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Part of Outster of Khanh as Viet Chief Seen as Shift to Neutralism

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• ,~Ouster of l(hanh as Vie(Chief
l fflf Seen as Shift to Neutralism
By Beverly Deepe
A Special Correspondent

SAIGON.

The dismissal of Lt, Gen.
Nguyen Khanh as armed forces
commander in chief demonstrates the dramatic shift of
the South Vietnamese republic away from a staunchly
anti-Communist position to
one ieaning toward neutralization.
The shift has become apparent since the recent American-Vietnamese bombings of
North Viet Nam.
Gen. Khanh was the anticommunist strong man, and
the military controlled the
government;
his strength
rested not on the unity of tbt?
armed forces qut on a neat
balancing of Catholic generals
and generals subject to manipulation by pro-neutralist
Buddhist monks,
At this moment the power
in the armed forces lies with
the pro-neutralist, Buddhist
wing of generals.
But no
strong man has emerged, and
it ls feared that Communist
political subversives will set
the generals of equal rank
fighting among themselves.

This would set the war effort
bacl{ substantially.
Gen. Khanh has. . been replaced by Catholic Maj. Gen.
Tran Van Minh, who even
Catholic sources admit is proFrench. However, he is considered the front man for the
pro-Buddhist wing.
.
Two leaders of this wing,
Brig. Gen. Nguyen Chanh Thi
and Air Vice Marshal Nguyen
Cao Ky, tangled with U. S.
Ambassador Maxwell D. Taylor during the Dec. 20 toppling
of the :Hig•i1 National Council
and they · unofficially blame
Gen ..Tiylor for the pro-Diemist coup last Fdday.
All 22 generals on the
Armed Forces Council now advocate prosecuting the war
against the Communist Viet
Cong guerrillas, but some are
open to manipulation polltically by pro-neutralist Buddhist Bonzes. A political test
for these generals will be if
they withdraw province chiefs
and division officers Joyal to
Gen. Khanh.
While the military is _ the
most organized anti-Communist forc e, other anti-Communist pillars-the Americans
and the Catholics-also have
been discredited by Friday 's

coup. The prestige of the Buddhist Institute has skyrocketed.
The government of Premier
Phan Huy Quat, installed only
67 hours before the coup, has
a number of pro-neutralist
Buddhist elements and proFrench elements in it.
Within one week South Viet
Nam made a big step in its
drift toward neutralization.
While the trend would be difficult to arrest, it is expected
to take many months or even
several years for openly Communist members of the National Liberation Front to enter a coalition government
advocating a cease-fire and a
withdrawal of Americans.
The crucial mistake following the bombing of North Viet
Nam, as following the Gulf
. of Tonkin incident in August,
was allowing a nine-day political vacuum to occur before
naming a new government. "It
was silly to bomb North Viet
Nam while our political base
in the south rested on quicksand," one Western diplomat
explained.
Gen. Khanh was toppled by
a two-stage coup-not a coup
against the government but
a coup against . the strong

man, wlio was above the government. The pro-Diemist,
pro-Catholic coup triggered
but did not cause his downfall.
That coup was led by exCo!. Pham Ngoc Thao, believed by most Saigonese to
have the support of Americans interested in curbing
Gen. Khanh's power but not.
toppling him and in warning'
Buddhists against more po- 1
litical advances than they had.
made in the new Ca:binet of j
Premier Quat. Col. Thao
spread a rumor among his
friends that he had been hidden by an American C. I. A.
man.
This bloodless coup was
stopped by the Buddhist wing
of the Armed Forces Council,
but its effect was to deprive
Gen. Khanh of the support
of Catholic generals on the
council who 'believed he was
too soft on Buddhists.
Seven angry Catholic gen::
erals joined the pro-Buddhist
generals by vocally expressing no confidence 111 Gen.
Khanh during last Saturday's
Armed Forces Council meeting. Buddhif'>ts long feared
Gen. Khanh would attempt to
become President; they did
not want a. strong milita.ry
government.

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