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derivative filename/jpeg
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363-06361 to 363-06369.pdf
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Digital Object Identifier
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363-06361 to 363-06369
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Title
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Article about the political impact of the Vietnam War on America
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Description
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Original title: "politics", Article draft about the Vietnam War's effects on American politics, for the Christian Science Monitor
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AI Usage Disclosure
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Draft transcripts were automatically generated via Google Document AI and are currently under review. Please report significant errors to Archives & Special Collections at archives@unl.edu.
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Transcript
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2030 526
politics 1 (normass/deepe)
LBJ-
Sturting
SAIGON, AUGUST 2-More than ever before, the politics of the
Vietnam war has overshadowed the war itself.
President Lyndon Johnson's tough-line political appraisal of the
battlefield situation here indicates ho made a very crucial choice
in selecting some facts to reveal a publicly at his impromptu press
conference earlier this week, while simultaneously covoring up equally
significant and substantive evidence.
His public statement that thoro is evidence Hanoi is making
massive preparations for a new offensive in the South-undoubtedly true-
obscures the equally significant current siu situation that Hanoi, as of
late July, had withdrawn from South Vietnam a "large proportion"
of its North Vietnamese main force unite-poossibly up to fifty per cent
of its big-unit formations. This military do-ecoalation-which
produced the July lull in the big-unit waris openly discussed here in
official, private and diplomatic circles. The July lull & as apparent
as crystal-balling preparations for an August offensive.
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2080 508
Jy nnm
polition 2 (normass/deepe)
The President's sharp warning that the Americans might take
"additional military measures 11 measures" if such a new offensive
is launched is simply the countorpoint to an equally rol option of his
ma king concessions to Hanoi in return for the July lull-an option he
chose to discard at this time.
The President's statement that North Vietnamese infiltrators
are flowing into South Vietnam at a record level of 300 30,000 men
In
in July fusses over the battlefield situation that Alliod units have been
unable to to find them. At an unprecedented rate in the war, Allied
forces are launching mall-unit patrols, long-range patrols and reconnaissance
operations to find theso big-unit formations-but without success.
the two nor thermost northernmost provinces along the demilitarized
sone, for example, four Allied divisions/are literally scouring
the Jungles and 1 valleyes to find either old North Vietnamese units or
APPRESLE
new arrivals--but without er contact.
to guloxe
Senior commanders there evo
have told reporters they believe several of the North Vietnamese divisions
have withdrawn across the demarcation line.
Que beis bacio difference
is that a southward flow of 30,000 mon from North Vie Vietnam
information probably based on aerial reconnassainoe--is quite different
from confirming their presence of those non in the South
by ground
broops the presence of these infiltrators in the South, as distinct from
La os or Cambodia.
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politics 3 (normass/doope)
From this rono to vantage point, it appears the President has
stiffened his demands for peace at the Paris conforance table.
The
press reports received here indicates that Washington officials have not
publicly denied that Hanoi has withdrawn some troops and de-escalated
FIND STATEME
the waze
But, Washington has ro-defined) its demando for do-escalation,
or "serious restraint"
on the part of Hanoi in return for stopping the
bombing over North Vietnam.
One key remark open to this interpretation hore was made thio
week by Secretary of State Dean Rusk when he told a news conference
that what is important is "not what happened yesterday but what will
happen tomorrow, next week, next month." In short, Borious
restraint by Hanoi is not se-moli's current de-escalation of the
battlefield war,
but assurance of not future re-escalation as well.
Simply
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politics 4 (normass/deepe)
While the Washington officialdom has not publicly denied
there has been a withdrawal of North Vietnamese forces from the South,
they have tended to obfuscate this point.
This has been done in
two ways-refusing to pu specify publicly how substantial the withdrawal
has been and socond to camouflage the grounds ground-war lull with
frequent predictions of another Communist offonsive.
In the past, these political official pronouncements of the
battlofield situation has b have been for out of stop with the realities
on the ground. One frustrating, and mysty mystifying case of this
occurred for correspondents covering the Vietnam visit of Secretary of
Defense Clark Clifford in mid-July. Upon departing Washington, he
agrins predicted a Communist offensive, but authoritative sources here
were noting that the Viet Cong High Command had held a major policy-making
session in early July--and that it would be at least six weeks before
they would be able to organise and instruct their troops for the offen
Also, in Washington, the Secretary
another offic offensive.
mentioned a sizeable buildup 2 of forces of eight or possible moro Communist
here HAD B
divisions in the five northern provinces, but ground commanders we
Cand the North Vietnamese had vanished. Upon arriving in the heatquertor
the northern headquarters of Danang, the Secretary backtracked,
said that North Vietnamese had withdrawn "some" of their divisions
a out of the South. He again predicted an offensive, which caught the
headlines and monto-me sop spoke of a Communist build-up of forces towards
Saigon just at the time field commanders in the Saigon area had specifically
been tolling correspondents the Communists were withdrawing from the capital.
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politics 5 (normass/deepe)
DISCREPncy Betuwol
AND
This obruscation of what the high-level pronouncements out of step
with direct reports of field commanders lead one veteram journalist to
conclude, "Something's fishy here. It's all to easy to get dates for
the next offensive and the latest infot infiltration figures. The
officials are setting up their own straw men; if the offensive comes
off, they can say," unlike 10
that we told you so. If the offensive
"THEY CAN SAY
does not come off, it shows the quality of effectiveness of the B-52 raids
and the aggressiveness of the ground troops."
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politios 6 (normass/deepe)
This delicate mirture of what might be called low-key nows management
and high-intensity pyechologioel warfare has boon a marked feature
in relations between the officialdom and the saigon press corps here since
the May offensive. At that tine, the military dooision political decision
was made to inform the press about the impending offensive-revealed by a
Communiat defector-rather than let the Saigone so and world suffer anothor
traumatic shook, as what happond in during the Tot offensive when the Allied
command here was as surprised as everyone eles The les
milites The loon learned from Tot was whatever military success the Allies!
gain is lost in the psychological upheaval of even knowing the Communists
can attack the oitice at will. Honce, with constant predictions of an
offensive, somo of the phy psychological sting is sapped from the
Communist attacks.
But, there are also other advantages. It keeps
the Allied troops, especially the Vietnamese, on their toes and the
recurring frequency on which they are order into 100 per cent alert status
not ropeat Not that an offensive is necessarily coming, but that.
indicates they dod not know spe their commanders do not know specifically
when the offensive is coming.
In addition, as one American offico
explained, "Is the American confond
officials koop prodio ting en offensive
every day, then they just might be right some time."
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polities 7 (normass/deepe)
По
the coolest head in the military orowl, from this vantage point,
is General Creighton Abrams, who refuses to make any prodictions.
reportedly remembers the fatality problems of prediction that his
predecessor, Goneral William Westmoreland, inowawed-but General Westmoreland
is still predicting another offensive now in Washington, is still predicting
another Viethon offensive.
Communist offensive.
Now, just at this time the time when President Johnson makes another
prediction of a now Communist offensive, ins
besnakomm
at the
mmm highest lovelo military circles and the
Saigon diplomatic set are beginning to speculate there may not be another
offensive until the end of the year. There are two cohools of thought
on this the prevailing one, with the abundance the predominence of
military evidence, is that thoro will be another Communist offensive,
probably sometime in August, and probably directed at district and provincial
capti capitals or Saigon, This, according to this line of reasoning
maintains Hanoi' are reasoning is the attacks would enhance their
N PAR
bargaining position, and further
deteriorate the van offert with the American
electorate, with The WAR,
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politics 8 (normass/deepe)
for the first time
Now,
a sooond school is beginning
po sprout hore--and in
the highest military oiroles that there the possibility oxiste hore
the Communists will not launch another offensive until January next year.
"Because
"I can tell you there is not ropont not going to be another
Communist offensive until January next year-then the new American
President takes office," the exponent of this view explained.
politically, the last thing Hanoi wants is to create a Pearl Harbor
mentality in the United States. And second, militarily, they are not in
a position to have another ej major offensive. The withdrawal of their
units from the South is making a political noosarvos for them making
a political virtuo out of a military necessity. There's nothing on
wo (the Allies) can foresee at this time that would cause Hanoi to launch
an offensive at this time."
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politics 9 (normass/deepe)
These games of second-guessing Ho Chi Minh has not b
influonood the readiness of the Allied commands in here to meet any situation
thrust upon them. "We hope we've kept all bets covered," czo
explained.
the
one pouroo
But, while the second-guessing hore, one embarrassing fact for
edcommand has emerged. For the Communists to have thoir
ground units prepared and ready for an offensive is like having Amoricon
B-52 strategic bombers constantly alerted and ready to fly anywhere at
anytime. The significant thing is not tho military readiness-thoug
In this case, 20 major
but the political green light to use them.
Communist policy decision regarding the now offensive was thought to have
been made at two significant policy meetings,
one held in early July
by the Communist Politiburo in the South and the second hold by the
Contral Committee of h the National Liberation Front in mid-July. But,
thus far,
none of the multitudes of Alliod intelligence agents have been
able to discover the closed-door-substance of these decisions-and whether
the Communists have st turned on the political green lig light for
the next offensivo.
(Hanks Thanks for your query. I hope this sheds some light on the
matter. I'll try to cable another military story tomorrow. I've airmailod
you another piece. The press corps here was severely ridiculed for
over-writing prodictions of a July offensive and so my idea is to be very
cautious until it happens. And when it happens, I suspect you'll be able
to see the flemos in Bostom. Right now, there's all too much hysteria here
and too much official propaganda to do
otherwise. Regards Bov).
Bond routor
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Date
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1967, Aug. 2
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Subject
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Vietnam War, 1961-1975; United States--Politics and government
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Location
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Saigon, South Vietnam
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Coordinates
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10.8231; 106.6311
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Size
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20 x 26 cm
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Container
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B11, F11
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Format
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dispatches
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Collection Number
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MS 363
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Collection Title
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Beverly Deepe Keever, Journalism Papers
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Creator
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Keever, Beverly Deepe
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Collector
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Keever, Beverly Deepe
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Copyright Information
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These images are for educational use only. To inquire about usage or publication, please contact Archives & Special Collections.
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Publisher
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Archives & Special Collections, University of Nebraska-Lincoln Libraries
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Language
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English
