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derivative filename/jpeg
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363-01714 to 363-01720.pdf
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Digital Object Identifier
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363-01714 to 363-01720
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Title
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Article on the US Marines and pacification
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Description
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Original title: "American Marines and Pacification Headaches." Original caption: "wrapup--article 4 of 4-article series" Article by Keever about the US Marine Corps and pacification strategy for New York Herald Tribune
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AI Usage Disclosure
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Draft transcripts were automatically generated via Google Document AI and are currently under review. Please report significant errors to Archives & Special Collections at archives@unl.edu.
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Transcript
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- Page 1
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s
deepe
Wrapup article 4 of 4-artiole sories
page 1
AMERICAN MARINES AND PACIFICATION RADACHES
FIVE MOUNTAIN VILLAGES,
SOUTH VIETNAM-Last fall, the
battle cry of the American Marines was "We'll bo in Hoi An by
New Year's '66." Today, they estimate it will be New Year's *68./
The hold-up in reaching Hoi An, a provincial capital
situated only 15 miles south of the strategic airbase of Danang,
illustrates the changing concepts of how American troops are to be
employed in Vietnam--and some of the many problems they face.
"We could easily have fought our way to Hoi An," one
Marine explained.
"But then, we would have had to fought our way
back. The essential problem i of this war is not moving your
frontlines forward-but is keeping your rear covered. "
This problem of "keeping your rear covered" is usually
identified as that "twilight area" of pacifiostion, which tios
together the military, political, social and economic aspects of the
war to control and gain the support of the local population. Without
VITAGERS,
control and support of the rural population, officials here believe
the war could continue for years.
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- Page 2
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deepe
Wrapup-article 4 of 4-article sorios
page 2
The decision to halt the advance of the Marine frontline
positions until tho Vietnamese cadre could pacify the population
brought vocal dissents withing the Marine Corps ranks and sneers
from Army colonels who claimed "the Marines are afraid to go out
and find the Viet Cong." Under the direction of Marine commandor
Maj. Gen. Lewis Walt, and backed by key Army generals in Saigon,
however, the Marine effort outiste outside of Danang slowly
began to dovetail with the activities of the Vietnamese government
to control the population.
"In a conventional war, progress is measured by an advancing
frontline," one reliable source explained. "But in this war our
are
outlying positions is constant and progress must be measured in the
third dinonsion. Wo a must go in depth down into the population
to dig out the Viet Cong infrastructure and then re-building the
loca 1 anti-Communist government."
The result of this coordinated Marine-Vietnamese effort
is the "Five Mountain Villages Campaign" initiated less than ten
miles southwest of Danang, band 15 miles from Ha Hoi An.
This campaign has been tabbed the No. 1 priority project in the
country; it is the foremost attempt in in pacification and a pilot
case for future decision-making in Vietnam.
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- Page 3
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deepe
Wrapup-article 4 of 4-article series
page 3
Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara was briefed in depth
on the project during his last visit.
"If this plan doesn't succeed here, it's not going to
succeed anywhere else in the country," ono reliable source
explained. "We'll really be in serious trouble then."
The project has already run into some serious trouble.
"Now we're just spinning our wheels," one source explained.
The "Five Mountain Villages" campaign calls for the pacification
of five villages (subdivided into 19 villages), covoring a twenty
Contains
square kilometor area. The five-village complex 42,000
population of high about seven percent of the families are
considered to bo related to the Viet Cong Communists. The villages
densely populated villages, smuggled in lush rice paddy, is surrounded
by the um offim five peaks of mountains containing grey and
salmon-colored marble.
are
(These Marble Mountains would make a great
tourist attraction, but you' be killed going out there," one Marine
cracked.).
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- Page 4
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deepe
Wrapup-article 4 of 4-article series
page 4
The plan calls for three components for pacification--the
American Marines who secure the outer perimeter of the area by myriads
of patrols to prevent the invasion of hard-core Communist units, the
Vietnamese paramilitary troops who scoure the x villages, and the
Vietnamese civilian cadre who through distribution of economic goods,
psychological warfare, census-taking and organizing the people
attempt to weed out the Viet Cong infrastructure and convince the
villagers to side with the anti-Communist government forces.
egs;
1
"The role of the American Marines is bin like on
one reliable source explained. "Our frontlines on the rin
of the area is the shell-but like a shell, the lines can be broken.
The vital installation--the Danang airbaso-is the yok yoke yolk and
we also defend that. The white is what we are trying to
pacify and then solidify."
Sores
On October 18, the Vietnamese government, with Merinos on
began their pacification in the rear by using on
headquarters company and on four understrength line companies
of the 59th Regional Forces Battalion to sweep through the area.
Then 327 civilian cadre were moved in from the provincial headquarters
and the Vietnamese commander put them through a detailed two-week
re-training course. Then the commander received five Vietnamese
Pobe People's Action Teams (PAT's), totalling 50 persons, who were
responsible for census taking and other activities.
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D
deepe
Wrapup article 4 of 4-article series
page 5
In each of the five villages, the Vietnamese
commander placed
and Regional Forces company and one People's Action Teams in each of
the 19 hamlets, he placed a civilian cadre team.
"But during the third wook of the campaing, a 50-man
Viet Cong platoon broke through the Marine blocking position
and wore in our area shooting things us up and they hit us hard,"
one reliable source explained.
several cadremen were killed.
was 42 per cent understrength,
"Five regional force troopers and
Since each of our armed companies
we had 15-man platoons in when
wo should have had 35 men. And fighting against 50 Viet Cong,
of course, we lose against those odds. Until that we were just
beginning to get the confidence of the people-but after that,
the people clammed up and wouldn't tell us anything. And it
also hurt the morale of our cadre. One whole 11-man team took
off-but the district chief talked them into coming back.
Then four nights later, the same Viet Cong platoon
hit us again. They slipped in between two Marine patrols, attacked
the Regional Force headquarters unit of 17 mon, killed several
civilian cadro and kidnapped two of the women working with the
drama unit. We haven't seen the women since. One of the American
Marines saw the whole action from 50 yards away--but he couldn't
open up with his machinegun.
than enomy.
He would have killed more friendlies
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- Page 6
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deepe
Wrapup article 4 of 4-article series
page 6
"Of course,
the Marines can't stop all small-unit infiltration.
It would take Marines shoulder-topshoulder to do that. And once
you had that, the Viet Cong would mortar them a from across the river,
which they've already started doing."
Sime these late November actions, the Vietnamese have
slightly reinforced the area with troop strength and the Marines have
moved in more units; now the Marines are not only holding the
outer perimeter by extensive patrolling, but they are also
responsible for securing the civilian cadre in 11 of the 19
With
villages, while the Vietnamese troops defending the remaining 8.
By mid-December, "we started pacy pacifying again and
things were moving slow, but good., the people started giving us
good intelligence and were turning in some Viet Cong. For the
first time, on a Sunday afternoon families from Danang would
come to the villages here to visit their relatives;
more than
100 families moved back into the area--but noen of none of the
people were of draft ago."
During late December, however, the Viet Cong launched on
one night four harassing actions, including mortaring the central
command post and sungm attacking another People's Action Team,
killing several of them.
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- Page 7
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deepe
Wrapup-article 4 of 4-article series
page 7
Fadly, through the operation, the number of civilian
cadremen dropped from 331 to 304; one serious disadvantage of
them is they were considered by reliable sources to be poorly
trained for the work and secondly none of them were residents of
the villages being pacified, which is considered to be an essential
PRERE
point.
し
Problems also arose about the 10-man People's Action
Teams, which are equipped, trained and paid for political
activities and la intelligence gathering by a subdivision
of the American Central Intelligence Agonoy. The Vietnamese
commander wanted to use the teams for providing security since they
had better guns than his military troops; the teams didn't want to
provide security. One of the five teams defected en masse and the
province chief transferred a second team which caused problems.
"But the biggest headache is that we can't move our
Vietnamese troops and cadro out of this 20 square kilometer
chunk of villages until we have villagers here who can defond
the Five Mountain Village area. And there's not one young man here
between 10 and 38 we can recruit. We have lost the middle generation.
No one has yet begun to find the answer to that problem."
There are eighty square kilometers of land to be pacified
before reaching Hoi An. And that's why the present official estimate
is Hoi An will be reached by New Year's, 1968.
-30-
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Date
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1965, Dec. 28
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Subject
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Vietnam War, 1961-1975; Strategy; United States. Marine Corps
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Location
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South Vietnam
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Coordinates
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10.8231; 106.6297
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Size
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20 x 26 cm
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Container
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B66, F4
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Format
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dispatches
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Collection Number
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MS 363
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Collection Title
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Beverly Deepe Keever, Journalism Papers
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Creator
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Keever, Beverly Deepe
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Collector
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Keever, Beverly Deepe
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Copyright Information
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These images are for educational use only. To inquire about usage or publication, please contact Archives & Special Collections.
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Publisher
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Archives & Special Collections
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Language
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English
