Letter from Beverly Keever about the difficulties facing the Saigon press corps

Item

derivative filename/jpeg: 363-06111 to 363-06128.pdf
Digital Object Identifier: 363-06111 to 363-06128
Title: Letter from Beverly Keever about the difficulties facing the Saigon press corps
Description: Long letter to Mr. Rosenfeld from Beverly Keever about the Saigon press corps and tensions with the U.S. military in Vietnam. She adresses corrspondents with particularly bad relationships with the military, including Horst Faas, Peter Arnett, and Morley Safer. She discusses a USIA delegation that came to listen to reporters in Saigon, where the reporters demanded no censorship and no diversion of the military to keep reporters away from major battles. The reporters also refuted that the Western press was losing the war, and pointed instead to military failure. Then she turns to issues for the New York Herald Tribune office specifically, namely difficulty communicating with the head office, low personnell numbers, surveillance by the Vietnamese government, and the lies from American official sources. She labels TIME as the paper that gets the best political leaks, but says the New York Herald Tribune has the best Vietnamese sources due to Pháº¡m XuÃ¢n áº¨n's work. She also briefly mentions the Newspaper Guild strike in New York
AI Usage Disclosure: Draft transcripts were automatically generated via Google Document AI and are currently under review. Please report significant errors to Archives & Special Collections at archives@unl.edu.
Transcript: --------------------
- Page 1
--------------------
September 18, 1965
TO:
MR. HARRY ROSENFELD
FROM: BEV DEEPE, SAIGON
RE:
SAIGON PRESS CORPS
(LETTER SIX)
Dear Mr. Rosenfeld:
It's a rainy night in Saigon and the elotricity on our blooks
is out off it happens about 2-3 nights a week now so I'll try to
type out a letter to you using kerosene lamps of Abe Lincoln vintage.
Hence, please overlode the typing errors. Having received this
morning Mr. Altman's cable about the lock-out, I suppose you're
in a worse fix than I am. So, this may be a good time to get
some pressing organizational matters straightened out I need some
very specific guidance on some matters; and In turn, since you seemed
interested in the covering letters on the Starlight battle, I'll
try to give you a rundown of some of the behind the scene things
going on in Saigon, what's happening within the press corps here,
where we fit into the picture, some of An's problems and where he
fits into the Vietnamese/American press corps.
First, two brief matters. During this strike period, I'll
continue working on Wald's woman's series, which is very nebulous
because there's no one source--or agency here which can give us all
the information. I'll try to get a few other pieces off to you as
best as possible. In the meantime, as things stand now, An is
planning to go down to the Mekong Delta area next week, just to
poke around. I think he'll come up with some good stuff--he himself
was born in the Delta, he has alot of Vietnamese fr friends-officers
there. Officially, the American generals are virtually saying that
the Delta is won-but our sources say that the subversive problem
is growing. I don't know what he'll come up with, but it should be
interesting, but probably not spectacular.
Saigon,
Two,
there are some people frax who have visited or lived im
whom I hope you or someone from the paper can talk privately
with. The first one is Horst Faas, the AP Pulitzer photographer who
will address an AP convention of some sort in Buffalo on Oct. 2.
If his AP sa schedule permits, he'll try to stop by the HT office
to meet some of you privately.
--------------------
- Page 2
--------------------
TO:
FROM:
RE:
ROSENFELD
DEEPE
SAIGON PRESS CORPS (LETTER SIX)
PAGE
TWO
Faas, a German is one of the most controversial correspondents
here-along with Peter Arnett, also of AP, a New Zealander, and more
recently Morley Safer of CBS, a Canadian. The officialdom here frequently
criticizes them on the basis of their non-American nationality and hence
lack of willingness to "rally around the flag, boys.".
The second group was the USIA advisory committee of Frank Starzell,
(ex- ap) Frank Stanton (CBS) and Palmer Hoyt (Denver Post), who visited
here on an official mission to look into the USIS affairs. One night they
met about 15 of the hard-core American correspondents-and listened to
our complaints. In three years, this is the first delegation I can
recall that listened to the American press complaints instead of arguing
with us.
The meeting itself covered alot of points, which I'll just
briefly summarize. Mal Browne (formerly AP, now ABC) opened up with
specific complaints of the U.S. government attitude and how they lied
to us on specific occasions. Second, Joe Friend, (NY Daily News) went
into a diatribe on the obnoxious way Arthur Sylvester treated the press
during his last visit here. (Sylvester during that meeting-off-the-
record-in effect thumbed his nose at the whole Saigon press corps, some
members simply walked out slamming Zorthian's door on the way, and
Sylvester ended the session by calling the NYTimes Jack Languth "stupid"
which left even Zorthian speechless.
My comments in the USIA session--I made it clear I was not
speaking for the paper itself, but only as a long-term correspondent
in Vietnam--were:
I didn't care what the U, S. govt. attitude was and I expected
them to lie, but I believed as a correspondent I had a right to two
demands and one request.
The demands were: no military censorship (all the members
agreed with me on that, except Jack Foisie of LA Times, who was hooted
down); and that in the case of large-scale fighting in remote outposts
etc. I felt we had a right to a U.S. helicopter to get into the action,
when all other transport means were inadequate. (CBS extended
this by
saying that maybe the press corps could rent or buy a helicopter from the
govt., much as it charters aircraft to cover Presidential election
campaigns). My request was that American correspondents
be tipped
off
in advance as to where to go for large-scale American operations--
5000 to 6000-men ones, that should be covered. I pointed out how
the Marines maneuvered and diverted the Western press away from the
Starlight operation. Also I pointed out that in that last session with
Sylvester, Zorthian told Sylvester that in his tour there he
had never
seen the Western press violate any security measures or leak
any
operations.
the beginning
There were alot of other individual complaints;
and I ended the
"What's wrong here? "
question poised by Stantion was
session expressing the view that in the total perspective of the problems
of Vietnam, the Western press is not a problem por so
.
--------------------
- Page 3
--------------------
ROSENFELD
TO:
FROM:
RE:
DEEPE
SAIGON PRESS CORPS (LETTER SIX)
PAGE THREE
I said that the problems in Vietnam were ever-present, but the
Administration didn't consider it a problem until the press reported
it and then they ridiculed the press reporting. Items the Marines
had burned alot of houses in the Danang area, but the administration
didn't think it was a problem until CBS filmed its the generals hero
have used napalm all the time here, but the Administration didn't
consider it a problem until AP radiophotoed the photos of it-and they
then denied it, etc. In short, The whole American policy was based
on what the American public (and international) public were these would.
swallow, rather than what was needed to solve the problems within Vietnam.
The NY Times and LA Times agreed with this.
said that
In the end, the three membersof the panel ended up siding with the
press corps and Stanton, the key member, it seemed to me,
the problems were basically in Washington and not in Saigone
When they left here a week ago, they were going to Washington;
they didn't know if they'd see LBJ-but they expressed the view that if
their thoughts were not given corrective action in Washington, they would
start some campaigning om their own among the major agencies in New York.
So, ye maybe some one from the office can see what happens.
From the standpoint of our office in Saigon, the two immediate
problems, however, ares the possibility of military censorship, and
our own communications-I'm awaiting your memo on the UPI arrangements
before writing mine. I'll cover these two subjects separately in another
memo.
Other than that, thought, we still have alot of other problems,
which I'll try to explain and hope you can make some suggestions.
1. Since your vacation and my trip to Danang, I feel we're operating
here z in a vacuum vis-a-vis what you are doing with our pieces and
what you are thinking. This is expel especially acute since the USIS
pay playbacks from Washington rarely cover what the Saigon correspondents
write-and since our NYHT from New York take six weeks to reach us
by boat.
Therefore, it would be of immeasurable help to us if we could do this
20
bo
get the Paris edition airmailed to us daily.
have someone in NewYork airmail to us clippings of BYHT copy
on Vietnamours plus pieces by Tom Lambert etc.-plus the New York Times
clippings. Our address would be: Beverly Deepe, % USIS Press Attache,
--------------------
- Page 4
--------------------
TO:
FROM:
RE:
ROSENFELD
BEV DEEPE
SAIGON PRESS CORPS (LETTER SIX)
PAGE FOUR
C. On articles that you've totally rejected, a two-sentence
reason or what's wrong with the piece, or suggestions for the future
would help us alot.
But, all of this is still not the heart of the matter. I
shall try to devote the rest of this letter to NYHT personnel-and
potential personnel--and our problems at all levels-and our sources;
hence, our strengths and weaknesses; what we can do in the future-
if NY wants.
PERSONNEL. We are terribly out-classed by AP (8 men) and
by the NYTimes on manpower (which isn't the same as brainpower).
The Times now has three American staffers: Charlie Mohzr and Neil
Sheehan and Johnny Apple. The first two are very, very good, having
been here during the Diem days. They have alot of official American
sources; they get the red-carpet treatment--and have alot of CIA
eibtants contacts. Their Vietnamese man is a detriment. I'll discuss
this more in the Vietnamese press section & An.
Furthermore, the NYT has their office in the Router office,
which means in practice that all the Reuters material is funneled
into the Times copy. Reuters is on the downgrade, however; their
bureau chief, formerly correspondent in Havanna, said he simply
couldn't hack the pace and resigned; as of the first of the year,
Reuters will have a new bureau chief and probably a better one;
the Singapore office is now scouting all over London for one.
In addition, the NYT has a beautiful communications network directly
to New York through the Reuters set-up.
UPI has improved in number-but not necessarily quality-of
their manpower since I say you in New York; and one of their current
strengths is one of their correspondents is close to Prime Minister Ky;
however, in the total perspective AP is covering the story better than
UPI, in a news-sense, but not necessarily in an interpretive-sense.
There are hundred of other specialss the key ones besides the times
are Jack Foisie of the LATimes, who is the brother of Phil Foisie
of the LATimes Washington Post and hence related to Dean Rusk;
Keyes Beech of the Chicago Daily News (now on vacation). Both
Foisie and Beech plus the Washington Post man do alot of cabling.
Realizing, we are hence in a critical position in terms of
manpower and communications, we then come to Donald Kirk, a young
fellow who called me up, saying he had met you in NY, and had written
for the paper from Hong Kong. Hiswife is now in HK working for a
local, English-language paper.
--------------------
- Page 5
--------------------
ROSENFELD
TO:
FROM:
DEEPE
RE:
SAIGON PRESS CORPS
PAGE FIVE
I told him I would
write to you and get your instructions.
Thisis what he wants: he wants a retainer, which would oblike him
to write for only the NYHT as a stringer, and no other newspaper, plus
space. He hopes this in time would lead to a staff position either
in Asia pr in New York. If he can make enough money that way, he'd
bring his wife to Saigon (she's a graduate of J-School, Columbia)
and they'd make ends meet.
If thisdoesn't work, he'll try freelancing in Thailand,
Cambodia and Laos.
Since I have never read his material, and have met him
only briefly, I have no way of judging his competency.
But, looking at the competition, we need more manpower here
if the paper can afford it. The most critical decision is this:
will the Vietnam story get bigger, or will it become boring, from
the viewpoint of the American reader. You would know better than I.
The argument I used in New York was there would be an invasion of
North Vietnam--and you said obviously you'd send out more people.
We still don't know if there will be an invasion-but it is clear that
if it comes off, it will be a clandestine venture...without Sylvester's
authorization we'd never get on it-my original idea to have the
office get Sylvester's approval is still the only hope of any
correspondent getting on it if it does come off. There's still a
good possibility it will.
It was Nixon who said the problem of the journalists here
would be that the story would get boring. Alot of people-journalists
here agreed with him. The story is becoming virtually impossible
to cover in a news sense. With luck, one can hitch onto a large scale
offensive operation-but only 1 on 10 will be of Starlight news-
interest. The other military actions will be thousands of small
patrols maybe a 40-man patrol will be wiped out, but it will only
be luck that a newsman is on that specific patrol-and survives it.
So, militarily, it is very difficult to cover.
The story may shift to the civilian side-USO projets,
doctors, etc.-good feature type coverage, which is what Kirk wants
to cover. The question is how long will this be readable-say over
a span of 5 years. And do you need more stories per week than what we're
giving you.
However, there's one other important consideration.
if we expect the Vietnam story to de-escalate in terms of reader
interest the other question is it worth trying to cover Lase,
Thailand, Philippines etc. I suppose the most important question
is how much the paper would invest for coverage in this area.
Even
--------------------
- Page 6
--------------------
TO:
FROM:
RE:
HARRY ROSENFELD
BEV DEEPE
SAIGON PESS CORPS
PAGE SIX
Kirk,
So, I will await your instructions the matter of Kirk. Besides
there is one other person here whom the New York office may know,
and may want to use-Jill Krementz. She's now here with a NBC fellow-
or was here until she departed for the Kashmir crisis, but she expects
to return. Arnold Beichman introduced us and suggested that she and I
might work together-specifically, on the woman's series, since she
wants to do a photographic book of South Vietnamese women. We also
discussed casually the possibility of her doing some portrait type shots
of Lodge and Lansdale to accompany Sunday features of them-but her
departure has already made this temporarily impossible. I've already
written my Lansdale profile and since I'll be meeting Lodge next week.
One other important trend is that the TV networks here will
start filming not only documentaries, but also newsfeatures in color.
Jill and I also discussed the possibility of doing a color spread of
a New York or Westpoint captain for the Sunday magazine... she was
going to write to the magazine editor, but I don't know that she did.
Anyhow, I feel sure the newspaper types hereare going to find it
increasingly difficult to compete with television in terms of appeal.
Jill is now accredited to, and working through, the Nancy Palmer Photo
Agency. Unlike Kirk, I don't think she's interested in a retainer or
permanent guarantees from the paper.
Since you all in New York know these people better than I,
please let me know what you want me todo about both of them.
Given the enormous manpower problem of the competition, and
the potential manpower the NYHY can use in this combating this problem,
we can now appraise the strengths and weaknesses of our current set-up.
but An, and my own interpreter,
The strengths now is not me,
whom I mentioned to you previously, Mr. Vuong. An is rather the dean
of the Vietnamese press here-those working for Western agencies and
there are multitudes of them. Everyone in Saigon admits that the
Trib has the best Vietnamese staff, and hence the best non-American
sources.
--------------------
- Page 7
--------------------
TO:
FROM:
RE:
HARRY ROSENFELD
BEV DEEPE
SAIGON PRESS CORPS
PAGE SEVEN
We can discuss An better after looking at the entire Saigon
press corps, which now numbers 109 Agencies. It is a very mixed lot.
There are 14 Japanese, people who are openly acknowledged to be intelligence
agents reporting to Tokyo, to counter-act the pro-American ambassador
here and his reports to the Japanese Foreign Office. There are 3 Frenchmen
working for AFP; other Frenchmen working for a multitude of other
publications; in general, they are suspect by the "merican officialdom,
but the bureau chief for AFP, married to an American, has more invitations
by American officails than his predecessors. There are currently 1 British
newspapers represented here--Daily Telegraph, Daily Express sometimes
until
India, sometimes BBC. Some of them are acknowledged to be intelligence
agents-re. the fact that one of them travels around the
country on Air
America, a CIA airdraft, whioli no American does; another admits in
private he has Viet Cong contacts.
There are 26 big resident American agencies,
Time, Newsweek,
Ap, UPI, LATimes, Washington Post, "hicao Daily News, NYTimes, NY Daily
News, being the major resident agencies., in the writing field, plus
huge television-radio operations.
I'll enclose a recent press list.
You may have gathered from my letters on the Chu Lai operation
how well the American officials (Marines) managed and out-maneuvered
The whole problem of the
the press in that one specific instance.
Saigon press corps is immensely more subtle and is almost impossible
to describe in words.
I sense, but can't prove,
that most of the news management
I suppose I can
operations are concerned with only the American media.
say that we are the victims of an enormous Big Brother operation-
if I
if not a Gestapo operation. I'm not saying this as an excuse;
we can't say that
were an American official I'd probably do the same;
this is good or bad; but it clearly is a fact. Examples: every cable.
that leaves the Paigon post office is mimeographed up and
distributed
as "Secret" brochures to all the Vietnamese ministers
daily. All
of
the service messages are mimeographed and distributed to a more
select
group of Vietnamese government officials. This is fact and
I will
enclose off the documents. I can't say I blame the Vietnamese government,
since they don't know until the clippings come back what is written
about Vietnam. But this is in violation of international agreements
.
The fact that we move so much of over copy by airexpress
instead of by cable has gotten them baffled; they don't know what
we're written until it is published--but we are the exceptional case.
--------------------
- Page 8
--------------------
TO:
FROM:
RE:
HARRY ROSENFELD
BEV DEEPE
SAIGON PRESS CORPS
PAGE EIGHT.
But, USIS officials also get a copy of these mimeographed
brochures of press cables. Barry Zorthian (formerly USIS director
and now "Minister of Information" under Lodge) once told the AP
staff this over the phone--and also warned tham to be careful what
they said over the phone u since their phones were also tapped.
This incident happened months ago, but it was confirmation that all
the press phones are tapped and that there are mimeographed copies
of all press cables received by both USIS officials as well as the
Vietnamese government officials. But, Mr. Zorthian didn't know that
AP had taped that conversation, so this is fairly provable.
Another factor in the Big Brother operation is that many of
the information officers (American) we work with are considered
(by me) to be simply intelligence officers. they'd be silly if they
weren't since the press corps here is an important factor in the whole
policy propaganda scheme. A long time ago, I saw the "Classified"
document that was written about Peter Kalischer (CBS), about how
he filmed one certain story; there are classified reports written
about our movements;; consistently, and as a matter routine. Example:
I once flew to Danang with General Thi, on his plane (when we interviewed
the first North Vietnamese prisoners a year ago.) But a military friend
of mine, working in Sylvester's office, wrote to me that he didn't know
I had left Saigon since thepress log didn't list my going to Danang.
This press log reports everything, including when a correspondent is sick.
Another example: This past week, I had a small farewell party
for one of the good (non-intelligence) information officers at MAC*V**
the American command. But one of the intelligence types immediately
started getting my opinions on everything what did I think about the
use of gas (about the Marine lt. col. using it inadvertently) what did
I think about the total situation--what was wrongs why didn't I write it-
specifically why I didn't resign from the Herald Tribune; why I wouldn't
resign from the Trib--and more important, who else I was writing for.
I swear it was like being grilled by psycho-analysis.
All of this is fairly well known and acknowledged by some of the
members of the press corps; none of us oare much and we don't really object
or resent this type of treatment. (One reason is that all of this in
intelligence type reporting is too beaucratic to be effective. Example:
All sorts of intelligence reports were sent in that Faas-Arnett were
working on the gas story in March but no one did anything about it.)
--------------------
- Page 9
--------------------
TO:
FROM:
RE:
HARRY ROSENFELD
BEV DEEPE
SAIGON PRESS CORPS
PAGE NINE
All of this is pretty much factualii. c. provable.
The really delicate part is that some of the press corps itslef
are intelligence agents or more subtly, in some case, 9 simply swap informatio
with intelligence agents-or, probably in the case of the * NYTimes, is
in constant contact with intelligence agents. This is another factor
why we are sox in such an unfavorable position vis-avis the Times.
is libelous, obviously, so I expect this to be a confidential memorandum
to you; all of this now is my impressions and suspicions, based on
watching the press operations for three years but all of it is
un-documentable.
All of this
But, to generalize, some correspondents simply use the cloak
of journalism as a cover--some of them have been in asia more than 15 years-
and it's obvious. Dames aren't necessary, except that obviously Arnold
Beichman and Bob Shaplon fall into this category.
In other cases, I suppose the deal is more subtle. If a correspondent
gatz
bees consistent tip-offs from certain sources (ie. CIA), he somehow j
re-pays the favor. This does not mean necessarily the correspondent
is on the payroll. of the CIA. Example: Joe Fried of the NY Daily
News. He arrived here from India in mid-1963, during the Buddhist crisis.
I have never hi seen im outside of Saigon more than 3 times. He
literally hibernates in the USIS building (loaded with CIA types)-yet he
has the best news tips in town. He knew, for damp example, that Bien
Hoa was shelled in Nov./64 before the Mac-V information officers did.
This happens consistently--ho knows liyerally everything. What made me
absolutely furious is that while I was in Danang, Fried told An that
I was going to be writing for this religious publication (I had cabled
you to get permission)-which means Fried is either getting copies of the
mimeographed cables sent to Vietnamese government officials and USIS
people or else someone is telling him all this. Frnakly, this is
not competitive journalism.
In return for this, Fried dominates every press conference; if
some correspondents are asking really & sizzling questions, which are about
to puncture all the official propaganda, he immediately interrupts with a
question which steers the entire press conference into a totally
different, and often irrelevant direction..n Example: I was questioning
the Marine commander of Hotel Company in a press conference after the
Starlight operation--how many tanks did he have with him-how many were
hit how many were left behind-the poor young lte was blushing and
evading all the questions when Friend kept interrupting, til I told him
to let someone else ask questions. Finally, then Peter Arnett # further
back refuted the official line with: You must have been in a different
war etc. I wrote you all this in the Starlight letter.
--------------------
- Page 10
--------------------
ТОВ
HARRY ROSENFELD
FROM:
BEV DEEPE
RE:
SAIGON PRESS CORPS
PAGE TEN.
(The fact that I'm going to write a piece for this religious
publication of R. Neibhur's which I supsect has pacific under-tones,
has gotten MAC-V types all riled up. But I'm not going to wite
write anything controversial enough to jeoparidze any of our official
sources for future use).
of course,
and
you
This is not ture true of all thex Western press,
it is not meant as an indictment of it. It's simply a statement
of what we have to put up with. At the other extremen, though,
have correspondents who have been here a short time, are lack any
perspective, write columns about some idea given them from some
American officials-and unfortunately it's all false. The source is
reliable, but it's not tur true.
The essential question ixx here, is not, what are the fact-
but who's facs are they. You can get any American or Vietnamese official
to say absolutely anything; w you can juggle any statistic to prove anythings
and if the statistics don't prove your thesis, you simply refute the
staticiics.
I guarantee I can get any Dai Viet party member to say that
a leading Dai Viet will be Prime Minister in six weeks and I can find a
Buddhist inside source to say their will be a Buddhist prime minister
in a month etc. And this happens all the time. One of the problems
is that to the Vietnamese, in the Vietnamese context, there is no
such thing as a lie-if it is to an individual's or a party's benefit
to make a statement, then make it and hope some correspondent will publish
it.
Now,
this same approach is going to be enforced by the American
officialdom. It will get worse, because Lansdale is known as a
black propagandaist-there will be millions of rumors and counter-rumors
all of them started either by Lansdale or his men. This is super-imposed
upon the constant Vietnamese--and sometimes Communist-rumor mill in
Saigon and the whole reporting game becomes ludicious, weird and
unctr uncontrollable.
To ignore all this, to say simply that one can't trust the
statements of any Vietnamese, the newer correspondents simply rely
--------------------
- Page 11
--------------------
TO:
FROM:
RE:
ROSENFELD
BEV DEEPE
SAIGON PRESS CORPS
PAGE ELEVEN
ON the official American (i. e. Zorthian or USIS) version of what the
Vietnamese are doing and saying. In short, the newcomers are either
silly or lazy and rely on the American official version.
There is, for
example, an intra-AP fight going on between the old-timers like H. Faas
and Peter Arnett and the newcomers who interview an American official,
write the story up like gospel, without any sense of the realities in the
villages, provinces etc.
Some of the
The problem is even more complicated than that.
corespondents are ex-Marines, for example, and can not in an i emotional
sense,
bring themselves to criticize the Marines in an operation.
Examples: Keyes Beech of Chicago Daily News; Bob Hewett of the Minneapolis
Star. Also, the official American version of events is not monolithics
in some cases,
the Embassy version is different from the MACV version.
An example, of the NYTimes play of the use of airpower in Vietnam follows
but not the MAC-V version.
the Embassy (or CIA political) version,
By this time,
is not totally grim;
you may be totally confused. However, the situation
there are many other sources around.
In our articles, we listen to all of the official American versions
and then attempt to balance them with what might be called ALLIED sources
that is, pro-American sources but perhaps disagreeing with American
tactics (but not strategy).
Among these allied sources, we place the Vietnamese highest on the
list in many cases,
the American and Vietnamese interpretations vary,
especially where the national interests of the two countries differ,
like on the Americans grabbing control of the highlands (in the latest
Montagnard article). In this case, the Vietnamese sources-including
the highest in the government will criticize the Americans, and we write
that. This is mostly because of An's hard work, and not my judgment, however.
Berhaps, more important, in terms of long-range judgment, however,
are the Western embassies, each of whom are violently pro-American and
critical
admit that the Americans must at all costs win this war-yet are
of the way American policymakers are operating and are scared stiff the
Americans will muff thickex the whole war.
Of these type of sources, there are really only two I trust, im
terms of judgment. You may have seen me mention them in my list of sources.
One is the British military attache, who comes from a long list of
(His grandfather was governor
military officials in the British military.
of South Africa during the Boer War). He's good and he levels with the press;
yet he knows alot of the American generals well and always payses out titbits
of news stuff. Most of all, he has analyzed the situation for himself and
--------------------
- Page 12
--------------------
TO:
FROM:
RE:
ROSENFELD
BEV DEEPE
SAIGON PRESS CORPS
PAGE TWELVE
This fellow has not been in Vietnam lang-about a year; but
he has a sound judgment-and delightful quotes. I used alot of his thinking
in the political series. We can sit down and have a free, two-way
discussion of ideas. BUT, it doesn't mean we get musicx any classified
information--because the American generals don't tell him that much.
As an example, He got the same propaganda about the Starlight operation
that the correspondents were told-but he had the military background
to know it didn't make sense. Both An and I have over the yeard had
very good British sources, because of An's Reuter connections and my
Daily Express ties.
More important than the British, however, is an Australian
colonel, that I've also listed for you several times. Unlike the British
colonel, he's been in Vietnam 3-4 years; he was a principal advisor
or watchdog on the strategic hamlet progam under Dien. Before that
he was in the Amala Malayan emergency and then was an advisor to the
Burmese government in the mid-50's "when we had ten ter insurgencies
against us at once--and we hadgurr guerrillas in the suburbs of Rangoon.
Of course,
we won all of them-but then they had a neutralist coup.
In his words. He's a very, very good source-in three years,
never seen him wrong in the key questions of Vietnam, and I rely
heavily on his judgment. He too, is very pro-American, thinks
they must at all costs win this war, but is critical of various
things they doing.
I've
In short, the whole problem is not getting the facts here-there
are way too many facts, or versions of facts-the question is who's
facts do you choose to lose.
And this is the area where we really need guidance.
The tenor of all of our reporting is to balance the official version
of the Americans off x versus the pro-American allied version--which means
we are always slightly, if not more, at vario varience with the American
officialdom. (12 Alot of people can beat us in a news sense, but
we have by far the best sources for interpretives.)
There is one other area, which so far we have chosen to use
as sources--we Ex rely on the lower-echelon people of the American
agencies as a counter-balance to the upper-echelong officials. Honce,
we use the quotes of captains and sergeants as a counter-balance to the
official versions of the generals. By doing this day in, day-out, AP
is able to get their buautiful scoops; frankly we're not doing enough
traveli jg in the provinces to do it. We can also do this among the
low-ranking USOM, Embassy types, to counterbalance the press conference
and press briefing versions of events.
--------------------
- Page 13
--------------------
TO:
EX:
RE:
ROSENFELD
DEEPE
SAIGON PRESS CORPS
PAGE THIRTEEN
One of the long-term strengths of the press corps, especially
during the Diem period, is that alot of the military reporting quoted
low-ranking officers in the provinces-which consistently made the press
reports about six months ahead of the official line of the generals and
ambassadors. Some of the correspondents have alot of friends among the
helicopter crews (and many of these helicopter crews will be coming back
to Vietnam for the second or third times soon) and consequently it was
very easy to hop on their aircraft and go with them when we wanted.
This is still simple in the provinces, but the BAC-V officials
are now attempting to break the bond between the low-ranking officers
and the correspondents. This trend has shown up in several ways in just
the past few weeks. For one thing, MAC-V has ordered all correspondents
to submit their requests for a helicopter to the information office, who
would in turn arrange the flight with the helicopter crews. We don't
have to do this--but the ifor information types also put the screws on
the helicopter crews and they get royal chewing-outs if they don't follow
orders. This has happened several times in the past--but eventually
the press can circumvent ti it. The second factor is that there is a
rising anti-press feeling among the lower-ranking officers--captains
and majors in the field. My source for this is a young captain, a very
good friend. (He and I attended the UNI. OF NEBR. together; were on
the student council together; he married a girlfriend of mine). He
spoke of this feeling saying to the lower-ranking officers the Press
is as big an enemy as the Viet Cong. Part of this is that in their
orientation session both in the US and in Vietnam, the incoming guys
are told in the words of one captain who just arrived here--"The
press corps is interested in sensationalism and in selling newspapers.
Be very careful whatyou tell them because you'll always be misquoted.'
The total trend vis-a-vis the press officialdom and the press
corps is they are attempting to gradually encircle us. For example,
the news regulations in which we can't report the number of friendly
casualtiesat first we were given the figures off-the-record in the
press briefings-now we don't even get this, but can get it only
privately. The whole trend is for tighter and tighter controls on
the press, directly and indirectly--and after awhile the final step
could well be press censorship.
--------------------
- Page 14
--------------------
TO:
ROSENFELD
FROM: BEV DEEPE
RE:
SAIGON PRESS CORPS
PAGE FOURTEEN
AN & THE VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT SIDE. While the trend is for
a tightening of American controls on the American press, the situation
becomes even murkier and more unhappy on the Vietnamese side. The
Vietnamese government is also tightening up-this does not affect
me nearly as much as it does the 'ietnamese personnel working for
American agencies. All of the actions are very, very subtle. The
Vietnamese government more often than usual is calling for all of
the Vietnamese press cards issued to Vietnamese correspondents
working for American agencies; these are issued only after a police
investigation.
The Vietnamese government pressures on An have grown considerably
since I talked with you in New York, and sincewe discussed his being
called to the police station. It will now be impossible, for the
time being, for his by-line to be used, unless it is on a very
innoculous article. Hence, you will probably be unable to see the
direct benefits of his work. May I only saythat he's been doing a
very, very execellent job; it was his work that was the basis of the
rice article and the Montagnard piece of late. He and I will try to
spend more time in working on his writing capabilities-but that has
also improved alot during the past year. We both agree that gx his
work, should be much more than information-gathering, but should also
be the writing part of the job. He's progressing nicely on the
writing part and, of course, has always been superb on information
gathering.
Of all the Vietnameseworking for American agencies] An is the
dean, as I said before. He's the only one who has studied journalism
abroad (two years in Calif.). There will be increasing pressures
on him to share some of his information with Vietnamese government
and police persons-a trick that thepolice used against him under Diem,
but which failed. We do know that the Vietnamese working for some of
the other American agencies are only information gather-ers who are
closely identified with the national police or other intelligence
agencies. The NYTimes Vietnamese man, we know from past experience,
is very unreliable; he's now in alot of trouble for pulling all
sorts of tricks to keep out of the Vietnamese army, and according to
our sources, Charlie Mohr and Sheehan have to entertain all the police
chiefs etc. to get him off the hook. It's fairly well established
that he is selling carbons of the NYTimes copy to the Vietnamese
language papers, for extra money-this has long been a trick of the
Vietnamese working for American agencies, especially with photographs.
The press attaches of some of the allied embassies have
approached Vietnamese working for American agencies to buy the carbon
copies of the daily cables-so that they have a constant flow of hot
information, before it is published. We know that some of our
competition is doing this...which obviously gives them access to hot
news out of that embassy.
Fortunately, An has escaped all this thus far. The one key
area of pressure that can be used against An is for the Vietnamese
government tocall him back into the Army or into the gotv. service.
--------------------
- Page 15
--------------------
MR. ROSENFELD
TO:
FROM:
BEV DEEPE
RE:
SAIGON PRESS CORPS
PAGE FIFTEEN
Thus, An prefers to remain as inconspicuous as possible, regarding
his by-lines.
An has an incredible range of Vietnamese sources--but also good
American sources,
local French sources, and contacts in the Asian
Embassies. He's also got a very cool temperment, and it takes more
than a coup to shake him up.
If you could find time to drop him a note sometime, it would be
a good boost for his morale. In addition, in October, he will havebeen
with the paper a year; it would be nice if the paper could give him a
slight raise in salary as a token of encouragement (realizing a strike
period is a sad time to bring up spending more money). There are several
factors to be considered: first, I think he's done a superb job. Second,
the inflation has spiraled here during the past year--which means
increasing cost of living as well as a higher price for making contacts
and friends. Third, An has increasing family obligations; a third
child is on the way and as of last October when his younger brother was
killed in the helicopter crash, he has assumed fina noial responsibility
for that family also. As some basis of comparison, The NYTimes
Vietnamese man gets $400 a month.
Before leaving the subject of An, one other point that might
be mentioned-re. Jimmy Breslin. An was elated to meet and work with
a "big name" from the New York office and felt that he learned alot
of from Jimmy. Both An and I are sorry that Himmy was unhappy with our
work for him and wished we could have done more. Unfortunately, Breslin
arrived while I was in Danang, but in our daily phone conversations,
I told An to help Breslin as much as possible and told him Breslin could
utilize anything of mine he wanted, including the house, my secretary
and my maid.
An received the cable that Breslin was to arrive on Sunday;
in fact, he arrived on Saturday. Within several hours of his arrival,
An visited him at the hotel. Breslin was tired and wanted to sleep.
The next day, Sunday, An took him to Cholon, dined with him, and tried
An worked with
to find out what he wanted. Throughout that first week,
him on filing nights, sometimes retyping his copy into cables, working
until nine, ten or eleven p.m. An was sorry he couldn't work later
than that, for 11 p.m. was then the surfew hour.
Finally after some mix-ups, my secretary got Jimmy's cabling
card from the Saigon post office.
Unfortunately, Breslin evidently was not happy since he cabled
Mr. Bellows that "there's no Beverly Deepe, there's no nothing here".
In the meantime, things got even more chaotic, when Arnold Beichman
arrived and An helped him get settled, in my house, and my maid helped
him with incidentals. (Unfortunately, neither An and nor I clearly
understood what Himmy wanted or expected.)
--------------------
- Page 16
--------------------
TO:
MR. ROSENFELD
FROM: BEV DEEPE
RE:
SAIGON PRESS CORPS
PAGE SEEN.
Our original cable from Mr. Bellows was to help Breslin
airexpress his material and An repeatedly told both Breslin and
Beichman that he would handle any packets to be airexpressed, first
because I was already airexpressing material from Danang and second
because the whole airexpress procedure, customs clearance, getting
onton the airport is extremely complicated. But, Breslin never did
give us any material to airexpress, though Beichman frequently did.
In another instance, sometime during the second week of Jimmy's visit,
he went to Danang, without telling An, which meant An couldn't
telephone me; Breslin evidently lived three doors down the hall from
me at the Press Center, but didn't look me up; and frankly Breslin
and I were never able to communicate properly.
Unfortunately, Saigon is not the same as New York; the cables
and telephones don't work herewith the same efficiency as in USA and
the red carpets in Vietnam just aren't very plush, and we both were
sorry Jimmy was unhappy about his trip here.
with
It's probably irrelevant to write about the local Vietnamese
a nd English-language papers here-but they are really a mess,
all sorts of things going on. Some of these journalists are
extortionists, black-mailers, some are bought off by the Vietnamese
government; a number are Viet Cong sympathizers if not agents. That's
really a cut-throat business.
In summary,
there are, and will be, an increasing number of
pressures from the American side and on An from the Vietnamese
government side-and vice versa-for correspondents "to get on the
team, 2 according to the local expression here. For those that refuse,
the price will be very dear-you won't get helicopter rides to battle
zones, your sources will probably be intimidated, you won't get lealts
on stories, you won't get tip-offs on where to be before a gi big
operation begins.
--------------------
- Page 17
--------------------
TO:
ROSENFELD
FROM: BEV DEEPE
RE:
SAIGON PRESS CORPS
PAGE SEVENTEEN
We (the NYFT) are quickly becoming a minority of one in our
interpretives; Horst Faas and Peter Arnett of AP are quickly becoming
a minority of two in the news side. This is not an off-the-bat
condemnation of news management per se; I suppose if I wore Arthur
Sylvester, I'd do the same thing. The dilemma of American officialdom,
it seems to me, is that in many cases the truth, orsome semblance,
thereof, is damaging to the American-Saigon position and is beneficial
to the Communists. And they have no recourse, but to attempt to
camouflage the facts.
I long ago decided we could not compete with the Times for
political leaks. They un automatically will have incredibly good
official sources. For example, we know that Halberstam during the
Diem-Buddhist crisis was regularly seeing the CIA chief Richardson.
Later, Grose, on almost a daily basis, was seeing the CIA-we even
knew the office. Therefore, Grose could easily write a long diatribe
about Westmoreland's new Hop Tac plan-but when I went to MAC-V, they
wouldn't give me a briefing on it. So, I used the Vietnamese channels
to see the chief Vietnamese (a colonel) about it-and was practically
tossed out of his office. This goes on all the time. We still don't
know how the new Times office operates, but I think the pattern is set.
An interesting incident happened at dinner the other night which
may give you an impression, or a feel, of what is evolving within
the press corps. One correspondent at dinner-a correspondent from
New York, non-resident-threw the question at me: Who do you want
to win the war. Obviously, I repied: As a reporter, it didn't
matter. This was one difference between the NYHT and Tass.
He opened up with how irresponsible the press is, and said we
should have "very cautious reporting from Saigon. To which Horst
Fase replied, "What we need from Saigon is simple reporting."
In another example, a week ago, on a lazy Sunday, I visited
the Australian colonel at his home-the colonel I mentioned earlier.
One of his first comments to me was: Please, I know you don't think
this,
but let me tell you...All this talk about the Viet Cong failing
in the monsoon offensive is just newspaper talk. In fact, MAC-V
expected the Viet Cong to make a big push during the monsoon and they
went into a flap. Now that the Viet Cong haven't made the push, the
American generals think they've won the war. But remember-it was the
Americans in Saggon and in Washington that announced a Viet Cong
offensive-the Viet Cong never, never said anything like that.
--------------------
- Page 18
--------------------
ROSENFELD
TO:
FROM:
BEV DEEPE
RE:
SAIGON PRESS CORPS
PAGE EIGHTEEN
This letter has rambled on, perhaps in a disorderly fashion,
and while it has covered the high-spots, it is still a fairly
superficial report.
But to summarize on the American side of the press corps:
1. There are genuine correspondents.
2.
There are genuine correspondents who are also gunuine
intelligence agents. (One recent example made headlines this week
Mr. Jerry Rose, formerly of Time magazine and Saturday Evening Post,
who later worked in the Vietnamese Prime Minister's Office, presumably
for the CIA, or at least for USOM. He has killed in airplane crash
this week.)
3.
as a cover..
4.
There are genuine intelligence agents, using journalism
There are genuine correspondents who swap information with
intelligence agents.
We do no know what proportion of the American correspondents
fa 11 into what categories.
On the Vietnamese side, the above four points are also
applicable, but the pattern becomes more complex because of subtle
pressures from the Vietnamese police and government officials.
A fifth point to be added on the Vietnamese side is that there
are genuine police agents who pretend to be correspondents--they are
but they simply
not officially accredited to any one American agency,
tell all their friends they are working for Time, UPI etc.
their questions in that context. Hence, everyone thinks he's a
journalist, but he really isn't.
and ask
The big question about Vietnamese working for American agencies
is how much of their information passes into the Viet Cong intelligence
An even greater possibility
network we have no way of judging this.
is, when Vietnamese journalists pass information to the Vietnamese
police, that the police system itself is penetrated by Viet
Cong
sympathizers or agents.
So, the circle goes round and round,
up the press corps on all sides. Any ideas,
from you will be very much appreciated.
like a hurricane sucking
suggestions, recommendations
Date: 1965, Sep. 18
Subject: Journalists; War correspondents; Vietnam War, 1961-1975; United States. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam. Office of Information; Government and the press; Freedom of the press; Censorship; New York herald tribune; Pháº¡m, XuÃ¢n áº¨n, 1927-2006; United States Information Agency; Faas, Horst, 1933-2012; Arnett, Peter, 1934-; Safer, Morley; Government secrets
Location: Saigon, South Vietnam
Coordinates: 10.8231; 106.6311
Container: B188, F2
Format: commercial correspondence
Collection Number: MS 363
Collection Title: Beverly Deepe Keever, Journalism Papers
Creator: Keever, Beverly Deepe
Collector: Keever, Beverly Deepe
Copyright Information: These images are for educational use only. To inquire about usage or publication, please contact Archives & Special Collections.
Publisher: Archives & Special Collections, University of Nebraska-Lincoln Libraries
Language: English