Article about Nguyẽ̂n Cao Kỳ

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363-06969 to 363-06975.pdf

Digital Object Identifier

363-06969 to 363-06975

Title

Article about Nguyẽ̂n Cao Kỳ

Description

Keever's title: "Prime Minister Ky was 'a champion of a cause that was already lost' - victory", article about Air Vice Marshal Nguyẽ̂n Cao Kỳ

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Draft transcripts were automatically generated via Google Document AI and are currently under review. Please report significant errors to Archives & Special Collections at archives@unl.edu.

Transcript

(Morgan Gandy) SAIGON, 19170, (UPIS)--From the very moment Air Vice Marshal Nguyen Cao Ky stepped into office, he was aye general without command and aye Prime Minister without aye country. During his eleven months in office, he failed--history may say he failed totally--but then he never had a chance to succeed. “Ky was aye champion--very much of aye champion,” one Vietnamese politician explained. “But he was aye champion of aye cause that was already lost.” That lost cause was victory. Ky publically announced--in fact dreamed--that he himself would preside over the victory not only in South Vietnam, but also would dramatically lead the invasion to liberate North Vietnam. But, in the end, he was only bequeathed the right to preside only over the requium of his own military regime. The demise of the bouncy, dynamic, outspoken Prime Minister, and his regime during the next three to five months when a constitutional assembly is slated to be elected is thus interpreted here as an end of an era. The coming fall of the Ky regime is the final shadowy anti-climax of the anti-Communist Ngo Dinh Diem era, which determinedly insisted not only on aye military contest against the Communists but also on aye political battle against any neutralization a la Laotian troika style. (More--Miller--BD) first add--morgan gandy--saigon x x x troika style x x The Ky regime was considered the [deletion: final] last government that would fight the Communists not only militarily, but more significantly fight them politically--[deletion: and] to oppose the [deletion: political re-arrangements] internal political re-arrangements which would pave the way towards and eventuall negotiation with the Communists. The future Saigon governments are predicted to [deletion: month] mouth officially the anti-neutralist political line--while clandestinely politically sparring with the Communist-led Liberation Front [deletion: on] for negotiations. This Ky flatly refused saying, “This is not aye question of my government--it’s a question of my country.” It was the 34-year-old Prime Minister at the Honolulu Conference in February who attempted to dissuade President Lyndon B. Johnson from holding early elections in Vietnam--elections which preluded the political re-arrangement necessary for future negotiations. This was Ky’s ultimate failure, but others more prestigious have notrptnot succeeded in [deletion: to] persuading the President Johnson. “The Americans in Saigon called Ky ‘Captain Midnight,’ as though he had dropped from the clouds into aye science fiction adventure here,” one Vietnamese politician explained. “But, in fact, he was Don Quixote in aye black flying suit. He was striking at windmills that he thought were fortresses. He sought to preserve aye past anti-Communist policy that was already obsolescent. He was vain, glorious, dynamic, colorful and [XXXX indicating deletion] brave; [deletion: and] He thought he would be the national here to defeat the Communists. But instead, he was forced to lead an invasion against [deletion: rebel] rebellious Danang, his own second largest city--and [insertion: he] even hopelessly failed in that. He thought he could win the war--but both America and his country wanted peace more than [deletion: victory.”] war and negotiations more than victory.” (More--Miller--BD) second add--morgan gandy--saigon x x x than victory x x x Why did Prime Minister Ky have neither the chance nor the choice of succeeding? In simplest terms, he possessed the appearance of power--which was magnified at the Honolulu Conference--but none of the substance; he had inherited all of the responsibilities of leading aye nation at war, without the authority to do so. He named a war cabinet, but notrptnot aye government, he had aye bureaucratic apparatus, but notrpt an administration. Horizontally, he was from the moment he entered office continuously being politically [deletion: asphixiated] suffocated by his, “first enemy within”--the Communists, his “second enemy within--the Buddhist politico-priests, and ironically by his staunchest ally, the Americans. He was aye political pawn of these three power [deletion: block] blocs--and [deletion: aye political prisoner] an immobile political prisoner within the very country of which he was Prime Minister. Vertically, the continuous process of the fragmentation of the central government peaked under Ky [deletion: ;]. The late Ngo Dinh Diem in 1963 attempted to concentrate power at the central echelons and was overthrown by the Americans and the Buddhists; General Nguyen Khanh aye year later attempted and failed to centralize power in Saigon--he was toppled by the Americans and his own generals. Ky did notrptnot even possess the power to attempt--little own attempt and fail--to centralize [deletion: power] authority. The power to run the war was usurped by the four Vietnamese corps commanders--and by American unit commanders--the former who could and did refuse his orders; the latter whom he could notrptnot even command. (More--Miller--BD) third add--morgan gandy--saigon x x x even command x x x. In short, Ky symbolized the shrinking authority of the central government in Saigon. [deletion: Geograph] Geographically, this shrinking process was done by the Communists, the Buddhists and the Americans. When Ky stepped into office, the Communists ruled most of the countryside. The Communists had seized power militarily and were administering it politically; they had become the government in the countryside and Ky’s weak political apparatus became “the shadow government.” Neither Ky the man, nor the Saigon regime nor the anti-Communist cause commanded any support from the countryside, for during the past eight years the Communists had either “liquidated” or “neutralized” any anti-Communist opposition. At the Honolulu Conference, American officials sought to make Ky and his policies popular and respected; but this mystique was already too late. For, the Communists had [deletion: already] effectively implemented the crucial principle of Mao-Tse-Tung: “Political power comes out of the barrel of aye gun.” (More--Miller--BD) fourth add--morgan gandy--saigon x x x aye gun x x x. Ironically, American combat units could successfully contest the Communist military units, but they could notrptnot fill the anti-Communist political vacuum in the countryside. In one night alone, in one village [deletion: outside of] six miles from the Marine-protected Danang airbase, small-unit Communist squads assassinated eight pro-government peasants. “Saigon is [deletion: in] so isolated that it [insertion: indirectly] is now the Ky government that must smuggle shrimp and rice into the city from the countryside,” one Western diplomat explained. “It is the [deletion: Ky] Saigon government [deletion: rather] [XXXX indicating deletion] that must pay the Viet Cong road and canal taxes--which is creating the inflationary spiral in the cities. It is the central government that must put helicopter gasoline in civilian trucks, pay Viet Cong taxes to transport it even [deletion: on] to the outskirts of Saigon. Even an American gasoline truck convoy wouldn’t get through; one and aye half American combat divisions outside of Saigon can notrptnot stop the Viet Cong noose around the cities.” With the countryside under the rule of his first enemy, the Communists, Ky was losing the cities [deletion: both] to and because of both the Americans, his ally, and the Buddhists, politico-priests, his “second enemy within.” In June, when Ky came into office, the urban revolt had already begun--the revolt against the [XXXX indicating deletion] consequences of the American troop buildup, which would and could be channeled by aye growing [insertion: pro-neutralist] Buddhist political machine. Ironically, the American troops that Ky needed so much to win the military war became his most damaging political liability. (More--Miller--BD) fifth add--morgan gandy--saigon x x x political [deletion: machine] liability x x x. The initial impact of the American troop build-up in the cities was myriads of bars along the maintstreets, battalions of bargirls and prostitutes and another gallop towards inflation. Ky signed aye decree ordering the bar-owners--at an unspecified date--to move into designated “recreational areas;” but, [deletion: the] American officials did notrptnot want organized [insertion: “] red light [insertion: ”] districts which would be subject to Congressional investigations. In an attempt to curb the black marketing of American dollars, the Ky government, after [XXXX indicating deletion] four months of haggling, instituted the American military scrip, but at the rate of onehundred eighteen piastres per dollar instead of the official seventy three piastres per dollar. “You see, the Americans were notrptnot interested in stopping inflation,” one Vietnamese politician fumed. “If they had been, they’d have accepted [deletion: 73] seventy three piastres per dollar instead of one hundred eighteen. The Americans demanded aye privileged position--and Ky lost some [deletion: of the] Vietnamese economic sovereignty to the Americans.” In an attempt to control the acute housing shortage, Ky signed aye decree stating the Americans [deletion: wou] military personnel would move out of Saigon. But, the American officials could notrptnot move thousands of military personnel outside of Saigon; the logistical system already was clogged to get in necessary war material; the Vietnamese construction workers were [XXXX indicating deletion] already soaked up [deletion: to] building necessary military installations. [insertion: (More--Miller--BD) sixth add--morgan gandy--saigon x x x military installations x x x After eleven years of American military presence in Vietnam, the lack of aye secure [deletion: “ghet “ghee] “ghetto-ized” military [deletion: cont] cantonment area outside of Saigon was [deletion: the] aye symbol of the unplanned war which Ky inherited. Ky did have the power to make promises--and to make programs on paper. He promised aye crackdown on corruption, but when he executed publically aye convicted Chinese businessman, American officials, Buddhist politico-priests and the wealthy Chinese businessmen turned against him. Still, aye court designated under the Ky regime also convicted and sentenced to death aye Vietnamese government official--the appeal is still pending. [deletion: Anto] Another six Vietnamese Customs officials were sentenced to prison terms of hard labor. In an attempt to re-assert anti-Communist political authority in the countryside, the pacification program was against [deletion: geared up] revised, re-named rural development, and the long process of training rural health workers, counter-subversive agents, [insertion: rural] policemen and propagandists begun. But, before the rural program had aye chance to succeed or to be implemented, the urban [insertion: anti-government] revolt was already underway. “Ky was notrptnot defeated in the Communist-held villages, but in his own cities,” one Vietnamese politician explained. “He was notrptnot defeated so much by the skill of the Communists--but by the mistakes of the Americans and [XXXX indicating deletion] the anti-Communists.” (Endit-Miller--BD)

Date

1966, Apr. 19

Subject

Vietnam War, 1961-1975; Nguyẽ̂n, Cao Kỳ; Vietnam (Republic)--Politics and government; Prime ministers; Strategy

Location

Saigon, South Vietnam

Coordinates

10.8231; 106.6311

Size

20 x 26 cm

Container

B188, F3

Format

dispatches

Collection Number

MS 363

Collection Title

Beverly Deepe Keever, Journalism Papers

Creator

Keever, Beverly Deepe

Collector

Keever, Beverly Deepe

Copyright Information

These images are for educational use only. To inquire about usage or publication, please contact Archives & Special Collections.

Publisher

Archives & Special Collections, University of Nebraska-Lincoln Libraries

Language

English