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derivative filename/jpeg
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363-05463 to 363-05471.pdf
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Digital Object Identifier
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363-05463 to 363-05471
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Title
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Article about the astrology of 1964
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Description
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Original title: "Dragon", Keever's title: "Chinese New Year sees 1965 as deciding wether U.S can ever win the war", Article about the astrology of 1964 being the year of Dragon and predictions of big upheavals, published by the New York Herald Tribune
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Transcript
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doope
dragon--1
dec. 28, 1964
SAIGON-By the Chinese lunar calendar, 1964 was the Year of the
Dragon, which is commonly accepted by Vietnamese historians and astrologers
of being a year of big upheavals. It was,
The year of 1965 for the Westerner will be known in the Orient
as the m Year of the Serpoent-hich is commonly nokmol acknowledgod
to be a continuation of, and a complement to, rather then a chance from the
Year of the Dragon, much as, in the worlds of one astrolgor, the
night is a continuation and a complement to the day.
The year 1964 was a pivotal turning point in the anti-Communist
the year 11 1965 will reveal the direction
political-military struggle;
and roporcussions of that pivot--and may determine the point-of-no-return
for victory against the Communist forces.
Astrolgers, military and political experts agree that 1965
is clearly the year od of decision. They believe the war con not be
lost during the year either militarily or politically-but 1965 m will
determine whothor it can over bo won.
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deepe
dragon-
dec. 28, 1964
The year 1964 was the beginning of the beginning of a now
phase in Vietnam's anti-Communist war; the year 1965 vill my uncover
the end of this beginning and may introduce a new stage in the struggle.
"In 1963, Viet Nam was a ship with all the sails flapping-but
one foreign diplomat explained.
it wasn't going anywhere,"
"In 1964,
the ship began to sink and by the end of 1964 the water was flodding
flooding the decks.
"Obviously,
the water can still be bailed out and the ship
can be saved--but 1965 will determine whether or not this is done. If it
is done,
war is not lost immediately--but it can never be won.
we still have a chance to win the war. If it isn't done-the
#
If 1964 was a year of dubious decivi decisiveness or inadvertent
indecisiveness, xxm the year 1965 will a year of specifio,
definite decisions--and the test will be how well these decisions are
keyed to solving the problems and how well they are implemented.
(More)
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7
deepe
dragon-
dec. 28, 1964
authoritarian-
which
The year 1964 began shortly after the fall of the Ngo Dinh Diem
regime; it ended on the surface with the Tran Van Huong government,
has been defor described as "an amiable, aimless anarchy."
For the astrolgers, 1963 marked the end of the 6-year half
cycle of the lunar calandars which are divided into two twelve years;
for the political observers, 1963 marked the end of the Ngo Dinh Diem
regime after nearly a decade of ruling; for the military experts, 1963
marked the end of a total drive amongm against the Communists;
future was
the
to see the war being waged against the Communists plus a
more invisible, but and hence more dangerous group which are commonly called
the "neutralists."
Thexxxx 1964 upheaval ox was an explosion of these
post-Diem political forces into the air; the year 1965 will see the
continuation of the this upheaval with the political forces, while
still in turbuoe turbulent motion, fall downwards into some sort of
unsettled order. The arrangements,
the alliances, the wars between
these political forces will determine the future of Viet Nam and the
prospects of prosecuting effectively the anti-Communist and anti-
neutralist war.
(More)
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deepe
dragon-34
dec. 28, 1964
While it appeared that 1964 saw the swing from the
authoritarian Diem regime to the anarchy of the Huong government,
in fact,
the year's events reflected the rise and fall of one man-Nguyen Khanh,
who entered the Prime Minister's Office on January 30 as a tham toe
goateed three-star general.
Add
During the year he failed to lead his nation in the anti-Communist
war a task the free world assigned to him--but he succeded suceeded to survive,
which is all Viet Nam expected of him. In 1965, the prospects according to
political observers here, and the destiny according to Vietnamese astrologers
is that Khanh will again em re-emerge,
with a stronger ps position and more
control than he weilded when he fist first came to power.
When Khanh entered the Prime Minister's Office, the American
polity, which supported him with varying degrees of effectiveness during his
fall from power,
was to build a strongman regime, aided by visits of
American Defense Secretary Robert McNamara and Secretary of State Dean Rusk.
This policy in 1964 was nota effected with sumon visible
semi-success, but not total failure. For, in 1965, this American policy
will be continued in an almost last-ditch attempt to maintain a politically
stable government with a high degree of centralized power resting in the hands
of Khanh. The prospect is that this duxigax plan will be implemented at all
costs and will succeed if at all possible-unless k Khanh is assassinated.
(More)
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deepe
dragon--5
Khanh entered the Prime Minister's Office on January 30
as the apparent strongman of the x
NU.S. BLE
an government;
smm at the end of 1964, he was the setual strongman outside the governmen
in 1965, he is expected to become the visible strongman inside the
goverment and in the whole anti-Communist sphere of influence in South
Viet Nam
When Khanh entered the Prime Minister's Office, he was in
fact only the frontman for a coalition of right-wing gner generals and
political parties; he himself considered his greatest enemies were in
N the
his rear and not the Viet Cong Communist guerrillas, At the end of
1964, he-with the help of American officials--had ins one way or another
eliminated all personal rivals x or powerful organizations which could
compete for his position. Mamm
He was clearly the invigilbe invisible strongman, who via
remote control, influenced most actions in the anti-Communist area.
But, in one important development in 1964, the totality of the
anti-Communist influence had diminished with the emergence of the
milite militant Buddhist organization lead by political priests whose
power wes rested in the masses. This powerful mass power throughout
1964 skirted a collision with the armed power of the armed forces;
1965 this will be one of the most important confi inten internal
confrontations--or compromises-which will affect the future course of
Viet Nam.
but in
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deepe
dragon-6
Im an important position paper, the Buddhist chief Buddhist
political-priest, Thich Tri Quang, explained that the his movement,
which is growing ih political importance and mass support, was against the
but also against the anti-Communists, which he clearly
Communists,
defined as the Catholics and the Americans..
And mermine
In an attempt to out-maneuver the Buddhists, who indirectly
routed him from the Prime Minister's Office in August and ignited a
savage campaign of religious warfare throughout the northern provinces,
Thanh who at the beginning of the year toured the country with
Ameriinum MoNamara, initiated a spectacular anti-American campaign,
specifically directed at American Ambassador Maxwell D. Taylor. A
massive confrontation with the Buddhists would simply drive them in the
into the arms of the Communists;
massive compromise with them
would lead x the anti-Communist elements in the country into
but a
defeat.
a n
Somehow, at the end of 1964-and continuing into 1965,
understanding between these anti-Communist forces, with focus on the Armed
Forces which Khanh now commands, and the Buddhists, which are neither
abhimm obvious allies nor open enemies of the state, amem will be
I forged. The nature of this understanding would shape the future of
the country; for the Buddhist movement is considered to be the legal
front for the Viet Cong Communists which would initiate 1 coulition
government and be exploited initiate for them and be exploited by them
a Laotian-style coalition government.
(More)
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deepe
dragon--7
The emergence of the Buddhist movement, which continuously
Binabaharumby,
attempted to undermine, subvert, if not to topple anti- American-backed
anti-Communist governments, produced a difference view of the war. While
in the past, American and Vietnamese officials had paid lipservice to the
subvervie subversive tax tactics of the Viet Cong Communists, im
1964, these subversive elements surfaced and were clearly visible; im
but were still ignored. In 1965, they will be acknowledged as
subversives, though there may the specific decision made to
contain them rather than to fight them..
Militarily, neither the strategy nor the tactics of the
anti-Communist ranged struggle were changed; but the scope and
immensity of it did. The hit and rum tactics of the guerrilla gave way
to the hit-and-run military and political confrontation between the
United States and North Vietnam,, and indirectly other Communist bloc
nations.
The cat-and-mouse gumiham na raids of the guerrilla
gave way to the tiger-and-liom pitched battles for delta outposts and
mountain hilltops, m with flashing reminisces of Korea-style conflict.
The war without a front line f of the guerrilla gave way to the war with
Mobile
the visible,
but momentary front line.
(More)
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deepe
dragon-8
The guerrillas who won once attacked in platoons and companies
have since attacked im battalion strength--with ree U. S. *made recoilles S
rifles and mortars--and maintain the capacity of attacking im
regimental strength. When once American and Vietnamese military
statisticians recorded one battalion-sized at Viet Cong attack in six weeks;
in 1964 they began recording six battalion-sized attacks in one week.
While from 1958-63, the guerrillas were consistently weaker than the
they maintained
U. S-backed Vietnamese government forces, in 1964,
momentary equilibriums in specific areas at certain times.
In short, the war ein 1964 escalated internally; im 1965
it is expected to a escalate internally and externally, principally im
Laos, perhaps also in Cambodia and North Viet Nam. In short, the big
little war hemmam in 1964 would become in 1965 "a bigger limited war."
An
According to thats
ancient managm but famous
moms book, of prophecy records two sentences which are considered
Now her
the basic points of Vietnamese history: which are/readily recalled by
astrao astrologers as the Year of the Dragom fades into the Year of the
Serpeant:
At the tail of the Dragon and at the Head of the Serpeant-
There is the beginning of the War;
Everywhere in the country the spears and the shields will be raised!
At the foot of the Horse (1966)
At the things thighs of the Goat (1967)
Many heroes will die.
During the period of the years of the Monkey (1958) and the Cock (1969
During that period
the country will see peace.
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deepe
dragon--9
Only the keepers of these mystical oracles-and the keepers
of "Top Secret" policy documents--can predict whether the dying
illusions of 1964 that victory would be easy will give birth to the
realistic decisiveness of 1965 that victory attainable.
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Date
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1964, Dec. 28
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Subject
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Vietnam War, 1961-1975; Astrology, Vietnamese; Public opinion
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Location
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Saigon, South Vietnam
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Coordinates
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10.8231; 106.6311
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Size
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20 x 26 cm
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Container
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B187, F1
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Format
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dispatches
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Collection Number
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MS 363
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Collection Title
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Beverly Deepe Keever, Journalism Papers
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Creator
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Keever, Beverly Deepe
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Copyright Information
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These images are for educational use only. To inquire about usage or publication, please contact Archives & Special Collections.
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Publisher
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Archives & Special Collections, University of Nebraska-Lincoln Libraries
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Language
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English
