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derivative filename/jpeg
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363-05580 to 363-05586.pdf
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Digital Object Identifier
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363-05580 to 363-05586
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Title
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Article about Ambassador Taylor's first high-priority task
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Description
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Original title: "taylor-revisions", Keever's title: "U.S. General-Turned-Ambassador Taylor sees Vietnam", article about American Ambassador Maxwell D. Taylor's first high-priority task
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Transcript
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- Page 1
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deope
taylor revisions
delete pages 4, 5, 6 of previously airexpressed story and replace with
following:
The first high-priority taks task Taylor assigned to himself
upon his July 7th arrival was to strengthen coordination of activities within
the American mission and then to concurrently to set up a joint
Vietnamese government-U. S. mission coordinating committee which would
routinely meet to discuss day-to-day implementation of key problems
in the country.
During one such meeting, for exmap example, the vast
medical program which outs across various Vietnamese ministeries plus
military a chain of command in and into the American military and economic
progrens-was reviewed in detail to strengthen the cor coordination of all
agencies and sorvies, services, both American and Vietnamese.
Foreign diplomats view this coordination "as better than it ever
has been" and a 180 degree reversal of Taylor's predecessor, Honry Cabot
Lodge, who "played his cards close to his vest and never told his staff
anything."
But, foreign diplomats also believe the results are less than
Ex hoped for because of other factors-Taylor has had to work with two
new Vietnamese governments in his five-month period, including a complete
changeover of all ministers, as well as a little-noticed "American coup"
within the mission.
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- Page 2
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deepe
taylor revision-2
Taylor brought with him thm a first-rate personal staff for
Embassy staff, including deputy Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson, an expert on
Far Far Eastern affairs, plus William H. Sullivan, former head of
Vietnam task force in Washington, who were to assist in the strengthen
strengthening of coordination. Sullivan left here last month, officially
with "mission accomplished," but no sooner had he departed than a
£ vioious battle broke out in the U. S. Agency for International
Development, which lead to the resignation of a Sullivan-appointed
counterinsurgency expert, Dr. George K. Tanham, in protest against the
views of the AID director hero.
While the Vietnamese po side had experienced a downward
plume plummeting-of
a continual downward trend towards pl political
instability, it if not an anarchy, the "American coup" had also
intim partly initiated by Taylor, resulted in day-to-day incohesiveness
within the Amr American ranks. There has been such a rapid turnover of
American personnel-in the highest echelon-of each key American agency
that a current American joke here is "If my boss calls, get his name."
Since the geinn beginning of the year, the hoads of the Contral
Intelligence Agency, United States Information Service, Agency for Internationa
Development and the American Embassy-all the agencies on the American civilin
civilian side-plus the commander of the Military Assistance Command-Viet Nam-
have been changed.
Some of these personnel changes were initiated under Lodge, but
they peaked with the arrival of Taylor in July, which caused a lack of
continuity in day-to-day implementation of policy,
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- Page 3
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deepe
taylor revision--3
Long time specialists in foreign embassies were only alightly
less than appaled a eppalled at the result, as one explained, "that now
everyone intrying to solve the problems with the same solutions wo triod
three years ago the solutions did not work thon and will not work now."
The whirlwind of personnel ohangohich a centered around
Taylor resulting from the "American coup" touched off a vast chain
reaction within Vietnamoso political oiroles which became a direct, if not
a mjnor major contributor to the deterioration of the political situation
within the past fow months.
For, Henry Cabot Lodgo maintained immense prestige among Vietnamese
oirolos particularly among the Buddhist ranks who # generously credited
him with helping to overthrow the Ngo Dinh ndom regime last year. Onco
Taylor arrived however, they wore longor obliged to grant this
pretic prentice to and popularity to Taylor and began to launch a
stream of anti-American, and vaguely pro-neutralist, propaganda.
One the military side, Lodge, often called "the American
Mandarin" was at such odds with the American military commander-another
Bostonian Gon. Paul D. Harkins that they would not even speak to each
other on the same plano. But the easy-going gracious manner of Hoskins
was soon to be replaced by the gung-ho spirt of # ano a younger
Westpointer named Oon. William C. Westmoreland, who soon began to
be known in the words of one Vietnamese nor general "as a child without
any idea of insurgonoy warfare."
While Lodge and Harkins were acknowledged to be at odds a
they wore solidly in agreement on one point--that General Nguyen Khanh,
then prime minister should remain the strongman in Viot Nam.
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- Page 4
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deepe
taylor re visions--4
The strong total suppir support for the goateed-gonoral was the
foundation of American policy in from the time he entered the
Prime Minister Office aftor his January 30th coup until the departure of
Lodge in June.
One July 7th, the Amri American policy had not changed--but the
American Ambassador and his staff did--and this was the looy to touching
off an immense chain reaction of events which tend to the polit leading to
political disaster.
Taylor began to sce Khanh's p91 political and military ro rivals,
primarly Gen. Duong Van Minh, who Taylor had kn
played tonnis with during the Diom days. Many observers believe that fo
the first two wocks Taylor was attempting to unify bring together the
personalities of Khanh and Minh to help capture populer support for the
Chord overl This failed disasterously; whatever was the ka
relationship betwoon Taylor, Minh and Khanh the key factor was that in
the minds of Saigonese,and in the view of Khanh himself-the Americans
had withdrawn exclusive support from him. Khanh and Taylor soon
booame deadlocked in an official policy battle-for two weeks after Taylor's
arrival Khanh launched his famed "Go North" policy of liboration North
Viet Nam, which Taylor made great pains to openly condome condemned and
max olarifiod was NOT American policy.
Early in August, however, Khanh baoked down from his "Go North"
campaign, oxplained it was to be a "psychological" invasion rather than
military invasion.
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deepe
taylor revisions-5
Only a few days later, however, the first Tonkin incident
erupted and American planes bombed North Vietnamese military installations.
Indirectly, and briefly momentarily, American policy had implemented
Khanh's "Go North" campaign; he and his ministers wore so jubilant they
served en champagne in a Cabinet meeting during the Tonkin gulf crisis.
By this time, however, it was that apparont-whether
justified or not-to Khanh and to every other Saigonese in military and
political circles that Khanh had lost the exclusivity of American
support.
By losing a total American support, Khanh had also lost the
great weight of stability produced by the money and material and men of
the American effort. It is doubtful, in the view of observers here, tha t
American policy shifted away from Khanh-or that Taylor intentionally
de-emphasized American support of Khanh; nevertheless,
expertly launched
And three weeks later,t the
rumors by "tricky-minded" Vietnamese politicians indicated that Khanh
had lost totality of American support.
political situation crumbled into a state of disaster, if not anarchy,
On Taylor's 63rd birthday-August 26th and less than two months of being
Ambassador the political deterioration became anarchy as student demonstration
lawlessness of street urchin urchins routed Khanh from the prime minister's
office and blood religious warfare broke out in the northern provinces.
For the
During the critical eight days during the upheaval when the fate
of Viet Nama nd the fate of the anti-Communist war effort-nh hung in
balance, Taylor did not discuss with Khanh the problems--or alternative
solutions.
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deepe
taylor revisions-5
It was during this orisis that the key operative principle of the
Taylor tenure became apparent--and which Taylor emphasized in recent talks
with Vietnamese leaders upon returning from Washington discussions with
President Johnson--that America would not interfer in Vietnamese
political in-fighting, that the Vietnamese must build their own
strong stable government, and that this stable government would be
a prerequisited for any major expansion of the war effort outside the
borders of Viet Nam.
Taylor's school of thought ran directly counter to the view of
hard-line military foreign and American military experts who contended
Vietnam was so important to the interests of the free world that
the West must take steps to interfere more, if necessary, into the
Vietnamese political arena in order to effectively prosecute the anti-
Communist war.
Following the August debacle, Khanh's policy was simply one of
survival which he succeeded in-and Taylor's policy was simply to keep thing
the lid on Vietnamese events until after the President election last month.
He succeeded also.
But since then, the civilian government which succeeded
has been confronted with the same political
opponents as Khanh-pro-Buddhist demonstrators à clamoring for more freedom
instead of more security and possible Communist subversives nibbling away
at the foundations of any political stability within South Viet Nam.
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- Page 7
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deepe
taylor rovisions-6
Since Taylor returned from Washington last wook after top-level
discussions with President Johnson, the political and military problems
a have grown more visible as reports of conflicts among Vietnamese generals
circulated through Saigon, compounded by rumors of coup d'etat and
unusual "practice" alerts in which Cabinet ministers and generale rushed
to their offices at midnight last wook.
Many observers believe that the changes in American policy-12
any as the result of the Taylor conferences in Washington are in a state
of preparation and only the coming weeks will bring them into the opon.
Some observers believe that after five months in the Ambassador's Office,
Taylor is now confronted with the same choices on internation internal
Vietnamese matters that ho fhood when he arrived in Viet Nem on
July 7th to bestow again total American political support on Gon. Khanh,
not only in his post of Commander-in-chief of the Arnod Fosoos but also
as the central figure in a now government,
ar to flounior aa Vietnam
has done in the past five months in a limbo of political instability and
whirlwind changes of government, one of thom commanding populer
disapproval.
(Uppick last para page 5, if wanted, xxx despite the pressurecz z :
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Date
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1964, Nov. 28
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Subject
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Vietnam War, 1961-1975; Taylor, Maxwell D. (Maxwell Davenport), 1901-1987; United States--Foreign relations--Vietnam (Republic); Visits of state; Diplomacy
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Location
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Saigon, South Vietnam
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Coordinates
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10.8231; 106.6311
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Size
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20 x 26 cm
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Container
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B187, F1
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Format
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dispatches
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Collection Number
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MS 363
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Collection Title
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Beverly Deepe Keever, Journalism Papers
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Creator
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Keever, Beverly Deepe
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Copyright Information
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These images are for educational use only. To inquire about usage or publication, please contact Archives & Special Collections.
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Publisher
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Archives & Special Collections, University of Nebraska-Lincoln Libraries
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Language
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English
