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Part of Is Asia 'Domino Theory' Passe?

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Is Asia 'Domino Theory'r.,ro) Passe?
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By Beverly D eepe

l

A Speci al Correspondent

President Johnson's key
decision a t the Honolulu
Conference- to
press
for
elections in South Viet Nam
as quickly as possible-could
well become the turning
point of Viet Nam's postcolonial history.
Oversimplified, the gist of
that decision was this: The
Johnson
administration
would be prepared-or possibly forced-to accept a political
settlement
which,
thoagh not quite capitulation, is far short of victory.
It meant the President is
more inte1,ested in attempting to end the war than in
attempting to win it.
On this analysis, military
sources of high realiability in
Saigon believe the Administration now considers the
"domino theory" passe . And!
they fe,ar that by failing to
hold a hard line in Viet Nam,
the United States will prove
that the Communists have
found a successful, low-cost
method for seizing power in
other small nations.
day target for sometime early
in 1967.
IMPLICATION
At Honolulu, it was emphaPrime implication of Mr. sized that Mr. Johnson was
Johnson's decision for elec- throwing his prestige behind
tions is that America's posi- Gen. Ky-the man, the adtion is shifting from one of ministration, and the 10-man
support for a powerful group junta.
of staunchly anti-Communist
But in fact, the President
generals to one which is willing to back a government run backed only the man. His
by civilians who, at best, would de•:ision to press for elections
undermined the foundation of
be largely neutralist.
It would be reasonable to the junta, the only solid base
expect that such a civil ruling of power on which Gen. Ky
group eventually would merge can rely.
As Gen. Ky and his delegain some degree of political cooperation with the National t ion to Honolulu, accompanyLiberation Front, the political ing Vice-President Humphrey,
base of the Viet Cong army, returned to Saigon in midthe sources believe.
February, the word quickly
These military figures say spread : President Johnson
that the election decision wanted elections as soon as
means that the United States possible.
tacitly has agreed to let the
Murmuring in the backCommunists negotiate their ground was growing. South
way into a. real say in South Vietnamese resentment of the
V'iet Nam under the legitimacy handling of things at Honoof recognized domestic poli- lulu. The Hanoi radio propatical institutions.
ganda line said "Ky went to
This, they argue, is a jump Honolulu to report to his
' from the pre-Honolulu Ameri- American boss." The short
can position that the Com- notice for the conference, and
munists would h ave a say only its announcement in Wash"around the table"- in a ington rather than both capimulti-nation conference in the tals, made the Hanoi line
general pat tern of t he 1954 credible in Saigon.
Geneva Conference.
Soon after Honolulu, religiReliable South Vietnamese
sources report that at Hono- ous and political opposition
lulu Mr. Johnson proposed to forces began secret consultaPremier Nguyen Cao Ky that tions. For action, they needed
elections for a national leg- only the proper pretext.
That pretext turned up on
islative assembly be held this
Ju:1e- shirtly after a new March 10, 27 days after the
constitution had ben drafted Honolulu conference ended,
and run through a referen- from its membership Lt. Gen.
when the junta voted to oust
doc.1.
Gen. Ky agr,eed on the prin- Nguyen Chanh Thi, the
ciple but not on the schedule, dynamic former paratrooi,
the sources sai<l. He wanted commander wiho had led an
two years to broaden the area abortive · coup d'etat against
and population in South Viet the Diem regime on Nov.
Nam that could be insulated 11, 1960.
Two days after Gen. Thi'!
against Communist dominadomination- and thus Com- ouster, the Buddhist leadership began, at a press conmunist victories at the polls.
erence, a campaign to underThe two men compromise
ne the junta by rushing
roughly splitting the differ
tion of a civilian legisen ce and setting an electi

lat!ve body-citing Presiden t
Johnson as support.
"In fact, the Buddhists
pulled a lulu on the President," one Vietnamese political source said. "They took
!his words at Honolulu and
pinned him to them."
These same Buddhists led
the anti-government dr;ve
against the late President
Ngo Dinh Diem, and in
November, 1963, with unofficial American backing,
toppled his regime. Since
then, their stren gth-and
suspicions about their movement-have grown.
In Saigon yesterday, .some
2,000
Buddhist
students
marched through the streets,
executing in effigy member's
of the Junta and demanding
installation of a civilian regime. One leader; speaking to
the rally, said: "We do not
accept an anti-Communist
struggle if the sovereignty of
!Vet Nam is lost."
During the demonstrations,
leaflets bearing the name of
the Nati•o nal Liberation Front
and urging support of the
Buddhist agitation were circulated.

PENETRATION
The Buddhist movemente,speciall its central Viet Nam
elements- is considered deeply penetrated by ,Communist
agents. Some an
munist Buddhists estima e that
from 50 to 70 per cent of
these organizations are infiltrated. And it is that central element which is strongest.
The behind-the-5cenes leader of the centml Vietnamese
wing is Thich Tri Quang--an
anemic Buddhist monk wh ose
title Thich means Venerable.
He was given political agylum in the American embassy
here during the Diem coup
crisis, in the first t our of duty

of Ambassador Henry Cabot
Lodge.
Acclaimed as one of the
most astute politicians in the
country, Tri Quang is widely
considered to be a Communist, although there is eubstantial dispute about what
kind, with many putting him
in the Tito mold.
In his early years, he studied under Thich Tri Do, now
h ead of the North Vietnamese
Buddhist Association.
He
thus can argue in the best
Marxist terminology as well
as Buddhist theological language.
While badly splinte1'ed, t he
South Vietnamese Buddhist
movement can be unified
quickly with invocation of the
common enemy : th e Roman
Catholics. In this lies the
significance of recend Bud- ,
dist demands fo r the purge
of Gen. Nguyen Van Thieu,
chairman of the junta and 1
Chief of State, a Cath olic ,
convert.
P art of the Buddhist cant
against the Catholics is that
t hey are tainted with "an imported foreign religion"which is widely identified
t he colonial French regime .
Th ey also are accused of complicity in Diem-era persecu- ,
tion of Buddhists. But the
Catholics are the most firmly
anti-Communist of t he South
Vietna_mese.
Thus, by attacking the
Catholics-and t he Americans
- the Buddhist movement is
abetting the ambitions of t he
Nation al Liberation Front. For
all
their
demonstrations
against the Right, the Buddhists have ye t to raise a
placard against the Commun ists.
It is increasingly difficult
to determine whe ther the
Buddhists represent a legitimate protest movement or are 1
a Communist front organization.