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derivative filename/jpeg
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363-02030 to 363-02044.pdf
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Digital Object Identifier
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363-02030 to 363-02044
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Title
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Article on tensions at the Honolulu Conference, page 1
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Description
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Original title: "The Lulu at Honolulu." Article by Keever on tensions at the Honolulu Conference, page 1
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AI Usage Disclosure
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Draft transcripts were automatically generated via Google Document AI and are currently under review. Please report significant errors to Archives & Special Collections at archives@unl.edu.
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Transcript
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Beverly Doope
64 Song Thap Ta
Sigon, Vietnam
Honolulu-page 1
March 26, 1966
THE MILU AT HONOLULU
SAICOT, VISTAidat the blay, honay atmosphero of the
Honolulu Conference in early February, President Lyndon B. Johnson
uggled his finger at the clusters of American and Vietnamese officials,
and said to Prime Minister guyan Cao Ky, "wo'll get together in
June to see how many coon skins you've mailed to the wall."
Later, one Vietnamese minister semi-facetiously retorted that
"perhaps a tiger skin would be more appropriate."
(More)
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deepe
honolulugo
Little did thone prosont realise the enormity of the changes
that would engulf Vietnam by Juno-changes determining whether indood,
Prime Minister Ky would still be in his post, whether his hard-line
anti-Communist military junte would still be in position, whother his
two-year plan for victory would even have fissled before it began, and
whether a neutralint, pro-Communist government would have seisod
po or which would make the initial step in the evolutionary, eventual
procese tords an internal negotiation with the Communists-and whether
the tentorn military prosence would sti12 ho eccepted or "totally
aburak chucked out of Vietnam, yms
The Honolulu Conference me historic, but for noon none of
the reasons cited in its famous Declaration and for none of the
statements made in the optomistic press cessions.
The key decision, made secretly and yet to be officially
announced, so the desire of President Johnson to hold election for
a Vietnamese legislative assembly "as soon as possible," instond
of in late 1967, as Prime Minister Ky's two-year program called for.
This key decision was the "lulu" of Honolulu, or as one
Tonton diplomat explained, "it should be called the follow-lulu
Conference it n a lulu, but it so hollow." Thother doliberately
or inadvertently, the President in his decision effected internally
within South Viotnam to toss the decision-making powers of the
covernment into the pro-neutralist elements, rather than the hard-lino
anti-Communist elononts.
(More)
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doopo
honolulu-page 3
The militant Buddhist religious-political organisation, heavily
ponotrated by pro-neutralist and pro-Communist elements, soised upon
the President's decision, pinned both the American officialdon and
Vietnamese government to that decision--and by doing so oponed a
second political front which openly and deliberately annistod
Communists first front-the National Liberation Front for the Liberation
of South Vietnam, which is the politionl backbone of the Communist
armed forco
In terms of American natione 1 interest in Vietnam, the effoot
o such that the Prosidont was moro interested in onding the war than
in winning it; in short, the policy to negotiate with the Communisto
rather than to defeat them.
"It moans simply that Amorice is now longor a first-rate posor,
but in on its way to boooming a second-rate one," a reliable
military export explained. "The Communists will be in India before you've
finished negotiating in Vietnam. 2"
The roasons for the President's decision are subject to only
educated guesses from the Saigon vantage point; however, unkind
they may be, those are some of the points of speculation.
A Tostorn diplomats The President wanted early clections
in Vietnam boonuse he has his om elections to worry about.
(Moro)
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deepo
honolulu-page 4
A Viotnemone intolleou intellectuals The Procidont's
desire for early elections was simply a manotrvor to stuff a tonel
in the banks of the /marioon dovon to shut them up.
A worried official, who attended the Honolulu Conferences
No Anorioan had the guts to tell the President he was ong
thatover the reasons, it was closer to political observors
hore that the President man operating in his traditional two-steps
fozd, one stop bedward approach to the problem of Vietnan.
The President--and he alone-decided to take the two gigantic strategie
stops, both in measured slow-motion, first to bomb North Vietnamoso
military targots and routes of communication and second to commit
American ground troops to the southern republic.
The one backward step, however, me the President's peace
offensive, shioh although it man admittedly mandatory in toamn
of international and American public opinion, servo to pull the
mug out from under the mar effort in the Southe
Likovice, i at the Honolulu Conference, the President
openly declared war on the social, economic and political
inadequacion within the South, and attempted to opon a scound
non-a111 taxy front, which long overdue. He then took the second
dcmonstrative step of dispatching Vice President Hubert 2x Humphrey
to Vietnam to drive the message hono & into the minds of the Southi
Vietnamese people-hich only a partial success. But, at Honolulu,
ho made the one step backward-the attempt to hold elections within
the South. This stop opened up the political pandora's box of
unprecedented political intrigue by the pro-neutralist elements.
and covert Communist agents.
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doopo
honlulu-page 5
Noi thor Vietnam nor the anti-Communist var vill over fully
recover from that decision.
For, the President, while over helmingly embracing
Price Ministor Ky-for the hole world to witness at the Honolulu
Conference, then proceeded to pull the rug from under Ky's famous
two-year program and Ky's sole political basis of support in tho country
the military junto,
Originally, the President is known to have expes expressed the
desire to hold eloctions for the national legislativo assembly in
June of this year. High-placed Vietnamese sources andint indicated
that Ky talked the President out of that decision docinion, which
would have provod na politically dimmotorous in within the South, and
they compromised to hold "olections as soon as possible," poshops
in early 1967. While Ky articulated the promise, however, he had
little intention of carrying it out--first because he was comitted
to his two-year program internally and second because ho gonuinoly
believed that the pro-neutralist, pro-Communist olemonts could sciso
logal poor within the country.
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deepe
honolulu-page 6
Curently,
CAS forced to
Zna
It was here, however, that Ky himself is now attempting to
compromise with the militant Buddhists to telescope his two-year program,
ed
which broadly attempts by late 1967 to have secured militarily
and controlled politically seventy six percent of the Vietnamese
population, simultaneously, pushing forward on his social,
economic reforms in the urban centers, while at the central
level,
submitted
a national
a national constitution would have been drafted,
to a national referendum of some sort--and by late 1967,
legislative assembly would have been freely elected, which could
conceivably had the power to name a new government to replace Ky
and his War Cabinet.
If Ky could have accomplished even partially this ambitious
program, he would have achieved a dramatic, internal political
victory of sorts.
The danger of telescoping this program into, less than two
years as the President advocated--was a fairly simple, though
vague mathematical calculation.
Vietname se government officials
currybly estimated that they/controlled politically and militarily
roughly fifty percent of the Vietnamese population, mostly in the
cities and towns and a thin swathe of viltix the surrounding
villages.
(More)
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deope
honolulupage 7
By the end of 1967, the government officials hoped to have
expanded their grip on the rural countryside and pushed the
Vlot Cong Communist military units and political oadre out of the
populous valleys and villages. At that time, free elections
for a national legislative council could be held--but still the anti-
Communist military junte would have indirectly vetood any known or
suspected Communist political agents from running as candidates,
although conceivably votors living in Communist-controlled areas would
have been granted the right to vote-but only for a non-Communiot
alato. The ten-man military junta is not only the legal basis
of the current government--but is also holds the significent
position of deciding future governments. But, in the midst
of the current Vietnamese political orinis, it is debatable whothor
the junta in its anti-Communist form and position of power wl will
survive.
By speeding up this election procedure, which the President
advocated, would have thus proved disasterous in the view of the
anti-Communist government.
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doope
honolulu-page 8
In short, the promise of the President's z dosire
to speed up the election = process appeared to rest on his
appraisal it was too late to win the war; the reluctance on
the part of Prime Minister Ky was the assumption that it was too
early to begin negotiations with the Communiste internally.
The Honolulu Conference clearly brought into focus that
Vietnam was no longer Secretary of Defonso Robert Mellanara's
marit me olarly LB clearly LBJ's ver. And this appeared,
from this vantage point, to tip the scales at the Washington
level from the Pentagon's hawk-like position towards tho
more moderate pro-negotiation position of the Procident. The
hawk-love controversy in Washington is mirrored here in on
kaleidoscope of disunity among the American agoncion here--tho
Agency for International Development (AID), the Central
Intelligence Agency, the American Embassy, the military-civilian
Joint United States Public Affairs Office (JUAP (JUSPAO)--and the
powerful military machine under the command of Gonorel William
C. Westmoreland.
(More)
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deope
honolulu-page 9
These American agencies, and even the military command,
are to act in support of the Vietnamese government in the tasks of
pacy pacifying the rural areas and promoting social-economic-poli tioml
development there plus in the urban areas. But, the American agencies,
in such a disarray of disunity, inf in-fighting, intrigue and
counter-intrigue, have only served to xxx men magnify, rather
then to nullify or solidify, the Vietnamese official in--fighting
in government circles. Washington's hawk-dove controversy
indirectly spazios the American in-fhg in-fighting in Saigon, but the
points of inter-agency conflict more specifically deal with the
tactical approaches to Vietnamese problems--and which Anerioan
agonoy should call the shots on the American side.
Some of the descriptive comments about this sent-paralysis
of the American bureaucratic operations in Vietnam are rather
alarming, when compared to the gravity of the internal crisis and the
enormity of the American committment of prestige, power and blood
to Viotaan.
One Western diplomats This isn't so much of an American war
it's another American civil war.
Ono American civilian exports The American officials have
put their minds in mothballs. Just like the Communists, they parrot
back their latest Party line dispatches to Washington-all of which
are based on over-optimism and self-delusion.
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doope
honolulu-page 10
An American tehn technicians The American burontierscy hore
in like a dinosaur-rith a big lumbering body and a small brain.
An American military officers "The American civilian
officials are careers careorists who come to a country for two-year
toure and intrigue and intrigue, without realising what they're doing.
They make promises of support to the Vietnamese suboonsolously, because
the Vietnamese are looking for these promises. They build empiron
liko children play with toy blocks. Then, in two years they
go to another post, without knowing they've played oat and motise
comes with other people's countries.
In short, the overwhelming impression and fear of some Amorican
officials, plus pro-/merican allies here, is that in Vietnam-
and other wars like this in the future--the American govermentel
processes abroad are substantially inadequate to meet the political-
little on the military-threat of a well disciplined, vol
superbly indoctrinated dictatorial Commumist machine that is attempting
to seize power with the most subtlo, refined political skills.
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deepe
honolulu-page 11
A descriptive microcosm of the bureaucratic snafu i thin
the American official ranks was displayed at the Warrenton session-
the prelude ill little-noticed prelude to the Honolulu Conference--
when in early January the heads of the American agencies omixx or their
representatives were recalled to Washington to hold consultations
on the Vietnamese pacification plan with the Far East Asia chiefs of
Various American superiors in Washgint Washington.
The session began at 9 a.m. on Saturday, January 9, in a
formor red schoolhouse at the Defense Department retreat of Warrenton,
in the fox-hunting country of Virginia fifty miles from Washington.
One of the basic points of discussions should the American officialdom
in Saigon set up an "integrated operational command" which would give
coordinating and substantive powers to one American to coordinato
the American military effort, with the American m civilian offort,
which would in turn have to be coordinated with a weak Vietnamese
paoification force
The answer seened obviously yes, for there was a desperate
nood at the Saigon level for authoritativo Amorioan management
on the key question of pacification.
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doope
honolulupage 12
But, then the classical American inter-agency conflict arose-
would the morionn military or the Amorioan civilians run the offort?
Underlying this question was the basic tactical approach to running the
wani whether the oventual American policy as to negotiate or
Ono American argued, "To may be a relatively short distance
anay from some sort of negotiation. In the course or aftermate
aftermath we may have to loss our military presonus-and it will be
easier to maintain a norocabattant civilian prosecne. Hence,
the pacification effort should, for example, stress civilia
American civilian police advisors to assist the Vietnamese
police rater rather then Amorioen military advir advisors to the
Tietnamese paramilitary units. This is debated all the time
within morican official circles. Hance, if we develop
pecification on the civilian side, the Americans on maintain
their strong in Vietnes longer than under a military establishment.
This is an important fundamental."
Buts
against this background, onna tho discussion started,
differences of opinion and approach began to emerge. The meeting
ma conducted under the co-chairmanship of Saigon's deputy mmbassador
1111am Porter and Leonard Ungor, former nabasandor to Laos and
hood of the Vietnam Coordinating Council in Washington.
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doope
honolulupage 13
The line-up of the conflict revealed thiss
The Washington officials who wanted the ine integrated
operational command were the White House representatives, the
Department of Defense representatives, the U. S. Agonoy fo
for International Development. The Central Intelligence Agency
à at the Washington level flatly refused to join. The State Department
officials at the Tushington level attempted to compromise "or to dilute"
the sauce
At the Saigon level, however, further splits in viewpoint
Though the Washington Defense Department officials woro
favored the ine integrated com operationa commend, the Seigen.
military representatives "took a protectionist view--because they
had the most power (i. e. the power of troops) and didn't want to
give it up." "Though the Washington AID officials favored
Sam Wilson,
ino integration, Saigon AID Director Charles Mann was against it.
"He likos playing soldier and the integrated command would have takon
his toys away," according to one reliable source. Ironically,
Mann's Saigon subordinate in charge of pacification,
violently disagreed and attempted vainly to push through the issue.
Barry Zorthian, Saigon director of the a paychological mrfare
operation, known so the Joint United States Public Affairs Office
(an offshoot of United States Information Service) was for the
coumand, "but then proportionately he had the least power to lose."
The American Embassy officials inxx from Saigon, including co-chairman
Porter, aided with the State Department superiors and diluted the whole
inous."
(More)
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doopo
honolulu pago 14
Saigon CIA officials aided with thoir Fachington CIA superiors
and refused to join the integrated operational command.
"The oc-chsd co-chairmen voro always moving on to anothor
topio, while the pro-inots pro-integrationists tried to puch
on with the discussion according to one reliable source. "In the
ond, they flicked at the inquo like brushing against a hot stove.
They are all too politi polito to onoh other when they should
hevo had a pushing, shoving shondom."
After two and half days of discussion, this key decision
an abolved.
Those baale dov divisions are now being a reflooted 15,000
milon amy in romote Vietnamese divisions. The bacio CIA position
in Washington, the CIA representatives in the northern provincos
of Vietnam, ronponsible for training helping to train the important
Viotminoso pealfication cadre, refuse to sit on a Vietnamese-/norioon
oouncil Ath the U. S. Marinos. These northern provincos,
known as the first Vietnamese military corps, are currently the
scono of disorderly public rebellion in the urban rear baco ozone
020 40,000 Anorioan Baringos Marinos yet the American Embassy
in Saigon doon't bother to inform the Marin Marinos of the key
docinions political decision that their Vietnene so commanding
conoral had boon sooved from his post in to their aron.
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deepe
honolulu-page 15
A month lator, the lionl Honolulu Conference was held. The
deolaion we finally made-no integrated a operational center. But
deputy ambassador Porter, who ironically had kirted the issue at
the Warrenton session, was named to the "special post" of
coordinating "all ameots of the work of the united states in
Vietnamono government projects...to implement the pacification
program advocated at Honll Honolulu." But, the appointment
authorised too little power muah to late in the game.
Lose than a month after Honolulu,
Vietnam was engulfed
in an unprecedented political crisia awesomely displaying the
Communist subversion on the one hand plus latent enti-Americanian
on the other hand. In zzz the fece of this rising political
theent, the Vietnamese government, oven with all the image-making
of Honolulu, m too went to governs the merican officials
in Washington and Saigon were too confuned to lead. The anti-Communist,
morioan position in Vietmen una gradually sliding into one of either
camouflaged retroat through negotiations or total humiliating
defest. While victory is still possible, but it in forgotten.
For the Honolulu Conference was the historio prelude to the
Final morican Snafu in Vietnam.
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Date
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1966, Mar. 26
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Subject
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Vietnam War, 1961-1975; Strategy; Vietnam War, 1961-1975--Peace; Elections; Honolulu Conference (1966 : Honolulu, Hawaii); Johnson, Lyndon B. (Lyndon Baines), 1908-1973
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Location
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Saigon, South Vietnam
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Coordinates
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10.8231; 106.6297
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Size
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20 x 26 cm
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Container
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B124, F4
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Format
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dispatches
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Collection Number
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MS 363
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Collection Title
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Beverly Deepe Keever, Journalism Papers
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Creator
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Keever, Beverly Deepe
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Collector
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Keever, Beverly Deepe
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Copyright Information
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These images are for educational use only. To inquire about usage or publication, please contact Archives & Special Collections.
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Publisher
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Archives & Special Collections
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Language
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English
