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derivative filename/jpeg
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363-07757 to 363-07762.pdf
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Digital Object Identifier
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363-07757 to 363-07762
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Title
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Article about the lack of a clear leader in South Vietnam
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Description
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Keever's title: "U.S. Kingmaker of Philippines President in 1950s proposes 'traditional carrot and whip method' in 1960s Vietnam", article about Ambassador Edward Landsdale and the lack of clear leadership in South Vietnam, for the New York Herald Tribune
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AI Usage Disclosure
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Draft transcripts were automatically generated via Google Document AI and are currently under review. Please report significant errors to Archives & Special Collections at archives@unl.edu.
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Transcript
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- Page 1
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(Morgan Gandy)
Saigon 13200 (UPIS) When ex-general Edward Lansdale
the most common question was,
arrived here last September,
"Who will be the Vietnamese Magsaysay?"
magical
Lansdale had been credited with being the almost
kingmaker behind Philippines President Ramon Magsaysay
houses,
in the early 1950s when he brilliantly offered land,
water buffaloes and grain seeds to the pro-Communists Huk
At a crucial turning
guerrillas to quell their local rebellion.
point when 40,000 armed HUKS stalked outside the capital of
Manila, Magsaysay politically sapped the strength of the
revolt which lead to a Communist defeat.
But, in Saigon, no Vietnamese Magsaysay has yet
emerged as political and military power has fragmented among
squabbling generals of equal status.
Instead, the Lansdale
concept at this point, according to highly reliable sources,
is to search for, support and help train "hundreds of
Magsaysays--at the village level."
The basic premise of the Lansdale strategy is that,
while American and Vietnamese military forces may partially
secure the countryside, there w can be no adequate internal
political solution without the support of the rural population.
(More Malloy--BD).
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First aid--morgan gandy--saigon
x x x the population x x x
The Lansdale strategy is concerned more with the tactics
of implementing the re-assertion of Vietnamese government political
authority in the villages than with the concept. The means of
implementation is called the "traditional carrot and the whip
method", according to one reliable source. The "carrot" is
kki that truly non-rigged elections would be held in which
the village population would select their own village leaders.
The Lansdale strategy advocates that unless this truly democratic
approach is made to the problem, the village population will
still support the Viet Cong guerrillas, rather than the Saigon
anti-Communist government. After the election, these villagers
would be given American-supplied economic assistance plus
And
sment Vietnamese government medical, educational political
cadre to assist the rural population.
The "whip" is specially trained "counter-terrorism"
squads which would weed out, isolate or capture the political
This
cadre in the Communist "People's Revolutionary Party.
Communist element--a branch of the
party is the hard-core,
Lao Dong Communist Party of North Vietnam--which directs and
leads the pro-Communist National Liberation Front.
The Front
is the political backbone of the Viet Cong guerrillas, but is
Communist directed.
(MORE MALLOY - BD)
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second add--morgan gandy--saigon x x x Communist diRECTED XXX.
The Lansdale plan calls for the utilization of 60
Vietnamese government cadre per each government-controlled
village. There are
official
en estimated 900 villages
under government control of the total of 2,800 villages
in the country. The 1966 plan calls for the bringing of
an additional 600 villages under government control.
These 60 Vietnamese government cadre per village are
broken down into four types: civic action teams to help
respond on the people's needs at the village level,
intelligence teams to obtain information on Communist
on
activities as well as misdemeanors committed by Vietnamese
government military or civilian officials, counter-terrorism
teams to fight the Communist political agents who attempt
to force the villagers to cooperate with the Communist side
and secret armed agents commissioned to protect the village
against Communist guerrilla attacks until other reinforcements
or strike aircraft arrive.
(More Malloy--BD)
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Third add-morgan gandy--saigon
x x x aircraft arrive x x x.
the
Most political sources here indicated that the weakness
for
in previous plans pacifying the villages was that even
though Vietnamese military forces secured the villages,
Viet Cong political infrastructure was never rooted out,
and the population still aided the Communists. The Lansdale
plan would attempt to overcome this previous failure.
Graphically speaking, the Lansdale approach is to move
horizontally-from village to village--and from the bottom upwards,
zhin an unorthodox approach which has hardly
endeared hem the former Air Force major general to the
administer vertically
orthodox bureaucratic mais bureaucrats who want to move from
the
top level of Saigon downwards.
The standard Communist guerrilla strategy is to capture
control of the villages in order to encircle and then to seize the
cities. Both American and Vietnamese military and civilian official s
have long recognized that unless the allied military forces and the
anti-Communist government "cuts a wide swath" of military and
political control in the villages surrounding the major cities,
the war will roll towards a stat stalemate, or possibly defeat
for th
theanti-
ti-
Communist forces.
(More Malloy--BD)
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fourth add-morgan gandy--saigon
x x x anti-Communist forces x x x.
This "wide swath" of government-controlled villages should
SEVEN
reach in an arc of at least efgles around the major cities,
since Communist forces have captured American .105 mm. howitizers
with a range of seven miles. Communist-bloc artillery is known
to be moving down the Ho Chi Minh train train from North Vietnam
on the backs of elephants, according to highly reliable sources.
While most of the American field camps and major Vietnamese
airbases are relatively protected against mortar attack, none
are out of range of artillery, according to reliable sources.
This concept of "cutting a wide swath" of government
control in the villages is not new, It was initiated under former
President Ngo Dinh Diem in 1962 and called the strategic hamlet
At its peak, the program was credited with fortifying
8,000 of the 12,000 hamlets in the country. (A hamlet is a subdivision
program.
Peptially
of the village). The program was visite virtually/ crushed by the
after themfnihxofmham Diem was overthrown
Communists, however,
in November, 1963.
The program was later revived,
but was never
successfully implemented,
as the pacification plan.
present government has re-case a
same program and re-named it Rural Construction.
Now, the
Prec re-cast and
named the
(More Malloy-BD)
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fifth add--morgan gandy--saigon
x x x Rural Construction x x x.
The Ministry of Rural Construction is headed by a dynamic
Vietnamese general-and a meticulous planner-named Maj. Gen. Nguyen
Duc Thinh Thang Lansdale, as the Unistates Mission Lais
Liaison Officer on Rural Construction,
is the counterpart of General
Tháng
Can Lansdale and General Thang succeed?
The outcome depends in large part on the current meeting
At this point,
in Washington of the heads of the American agencies here as well
as the American military advisor on pacification.
sources in Saigon believe that Lansdale has only the responsibility
of advising the Vietnamese goverment on pacification-without the
authority of ordering American agencies which support the pacification
effort with material, money and the training of cadre. These sources
say that in this bureaucratic snafu, there are thirty nine different
kinds of Vietnamese pacification cadre, with each American
agency here supporting one or more different kinds.
These sources
believe that Lansdale needs more power to coordinate American activities
which support the Vietnamese government on pacification.
Other reliable sources indicate that the total concept of
pacification needs a thorough review.
"The concept of pacification was good-though never implemented-
when we had a few stray Viet Cong battalions running around the country,
es we did in 1963," one reliable source explained. "Now we have nine
North Vietnamese regiments in here. Even if we have one American Marine
battalion protecting each village--the Communists will send two regiments
to overrun it. We need to consider alternative means to establish security."
Endit Malloy.
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Date
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1966, Jan. 13
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Subject
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Vietnam War, 1961-1975; Lansdale, Edward Geary, 1908-1987; Vietnam (Republic)--Politics and government; Political leadership; Magsaysay, Ramon, 1907-1957; Vietnam (Republic)--Relations--United States
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Location
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Saigon, South Vietnam
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Coordinates
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10.8231; 106.6311
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Size
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20 x 26 cm
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Container
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B188, F3
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Format
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dispatches
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Collection Number
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MS 363
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Collection Title
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Beverly Deepe Keever, Journalism Papers
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Creator
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Keever, Beverly Deepe
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Collector
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Keever, Beverly Deepe
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Copyright Information
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These images are for educational use only. To inquire about usage or publication, please contact Archives & Special Collections.
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Publisher
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Archives & Special Collections, University of Nebraska-Lincoln Libraries
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Language
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English
