Article about Vietnamese armed forces bearing the burnt of the war

Item

derivative filename/jpeg
363-06268 to 363-06274.pdf
Digital Object Identifier
363-06268 to 363-06274
Title
Article about Vietnamese armed forces bearing the burnt of the war
Description
Original title: "Vietnamese", Keever's title: "Vietnam War Intesifies in Scope and Size as Casualities Rise", article about Vietnamese armed forces bearing the burnt of the war and the rising number of casualties
AI Usage Disclosure
Draft transcripts were automatically generated via Google Document AI and are currently under review. Please report significant errors to Archives & Special Collections at archives@unl.edu.
Transcript
Deepe Vietnamese--page 1 November 25, 1965 SAIGON--Despite increasing American battle casualties, the Vietnamese armed forces are still bearing the brunt of the war that is quickly escalating into unprecedented, virtually overwhelming dimensions in this country. Both the highest ranking American generals and Vietnamese government officials have expressed concern that the war is portrayed as “an American only” effort, ignoring the increase in Vietnamese military and civilian casualties. “This is a Vietnamese war, which the Americans are supporting,” one high-placed official said--”The American story is better told than the Vietnamese story. This is still a Vietnamese war-the Vietnamese must win it--the Americans can’t win it alone.” During October, 1964, the Vietnamese armed forces suffered 755 killed compared to 1,040 in October of this year; in October 1964, they suffered 1,586 wounded compared to 2,615 in October of this year. The total of 1040 Vietnamese military killed in battle in one month--October, 1965--is only slightly below the total number--1095--of U.S. killed-in-action casualties since January, 1961. Deepe Vietnamese--page 2 Communist killed-in-action and defectors are also increasing in number; and U.S. casualties are also escalating. In short, the trend is for general escalation on all fronts--despite heavy battle losses, the Communist strength within South Vietnam is still increasing. Despite increasing American battle casualties, more American units are expected to arrive. And, despite heavy and continuing battle casualties, the Vietnamese armed forces is growing in numbers. The war is expected to mushroom in scope, size and intensity in the coming months. The Vietnamese armed forces casualty totals for the first ten months of 1965 (January-to-October) are more than double the 1962 battle figures--and the yearly total for 1965 may almost double the 1963 total. These killed, wounded and missing totals for the Vietnamese armed forces are: 15,509 in 1962; 21,031 in 1963; 29,770 in 1964 and 35,528 for January-to-October 1965. The four-year total is 101,838--the equivalent in size [deletion: to] of a small American city and [insertion: of] a significant proportion of the American casualties during the Korean war. In addition, during the first six months of 1965, 349 Vietnamese government officials were killed compared to 479 in all of 1964; 624 were abducted in the first six months of 1965 compared to 663 in all of 1964. The Communist use of terrorism and political agitation in the provinces is considered to be increasing as well as their spectacular military actions, which are now [deletion: reacting] reaching a higher level of magnitude. Deepe Vietnamese--page 3 Last week, as U.S. 1st Air Cavalry units and North Vietnamese units were fiercely engaged near the jungled Cambodian border, Communists heavily hit the Vietnamese forces--one multi-battalion attack, three battalion-sized attacks and two-company-sized attacks. One of these Communist battalion-sized attacks was the largest ever recorded on the outskirts of Saigon. A Vietnamese government ranger battalion suffered the heaviest casualties--the Communists have virtually destroyed one Ranger company a week for the past eight weeks as the Communist forces attempt to annhiliate portions of Saigon’s strategic reserve. Although a Vietnamese Ranger company has an authorized strength of 146 men, some of the companies were understrength by as much as fifty percent. The role of the Vietnamese armed forces, totalling 660,000 men, has thus far remained virtually unchanged since the arrival of American combat units eight months ago. The American combat units act as a complement to-or a superimposition upon--the Vietnamese armed forces. The American combat units fulfill the two-fold responsibility of protecting key base areas--generally airfields--from which they can launch large-scale offensives into Communist controlled base areas, such as D-Zone or the area near the Cambodian border where 1st Air Cavalry elements were engaged. Deepe Vietnamese--page 4 The Vietnamese armed forces, especially in the face of increased infiltration [deletion: for] from North Vietnam [deletion: in] during the past year, have never attained the adequate capabilities to launch sufficiently large offensives. “Obviously, if the Vietnamese armed forces could have licked the increasing numbers of Communist forces, we wouldn’t have needed American troops in Vietnam,” one high-placed source explained. As additional American combat units are believed to be slated for Vietnam, the Vietnamese government and the American high command have appointed separate Vietnamese and American committee of senior officers to study and recommend the future structure and role of the Vietnamese armed forces. Later, the Vietnamese committee [XXXX indicating deletion] is scheduled to meet with members of the American committee to reach a joint agreement. The committees are expected to review what proportion of the Vietnamese units should be allocated for mobile offensive operations, what proportion should be utilized for clearing and holding operations as part of the pacification program and what role the paramilitary units should play in the pacification of cleared areas. Deepe Vietnamese--page 5 Currently many of the Vietnamese units [XXXX indicating deletion] are tied down to long-term static security positions, which are easily detected by the Communists. An example is the strategic Hop Tac plan, advocated by General William C. Westmoreland, American military commander, as a means to defend the six key provinces around Saigon. Vietnamese military commanders proposed to Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara during his July visit that large numbers of the regular Vietnamese armed forces be re-organized into “a mobile strike force” of “shock troops”; but this plan was rejected at that time. Paralleling the increase in Vietnamese battle casualties is the increase of recruits and draftees--and desertions. The current strength of the total Vietnamese armed forces--the army, navy, air force and para-military elements--is 660,000. Of this 660,000, the current strength of the Vietnamese regular army is 298,000--a figure that has been reached before the deadline ending December 31, 1965. The strength jumped rapidly during this year. In April the strength was only 207,000; by August it was 246,000 and in November the figures had reached the yearly target mark of 298,000. The total monthly losses in the regular army is 7,000--which includes discharges, desertions and battle casualties. The monthly “accessions” for the regular army is 11,000--a net increase of 4,000 men a month. An additional 34 regular army battalions are scheduled to be formed; 16 of these are already in training. Deepe Vietnamese--page 6 The Vietnamese training centers are virtually filled to the brim; a year ago they were almost vacant. The elite or specialized regular services--the Vietnamese airborne, marines, navy and airforce--are now considered to be up to strength and have stopped recruiting, except for specialized personnel. Some of the regular army divisions are currently overstrength; but some are still understrength. The Rangers, composed of 20 battalions, are still understrength. The paramilitary Popular Forces--paid $14 a month to defend their home districts--has dropped [insertion: in strength] “on paper” from 270,000 to 235,000 this year--but some of this drop was considered by personnel experts to represent pruning out padded rosters. Within the regular forces, reliable sources announce the current rate of desertion of 12-13 men per thousand, a trend which is slightly downward [deletion: .] compared to last year. Within the regional forces, which are ground troops operating within their home provinces, the rate is higher--13-14 per 1000. Within the popular forces--the lowest paid troops paramilitary troops operating within their home districts--24 out of 1000 desert. Overall within the 660,000-man armed forces, the desertion rate for October was 17.9 per 1,000 compared with 11.2 per 1,000 for October, 1964. Deepe Vietnamese--page 7 Reliable sources indicate that few of the deserters leave the Vietnamese armed forces to join the Communists. Instead, many of them desert to return to help their families harvest rice, or attend family funerals and then return to their units--but after the six-day period authorized leave period. Some of the troops in the popular forces “desert” their units so they can join the regular forces for more money and fringe benefits--but without bothering with the government’s red tape to get a transfer. “The divisions around Saigon suffer from the worst desertion rate,” one reliable source explained. “I suppose the attractions of Saigon are too much for them.” In some cases, the young trainees complete their training cycles but refuse to report to their assigned units. In one “extreme” case, of a 700-man training cycle, 279 failed to report to their assigned unit in the Mekong Delta.
Date
1965. Nov. 25
Subject
Vietnam War, 1961-1975; War casualties; Vietnam (Republic). Quân lực
Location
Saigon, South Vietnam
Coordinates
10.8231; 106.6311
Size
20 x 26 cm
Container
B187, F6
Format
dispatches
Collection Number
MS 363
Collection Title
Beverly Deepe Keever, Journalism Papers
Creator
Keever, Beverly Deepe
Collector
Keever, Beverly Deepe
Copyright Information
These images are for educational use only. To inquire about usage or publication, please contact Archives & Special Collections.
Publisher
Archives & Special Collections, University of Nebraska-Lincoln Libraries
Language
English