

deepe

taylor--revisions

delete pages 4, 5, 6 of previously aexpressed story and replace with following:

The first high-priority task Taylor assigned ~~2~~ to himself upon his July 7th arrival was to strengthen coordination of activities within the American mission and then ~~in~~ concurrently to set up a joint Vietnamese government-U. S. mission coordinating committee which would routinely meet to discuss day-to-day implementation of key problems in the country. During one such meeting, for ~~exmap~~ example, the vast medical program--which cuts across various Vietnamese ministries plus military ~~ex~~ chain of command ~~in~~ and into the American military and economic programs--was reviewed in detail to strengthen the ~~cor~~ coordination of all agencies and services, services, both American and Vietnamese.

Foreign diplomats view this coordination "as better than it ever has been" and a 180 degree reversal of Taylor's predecessor, Henry Cabot Lodge, who "played his cards close to his vest and never told his staff anything."

But, foreign diplomats also believe the results are less than ~~ex~~ hoped for because of other factors--Taylor has had to work with two new Vietnamese governments in his five-month period, including a complete changeover of all ministers, as well as a little-noticed "American coup" within the mission~~s~~.

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taylor revision--2

Taylor brought with him ~~him~~ a first-rate personal staff for Embassy staff, including deputy Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson, an expert on Far Far Eastern affairs, plus William H. Sullivan, former head of Vietnam task force in Washington, who were to assist in the strengthen strengthening of coordination. Sullivan left here last month, officially with "mission accomplished," but no sooner had he departed than a ~~fixx~~ vicious battle broke out in the U. S. Agency for International Development, which lead to the resignation of a Sullivan-appointed counterinsurgency expert, Dr. George K. Tanham, in protest against the views of the AID director here.

While the Vietnamese ~~ps~~ side had experienced a downward plume plummeting of a continual downward trend towards pl political instability, it if not a n anarchy, the "American coup" had also ~~indium~~ partly initiated by Taylor, resulted in day-to-day incohesiveness within the Amr American ranks. There has been such a rapid turnover of American personnel--in the highest echelon--of each key American agency that a current American joke here is "If my boss calls, get his name."

Since the geim beginning of the year, the heads of the Central Intelligence Agency, United States Information Service, Agency for International Development and the American Embassy--all the agencies on the American civilin civilian side--plus the commander of the Military Assistance Command-Viet Nam--have been changed.

Some of these personnel changes were initiated under Lodge, but they peaked with the arrival of Taylor in July, which caused a lack of continuity in day-to-day implementation of policy.

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taylor revision--3

Long-time specialists in foreign embassies were only slightly less than appaled a appalled at the result, as one explained, "that now everyone is trying to solve the problems with the same solutions we tried three years ago--the solutions did not work then and will not work now."

The whirlwind of personnel changes--which s centered around Taylor-- resulting from the "American coup" touched off a vast chain reaction within Vietnamese political circles which became a direct, if not a mjaor major contributor to the deterioration of the political situation within the past few months.

For, Henry Cabot Lodge maintained immense prestige among Vietnamese circles--particularly among the Buddhist ranks who x generously credited him with helping to overthrow the Ngo Dinh Diem regime last year. Once Taylor arrived however, they were longer obliged to grant this pretig prestige to and popularity to Taylor and began to launch a stream of anti-American, and vaguely pro-neutralist, propoganda.

One the military side, Lodge, often called "the American Mandarin" was at such odds with the American military commander--another Bostonian Gen. Paul D. Harkins--that they would not even speak to each other on the same plane. But the easy-going gracious manner of Harkins was soon to be replaced by the gung-ho spirt of s and a younger Westpointer named Gen. William C. Westmoreland, who soon began to be known in the words of one Vietnamese gner general "as a child without any idea of insurgency warfare."

While Lodge and Harkins were acknowledged to be at odds x they were solidly in agreement on one point--that General Nguyen Khanh, then prime minister should remain the strongman in Viet Nam.

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taylor re visions--4

The strong total supp support for the goateed-general was the foundation of American policy ~~algorithm~~ from the time he entered the Prime Minister Office after his January 30th coup until the departure of Lodge in June.

On July 7th, the ~~Amri~~ American policy had not changed--but the American Ambassador and his staff did--and this was the key to touching off an immense chain reaction of events ~~which lead~~ to the polit leading to political disaster.

Taylor began to ~~see~~ Khanh's ^{US} political and military re rivals, primarily Gen. Duong Van Minh, who Taylor had ~~known from childhood~~ played tennis with during the Diem days. Many observers believe that for the first two weeks Taylor was attempting to unify bring together the personalities of Khanh and Minh to help capture popular support for the Khanh government. This failed disastrously; whatever was the ~~ms~~ relationship between Taylor, Minh and Khanh the key factor was that in the minds of Saigonese,--and in the view of Khanh himself--the Americans had withdrawn exclusive support from him. Khanh and Taylor soon became deadlocked in an official policy battle--for two weeks after Taylor's arrival Khanh launched his famed "Go North" policy of liberation North Viet Nam, which Taylor made great pains to ~~openly condemn~~ condemned and ~~max clarified~~ was NOT American policy.

Early in August, however, Khanh backed down from his "Go North" campaign, explained it was to be a "psychological" invasion rather than military invasion.

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taylor revisions--5

Only a few days later, however, the first Tonkin incident erupted and American planes bombed North Vietnamese military installations. Indirectly, and briefly, momentarily, American policy had implemented Khanh's "Go North" campaign; he and his ministers were so jubilant they served ~~an~~ champagne in a Cabinet meeting during the Tonkin gulf crisis.

By this time, however, it was ~~obvious~~ apparent--whether justified or not--to Khanh and to ~~every~~ other Saigonese in military and political circles that Khanh had lost the exclusivity of American support. By losing ~~an~~ total American support, Khanh had also lost the great weight of stability produced by the money and material and men of the American effort. It is doubtful, in the view of observers here, that American policy shifted away from Khanh--or that Taylor intentionally de-emphasized American support of Khanh; nevertheless, expertly launched rumors by "tricky-minded" Vietnamese politicians indicated that Khanh had lost totality of American support. And three weeks later, the political situation crumbled into a state of disaster, if not anarchy. On Taylor's 63rd birthday--August 26th and less than two months of being Ambassador--the political deterioration became anarchy as student demonstration lawlessness of street urchin urchins routed Khanh from the prime minister's office and blood religious warfare broke out in the northern provinces.

For the

During the critical eight days during the upheaval when the fate of Viet Nam--and the fate of the anti-Communist war effort--was hung in balance, Taylor did not discuss with Khanh the problems--or alternative solutions.

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taylor revisions--5

It was during this crisis that the key operative principle of the Taylor tenure became apparent--and which Taylor emphasized in recent talks with Vietnamese leaders upon returning from Washington discussions with ~~the~~ President Johnson--that America would not interfere in Vietnamese political in-fighting, that the Vietnamese must build their own strong stable government, and that this stable government would be a prerequisite for any major expansion of the war effort outside the borders of Viet Nam.

Taylor's school of thought ran directly counter to the view of hard-line military foreign and American military experts who contended Vietnam was so important to the interests of the free world that the West must take steps to interfere more, if necessary, into the Vietnamese political arena in order to effectively prosecute the anti-Communist war.

Following the August debacle, Khanh's policy was simply one of survival--which he succeeded in--and Taylor's policy was simply to keep the lid on Vietnamese events until after the President election last month. He succeeded also.

But since then, the civilian government which succeeded Khanh ~~has been~~ has been confronted with the same political opponents as Khanh--pro-Buddhist demonstrators clamoring for more freedom instead of more security and possible Communist subversives nibbling away at the foundations of any political stability within South Viet Nam.

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taylor revisions—67

Since Taylor returned from Washington last week after top-level discussions with President Johnson, the political and military problems have grown more visible as reports of conflicts among Vietnamese generals circulated through Saigon, compounded by rumors of coup d'etat and unusual "practice" alerts in which Cabinet ministers and generals rushed to their offices at midnight last week.

Many observers believe that the changes in American policy—if any—as the result of the Taylor conferences in Washington are in a state of preparation and only the coming weeks will bring them into the open. Some observers believe that after five months in the Ambassador's Office, Taylor is now confronted with the same choices on international internal Vietnamese matters ⁻³⁰⁻ that he faced when he ~~arrived~~ arrived in Viet Nam on July 7th—to bestow again total American political support on Gen. Khanh, not only in his post of Commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces but also as the central figure in a new government, or to flounder as Vietnam has done in the past five months in a limbo of political instability and whirlwind changes of government, ^{PH} none of them commanding popular disapproval.

(Uppick last para page 5, if wanted, x x x despite the pressures x x x