deeps dregen-1

doc. 28, 1964

Dragon, which is commonly accepted by Vietnamese historians and astrologers of being a year of big upheavals. It was

The year of 1965 for the Westerner will be known in the Grient as the E Year of the Serpeant—which is commonly acknowledged to be a continuation of, and a complement to, rather than a change from the Year of the Bragon, much as, in the worlds of one estrolger, the night is a continuation and a complement to the day.

The year 1964 was a pivotal turning point in the anti-Communist political-military struggle; the year 11 1965 will reveal the direction and repercussions of that pivot—and may determine the point—of—no—return for victory against the Communist forces.

Astrolgers, military and political experts agree that 1965 is clearly the year od of decision. They believe the war can not be lost during the year either militarily or politically—but 1965 mt will determine whether it can ever be won.

deepe dragon—3

The year 1964 was the beginning of the beginning of a new phase in Vietnam's anti-Communist war; the year 1965 will my uncover the end of this beginning—and may introduce a new stage in the struggle.

"In 1963, Viet Nam was a ship with all the sails flapping—but it wasn't going anywhere," one foreign diplomat explained. "In 1964, the ship began to sink and by the end of 1964 the water was flodding flooding the decks.

"Obviously, the water can still be bailed out and the ship can be saved—but 1965 will determine whether or not this is done. If it is done, we still have a chance to win the war. If it isn't done—the war is not lost immediately—but it can never be won."

If 1964 was a year of dubious decivi decisiveness or inadvertent indecisiveness, xxfit(nrm)mm the year 1965 will a year of specific, definite decisions—and the test will be how well these decisions are keyed to solving the problems and how well they are implemented.

dec. 28, 1964

The year 1964 began shortly after the fall of the Ngo Dinh Diem regime; it ended on the surface with the Tran Van Huong government, which has been described as "an amiable, aimless anarchy."

For the astrolgers, 1963 marked the end of the 6-year half cycle of the lunar calandars which are divided into two twelve years; for the political observers, 1963 marked the end of the Ngo-Dinh Diem regime after nearly a decade of ruling; for the military experts, 1963 marked the end of a total drive among against the Communists; the future was to see the war being waged against the Communists plus a more invisible, but and hence more dangerous group which are commonly called the "neutralists."

The xyear 1964 upheaval of x was an explosion of these post-Diem political forces into the air; the year 1965 will see the continuations of the this upheaval with the political forces, while still in turbuoe turbulent motion, fall downwards into some sort of unsettled order. The arrangements, the alliances, the wars between these political forces will determine the future of Viet Nam and the prospects of prosecuting effectively the anti-Communist and anti-neutralist war.

deepe dragon-34

dec. 28, 1964

While it appeared that 1964 saw the swing from the authoritarian Diem regime to the anarchy of the Huong government, in fact, the year's events reflected the rise and fall of one man—Nguyen Khanh, who entered the Prime Minister's Office on January 30 as a throng goated three-star general.

During the year he failed to lead his nation in the anti-Communist war—a task the free world assigned to him—but he succeeded succeeded to survive which is all Viet Nam expected of him. In 1965, the prospects according to political observers here, and the destiny according to Vietnamese astrologers is that Khanh will again em re-emerge, with a stronger ps position and more control than he weilded when he first first came to power.

When Khanh entered the Prime Minister's Office, the American policy, which supported him with varying degrees of effectiveness during his fall from power, was to build a strongman regime, aided by visits of American Defense Secretary Robert McNamara and Secretary of State Dean Rusk.

This policy in 1964 was note effected with semimentum visible semi-success, but not total failure. For, in 1965, this American policy will be continued in an almost last-ditch attempt to maintain a politically stable government with a high degree of centralized power resting in the hands of Khanh. The prospect is that this design plan will be implemented at all costs—and will succeed if at all possible—unless k Khanh is assassinated.

Khanh entered the Prime Minister's Office on January 30 as the apparent strongman of the regime, which is a strongman outside the government; which at the end of 1964, he was the several strongman outside the government in 1965, he is expected to become the ser visible strongman inside the government and in the whole anti-Communist sphere of influence in South Viet Nam.

When Khanh entered the Prime Minister's Office, he was in fact only the frontman for a coalition of right-wing gner generals and political parties; he himself considered his greatest enemies were in his rear—and not the Viet Cong Communist guerrillas. At the end of 1964, he—with the help of American officials—had ins one way or another eliminated all personal rivals of powerful organizations which could rive compete for his position. Hemmen

He was clearly the invisible invisible strongman, who via remote control, influenced rif most actions in the anti-Communist area. But, in one important development in 1964, the totality of the anti-Communist influence had diminished with the emergence of the militar militant Buddhist organization lead by political priests whose power was rested in the masses. This powerful mass power throughout 1964 skirted a collision with the armed power of the armed forces; but in 1965 this will be one of the most important comfortant internal confrontations—or compromises—which will affect the future course of Viet Nam.

In an important position paper, the Buddhist chief Buddhist political-priest, Thich Tri Quang, explained that the his movement, which is growing in political importance and mass support, was against the Communists, but also against the anti-Communists, which he clearly defined as the Catholics and the Americans.

In an attempt to out-maneuver the Buddhists, who indirectly routed him from the Prime Minister's Office in August and ignited a savage campaign of religious warfare throughout the northern provinces, Khanh, who at the beginning of the year toured the country with management McNamara, initiated a spectacular anti-American campaign, specifically directed at American Ambassador Maxwell D. Taylor. A massive confrontation with the Buddhists would simply drive them in the into the arms of the Communists; but a massive compromise with them would lead that the anti-Communist elements in the country into defeat.

Somehow, at the end of 1964—and continuing into 1965, a n understanding between these anti-Communist forces, with focus on the Armed Forces which Khanh now commands, and the Buddhists, which are neither whitement obvious allies nor open enemies of the state, which are neither forged. The nature of this understanding would shape the future of the country; for the Buddhist movement is considered to be the legal front a for the Viet Cong Communists which would a initiate a condition government and be exploited initiate for them and be exploited by them a Laotian-style coalition government.

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The emergence of the Buddhist movement, which continuously inhibitarity, attempted to undermine, subvert, if not to topple anti-American-backed anti-Communist governments, produced a difference view of the war. While in the past, American and Vietnamese officials had paid lipservice to the subvervie subversive elements tactics of the Viet Cong Communists, in 1964, these subversive elements surfaced and were clearly visible; in but were still ignored. In 1965, they will be acknowledged as subversives, though there may the me specific decision made to contain them rather than to fight them.

Militarily, the neither the strategy nor the tactics of the anti-Communist warman and struggle were changed; but the scope and immensity of it did. The hit-and run tactics of the guerrilla gave way to the hit-and-run military and political confrontation between the United States and Ma North Vietnam, and indirectly other Communist bloc nations.

The cat-and-mouse amount them is made and raids of the guerrilla gave way to the tiger-and-lion pitched battles for delta outposts and mountain hilltops, not with flashing reminisces of Korea-style conflict. The war without a front line f of the guerrilla gave way to the war with the visible, but momentary front line.

The guerrillas who were once attacked in platoons and companies have since attacked in battalion strength—with res U. S.*made recoilles s rifles and mortars—and maintain the capacity of attacking im regimental strength. When once American and Vietnamese military statisticians recorded one battalion—sized att Viet Cong attack in six weeks; in 1964 they began recording six battalion—sized attacks in one week.

While from 1958—63, the guerrillas were consistently weaker than the U. S-backed Vietnamese government forces, in 1964, they maintained momentary equilibriums in specific areas at certain times.

In short, the war ex in 1964 escalated internally; in 1965 it is expected to see escalate internally and externally, principally in Laos, perhaps also in Cambodia and North Viet Nam. In short, the big little war kermanum in 1964 would become in 1965 "a bigger limited war."

According to Manhaman and Long en ancient manham but famous astronoments book, of prophecy records two sentences which are considered the basic points of Vietnamese history: which are readily recalled by astronoments as the Year of the Dragon fades into the Year of the Serpeant:

At the tail of the Dragon and at the Head of the Serpeant— There is the beginning of the War; Everywhere in the country the spears and the shields will be raised;

At the foot of the Horse (1966) At the thigs thighs of the Goat (1967) Many heroes will die.

During the period of the years of the Monkey (1958) and the Cock (1969) During that period the country will see peace.

deepe

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Only the keepers of these mystical oracles—and the keepers of "Top Secret" policy documents—can predict whether the dying illusions of 1964 that victory would be easy will give birth to the realistic decisiveness of 1965 that victory is attainable.