BUT
the soft-sel
he soft-self
English translation for
Jessy image purposes from ma the Vietnamese words of "Xay Dung Nong Thon"
which means literally, "rural building officials here are miffel t
that for Vietnamese consumption, t
the world meanier "revolution" are edited out of
Vietnamese government spectacles.
Despite it's jazzy name useful for foreign press reports, the Rev Dev
program is old in concept tactics and techniques; experts on pecification report.
Some of these sources the program is not only currently failing but is
impossible to succed in the future.
"The 1967 Rev Dev program is simply the resurrection of the old strategic
hamlet program launched in 1962 by American advisors and the Vietnamese
government then headed by President Ngo Dinh Diem," one Vietnamese politicion
explained. "The program failed then and it is even more certain to fail again
unless radical changes are made." These sources point out that there are now
far more odds against the program then there were in 1962, first because at
that time the Communist controlled little of the rural tonerity territory or
the population--and now they control substantial numbers--and second because the
government of President Ngo Dinh Diem had disciplined political administrative
and military chers of Command. Now the administrativo-political structure
under Prime Minister Ngyuon Cao Ky for purposes of governing is virtually
termited away with Communist subversion, corruption among government employes
and general lack of leadership.
0
Countryside,
Of the 12,000 hamlets in the Vietnamese counteyside, 5,000-on paper for
public consumption--are considered by the Vietnamese government to be under
government control. Privately, these well informed sources say that the Vietnamese
government concedes it controls only slightly more then 1000 of the 12,000
hamlets in the country. According to the Revolutionary Development plan American
troops are to launch offensive operations, which will provide an outer screen
security for the four high-priority target areas in the countryside in the
first phase called clearing. (m(MORE)
oft
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Doope
Series-article four of fivo-article series
Page 3
Then Vietnamese army and para-military troops will systematically
attempt to protect these selected villages in the second phase of the program
called securing.
Then in the third phase called nation-building, 500 pacification teams
each team will attempt
of 59 mon each will be sent to these selected hamlets;
to pacify two hamlets a year during 1967, raping by raising by at least another
1000 the to total number of hamlets under government control. By The
59-man teams are broken down into six kinds of cadre, each to perform different
roal new life hamlet
functions. They ares people's self-defense teams,
cadre, new-society-building cadre in charge of self-help projects such as
building sh schools and bridges, rural political cadre, civic action teams
and armod propaganda teams.
sinster
In addition to the 59-man teams, there is also a rather
which are inconspicuously linked to the
bunch of "census grevance takers",
American Central Intelligence Agency. They travel the country logging
who's
complaints and trying to keep track of who's who in the Viet Cong, won's on
the Saigon side and who's sitting on the fence.
Consus ei grievance workers must fill out nineteen forms each day so
that American-supplied computers can digest how many z pigs are in an area,
much food is in the market and so on.
a rod one for
Each census grievance cadre also has two penois pencils,
coloring Viet Cong areas on his village map and a green one for in-botteen
and wavoring
areas.
Friendly areas are left uncolored.
how
(More)
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Deepe
Series article four of five-article series
Page 4
Besides the Revolutionary Development program, the over-all military
strategy for 1967 calls for continuous, intensive and systematic tactical
operations rather than the rakhemm random reaction-type operations which have
occured since the arrival of American units here in March, 1965. The highlights
of this more-of-the-same policy are:
1. An all-out effort to annhiliate or noutralize roughly a dozon
clusters of the ninety Communist military base areas in South Vietnam.
The tactical implementation calls for the harshost, most destructive non-
nuclear means seen to date in the war. American air, artillery and naval
gunfire will be called on more than eve to ever to pulverize small portions
of these selected targets. Other means include digging up Communist tunnel
complexes with special engineering equipment and explosives, sprking
sprinkling non-lethal tear gas in these selected areas, defoliation of large
tracts of Communist-held jungle wastoland, dostruction by aerial spraying
of rice mixundenmanku crops grown by Communist or pro-Communist elements,
blowing up important salt beds, rooting up sections of the Communist-hold
Jungles with special plows and ingat significant resettlemont of the
rural population now living in the Communist-held base areas.
"In small selected areas, we want to take the jungle, the rice and the
people away from the Communists," one source explainod.
2. While destroying Communist base areas on a priority basis, other
"search and destroy" operation-in a slight shift of emphasis since 1966-
will be fa confined to military priority areas which directly support and
for
provide security of the Revolutionary Development program.
(More)
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Doopo
Series articlo four of five-article series
Page 5
More American ground operations are to serve as follow-ups of B-52
Strategic Air Command raids and artillery bombardments rh rather thn
than sgel solely strike forces of ground-power.
3. An o across-the-board intensification of attempts to seal off
both the ground and sea routes of infiltration into South Vietnam.
4. Far greater emphasis on psychological warfare techniques- leaflets,
radio broadcasts, personal appeals--to casot cause the Communist troops to
defect to the Vietnamese government aide or to desert their own units.
not only
5. Far greater intensification of intelligence-gathering,
for day-to-day tactical military and political information within South
Vietnam, but also strategic information on over-all Communist plans, such
es attempting to ascertain theso questions will the Communist Chinose
directly intervene in the Vietnam conflict, either with ground forces in South
Vietnam or other parts of South East Asia, or in the air either to fight
to Launch
American bombers over North Vietnam or launching their own retaliatory
air-raids against strategic American airbases, such as at Danang or in
Thailand? Will a dissident, neutralist or pro-Communist group attempt to
el ther through a
seize power in
coup d'etat or political insurrections?
(More)
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Deepe
Sories article four of five-article serios
Page 6
Concurrently, political attempts are in the offing to strongthen
the sai gon regime at the central-government level, the begiming being the
drafting of a constitution and the re-birth of a popularly-elected
oxecutive and legislative brao branches of government which would provide
a legal and representative basis not simply for the governmont a but also
possibly for the American premi presence in South Vietnam. This process at the
central government level is not considered a solution to Vietnam's political
problems, but is simply the first of a long, painstaking series of stops
necessary to build a cohesive body politic on the non-Communist side within
the South, political sources report.
Some Western political sources believe that it is already too late to
re-knit a poli non-Communist political fabric strong enough to withstand
the ever-expanding Communist subversion of the cities, the government, the
police, schools and nationalist political and social organizations.
"The question is not whether the Communists think they can win
South Vietnam politically," one high-ranking Western source explained.
"The
question is whether they believe they have already won it. Maybe they have."
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Date
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1967, Jan. 14
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Subject
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Vietnam War, 1961-1975; United States. Army; Soldiers; Deployment (Strategy)
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Location
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Saigon, South Vietnam
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Coordinates
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10.8231; 106.6311
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Size
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20 x 26 cm
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Container
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B188, F6
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Format
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dispatches
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Collection Number
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MS 363
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Collection Title
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Beverly Deepe Keever, Journalism Papers
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Creator
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Keever, Beverly Deepe
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Copyright Information
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These images are for educational use only. To inquire about usage or publication, please contact Archives & Special Collections.
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Publisher
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Archives & Special Collections, University of Nebraska-Lincoln Libraries
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Language
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English
