Article about Ambassador Taylor's first high-priority task

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363-05580 to 363-05586.pdf

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363-05580 to 363-05586

Title

Article about Ambassador Taylor's first high-priority task

Description

Original title: "taylor-revisions", Keever's title: "U.S. General-Turned-Ambassador Taylor sees Vietnam", article about American Ambassador Maxwell D. Taylor's first high-priority task

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Draft transcripts were automatically generated via Google Document AI and are currently under review. Please report significant errors to Archives & Special Collections at archives@unl.edu.

Transcript

deepe taylor--revisions delete pages 4, 5 [deletion: , 6] of previously airexpressed story and replace with following: The first high-priority task Taylor assigned to himself upon his July 7th arrival was to strengthen coordination of activities within the American mission and then [deletion: to] concurrently to set up a joint Vietnamese government-U.S. mission coordinating committee which would routinely meet to discuss day-to-day implementation of key [deletion: problems] programs in the country. During one such meeting, for example, the vast medical program--which cuts across various Vietnamese ministeries plus military chain of command [deletion: in] and into the American military and economic programs--was reviewed in detail to strengthen the coordination of all agencies and services, both American and Vietnamese. Foreign diplomats view this coordination “as better than it ever has been” and a 180 degree reversal of Taylor’s predecessor, Henry Cabot Lodge, who “played his cards close to his vest and never told his staff anything.” But, foreign diplomats also believe the results are less than hoped for because of other factors--Taylor has had to work with two new Vietnamese governments in his five-month [deletion: period] [illegible] including a complete changeover of all ministers, as well as a little-noticed “American coup” within the mission. deepe taylor revision--2 Taylor brought with him [deletion: the] a first-rate [deletion: personal staff for] Embassy staff, including deputy Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson, an expert on Far Eastern affairs, plus William H. Sullivan, former head of Vietnam task force in Washington, who were to assist in the strengthening of coordination. Sullivan left here last month, officially with “mission accomplished,” but no sooner had he departed than a [XXXX indicating deletion] vicious battle broke out in the U.S. Agency for International Development, which lead to the resignation of a Sullivan-appointed counterinsurgency expert, Dr. George K. Tanham, in protest against the views of the AID director here. While the Vietnamese [XXXX indicating deletion] side had experienced [deletion: a downward plume plummeting of] a continual downward trend towards political instability, if not anarchy, the “American coup” [deletion: had also] [XXXX indicating deletion] partly initiated by Taylor, resulted in day-to-day incohesiveness within the American ranks. There has been such a rapid turnover of American personnel--in the highest echelon--of each key American agency that a current American joke here is “If my boss calls, get his name.” Since the beginning of the year, the heads of the Central Intelligence Agency, United States Information Service, Agency for International Development and the American Embassy--all the agencies on the American civilian side--plus the commander of the Military Assistance Command-Viet Nam- have been changed. Some of these personnel changes were initiated under Lodge, but they peaked with the arrival of Taylor in July, which caused a lack of continuity in day-to-day implementation of policy. deepe taylor revision--3 Long time specialists in foreign embassies were only slightly less than appalled at the result, as one explained, “that now everyone istrying to solve the problems with the same solutions we tried three years ago--the solutions did not work then and will not work now.” The whirlwind of personnel changes--which centered around Taylor--resulting from the “American coup” touched off a vast chain reaction within Vietnamese political circles which became a direct, if not a major contributor to the deterioration of the political situation within the past few months. For, Henry Cabot Lodge maintained immense prestige among Vietnamese circles--particularly among the Buddhist ranks who generously credited him with helping to overthrow the Ngo Dinh Diem regime last year. Once Taylor arrived however, they were longer obliged to grant this prestige [deletion: to] and popularity to [deletion: Taylor] him and began to launch a stream of anti-American, and vaguely pro-neutralist, propaganda. One the military side, Lodge, often called “the American Mandarin” was at such odds with the American military commander--another Bostonian Gen. Paul D. Harkins--that they would not even speak to each other on the same [insertion: [illegible]] plane. But the easy-going gracious manner of Harkins was soon to be replaced by the gung-ho [deletion: spirit] [illegible] of [deletion: ano] a younger Westpointer named Gen. William C. Westmoreland, who soon began to be known in the words of one Vietnamese general “as a child without any idea of insurgency warfare.” While Lodge and Harkins were acknowledged to be at odds they were solidly in agreement on one [insertion: [illegible]] point--that General Nguyen Khanh, then prime minister should remain the strongman in Viet Nam. deepe taylor re visions--4 The strong total support for the [insertion: 37-year-old] goateed-general was the foundation of American policy [XXXX indicating deletion] from the time he entered the Prime Minister Office after his January 30th coup until the departure of Lodge in June. One July 7th, the American policy [deletion: had] [illegible] not changed--but the American Ambassador and his staff did--and this was the key to touching off an immense chain reaction of events [deletion: which lead to the polit] leading to political disaster. Taylor began to [deletion: see] visit Khanh’s political and military [deletion: re] rivals, primarily Gen. Duong Van Minh, who Taylor had [XXXX indicating deletion] played tennis with during the Diem days. Many observers believe that for the first two weeks Taylor was attempting to [deletion: unify] bring together the personalities of Khanh and Minh to help capture popular support for the Khanh government. This failed disasterously; whatever was the relationship between Taylor, Minh and Khanh the key factor was that in the minds of Saigonese,--and in the view of Khanh himself--the Americans had withdrawn exclusive support from him. Khanh and Taylor soon became deadlocked in an official policy battle--for two weeks after Taylor’s arrival Khanh launched his famed “Go North” policy of liberation North Viet Nam, which Taylor made great pains to [deletion: openly condemned and max clarified] clarify was NOT American policy. Early in August, however, Khanh backed down from his “Go North” campaign, explained [insertion: [illegible]] it was to be a “psychological” invasion rather than military invasion. deepe taylor revisions--5 Only a few days later, however, the first Tonkin incident erupted and American planes bombed North Vietnamese military installations. Indirectly, and [deletion: briefly,] momentarily, American policy had implemented Khanh’s “Go North” campaign; he and his ministers were so jubilant they served champagne in a Cabinet meeting during the Tonkin gulf crisis. By this time, however, it was [XXXX indicating deletion] apparent--whether justified or not--to Khanh and to [deletion: everyone] every other Saigonese in military and political circles that Khanh had lost the exclusivity of American support. By losing total American support, Khanh had also lost the great weight of stability produced by the money [deletion: and] material and men of the American effort. It is doubtful, in the view of observers here, that American policy shifted away from Khanh--or that Taylor intentionally de-emphasized American support of Khanh; nevertheless, expertly launched rumors by “tricky-minded” Vietnamese politicians indicated that Khanh had lost totality of American support. And three weeks later, the political situation crumbled into a state of disaster, if not anarchy, On Taylor’s 63rd birthday--August 26th and less than two months of being Ambassador--the political deterioration became anarchy as student demonstration [insertion: [illegible]] lawlessness of street urchins routed Khanh from the prime minister’s office and bloody religious warfare broke out in the northern provinces. [deletion: For the] During the critical eight days [deletion: during] of the upheaval when the fate of Viet Nam--and the fate of the anti-Communist war effort--hung in balance, Taylor did not discuss with Khanh the problems--or alternative solutions. deepe taylor revisions-- [deletion: 5] 6 It was during this crisis that the key operative principle of the Taylor tenure became apparent--and which Taylor [insertion: [illegible]] emphasized in recent talks with Vietnamese leaders upon returning from Washington discussions with [deletion: Joh] President Johnson--that America would not interfere in Vietnamese political in-fighting, that the Vietnamese must build their own strong stable government, and that this stable government would be a prerequisite for any [insertion: [illegible] supported] major expansion of the war effort outside the borders of Viet Nam. Taylor’s school of thought ran directly counter to the view of hard-line [deletion: military] foreign and American military experts who contended Vietnam was so important to the interests of the free world that the West must take steps to interfere more, if necessary, into the Vietnamese political arena in order to effectively prosecute the anti-Communist war. Following the August debacle, Khanh’s policy was simply one of survival--which he succeeded in--and Taylor’s policy was simply to keep thing the lid on Vietnamese events until after the President election last month. He [insertion: also] succeeded [deletion: also]. But since then, the civilian government which [deletion: succeeded] followed Khanh [XXXX indicating deletion] has been confronted with the same political opponents [deletion: as Khanh]--pro-Buddhist demonstrators clamoring for more freedom instead of more security and possible Communist subversives nibbling away at the foundations of any political stability within South Viet Nam. deepe taylor revisions--6 7 Since Taylor returned from Washington last week after top-level discussions with President Johnson, the political and military problems have grown more visible as reports of conflicts among Vietnamese generals circulated through Saigon, compounded by rumors of [insertion: a] coup d’etat and unusual “practice” alerts in which Cabinet ministers and generals rushed to their offices at midnight last week. Many observers believe that the changes in American policy--if any--as the result of the Taylor conferences in Washington are in a state of preparation and only the coming weeks will bring them into the open. Some observers believe that after five months in the Ambassador’s Office, Taylor is now confronted with the same choices on [deletion: internation] internal [deletion: -30-] Vietnamese matters that he faced when he [XXXX indicating deletion] arrived in Viet Nam on July 7th--to bestow again total American political support on Gen. Khanh, not only in his post of Commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces but also as the central figure in a new government, or to flounder as Vietnam has done in the past five months in a limbo of political instability and whirlwind changes of government, [deletion: none] all of them commanding popular disapproval. (Uppick last para page 5, if wanted, x x x despite the pressures. x x x

Date

1964, Nov. 28

Subject

Vietnam War, 1961-1975; Taylor, Maxwell D. (Maxwell Davenport), 1901-1987; United States--Foreign relations--Vietnam (Republic); Visits of state; Diplomacy

Location

Saigon, South Vietnam

Coordinates

10.8231; 106.6311

Size

20 x 26 cm

Container

B187, F1

Format

dispatches

Collection Number

MS 363

Collection Title

Beverly Deepe Keever, Journalism Papers

Creator

Keever, Beverly Deepe

Copyright Information

These images are for educational use only. To inquire about usage or publication, please contact Archives & Special Collections.

Publisher

Archives & Special Collections, University of Nebraska-Lincoln Libraries

Language

English