-
derivative filename/jpeg
-
363-02306 to 363-02312.pdf
-
Digital Object Identifier
-
363-02306 to 363-02312
-
Title
-
Revisions of article on Ambassador Maxwell D. Taylor
-
Description
-
Original title: "taylor--revisions." Revisions of an article by Keever on Ambassador Maxwell D. Taylor
-
AI Usage Disclosure
-
Draft transcripts were automatically generated via Google Document AI and are currently under review. Please report significant errors to Archives & Special Collections at archives@unl.edu.
-
Transcript
-
--------------------
- Page 1
--------------------
deepe
taylor-revisions
واسطر
delete pages 4, 5 of previously airexpressed story and replace with
following:
The first high-priority taks task Taylor assigned to himself
upon his July 7th arrival was to strengthen coordination of activities withim
the American mission and then in concurrently to set up a joint
would
Vietnamese government-U. S. mission coordinating committee gran
routinely meet to discuss day-to-day implementation of key problems
in the country. During one such meeting, for exmap example, the vast
medical program--which cuts across various Vietnamese ministeries plus
military or chain of command in and into the American military and economic
programs--was reviewed in detail to strengthen the cor coordination of all
agencies and servies, services, both American and Vietnamese.
Foreign diplomats view this coordination "as better than it ever
has been" and a 180 degree reversal of Taylor's predecessor, Henry Cabot
Lodge, who "played his cards close to his vest and never told his staff
anything."
But, foreign diplomats also believe the results are less than
Ex hoped for because of other factors-Taylor has had to work with two
ENURS
new Vietnamese governments in his five-month period, including a complete
changeover of all ministers, as well as a little-noticed "American coup"
within the missions.
--------------------
- Page 2
--------------------
deepe
taylor revision--2
Taylor brought with him the a first-rate personal-sta
Embassy staff, including deputy Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson, an expert om
Far Far Eastern affairs, plus William H. Sullivan, former head of
Vietnam task force in Washington, who were to assist in the strengthen
Sullivan left here last month, officially
strengthening of coordination.
with "mission accomplished,"
but no sooner had he departed tham a
fxxx vicious battle broke out in the U. S. Agency for International
Development, which lead to the resignation of a Sullivan-appointed
counterinsurgency expert, Dr. George K. Tanham, in protest against the
views of the AID director here.
While the Vietnamese side had experienced a dowod
a continual downward trend towards pl political
instability, it if not a anarchy, the "American coup", had als
Hodalss
in partly initiated by Taylor, resulted in day-to-day incohesiveness
within the American ranks. There has been such a rapid turnover of
American personnel--in the highest echelon of each key American agency
that a current American joke here is "If my boss calls, get his name.
Since the gain beginning of the year, the heads of the Central
Intelligence Agency, United States Information Service, Agency for Internationa
Development and the American Embassy--all the agencies on the American civilin
civilian side-plus the commander of the Military Assistance Command-Viet Nam-
have been changed.
Some of these personnel changes were initiated under Lodge, but
they peaked with the arrival of Taylor in July, which caused a lack of
continuity in day-to-day implementation of policy,
--------------------
- Page 3
--------------------
deepe
taylor revision--3
Long time specialists in foreign embassies were only slightly
less than appaled a appalled at the result, as one explained, "that now
everyone is trying to solve the problems with the same solutions we tried
three years ago--the solutions did not work then and will not work now.
The whirlwind of personnel changes--which s centered around
Taylor resulting from the "American coup" touched off a vast chain
reaction within Vietnamese political circles which became a direct, if not
a mjor major contributor to the deterioration of the political situation
within the past few months.
Once
For, Henry Cabot Lodge maintained immense prestige among Vietnamese
circles-particularly among the Buddhist ranks who x generously credited
him with helping to overthrow the Ngo Dinh Diem regime last year.
Taylor arrived, however, they were longer obliged to grant this
pretig prestige to and popularity to Taylor and began to launch a
stream of anti-American, and vaguely pro-neutralist, propaganda.
One the military side, Lodge, often called "the American
Mandarin" was at such odds with the American military commander--another
Bostonian Gen. Paul D.. Harkins-that they would not even speak to each
other on the same plane. But the easy-going gracious manner of Harkins
was soon to be replaced by the gung-ho spirt of ano a younger
Westpointer named Gen. William C. Westmoreland,
who soon began to
be known in the words of one Vietnamese girer general "as a child without
any idea of insurgency warfare."
While Lodge and Harkins were acknowledged to be at odds
they were solidly in agreement on one point-that General Nguyen Khanh,
then prime minister, should remain the strongman in Viet Nam.
--------------------
- Page 4
--------------------
deepe
taylor re visions--4
37-you-old
The strong total suppir support for the goateed-general was the
foundation of American policy ammmmm from the time he entered the
Prime Minister Office after his January 30th coup until the departure of
Lodge in June.
dd
One July 7th, the Amri American policy not changed-but the
American Ambassador and his staff did--and this was the key to touching
off an immense chain reaction of events which leat to the pollt leading to
political disaster.
Visit
A
Taylor began to see Khanh's 91 political and military Te rivals,
primarly Gen. Duong Van Minh, who Taylor had kemik
Diomayam
played tennis with during the Diem days. Meny observers believe that for
the first two weeks Taylor was attempting to unify bring together the
personalities of Khanh and Minh to help capture popular support for the
Khanh government. This failed disasterously; whatever was the k
relationship between Taylor, Minh and Khanh the i key factor was that in
the minds of Saigonese,--and in the view of Khanh himself-the Americans
had withdrawn exclusive support from him. Khanh and Taylor soon
became deadlocked in an official policy battle--for two weeks after Taylor's
arrival Khanh launched his famed "Go North" policy of liberation North
Viet Nam, which Taylor made great pains to openly condeme condemned and
Clari
rified was NOT American policy.
Early in August, however, Khanh backed down from his "Go North"
Ng
campaign, explained it was to be a "psychological" invasion rather than
military invasion.
--------------------
- Page 5
--------------------
deepe
taylor revisions--5
Only a few days later, however, the first Tonkin incident
erupted and American planes bombed North Vietnamese military installations.
Indirectly, a nd briefly, momentarily, American policy had implemented
Khanh's "Go North" campaign;
he and his ministers were so jubilant they
served champagne in a Cabinet meeting during the Tonkin gulf crisis.
By this time, however, it was sham apparent--whether
justified or not-to Khanh and to every other Saigonese in military and
political circles that Khanh had lost the exclusivity of American
support.
By losing Am total American support, Khanh had also lost the
great weight of stability produced by the money, and material and men of
the American effort. It is doubtful, in the view of observers here, tha t
American policy shifted away from Khanh--or that Taylor intentionally
de-emphasized American support of Khanh; nevertheless, expertly launched
rumors by "tricky-minded" Vietnamese politicians indicated that Khanh
had lost totality of American support. And three weeks later, the
political situation crumbled into a state of disaster, if not anarchy,
On Taylor's 63rd birthday--August 26th and less than two months of being
Ambassador--the political deterioration became anarchy as student demonstrations
lawlessness of street urchism urchins routed Khanh from the prime minister's
office and blood religious warfare broke out in the northern provinces.
blood religi
And
For the
During the critical eight days during the upheaval when the fate
of Viet Nam--a nd the fate of the anti-Communist war effort--unh hung in
balance, Taylor did not discuss with Khanh the problems--or alternative
solutions.
--------------------
- Page 6
--------------------
deepe
taylor revisions--
It was during this crisis that the key operative principle of the
Taylor tenure became apparent--and which Taylor emphasized in recent talks
with Vietnamese leaders upon returning from Washington discussions with
Ink President Johnson that America would not interfer in Vietnamese
political in-fighting, that the Vietnamese must build their own
strong stable government, and that this stable government would be
AMERIC
Su
appo
TED
a prerequisited for any major expansion of the war effort outside the
borders of Viet Nam.
Taylor's school of thought ran directly counter to the view of
contended
hard-line military foreign and American military experts who
Vietnam was so important to the interests of the free world that
the West must take steps to interfere more, if necessary, into the
Vietnamese political arena in order to effectively prosecute the anti-
Communist war.
Following the August debacle, Khanh's policy was simply one of
survival--which he succeeded in--and Taylor's policy was simply to keep thing
the lid on Vietnamese events until after the President election last month.
-AS
He succeeded also.
Followed
But since then, the civilian government which succeeded
Khanh xammam has been confronted with the same political
opponents as Khanh-pro-Buddhist demonstrators i clamoring for more freedom
instead of more security and possible Communist subversives nibbling away
at the foundations of any political stability within South Viet Nam.
--------------------
- Page 7
--------------------
deepe
taylor revisions--
Since Taylor returned from Washington last week after top-level
discussions with President Johnson, the political and military problems
a have grown more visible as reports of conflicts, among Vietnamese generals
circulated through Saigon, compounded by rumors of coup d'etat and
unusual "practice" alerts in which Cabinet ministers and generals rushed
to their offices at midnight last week.
Many observers believe that the changes in American policy--if
any as the result of the Taylor conferences in Washingtom are in a state
of preparatiom a nd only the coming weeks will bring them into the open.
Some observers believe that after five months im the Ambassador's Office,
Taylor is now confronted with the same choices om internation internal
Vietnamese matters that he faced whem he named arrived in Viet Nam on
-30-
July 7th to bestow again total American political support om Gen. Khanh,,
not only in his post of Commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces but also
as the central figure im a new government,
or to flounder as Vietnam
has done in the past five months im a limbo of political instability and
All
whirlwind changes of government,, of them commanding popular
disapproval.
(Uppick last para page 5, if wanted,, x x x despite the pressuresx x x
-
Date
-
1965, Dec. 10
-
Subject
-
Vietnam War, 1961-1975; Taylor, Maxwell D. (Maxwell Davenport), 1901-1987; Ambassadors
-
Location
-
Saigon, South Vietnam
-
Coordinates
-
10.8231; 106.6297
-
Size
-
20 x 26 cm
-
Container
-
B66, F12
-
Format
-
dispatches
-
Collection Number
-
MS 363
-
Collection Title
-
Beverly Deepe Keever, Journalism Papers
-
Creator
-
Keever, Beverly Deepe
-
Collector
-
Keever, Beverly Deepe
-
Copyright Information
-
These images are for educational use only. To inquire about usage or publication, please contact Archives & Special Collections.
-
Publisher
-
Archives & Special Collections
-
Language
-
English
