Article on the Communist viewpoint

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363-01666 to 363-01681.pdf

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363-01666 to 363-01681

Title

Article on the Communist viewpoint

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Original title: "strategy." Original caption: "This is the last of a two-part series on the military situation in the Vietnam war. This article discusses the war from the Communist viewpoint." Article draft by Keever about the Communist viewpoint on the Vietnam War

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Draft transcripts were automatically generated via Google Document AI and are currently under review. Please report significant errors to Archives & Special Collections at archives@unl.edu.

Transcript

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2020 606
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strategy 1 (normess/deepe)
(This is the last of a two-part series on the military
situation in the Vietnam war. This article discusses the war from
the Communist viewpoint).
tumultous
SAIGON, AUGUST 6-A few weeks after the rampagous Communist
Tet offensive, a ver veteran journalist, who had also covered the
French Indo-China Wax,, made one of his many visits to Vietnam. Hle
shook his head à lamonted, "No one here has road Truong Ching Chinh.
"The whole Tot offensive is spelled out in his book-lightning attacks
into the cities. But.
"Ilitar militant
t of North Vietnam.
a loading role
tion and the people's
hese tactics of
led "The August
Communi
In August when
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strategy 2 (normass/deepe)
Truong Ching Chinh's writing maps out the political strategy
of Communist revolutionary warfare--but the great rhythms of military
strategy are still best defined, systematized and articulated by
Mao Tse Tung, who left on an indolible print stamp on the military thinking
of North Vietnamese strategists and tacticians.
a s other Ho Chi Minh and other Party leaders,
Truong Chính
all fled to China at
various times when suppression campaigns exiled them from Vietnam.
The name Truong Chinh is simply a Party alias which itself mez means
"The Long March."
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strategy 23 (normass/deepe)
Read together, Mao and Truong Chinh, their writings provide not
only complementary political and military components of revolutionary
warfare of a buy by-gone era-but components still applicable,
as the
ver veteran journalist indiented indicated, in providing a sense of
direction for the future. So Specifically, Mao's guerrilla warfare
principles the dynamics, movements and progressions of this
unconventiona 1 and complex kind of warfare--is still the foundation
of the Communist military policies of fighting in the South,
in general the
use of peasantry waging warfare in the countryside as a means to encircle
and finally defeat the urban centers. But, Truong Chinh's political
strategy of the August Revolution is much closer to the Russian putsch
Communist putsch of 1917, by applying the power of the urban working class
to seizure power in the streets of the cities. These two Moo-ist-
Moscow components thus seem to reflect be equal or uneta unequal parts of
the whole embodied in today's current Communist appeal in the souths
a call for the "goneral offensive and the general uprising."
#more router
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strategy 4 (normass/deepe)
This duality of stre strategic, lines in achieving victory now gives
the Communists a split-level war at this time in the Southe differentiation
between the big-unit military formations and the imperceptible, yet
omnipresent clandestine and quasi-military structures which are necessary
in igniting an uprising
As of this writing, the Communist big-unit formations--mostly
of North Vietnamese origin-are on the strategic retreats
the hidden half
of the split-level war, forming the insurgency side, are on the strategic
offensivo. The North Vietnamese have reportedly withdrawn up to possibly
as many as fifty per cent of their main-force strength from the South,
Truong
thus creating the conspicuous lull in this strata of the war.
Chinh's book does not mention strategie retreats, but Mac defines them
with clarity and prés precision. He wrote:
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strategy 5 (normass/deepe)
"A strategic retreat is a planned strategic stop taken by an inferior
force for the purpose of conserving its strength and biding its time to
defeat the enemy.... The object of strategie retreat is to conserve military
strength and prepare for the counter-6ffensive." He identifies the two
stages of revolutionary warfare as the strategio offensive and the strategio
defensive, End within the defensive is contained the two stages of the
strategic retreat and the strategio counter-offensive.
"To prepare for a counter-offensive," he continued, "we must
select or create conditions favorable to ourselves but unfavorable
to the enemy,
so as to bring about a change in the balance of forces,
before we go on to the stage of the counter-offensive....During the
stage of retreat we should in general secure at least two of the following
conditions before we can consider the situation as boing favorable to us
and unfavorable to the enemy and before we can go over the counter-offensive.
These conditions ares 1. the population actively supports the Red Army
(the most important condition, he says) 2. The terrain is favorable for
operations (the current rainy season in the South might be considered
an unfo unfavorable condition until October) 3. All the main forces of the
Red Army are concentrated 4. The enemy's weak spots have been discovered
5. The enemy has been reduced to a tired and demoralized state and 6.
The enemy has been induced to make mistakes,"
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strategy 6 (normass/deepe)
Mao's elucidation of the great military ebbs and flows of revolutionary
warfare provides an historical skeleton for the steady progression
of the war in South Vietnam. In 1960, the Viet Cong's home grown
guerrillas
Through 1963 and 1964, as the
began fighting after four years of unarmed political
subversion and agitation by Communist cadre. The guerrillas began in
1960 and continued on the strategic defensive until late 1963, when a
military cot coup d'etat by nationalist generals overthrew President
Ngo Dinh Diem and thus provided the conditions for the Communists
to shift into the strategic offensive.
Vietnamese nationalist governmental and military situation continued to
deteori deteriorate with successive coups and counter-coups, the guerrillas,
escalating into regular formations, S smashed the government's strategic
hamlet program through most parts of the countryside. By late 1964, the
guerrilla movement had escalated into Phase II their final Phase III
with positional warfare battles against elite government troops.
#=more reuter
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strategy 7 (normass/deepe)
Then came the buildup of American combat troops in 195 1965. The
relative balance of forces against shifted against the Communist guerrillas
and regulars; the Communis ts again became the "inferior force" in
relative terms of manpower and material. They again shifted to the strategic
defensive, specifically to strategic retreat. This posture of
5 strategic retreat was the period of preparing for the counter-offensive,
which was effected with a world-wide sensational impact during late January
of this year. As the veteran journalist had lamented, Truong Chinh
had articulated the counter-offensive two twenty years before with
such precision that the Communist Tet thrust this year appeared to be
simply copied from his manual. He wrote:
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strategy 8 (normass/deepe)
"Our troops concentrate rapidly an
lightning attacks on the cities and the
ennihiliate thon. In brief, we throw
country into the battle to crush the en
whole of our territory...."
Tho Tot a counter-offensive did not succeed in the totality or s
power by the use of military forces in foot, military commanders here
believe the Communists suffered a military defeat of great magnitude,
although they effectively gained some political and psychological f
advantages as byp by-products of their military defeat. Thus, the
Communists have again referted reverted to the strategic retreat-and if
Mao is appropriate accurate, in this circumstance, they are again preparing
for another counter-offensive. Some ourpho euphoric military sources believ
that the Communist military defeat at Tot was decisive and final-that they
Not
A
must de-escalate their total strategy to one of a lower-level of activity.
Seems
But, those more pertinent,,would be the historical fact that the
Communists North Vietnamese Communists launched three c 'general
counter-offensived against the French--and completely failed in each-
until they were victorious with their ge fourth counter-offensive at the
most sensitive political moment of peace negotiations.
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Truong Ching Chinh specifically forecasts the possibility of holding
negotiations while fighting, saying, " "In that case, our long resistance
will be interrupted by new talks, and that is precisely on of its characteristics.
However However as long as the French colonialists live in our country, and
we have not yet completed the third stage (of the general counter-offensive),
we cannot obtain genuine independence and unification." If applicable
currently, his words would continue to imply that since the American
TROOPS
neo-colonialists are still in Vietnam and since the Communists have
not successfully completed the general counter-offensive, they will continue
fighting for their political objectives.
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strategy 10 (normass/deepe)
(In a point of nuances of definition, both Mao and Truong Chinh
speak more of a strategic counter-offensive by the Communists than of a
strategic offensive. Mao wrote: "Whether in a counter-offensive or in
an offensivo, the principles with regard to these problems do not diffor
in their basic character. In this sense we may say that a counter-offensive
is an offensive. Still, a counter-offensive is not exactly an offensive.
The principles of the counter-offensive are applied when the onomy is on
the offensive (as that Allied troops were before the Communist thrust at Tet).
n which would make their Tot action more of a counter-offensive than
an offensive). The principles of the offensive are applied when the enemy is
on the defensive as is now the case with the Allied strategic posture.. In
this sonse, there are certain differences between a counter-offensive and
an offensive."
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strategy 11 (normans/deepe)
At this most peculiar moment in the Vietnam war, the Communist
big unit formations have retreated, some of them across the borders of
South Vietnam, the Allied Allies are on the strategic defensive
until the American elections-waiting for the Communist counter-offensive.
But, under this Communist big-unit layer of the war in their split-level
war, the Viet Cong remain on the strategic offensive, which is explained
by Mao in terms directly reflective of what is happening in Vietnam now:
When the "enemy" is on the strategic defensive adn and "we are on
the strategic offensive, at such times our operational policy is not to
attack enemy forces which are ontrenched in defensive positions and which
we are not sure of defeating, but systomatically to destroy or drive
out the small enemy units and puppet forces in certain areas, which are
our guerrilla units are strong enough to deal with, and to expand our areas,
arouse the massoss for struggle...replenish and train our troops and
organize new guerrilla units!" In
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military 12 (normass/deepe)
DEVELOPED
This lower level of the split-level war, conducted with a mixture
continuous, irregular warfare fought by local guerrillas and
is directly related to the Communist big-unit war; it serves
as the essential springboard, providing a para-military, political, economic
and george geographic foundation for the Communist big-unit formations
to cease their strategic retreat, about-face, and hurl themselves forward
into a sensational strategic offensive.
This lower echelons of low-level guerrilla warfare also provides the
line between
many-faceted base for the Communist "general uprising"--the, 15
tryin
THE
low-level guerrilla activity and armed political activity becoming relatively
obscure. The "general uprising" is now interpreted here as meaning the
seizure of power from the Vietnamese government and its affiliates into
the hands of the people, who are protected in this process of by bands
of armed insurrectionists or guerrillas. Students seize power from the school
principo principals and university administrations. The citizens seize
control of outposts, government offices, police stations, military
institutions and then the Presidential Palace and the elected legislat
VE HAIL
legislature. Hence, the Vietnamese government and its appendages is destroyed
OR OUT Anks
by a popular insurection armed insurrection in the cities, which negates
at least partially conventional military power.
==more reuter
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Currently,
the Communists are not only consolidating power in villages
under their control, but continue to fan out with precision into
the contested and government-controlled areas, including the urban centers,
to terroriso and neutralize selective pro-government officials, newspaper
offices, businessmen, to weaken the will of prò government-controlled towns
by roining in raining in harrassing fire by mortars and rockets,
over-run or reach an accommodation with government outpost militiamen,
to ova to proselytse politically Vietnamese organized units and O
to
in the countryside and senior Army officers in the cities and to fragment
Vietnamese government reservoirs of political strength and coonomic
buoyancy.
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There is overhemingly one overwhelmingly significant and conspicuous
political similarity betmoon August of 1968 and the August Truong Ching
Chinh's August Revolution of 1945. This revolves around the formation
people's liberation councils and poople's liberation committoos in the
villages and hamlets either subject to their ourront control or penetration.
Currently those
midazon are to serve as a fighting moohino and not a
puroly administrative machine as in peacetime."
The formation of these
committoos, set up through a rather re highly regulated form of election proces
were to be cap in accordance with a high-level directive issued March 5
the Communiste now boast 26 of these people's liberation committoos on
the outskirts of Saigon.
itself.
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military 15 (normass/deepe)
were effective.
Axiommon in form,
(
૧૪૮ ભારત
These committees are duplicates izmis
mission purpose, character-and name to what Truong Chinh established
before the general insurrection th August of 1945. He writes that these
committees were used first as "transitory organization forms" to gain on
enemy power and paralyze its administrative machine. These organizations
They gave the people the occasion to realize universal
suffrage and become act acquainted with administrative affairs, led them
to direct henceforth their own destiny.... In effect, after the August
General Insurrection, these different Liberation Committees became real
administrative organizations. To use People's Committees and Liberation
Committees as springboards for the direct transition to the democratic
republican regime was an extremely interesting characteristic of the
Communist tactics in the -1@pre-insurrectionary port period."
VOLVED
These sit "transitory organizations" with their "pre-governmental the
character" gave way to the provisional government and finally became that
Once they ZED Pow
OWER.
Communist government whonet
destroyed.
= =more ruot router
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militery 1 (normass/deepe)
Howeve
There is om by one oveni overwhelmingly significant and conspicuous
political difference between August of 1968 and Truong Chinh's August Revolution
of 1945. The 1945 insurrection was waged against the Japnosey Japanese,
who had been internationally defeated, but still hold weapons and power in
Vietnam. The purpose of the gonoral insurrection was s simply to seize
their weapons and their power-to preclude a return of the French colonialists.
Currently, the Allies are in the strongest defensive postion position to
date in the war and
Honce,
der general uprising would only moan wanton massacre.
the dual nature of the current Communist appeal for ort
"general offensive and general uprising" or else the total morgor of those
two into by convorsing of their main-force and local force unite into
Would
armed insurrections insurrectionists in the oito cities, & moans
of out-flanking the Allied military power machine while enacting, 0.0
Truong Chinh did in 1945, "the general form of struggle of the axmed
demonstration,"
The Allied war machine here 48 fully clerted to the predicted Communist
general offensive, but they find approaching as well what yo Tryong
Chinh described as the "soro hour of insurrection."
(Hanks This is all I'm definitely planning to filo this week. However,
I've requested to see the foreign minister and that might como through this
week. I'm also attempting to wrapup a political situationor on the Huong
governmont, but I doubt that if finished by weekend. Regards Bev).
#ond reuter

Date

1967, Aug. 6

Subject

Vietnam War, 1961-1975; Soldiers; Psychological warfare; Military morale; Strategy; Mặt trận dân tộc giải phóng miền nam Việt Nam

Location

Saigon, South Vietnam

Coordinates

10.8231; 106.6297

Size

20 x 26 cm

Container

B66, F4

Format

dispatches

Collection Number

MS 363

Collection Title

Beverly Deepe Keever, Journalism Papers

Creator

Keever, Beverly Deepe

Collector

Keever, Beverly Deepe

Copyright Information

These images are for educational use only. To inquire about usage or publication, please contact Archives & Special Collections.

Publisher

Archives & Special Collections

Language

English