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derivative filename/jpeg
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363-01652 to 363-01662 and 363-01665.pdf
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Digital Object Identifier
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363-01652 to 363-01662 and 363-01665
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Title
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Article on US military views on the Vietnam War
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Description
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Original title: "strategy." Original caption: "This is the first of a two-part series on the military situation in the Vietnam war. This article discusses the Allied posture; the second discusses the war from the Communist viewpoint." Article draft by Keever about US military strategy and views on the Vietnam War
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AI Usage Disclosure
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Draft transcripts were automatically generated via Google Document AI and are currently under review. Please report significant errors to Archives & Special Collections at archives@unl.edu.
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Transcript
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military 1 (normass/deepe)
Strate 94.
(This is the first of a two-part series on the military situation in the
This article discusses the Allied posture; the second discusses
the Communist viewpoint).
Vietnam war.
the war from
SAIGON,
AUGUST 5-The Vietnam war, which has dangled relatively
motionless and indecisively since mid-June, is begin being breathlessly watched
here for a violent, strategic shift of direction or escalation of intensity.
Currently, the Allied side of the military conflict has become frozen
into a posture of the strategic defensive. It is a non-static and vigorious
defensive posture with the relative balance of pure military power clearly on its
side.
On the other side of the war, the Communists continue to unroll their
ownu unique split-level war-but at extravagantly varying speeds. The Communists'
main-force war, which had previously unveiled the spectacular violence of the
conflict, has flipflopped from a posture of the strategic-counteroffensive
STANCE,
into a mover
of e strategic retreat. Informed sources
here report up to possibly fifty per cent of the North Vietnamese units, the backbone
of the Communist big-unit war, have been withdrawn out of South Vietnam, into
their traditional sanctuaries across the borders.
--more reuter
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military 2 (normass/doope)
Thus, the big-unit war has shifted into a peculiar monent without
precedent since the American build-up of forces began in 1965--neither
the Communists nor the Allies are on the strategic offensive. No one
here is certain long 2 how long his military aborration will continuo,,
although President Lyndon Johnson last week predicted a new Communist
offensive.
However, the bottom portion of the Communists*
war appears to continue
split-lovel
the strategie offensive. This portion
of the Communist war, sometimes called the insurgency side of the struggle,
has consistently boon moving forward with an imperceptible, if not
invisible, mixture of continuous, low-level irregular warfare fought by
local guerrillas and heavy doses of socio-economic, political action and
intense propaganda.
D.
#nore routor
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The Allied military posture took a gigantic swerve from the strategic
offensive to the strategic defensive in late January this year in reaction to the
Communists' country-wide, momentary thrust into the cities. Since then,
the Allied strategy has simply been a matter of shaking down and settling into
this anchoring position of reaction-of waiting for the next Communist thrust.
The evacuation of the Marine combat base at Khe Sanh was not this spring was
not so much a change of Allied strategy, but only a fragment of the broad sweep of
this this evolving strategy, The Allied posture is currently frozen into this
pattern, which is expected here to continue at least through the American
p Presidential elections in November, and perhaps even through the end of 1968.
"The orders to General (Creighton) Abrams are clear," one informed
source explained bluntly. "Don't let the Reds pull off anything be big before the
American election."
--more reuter
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The current Allied situation was summed up by one knowledgeable military
source: "The Allies are in a position in which the only action they can
effectively undertake is reaction. The Allied reaction is good; the Allied
initiative is non-existent."
The Allied strategic defensive--an active defensive--has meant a significant
geographic re-deployment of Allied, mostly American, companies and battalions
from the remote border areas of South Vietnam--where the offensive objective had
been to destroy the Communist main-force--to the populated areas where the defensive
objective is to destroy the Communists once they assault.
more reuter
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There are, however, two exceptions to this urban-centered troop deployments:
the first exception is along the de demilitarized zone, where the Third Marine
Division (reinforced) is based horizontally along the border with North Vietnam;
the second excrp exception is a vertical deployment along the western Cambodian-
Laotian fronter, where for two years the U. .S. Army 4th Infantry Division
has attempted to act as an "anti-invasion" blocking force. Both of these
two long-term deployments have, however, been essentially defensive--and the most
static of the dfe defensive-since any forward offensive move would have
meant military militarily crossing into Laos, Cambodia or North Vietnam, which
was politically prohibited by Allied policymakers (except for small-scale
clandestine operations across into these countries).
--more reuter
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The most clear outt evidence of this strategic sommersault is
witnessed around Saigon, where the equivalent of my more than
eight Allied divisions are committed to the capital and the broad complex
40
of military installations surrounding it. More than half of the
American combat battalions in Vietnam are committed directly or indirectly
to the defenso of Saigon and its periphery.
Two-thirds of the Vietnamese
strategic reserve-ten airborne and Marine battalions are now committed
inside the Saigon city limits or its suburbs. A year ago, these Allied
units were sweeping the remote jungled at Communist stronghold areas
alohetho noar Vietnam's border frontiers.
The defense of Saigon is based on troop deployments in three concentric,
although ingles circular rings. The first ring rungs from the Saigon
city limits and extends outwards roughly six milos-which is the range of
Na
Communist rockets. Roughly 25 per cent of the Allied troop strength
defending Saigon is concentrated in this layer of territorial defonso.
Beyond this rung, ranging from nine to two twelve miles outward, lies the
heaviest concentration of Allied troops-five American brigades,
one A
Australian t
task force, one Thai regiment, and seven
reiments of Vietnamese regulars, all backed up by armor, artillery, small
naval craft, helicopters and paramilitary units. This second reing contains
roughly fifty per cont of those Allied troops engaged in defending saigon.
##0020 routor
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Beyond this,, stretching towards the Cambodian border on the west
and the South China Sea on the east, is committed a thinner grouping of
troops three light American brigades and two Vietnamese regiments. In
where American divisions once
these remote, thinly populated areas,
there is a pronounced
to
swept through the Communist-infested bases,
shift to smaller unit patrols. Their objective is not engage the Communist
units as before-but simply to find the Communists and them call in Allied
a irstrikes and artillery barrages on them.
Not long ago,
a senior Vietnamese officer was asen astonished to
see an American map showing the Allied troop units around Saigon.
Allied unit wasey symbolized on the map with a thumbtack. "It will be
impossil impossible to move more troops around Saigon," he mused.
don't have enough room on the maps for more thumbtacks."
Each
"We
==more reuter
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5050 886
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military 8 (normass/deepe)
One knowledgeable military analysist explained that before the
Communist Tot upheaval, General (William C.) Westmoreland (former American
commander) had placed the Allies on the strategio offensive. After
Tet, General Westmoreland pulled the Allied to ops book twoards the urban
This was not a strategic
cene centers and off the jungle operations.
He HAD
decision chose to make; it was a strategic necessity imposed upon him by the
Communists.
"Since Abrams took over the Westmoreland," ht the source explain d
"he has not made any substantive changes in strategy; he has oh only
formalised and finalised those changes that the Communists forced
Westmoreland to inks initiate."
4
more router
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"Aside from this, what Abrams thinks and says he is doing is not
being reflected on the ground. For example, he has given the order
to stop search-and-destroy operations. The field commanders are not
flagrantly and deliberately disobeying this. But, in some cases, they
are still conducting search-and-destroy operations, but on a smaller
scale and calling them different names.
In other cases, the field
commanders are not conducting search and destroy operations; but they are
not conducting clear-and-hold operations either. They're somewhere in
between both of these."
redeploymen
However, this geographic r e-drifting of Allied troops has
produced some opinion optimism in those military circles that formerly
criticized General Westmoreland's over-emphasis on fighting the Commwrists
searching for the Communist big-units along the frontiers. Specifically,
Westmoreland was criticized for his ratio of having two American
battalions comited committed to fighting Communist big-unit formations versus
only one American battalion committed to securing of populated areas.
"Now,
interestingly and by accident, Abrams has inherited a reversal
of that ratio," the source continued. "There are now two American battalions
for EVERY
fighting in the populated areas versus one fighting the main-force war. The
Allies have now been forced to bring their troops back to the urban centers-
the emphasis which Westmoreland should have had originally."
==more reuter
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Now, General Abrams has been locked into this defensive
strategy around the populated centers by the time blockade
of the American elections and the threat of a future Communist
offensive. Furthermore, he is being forced to de-emphasize
again the big-unit offensive sweeps because of another
important, but little-noticed development. These sources
believe this occurred when Abrams took over command from
Westmoreland.
more reuter
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"Then, I suppose that President Johnson told Abrams he
could not have any more American troops," one military
source exo explained. "At this stage, neither Johnson
nor Abrams understood the implications of this. But, the
implications in Vietnam were plain. Never before did the As
Americans have a strategic reserve inside Vietnam--because
they never needed it. If more American troops were urgently
needed, they were either in the pipeline or out-of-country
ready to be shipped in. A strategic reserve should be
roughly 25 per cent of theform deployable forces.
"Now, Abrams, if he is to have a strategic reserve,
must
subtract these troops from his existing deployment
in Vietnam, and this must come from his American forces fightin
the main-force war. Thus, Abrams is being forced to reshape
the Allied strategy even more-and he is being forced to re-
BY
shape it only one way--bat de-emphast de-emphasizing once
His other battalions in the
again the main-force war.
populated areas have established the military posture suitable
for gasification of the rural areas--although pacification itself
is weak weak.
"He Concluded. This CAANGE
"That's where stand now! \s will be intellectually
and professionally resisted by Abrams and the American military
command--but it is inevitable."
--end reuter
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Hence,
But,
while the massive Am Allied war machine is pro in the defensivel
posture of securing the urban centers against a large-scale assault by Communist
big-unit formations. But, it is not yet geared towards providing the samll
rural villages are not being secured from within against the Communist political
infrastrucutre and guerrill irregular guerrillas existing in those hamlets.
taks
This
task positive task of res establishing Vietnamese government authority
and somehow controlling or winning support from the peastry is essentially
the task of the GMN's pacification, or rural development program.
this pacification program has failed to establish any strategic momentum--and there
is no evidence it will do so in the foreseable future.
Thus far,
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Date
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1967, Aug. 5
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Subject
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Vietnam War, 1961-1975; Soldiers; Psychological warfare; Military morale
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Location
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Saigon, South Vietnam
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Coordinates
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10.8231; 106.6297
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Size
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20 x 26 cm
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Container
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B66, F4
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Format
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dispatches
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Collection Number
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MS 363
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Collection Title
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Beverly Deepe Keever, Journalism Papers
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Creator
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Keever, Beverly Deepe
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Collector
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Keever, Beverly Deepe
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Copyright Information
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These images are for educational use only. To inquire about usage or publication, please contact Archives & Special Collections.
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Publisher
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Archives & Special Collections
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Language
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English
