Article about potential Việt Cộng tactics

Item

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363-07784 to 363-07792.pdf
Digital Object Identifier
363-07784 to 363-07792
Title
Article about potential Việt Cộng tactics
Description
Original title: "War", Keever's title: "Vietnam War: 'A Sinking Ship'", Article draft about the potential military and political tactics of the Việt Cộng, for the New York Herald Tribune
Transcript
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- Page 1
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Beverly Deepe
101 Ong l
Saigon
Pago War
SAICON--Ten months ago, a Western diplomat described the
anti-Communist war inVietnam as "a ship with all the sails flapping, but not
going anywhere." This weck, the same diplomat lamented, "Now the ship is
sinking."
the
The prevailing mood of pessimism inning is based one
current instability and uncertainity of the Saigon on the one
hand and the expectations of a political-military offensive t by the
pro-Commist Viet Cong guerrillas on the other hand.
This is a sun-up of the views of political-military sources
in now look at the tangled situations
(More)
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Deverly Deepe
101 Cong Ly;Saigon
War--1
Valternate
Land.
Saigon Reliable military sources report pro-Communist Viet Cong
guerrillas are moving heavily-equipped battalions to concentrate their
military strength in a "strangulating are" inng
Bendicinale
of provinces around Saigon.
(See map.)
Sources believe the purpose of troop movements of classified
number of battalions is not for direct military attacks om Saigon, but for
the establishment of the proper "political climate" in this capital city
already rent with political uncertainties one Vietnam
"This political climate is not necessary necessarily neutralism
as the Communists wanted six months ago,"
explained.
"They do not need that now.
absolute accommodation to whatever the
one reliable Western military source
They're now strong enough to expect
They can wish to dictate."
(More)
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Deepe
War-2
A mysterious, momentary period of relative inactivity by the
Viet Cong, has given the Vietnamese government forces a brief breathing time
SIGHT
for progress in military operations and a the sister program of
pacifying with social-economic-political means the civilian population.
government
Ces
However,
these tactics of t
forces are bracing themselves for the time when this
"ominous lull" are abandoned by the pro-Communists for refgmen regimental-
controlled operations against district towns and provincial capitals.
"The Viet Cong will try to use regimental sized units," one
only General Nguyen Khanh,
high-ranking Vietnamese officer (informatively
prime minister) conceded. "They are quite capable of doing this and are
willing to do so. But they will never have to force to hold. We (the government
forces) can go anywhere we like to."
Mili taps
°
Military sources say that the Viet Cong have already in the past
three months conducted well-coordinated operations of three-battalion strenght.
In one of these last month, two battalions simultaneously attacked
five outposts, but the third was positioned to ambush reinforcements.
ambush samimmmby inflicted serious casualties om an elite Ranger company.
(More)
[Pickup 2A
The
on other Staticle]
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Deepe
Wan-3A
Seme
Some military sources
A American military sources attribute the "ominous lull" of the
Viet Cong to the success of more than 6,000 mall-unit pa trols, many of them
st night. Other American sources note that Viet Cong activities always
flow in cycles; with periods of rest and training alternated between
military offensives. Sone Vietnamese officers, who fourh fought with the
Communist guerrillas during the Pranch Indo-"hina War, believe that the
Viet Cong are writing their semi-annual reports to superior headquarters end
resting aftor securing their loot during the rice harvest season.
(my)
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deepe
1. Pro-Commist Viet Cong guerrillas are now moving
well-equipped battalions to concentrate their strength in a "strangulating
arof in the provinces around Saigon, according to reliable military sources.
(See map.)
The troop movement from the lower Mekong Delta region, known
as IV Corps--which the Viet Cong already assume they a dominate-to more than
half dozen provinces around Saigon,, increases the guerrilla's capability
for regiment-controlled attacks against all district towns and many provincial
towns around Saigon.
"The Viet Cong will try to use regimental-sized units," one
high-ranking Vietnamese officer predicted. (Informatively only-General Nguyen
Khanh, prime minister). "The are quite capable of doing this and are willing to
do so. But they will have never the force to hold a position. We (the government)
can go anywhere we like to."
Some military sources believe that the Viet Cong have already in the
past three months condutos conducted a well-coordinated operations of three-battalion
strength. In one of these last month, two battalions simultaneously attacked
five outposts, but the third was positioned to ambush reinforcements, which
inflicted heavy casualties on an elite Ranger company.
(More)
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Deepe
Waz--3
2a This acknowledged threat of Viet Cong reglemental-zi
regimental-sized operations brings the crucial--and final-Third Phase
which lead to the disasterous defeat of
Irons
of guerrilla warfare,
at Dion Bien Phu ming
in 1954.
which ended the Indo-China War
Tse-Tung,
In the Third Phase, described in the military writings of Mao
small guerrilla bands with a support of the population consolidate
For the
into conventional warfare units, but they operate along a mobile frontline,
to produce what Mao calls "decision or destruction of the enemy."
first time in the war, government officials have been picking up Viet Cong
propaganda appealing for popular support during
war."
this decisive phase of the
However, military sources hore do believe the por pro-Communist
units will attempt a showdown battle in one place, but will attempt
in meny places.
"We're not going to have a Dien Bien Phu," one military officer
a hundred
explained, "but many si
small-or-scale Dien Bien Phus."
Sobolra Scholars of guerrilla warfare say that there is little
hope of destroying a revolutionary guerrilla movement after it has survived the
first phase (organization and consolidation) and has acquired the sympathetic
support of significant numbers of the people.
(See notes of Samuel B.
Briggith in Mao Tse-Tung on Querrilla Warfare; page 27).
(More)
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Deepe
Waz4
3. However, despite this concentrated military threat,
observers believe the Viet Cong are not interested in military victories,
but in producing the "proper politicel olimate" in this capital city
already rent with political uncertainty.
"This polition) at climate is not necessarily neutralism:
as the Commmiste wented six months ago," one reliable Western military source
explained. "They do not need that now. They're now strong enough to
expect absolute accommodation to whatever they wish to dictate."
Simultaneous with this consistent, spootacular military offensive,
which is expected during the monsoon season lasting until October, the
bowen "invisible" political subversion of the
pro-Gomunist elements is becoming increasingly evident in Saigon and other
urban centers. The prime focus is on current Catholic-Buddhist tensions.
Many persons believe both the Catholic and Buddhist organisations are either
infiltrated of influenced by the Viet Congs almost everyone solnowledges
that even if this is not true, the Viet Cong more then eneste any other element
benefits from these dissensions.
"We know these regions religious tensions are part of the
Viet Cong strategy," a high-ranking Vietnamese security officer lemented.
"But we can not prove who their agents are."
(More)
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Deepe
Other reliable sources note that 18 oz of the more than 30
Vietnamese-language newspapers in Saigon have Viet Cong a gents on their
staffs. But the security source z explained, "the government dare not
arrest those people because they are close associates of powerful economio
interests and high-ranking government officials."
"Bobdind all this anti-government talk is the Buddhists, Catholics,
political parties," one militant Vietnamese anti-Communist explained. "And
behind them are the Viet Cong. And behind the Viet Cong are the French,"
who during the past 2 ton months have proposed a noutralist settlement for
South Viet Nam and an allied themselves with the Communists in proposed
Laotian and Cambodian at conferences.
5. While the Viet Cong political agitation has resulted in
dissensions and uncertainties insaigon, the inherent weaknesses withing the
Saigon government has done likewise.
"There's a Crisis in leadership and a crisis in confidence in
the Vietnamese government," a university professor explained, A growing four
persists among the Indien and Chinese business community; middle-class parents
are attempting to get their children out of the country; young adrien married
couples try to secure false French citizenship papers or to smuggle themselves
over the Cambodian border. Exit permits are becoming increasingly prized.
of 22 younge
pool,
am English-speaking Vietnamese working in a translating
eight are trying to leave Viet Nam. Vietnamese now in exile in Paris and
the United States are relect reluctant to return upon the request of the government.
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T
Deape
Tar-6
Speculation of a pending government reshuffle along the lines
of de- de Culle's France has not become ontangled with
the persistent threat of a violent military coup d'etat against prime minister
Generel Nguyen Khenh. But even the Tex intellectuals in Saigon are in
disagreement as to whom should be named as a new strongman to replace
the energetic goateed general, who has been caught in a cris crossfire between
hisz the Catholic-Buddhist tensions, botwoon various factions of Vietnam's
flm flimsy political partions between in-fighting within his own military
junta.
In fact, about the only point of agreement at all is, as one
Vietnamese intellectual explained, "the Vietnamese government is at the end
of something and the beginning of something now. Tut knobody knows what's
going to happon."
-30-
(Notes
Source for most of the first two pages of this is Col. Serong,
head of the Australian Training theem hore. He's on Gon. Harkins staff and
Io forecasted
everytime I've interviewed him, he turned out to be right.
the collapse of the strategie hamlet program months before it happeneds
he's seen Communist taotion in Burma and Malaya and is generally considered
an excellent source.)
Date
1964, Jun.
Subject
Vietnam War, 1961-1975; Mặt trận dân tộc giải phóng miền nam Việt Nam; Tactics; Strategy
Location
Saigon, South Vietnam
Coordinates
10.8231; 106.6311
Size
20 x 26 cm
Container
B3, F7
Format
dispatches
Collection Number
MS 363
Collection Title
Beverly Deepe Keever, Journalism Papers
Creator
Keever, Beverly Deepe
Collector
Keever, Beverly Deepe
Copyright Information
These images are for educational use only. To inquire about usage or publication, please contact Archives & Special Collections.
Publisher
Archives & Special Collections, University of Nebraska-Lincoln Libraries
Language
English