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Part of Little Known Red General Casts Shadow Across Viet

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Little-Known Red Ge eral
Casts Shadow Across Viet
By Bever1y Deepe

The Communist calendar in South
a.round two important holidays-Dec. u, which is the
SAIGON.
founding of "The National · Liberation Front," and May 19,
which is the birthday of North Vietna nese President
The most important general in South Viet Nam is,
Ho Chi Minh . Observers in Saigon are care "ully watching
perhaps, one whom many have heard of but few have even
these two dates this · year to see whether the\ Communists
seen. He is Maj. Gen. Nguyen Don. He is the highest
within the South create either an official· provisional
ranking Communist commander in South Viet Nam; some
government or a regular, conventional army ..
Saigon officials speculate he will be named commander~
Some Saigon observers, however, believe the "Liberation
in-chief of the Communist Viet Cong "Liberation Army,"
Army" will not attempt to create a conventional armyif it ever becomes a regular, conventional army. Gen.
as they did in the final phases of the French Indochina
Don, trained in Moscow, commands the Communist InterWar-first , because militarily t hey are successful at their
Zone 5, which covers the northern provinces of South Viet
present stage of development, and second, because large
Nam where for the past month guerrilla forces, reinforced
concentrations of troops-of a division in strength-would
by North Vietnamese units, have waged an impressive,
be vulnerable to the superior firepower and airpower of
but not entirely successful, offensive against government
the American-backed government forces.
forces. They have with some consistency employed mobile
Reliable sources inddcate that since the Communists
warfare tactics-which are a step above usual guerrilla
have neither a commander-in-chief of a regular a1my nor
. warfare tactics.
a provisional government, they are unable to issue an
Much of this Communist offensive has come in Gen .
official medal for meritorious services performed by their
Don's home province of Binh Dinh, which some Saigon
t1:oops. This has reportedly caused some grumbling and
officials suspect the Communists will attempt to capture,
dissatisfact10n among the Viet Cong forces.
thus cutting the country into two parts, and then establishing a "mobile capital" for a provisional government
Since its official inception in 1960, the "Liberation
to rival the American-backed Saigon government.
Army" has had a complex, but very effective four-tiered
military structure. The bottom tier, like the' lower level
NEW GENERATION
of a large wedding cake, comprises the popular forcespart-time farmers and part-time fighters. They may be
responsible for the production of food; there are no precise
Gen. Don is considered to represent the new generaestimates of their strength, as it varies Irom minute to
tion of Communist commanders-none of the Communist
minute throughout the countryside.
generals who fought the Indochina War and defeated
the French are commande1's in the South. However,
.
Above this Jaye ris the guerrilla forces, which operate
North Vietnamese generals, such as Gen. Vo Nguyen Giap,
m platoon strength in the villages. The third level is the
who adapted Mao Tse-tung's principles of guerrilla warregional forces, which operate in at least one-company
fare to the Indochina campaign, may play an important
strength in each district throughout the countryside . These
role by remote control from Hanoi.
two levels are estimated to number more than 100 000 fulltime troops.
'
There is little confirmed information about Gen. Don,
but he is believed to be nearly 40 years old. Born in Binh
The fourth level is the mainforce units, which operate
Dinh Province, 250 miles north of Saigon, the two-star
in at least one-company strength in each district anti at
general is believed to have remained in South Viet Nam
least one-battalion strength per provice, plus regimental
after the 1954 Geneva accords, which divided North and
strength at the six inter-zone levels. American military
South Viet Nam, and which provided that Communist
officia~s estimate there are about 35,000 regular troops
troops would move to North Viet Nam. Reliable sources
orgamzed into units in tms category. So far they have
indicate that in 1959, Don, then a captain, moved through
not orga~ized in division strength, Paralleling this military
the jungle mountain trails to North Viet Nam. During
orgamzation at every level is the political organization of
the next two years, he received additional military and - ~~r.m.ed.. <'M:,re~ an d commissars of "The National
Liberation Front -which revo ves around the People's
political training in North Viet Nam and in Moscow.
Revolut10nary party (Communist) . Saigon observers believe
In 1961, shortly after the birth of "The National
that eve1: if "all the guer~·illa units leave the country, the
Liberation Front," Don reportedly left North Viet Nam
Commumsts through pol!t1cal subversion can still take over
with two eleven-man squads and fought his way through
the country without firing a shot."
Laos and government-held areas of South Viet Nam back
to Binh Dinh Province.
THE FIFTH LAYER
Although still a captain in rank, he was named
head of a military and political cadre in charge of InterZone 5, which extends along the populous, rice-growing
Since the beginning of 1964, a new and entirely differplains of the South China Sea southward for 300 miles
ei:t. fifth layer has been added to the "Liberation Army"
from the 17th parallel.
. m11Itary structure. This has been the introduction of
Viet Cong officers who have served with Don, and
North Vietn_amese-born personnel, rr-any of them operating
!have since been captured by the government, reportedly
In orgamzed umts, American military officiaJ11 have conconsider him "more intelligent and competent than the
firmed that a_t least 90 per cent of · the 4,000 "confirmed"
older generation generals/ although this may be an
persons who mfiltrated from North Viet Nam during the
exaggeration of his ability.
first mo_nths of 1964 were born and raised in North Viet
Don's headquarters are, according to government comNal:11· This is in marked contrast to previous infiltration,
manders, in Do Xa, a jungled mountainous stronghold in
w~ch had largely been of Persons born and raised in South
Quang Ngai Province, just north of Don's native Binh
V1;t Na~ .. but who moved to North Viet Nam during the
Dinh Province. About once a year government forces
19o4 d1v1S1on of the country, and then again i.Dfiltrated
launch a large-scale operation through the intricately
to ·their. native provinces durinJ th..a ~ t contangled jungles around Do Xa, where they destroy storehouses of food , medicines and administrative buildings
. _Officially, both the Saigon government and American
but are seldom able to capture or kill any of the command
~ffi:c1als cal~, these new. North Vietnamese infiltrators as
headquarters staff.
Viet C_ong, a term which means Vietnamese Communist,
bu~ which ha~ largely been used to define the SouthernFIVE CONDITIONS
?Oln Com,mumst who moved to North Viet Nam and then
mfil~rated back to his native province. American military
officials call them "infiltration i roups" from North Viet
The Viet Cong commanders of the five other interNam, but ar~ hesitant to label them units of the People's
zones and two special zones into which the Communists
Army of North Viet Nam, commonly called PAVN
have divided South Viet Nam are relatively unknown or
This quibbling over semantics 1s largely overiooked
unheard of, but reliab1e sources indicate that they range
!Jowever, by American advisers working in the Communist~
in rank from lieutenant colonel to brigadier general.
infested areas where these units have infiltrated
While the Communist offensive in Don's command
It is the introduction of these new PA VN · units into
area have escalated into semi-conventional warfare tactics
~he Northern provinces of South Viet Nam which has
along a mobile front line, the Communists themselves do
not claim the "Liberation Army" to be a regular, convenmtern~lly escalated the war. These units, operating in
tional army.
battal!on and regimental strength, have been able to
According to a captured Viet Cong document, the
employ mobile wa1:fare tactics. Last month, these PA VN
Communists require five conditions for the formation of a
umts held a mobile front-line position of six miles in
regular, conventional army. These "five conditions for
length
four days-but this was etill not a fixed frontunification" are:
lme pos1ti~n which characterizes conventional warfare.
1. Unification In military command. At this time, the
"Liberation Army" has reached the inter-zone level (a
combination o!f a number of provinces), but it does not
have a unified nation-wide militar;' command under a
commander-in-chief.
2. Unification in political leadership. At this time. the
political backbone for the Communists in South Viet Nam
jg the Communist party-directed "National Liberation Front
fol' South Viet Nam." But this is stm. a front, and not a
government.
3. Unification in equipment.
-a.pture of a number
Jf the "ne\\" family" of weapons,
se Conununist..copies
of Soviet weapons. indicates to
1i!itary sources t
the "Liberation Army" is a
to standardize its
equipment.
I
4. Unification in organizati
adaption to local
conditions.
5. U11J.fication in t ·uw
A Special Correspondent

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