Article about the American bombing campaign in South Vietnam

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363-08322 to 363-08329.pdf

Digital Object Identifier

363-08322 to 363-08329

Title

Article about the American bombing campaign in South Vietnam

Description

Original title: "bomb", Keever's title: N/A, Article draft about the American bombing campaign in South Vietnam, for the Economist

AI Usage Disclosure

Draft transcripts were automatically generated via Google Document AI and are currently under review. Please report significant errors to Archives & Special Collections at archives@unl.edu.

Transcript

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SAIGON, OCTOBER 23-As the world watched Vietnam's week-long dangling
between war and peace, the ground war in the South is almost became
synonomous with the peace for which diplomats were so frenetically searching.
In Saigon, early in the week, a senior American official looked at the red and blue
arrows stuck on a plastic-covered map of the South; each arrow indicated
an armed action in which five or more persons had been killed within
the past forty eight hours. The red arrows indicated Communist-initiated
actions--there were only two of those on the map; the blue arrows denoted
Allied-initiated contact is--there were but six of these.
"Look at the war--only eight contacts in two days," he exclaimed.
"It's not much of a war. It doesn't mean the Comm Communiste aren't trying--this is all they can come up with."
--more reuter
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With a great deal of reluctance, American military sources here admit
that five North Vietnamese divisions have withdrawn into their out-of-country
sanctuaries. Military evidence for the North Vietnamese withdrawal includes
intelligence information from many sources, such as side-looking radar
which peers across the border into Cambodia, color photography detecting
Communist concentrations and troops movements, "people-sniffing" machines
and agent reports. More substantial, however, is the evidence on the ground.
With close to one million combatants "beating the bush" more actively than ever before, on small patrols, reconnaissance missions
and company-sized forays, the Allies are unable to make any
substantial contact with a good-sized group of Communists.
--more reuter
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American military and Vietnamese government sources, maintain however,
maintain an emphatic so "so what" attitude, downplaying any political
significance in the move. They argue that them this is on
"Abrams-forced withdrawal", referring to the successful tactical operations
of American commander General Creighton W. Abrams,
rather than one Hanoi has chosen to make. They say that during the ten weeks
during and following the Communists' mini-Tet May offensive and their
so-called third wave beginning August 17, the Communists lost
close to 90,000 killed and wounded from both ground actions and indirect
support fire missions. And they argue the Communists have consistently ducked out of
South Vietnam when they wanted to re-gear their whole war effort.
And, they say the [deletion: North Vietnamese] current nor North Vietnamese
withdrawal of the equivalent of five divisions is less pronounced than
in July, when elements of seven divisions-specifically fifty five
battalions-were moved out of the South.
The difference is, of course, that Washington chose to consider
the October withdrawal as politically significant but not the July one,
which they believed was only the breather before the Communists' weak August
offensive.
--more reuter
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The North Vietnamese withdrawal, of course, is probably more
significant than this all the official to-bomb-or-not-to-bomb
talk. For what appears to be definitely shaping up here is the possibility
of two unilateral troop withdrawals--with the American troops beginning to
be "phased out" of Vietnam-officially because the Vietnamese armed forces
are capable of taking over--but actually because of an unannounced,
if not camouflaged arrangement with the North Vietnamese
These moves if Hanoi actually agrees to them in the next few weeks--could
probably be held in conjunction with a de facto ceasefire and is inconceivable this could happen before the end of the year.
--more reuter
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Hence, while the Americans would be officially portraying
a unilateral move to "de-Americanize" the war here, the Communists
would also be moving in tandem for a "gradual and proportionate"
withdrawal leading towards "de-Northernizing" their side of the war.
Vietnamese government officials aro confident that if the
North Vietnamese leave the South in peace, the Saigon government
can manage the loft-over Viet Cong. This, of course, is open to question,
largely depending on how well the Communists keep their half the bargain.
--more reuter
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The impact of de-Northernization of the Communist side of the war
can be seen from these current statistics. In or on the fringes of
South Vietnam, there are nine Communist divisions--two Southern Viet Cong
and 7 seven North Vietnamese. There are 53 separate regiments--ten
Viet Cong and 43 North Vietnamese; 280 autonomous battalions--110 Viet
Cong and 160 North Vietnamese. And there are 240 separate companies--of
which only 20 are North Vietnamese. In short, the whole main-force
effort above the company level is predominantly North Vietnamese--and
if this is removed--and guaranteed to stay out of South Vietnam--then
the Vietnamese government feels it has a manageable problem. Just
how Saigon, the American file officialdom or international commissions
can ever guarantee that North Vietnamese cadres and individual troops are not
re-funneled back into the south to reinforce the Viet Cong remains a very sticky issue, however.
--more reuter
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The narrow issue of halting the bombing over the North appears to
be a relatively simple natter here for the Saigon government.
The American government is setting the pace, with President Nguyen Van Thieu
in agreement with the broad outline of the U. S, plan-and, internally,
President Thieu is setting the pace for the government, the
two-house legislature and the independent components of the Vietnamese
body politic. Any differences of opinion between the American officialdom
and the Thieu-the key, if not [deleted: tantamount] sole Vietnamese peace decision-maker,
have been "over-dramatized"; the American officials, in private, are
pleased with the coolness of Thieu's pulling various Vietnamese political
elements in and out of the government along with him. And, Vietnamese
government officials in their conversations with the press are so [insertion: western journalists emit]
confidence to the point of cockiness, if not premature optimism.
--more reuter
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Both the Vietnamese--Thieu and the two-house legislature--and the American officials are in agreement that there must be some "reciprocity" from the Communists and think they are going to get it, this "reciprocity' is defined only in general terms of
Hanoi showing its good will or de-escalating the war--which leaves a great
deal of room for diplomatic maneuvering. On the issue of negotiating with
the Viet Cong, Thieu himself is maintaining an adamant stand against it;
none of the senior politicians Vietnamese politicians have publicly
advocated otherwise--since the government has been tried and convicted Trueng Dinh Dus
Dzu for this stand, while closing down several newspapers publications
that even hinted at this approach. But, in private, Vietnamese politicians
know that the time may come for negotiations with the Viet Cong--"We've
got to talk with them some time, if a only to get them to accept the
one-man one-vote solution," one sorce explained. It seems clear that
if and when that time comes, the Vietnamese government, including Thien
himself, will "swallow their previous hard-line statements."
--end reuter

Date

Unknown, Oct. 23

Subject

Vietnam War, 1961-1975

Location

Saigon, South Vietnam

Coordinates

10.8231; 106.6311

Size

20 x 26 cm

Container

B191, F3

Format

dispatches

Collection Number

MS 363

Collection Title

Beverly Deepe Keever, Journalism Papers

Creator

Keever, Beverly Deepe

Collector

Keever, Beverly Deepe

Copyright Information

These images are for educational use only. To inquire about usage or publication, please contact Archives & Special Collections.

Publisher

Archives & Special Collections, University of Nebraska-Lincoln Libraries

Language

English

Item