Article about North Vietnam invading South Vietnam

Item

derivative filename/jpeg
363-01188 to 363-01195.pdf
Digital Object Identifier
363-01188 to 363-01195
Title
Article about North Vietnam invading South Vietnam
Description
Original caption: "infiltrate." Article about the North Vietnamese invasion of the South. For the New York Herald Tribune
Transcript
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Beverly Deepe
101 Cong Ly
Saigon
infiltrate one
FIRST DIVISION AREA, VIETNAM-A serious question regarding the
credibility of an American militery announcement about North Vietnamese
troop infiltration south of the 17th parallel has been raised by South
Vietnamese generals.
The official American statement minimizing reports of
infiltration here has been sharply contradicted by South' Vietnamese
officers in this mountainous, 2-province area bordering both Laos and
North Vietnam where the infiltration has been concentrated.
On July 14, a top U. S. military spokesman (informatively only-
chief of staff Stilell) at a specially convened press conference handed
reporters a prepared statement-which had been at least checked by the
American Embassy-reading "there are no indications of the presence of
any PAVI (People's Army of North Vietnam) units on South Vietnamese soil. "
However, only the day before Premier General Nguyen Khanh in an
exclusive interview Sx described the infiltration as "overt invasion"
and explained, "Before we had the problem of infiltration and subversion.
Now we have whole units coming in from North Vietnam. Before they (north Vietnam)
took soldiers from south of the 17th pra parallel and sent them back. Now we
find for the first time we caught prisoners who wore born in North Vietnam."
(More)
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te .2
The North Vietnamese prisoners the first ones captured in the war,
he said--were the first concrete proof of Hanoi's involvement in the gu
guerrilla movement in the South.
The U. S. military statement-followed two days later by a similiar
one from Seoneta Defense Secretary Robert McNamara in Washington-raises a
question which is troubling many os observers here: What was the evidence on
which the U. S. statment was based? Was the statement an exmaple of
"managed news?"
If, for example, Washington
o acknowledged that
Hanoi was escalating the five-year-old war against anti-Communist Vietnam,
would Washington be forced ther therefore to retaliate against North Vietnam as
Administration of ficials had threatened to do last month. C2 did the American
statement reflect a more cautious and less emotional analysis than the
PREM.
publicly expressed views of Prime Minister Khan and his generals? Khanh last
weekend called for direct attacks on North Viet Nam.
On-the-spot investigation by this repot reporter in First Division
area, comprising the two northernmost provinces, discloses that:
1. Prior to issuance of the U. S. military statement on July 14 and
the Washington statement on July 16, no American official had interviewed any of the
North Vietnamese prisoners seized by government forces during the
previous eight days. In fact, American field officers conceded they did not even kno
know how many North Vietnamese prisoners had been captured. (A Vietnamese
intelligence report listed three;
this correspondent saw two.)
(More)
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deepe
infiltrate 3
2. Since American officials had not interviewed the
North Vietnamese prisoners and hence had no independent source of judgment,
they were forced to rely primarily on prisoner interrogation reports prepared
by Vietnamese military officers. These "initial" reports, averaging four
pages per prisoner, dealed primarily with immediate tactical information.
3. U. S. military officials demonstrated a selective
credibility by accepting one part of one report as accurate-namely that two
Russian helicopters had ferried troops from North Vietnam into Laos and that
these troops had then marched across the border into South Vietnam.
BUL
4. Other sections of the interrogation reports were discounted or i
by American military officials as lacking substantiation.
During athree-day visit to the 1st Division area,
this
reporter interviewed on North Vietnamese prisoner for three hours and discussed
with division commender Sub-Brig. Gen. /(one-star) Nguyen Nguyen Chanh Thi
and his intelligence staff the testimony of the prisoners.
These staff officers
openly ci criticized the American officialdom for being "too slow and
sticking too close to form."
"The Americans weren't even interested in these prisoners,"
Gen. Thi exploded. (Informatively only-he used a four-letter word to
describe the Americans). "None of the American advisors here speak Vietnamese,
but the American consul (in Hue) does. He wouldn't even condescend to
come here (to military headquarters) to interview them.
We gave them (American
military advadvisors) this report," he said wavigin waving the brief
prisoner interrogation report. "Maybe they translated its maybe they didn't."
(More)
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deepe
infiltrate-4
American officers in the field, soncede conceding that Americans
had not interviewed the prisoners, replied,
"We've
never had a policy of interviewing prisoners. We're not running this war."
Presumably, no orders from Saigon-or Washington--reversed this
policy, even during this unique situation, though American advisors actively
participate in other areas of the war effort.
The American advisors in the field also called Gen. Thi
& "a sensationalist and publicity hound."
However, Premier Khanh said in
an exclusive interview, "we are in the first state of massive infiltration
like in Laos. In Laos, North Vietnamese infiltrated cadre to command Pathet Lao
units. Then they infiltrated the units."
In addition, this correspondent also read & the interrogation
report of prisoner Lee Phan Hung, a 24-year-old middle-class peasant born south
of Hanoi. He was listed in the report as a private first class, who
had entered the North Vietnamese army in May, 1963, was sent to a training
center for three months and was then sent to join Co. 6, Batata Battalion
7, Division 324, stationed in Nghe An, North Vietnam,
Excerpts of the rea
Hand
220 miles Southing Har
report reads: "he then undermet further
training for six months on .81 mm. mortars and was then sent as a laborer to
building dikes for three months...
"He was then sent back to the battalion, given five days rest, was
later instructed on the situation in South Viet Nam, then received orders to
go to South Viet Nam to destroy the control of the enemy over the population.
He was well fed over the five days in preparation for the trip South and was
(More)
promoted to private first class.
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deepe
infiltrate 5
"In May, 1964, he received the order to start the trip with
Other companies have not started the trip yet, but they
his whole company.
All
may perhaps go later. This company is composed of draftees of 90 fighting men.
the cadre (El Note: generally meaning officers) stayed in the North. In addition
to this company there's another company of 90 men which came South with
his. So 180 men started moving, south May/7964 by nine trucks from Nghe An
to Dong Hoix one day, making one overnight stop.
"At 6 a.m. the next day they were taken to the airfield of Dong Hoi
and boarded a helicopter painted black. The helicopter carried 20 passengers
two
There were heloopt helicopters and each helicopter made four trips. Each
At about 2 o'clock in the afternoon
infinger trip took forty minutes.
all 180 had been transferred. The helicopter landed in the jungle in Laos.
Location ko unknown...."
During a 3-hour interview with this reporter, the prisonar confirmed
and expanded upon this report.
Several sections of the report were accepted by high-ranking
American officials in Saigon and in the northern provinces: first that the
prisoner was/x bona fide; second that he flew to Laos in a Russian helicopter. They
also accepted that the prisoner was a private-and that rank would indicate combat
troops rather than Mr. Mallamara's description of "cadre of individuals."
Comm
Cadres generally mean military officers, political experts or military specialists.
SHARPLY Conterdict
The Saigon statement and Moleman McNamara press conference ener
alm
these fundamental parts of the reports
1. The prisoner said he came to Vietnam with hiw own 90-man company
along with another 90-man company.
(More)
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deepe
infiltrate6
The U. S. military statement reads that the infiltrators were
"dispatched in small groups to South Viet Nam where they reportedly were to
combine with existing local units to form now companies and battalions."
Mr. McNamara indicated at his Washington press conference that he knew of no
instances of infiltration of organized North Vietnamese units into the
South Vietnamese war.
WHE
The prisoner interrogation report makes no mention of the
Compose)
on.
No
entire 90-man company of the prisoner were was of Nortir Vietnamese personell
North V.
<T NAM.
personnel
N
however, the U. S. military
statement said they were trained in "mixed packets," indicating some were
th
born in the North/and some in South Viet Nam. (This prisoner told this
correspondent all 90 men in his company spoke in North Vietnamese dialect.)
2. The prisoner identified himself with 6th company of the
The
7th battalion of thr 325 division of the People's Army of Vietnam.
report lists names of its officers in the north. In the report states the
prisoner moved into South Vietnam with the 90-men in the company with whomet
he was trained.
The U. S. military statement explains that though low-ranking
infiltrators "continue to identify themselves with their parent unit in North
Viet Nam," this "occasionally gives rise to fals initial impressions that
e
regular PAVN units have infiltrated into South Viet Nam."
The U. S. military statement also explains reads:
"As far as can be determined, all former members of PAVN units and groups of men drawn
SEVE
from PAVN units several connections with their former units once they have
(more)
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deepe
infiltrate 7
infiltrated into South Viet Nam.
Thus is can be said with a fair degree
of probability that there are no m members of PAVN in the northern ara
areas of South Vietnam, for that matter, anywhere in South Viet Nam,"
American intelligence of procedures demand at least
two pieces of evidence--such as prisoner report and a document-before
they da may confirm the existence of a unit.
A similar, but oversimplified analoj analogy to the infiltration
situation here might be something like this: suppose a 90-man company of
American Army recruits, newly trained at Ft. Bragg, N. C., were dispatched
on a special mission to Cuba, and broke all communications with Fe. Bragg.
Would there be a regular U. S. army unit on Cuban soil?
The Americans version-based one the U. S. military statement
in Saigon would be no. But the Vietnamese version insists there would be.
It is on this basis that Vietnamese při premier Khanh labelled the situation
as "an overt invasions."
-30-
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deepe
infiltrate-8
insert to page five after third para xxx or military, specialists.
hird pa
A rough analogy between the North Vietnamese private end
Moñamara's calling the infiltrators "cadre of individuals would be that
of the U. S., government sending American combat troops instead of
advisors to South Viet Nam.
Pickup next paras
The U. S. military statement Xxxf
30-
Date
1964
Subject
Vietnam War, 1961-1975; Vietnam (Democratic Republic). Quân đội; Strategy; New York herald tribune
Location
First Division Area, South Vietnam
Coordinates
16.4498; 107.5623
Size
21 x 27 cm
Container
B4, F2
Format
dispatches
Collection Number
MS 363
Collection Title
Beverly Deepe Keever, Journalism Papers
Creator
Keever, Beverly Deepe
Collector
Keever, Beverly Deepe
Copyright Information
These images are for educational use only. To inquire about usage or publication, please contact Archives & Special Collections.
Publisher
Archives & Special Collections
Language
English