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derivative filename/jpeg
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363-01594 to 363-01615.pdf
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Digital Object Identifier
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363-01594 to 363-01615
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Title
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Article draft on optimism of US Generals
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Description
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Original caption: "This is the first of a series on the two totally divergent views of the state of the military war in Vietnam. This article explains why General William C. Westmoreland's command here is optimistic on the Allied side. The second article delineates why the Communist side is equally optimistic." Article draft by Keever about optimism of the US Generals
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AI Usage Disclosure
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Draft transcripts were automatically generated via Google Document AI and are currently under review. Please report significant errors to Archives & Special Collections at archives@unl.edu.
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Transcript
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SAIRAD
PROREUTER TOKYO
MILITARY 1 (Normass/Deepe)
Mil.
Strategy
67.
(This is the first of a series on the two totally
divorgont views of the state of the military war in Vietnam. This
article explains why General William C. Westmoreland's commend i
here is optomistic on the Allied side. The second article delineates
why the Communist side is equally optomistic).
SAICON, December 7-The top optimism of
Conorel William C. Westmoreland and his top subordinates here
on the progrons of Vietnam's military war is based on simple
aritmetio n arithmetic and a teensy bit of miracle-mongering.
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BAIRAD
PRORSUTER TOEYO
MILITARY 2 (Normans/Deepe)
is robegebot
This optomiem, vieidd unveiled at length officially,
almost exclusively to the so-called
This is largely the American sphere of the var
versus the North Vietnamese "invasica" forces. This spectacular
confrontations botyoon Aterioen end Noz Vietnamese unito--sometimes
their divinions es nose-to-noso-is incxcoringly
assuming a conventionslised,
Kozen-styled chracter;
it excludes the volcanic armod military insurgency 1 beneath
the surface.
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SAIRAD
PROREUTER TOKYO
MILITARY 3 (Normass/Deepo)
The mathematical oxcroises performed by the Amoricon
HAVE
officialdom here been refined to a quasi-sophisticated science
defined by scores of statisticians, human calculators and rather
tempermental computers (which in are influenced by monsoon
rains and saigon's erratio electricity).
The arithmetic of General Westmoreland's command
runs something like this: a significant proportion of the North
Vietnamono regular army is tied down in their home country by the
threat of an American invasion and by their duties of keeping
open the heavily-bombed z logistical lines of communication.
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SAIRAD
PROREUTER TOKYO
MILITARY 4 (Normass/Deepe)
Add to this a sizeable chunk of the North's invasion forces
which has been or will be "ground down" in the South Vietnam.
Subtract the sum of these two from the total North Vietnamese
regular army strength. The remainder indicates that North Vietnem can
funnel into the South the same quantity it has already committed there
in the past three years.
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SAIRAD
PROREUTER TOKYO
MILITARY 5 (Normass/Deepe)
In short, the allies have wipedant nearly half the North
Vietnamese regular army not fied down in the North, and the second
half yet to be committed the American command believes, can be eradicated
within the next year or so. Then a phased subtraction of American combat
troops can begin.
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SAIRAD
PROREUTER TOKYO
MILITARY 6 (Nommass/Doope)
(To outsiders, this mathematical exercise appears to be
an algebraic equation of unknown. But for the military commend, the
arithmetic Bigubbanused are known estimates. These estimates, which
are overall North Vietnamese order of battle, are classified. In
the early 1960s, however, the regular army strength of North Vietnam
was officially listed as 400,000 men-roughly 2,5 repent two decimal
five percent of its total population. Since the bombing of North
Vietnam bogen in 1965, the Hanoi regine has called up its reserve
unite to augment its regulars. It has also dramatically increased its
village militis.
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SAIRAD
PROREUTER TOKYO
MILITARY 7 (Normass/Deepo)
(The American military command recently estimated
the tornim main force Communist main forces in the South totallod
more than half
118,000, of which thengz
y were of North Vietnamese
origin. This estimate remain of 118,000 regular forces is
a reduction from the 127,000-man peak in September of last year).
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SAIRAD
PROREUTER TOKYO
MILITARY 8 (Normass/Deepe)
600,000-MA
The subtract-out of American combat troops, however,
requires a complete transformation, if not a re-birth, of the
Vietnamese armed forces to fill the resulting power vacuum.
Knowledgeable sources, both American and Vietnamese, regard this
as zx demanding something close to a mini-miracle. These sources
believe the Vietnamese armed forces can still be re-organised, But
having heard such inflated promises and seen such meagre
performances in the past, they have adopted a cynical wi
wait-and-see attitude.
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SIIRAD
PROREUTER TOKYO
MILITARY 9 (Normass/Deepe)
Indeed, the tantalizing question here is not so much whether
this transformation will occur, but whether the Amorioen troops will be
phased-out even if it does not. This school of speculation, discussed
by officials in hushed tones, suggests that the phase-out of American
troops, having virtually defeated the Communist main forces, would be
have garnered a rather glorious military victory, if the Saigon
government was still unprepared for the phase-out, it would be left to
its own if it meant the possibility of a Communist victory in the insurgency.
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SAIRAD
PROREUTER TOKYO
MILITARY 10 (Normass/Deepe)
Those
American military sources said the Communists are
implementing a "border strategy" by building three big-unit
concentratione hugging the frontiers of South Vietnam.
sources believe the pattern of the main-force war has bounced,
like a hectic pinball machine, from one of these pivot arese
to the next--and that the American forces have masterfully won
each of these campaigns. They believe the main big-unit mar
will continue in the coming months to gyrate between these three
key expass the dominand demilitarized zone on the north,
the three-border frontier where Laos, Cambodia and South Vietnam
Join and the Communists' war-sone complexes running.astrord
North
Tayninh province and the Cambodian border.
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SAIRAD
PROREUTER TORTO
MILITARY I (Normass/Deepe)
"These three main pressure concentrations will continue
CRIAL
to be important in the future," one
officer explained.
American military
"The Communists are going to try to koop
their main-forces alive, to koop using them as a throat, but
close enough to his border sanou sanctuaries where fie con pump
them up, re-equip and feed them. They will fight
from these border concentrations, but they'll try to reduce their
casualties."
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SAIRAD
PROREUTER TOKYO
MILITARY 12 (Normass/Deepo)
A rundown on these throe
a critical hotspots
follows!
The DIZ. This is still the Communists' most significant
and serious military throat in the eyes of American military officials.
The Communists now maintain two divisions in and around the demilitarised
from Con Thion to Leas
sono
and has roads into the area over which he readily moved, despite
round-the-clock
American bombing, a wide array of artillery and rockets.
The
DZ campaign, recently quiet as the battle grounds me pivoted to
Loc Ninh and Dak To, is now beginning to flare up again. Recent
reports indicate Con Thien is receiving more than 100 rounds of
artillery and rocket-fire daily. This is still far below the peak
during September when 600 to 1000 rounds daily was sprayed along the
N
Con Thien area. The Americans countered then with 6000 rounds of
heavy artillery, more than eighty per cent of the B-52 strategio
airstrikes and more than one ho 100 rmmin fighter-bomber tactical
airstrikes daily.
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SAIRAD
PROREUPER TOKYO
MILITARY 13 (Normass/Deepe)
This heavy firepower, plus unseasonably bad flooding
along Communist supply lines, quieted the area in october until
December, but evidence now suggests the Communist forces are again
building up their unite and ammunition stookpiles. This is one of
the pivotal reasons American military sources are so edemantly and
public blly against an extended bombing pause during the bupcoming
holiday season.
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SAIRAD
PROREUTER TOKYO
MILITARY 14 (Normans/Doope)
American sources said the Communists have suffered
up to an estimated 10,000 killed along the demilitarized zone
during the past year, giving the American Marines a kill-ratio
of better than six to one. American military officials are
particull particularly optomistic about the results of miz
campaign, wirion began in Jatyy 1966, and are confident that the
Marines, who have remained in position along the line, vill
succeed again should the Communists & venture down through the
Beginning in July, 1966,
again.
the on-again, off-again
Z actions have constituted
the longest, bloodiest campaign of the war to dato.
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SAIRAD
PROREUTER TOKYO
MILITARY 15 (Normass/Deepo)
"If the Communists come back down anion through
the demilitarised zone, there will be heavy fighting once again,"
one military source explained. "The Marines have retained their
posture along the line to keep them out, and that will continue
to be our strategy. We have stayed south of the Ben Hai river in the
past and that also will continue to be our strategy."
The Ben Hai river is considered the dividing linnning
natural dividing feature between the northern and southorn half of
the six-mile wide demilitarized zone.
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SAIRAD
PROREUTER TOKYO
MILITARY 16 (Normass/Doope)
end most immediately explosive
Amorioen officials consider the second area of
Communist threat to conter in the Communist base areas running
through portions of Phuoc Long, Phuoc Thanh and Tayninh provi0006
a large jungled concentration containing a decade-old secret
American forces, ce quickly reinforcing this.
bases called War Zone C War Zone D and Duong Minh Chou
The
recent battle of Loo n Minh, the most ah oloan-out Amor103
Allied victory of the war, oooured in this sone.
Despite the
that Communist defeat, American sources believe
they still maintain a maximum of three divisions in that power-pocket.
Unlike the mi predoman predominantly North
Vietnamese composition of the divisions along the DUIZ, the
Communist units in the complex north of Saigon are mixed North
Vietnamese, and indigenous II Southern recruits. Some of these
Communist units are totally Vietns North Vietnamese, but Northerners
are also sprinkled through some of the predominantly Viet Cong units.
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SAIRAD
PROREUTER TOKYO
MILITARY 17 (Moamane/Deepe)
Also, significantly, the Communists have emaeced this
concentration by mucking back their regular units from the populated
constal ar008,
hich may wonkon their guerrilla and political structures
B.c
left behind. In the other red concentrations, fre frosh troope
from North Vietnam have boen introduced, which forced American
coastal
commanders to reluctantly shift from the populated areas while the
Communist mein force divisions have remained there.
R OPPesiy
The
Population
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SAIRAD
PROREUTER TOKYO
MILITARY 18 (Normass/Deepe)
The third and concentration is called the B-3
areath where the borders of South Vietnam, Loa Laos and
Cambodia join.
Despite losing an estimated 1600 troops in
three-peak-long
SHI
the bat rooont battle of Dak To, the Communists have organised
and maintained two divisions in the area. Unlike the IMS,
this area is not known to have roads leading into it and hence
the Communists have more difficulty in ref replacing combat
losses and replenishing supplies.
CHRE EM
him,"
now,
"American, forces are still posed in that area for
one source explained. "While the battle sone is quiet
we'll have to keep our eyes on it."
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SAIRAD
PROREUTER TOKYO
MILITARY 19 (Normass/Deepe)
Anido from those three potent border concentrations,
a string of inland pookets of less formidable Communist min
main force strongth unravels from the DZ southwards half
the length of the country. These inland blotches, of up to a
division in strength, lie in the Piedmont area between the populated,
The ion-io fi rice-rich coastal plains and the eastern rinos
of the É Annami to chain.
The Communists maintain these magun
en divisions
but weak divisions--to sustain and support their gude guerrilla network
and political infrastructure as they attempt to rock the government's
pacification program. @thom West of the old imperial capital
of Hue, the northernmost pocket of several regimente forms a base
in the rear of the American Marine bases stretching along the
DEZ. During the summer months, American Marines we ongegod in
several sharp, company-sized engagements with these Communist unite
but lately the pocket has been quiescent.
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SAIRAD
PROREUTER TOKYO
MILITARY 20 (Normass/Deepe
Another pocket lies south of Denang where the second
North Vietnamese division has been countered by a composite
American Marine-Army division oquivalent.
Since the Communist
division arrived in April, Amorioan forces have killed more than
5000 of them, in one of the continuous, nomen sweeping operations"
that has been overshadowed by the dramatic Z campaign.
Another pocket lies in northern Binh Dinh province,
whore the U. . Army 1st Air Cavarl Cavalry Division has been
forcated
pitched against the Third North Vietnamese Division in a cories
of mff sporadic, but un-spectacular firefights. Military sources
min another pooket lice further down
the seacoast in the province of Tuy Hoa where the Fifth North
Vietnamese Division, a rather weak one, has occasionally harrasse
harrassed the Korean forces with a peculiar kind of villago fight
fighting. Mahitanya American officials believe there
are having
inland divisions, predominently North Vietnamese,
difficulty getting supplies and personell replacements.
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SAIRAD
PROREUTER TOKYO
MILITARY 21 (Normasa/Deepe)
H
HA
American oivilian officiale ngroo with General Wostmoreland's
commend that "the Communists are taking a boating," but some
question of whether the beating is hard enough to be decisive.
Some orities of the American military command Iore believe t
it hag
at times exaggerated Communist battlefield in fatalities
so as to undercut the political impact of heavy American Is longos.
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SAIRAD
PROR UTER TOKYO
MILITARY 22 (Normass/Deepe)
However optimistic mod American officials appraise
the status of the war, the Communists are also confident of their
om victory. To comprehend the different viewpoints, one's
frame of reference ijs must shift from the conventionalized
main force war to the "people's war," in which the Communists
have added looal populations as a new dimension and critical
ingredient to x military warfare. In short, if General
Festmoreland's optimism is partially based on arithmetic,
the Communists' optimism is based on trigonometry.
(Tomorrows The Communists 3-D War).
trigonometry.
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Date
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1967, Dec. 7
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Subject
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Vietnam War, 1961-1975; Psychological warfare; Strategy
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Location
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Tokyo, Japan
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Coordinates
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35.6762; 139.6503
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Size
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20 x 26 cm
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Container
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B45, F1
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Format
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dispatches
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Collection Number
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MS 363
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Collection Title
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Beverly Deepe Keever, Journalism Papers
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Creator
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Keever, Beverly Deepe
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Collector
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Keever, Beverly Deepe
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Copyright Information
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These images are for educational use only. To inquire about usage or publication, please contact Archives & Special Collections.
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Publisher
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Archives & Special Collections
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Language
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English
