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derivative filename/jpeg
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363-04821.pdf
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Digital Object Identifier
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363-04821
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Title
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Cong Clings to Saigon Area
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Description
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Article published in the New York Herald Tribune about the Việt Cộng offensives around Saigon, page unknown
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Date
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1965, Oct. 3
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Subject
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Saigon (Vietnam); Mặt trận dân tộc giải phóng miền nam Việt Nam; Vietnam War, 1961-1975--Campaigns--Mặt trận dân tộc giải phóng miền nam Việt Nam
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Location
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Saigon, South Vietnam
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Coordinates
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10.8231; 106.6311
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Container
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B4, F6
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Format
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newspaper clippings
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Collection Number
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MS 363
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Collection Title
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Beverly Deepe Keever, Journalism Papers
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Creator
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Keever, Beverly Deepe
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Copyright Information
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These images are for educational use only. To inquire about usage or publication, please contact Archives & Special Collections.
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Publisher
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Archives & Special Collections, University of Nebraska-Lincoln Libraries
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Language
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English
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extracted text
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Cong Clings ,to Saigon Anea
By Beverly Deepe
)
A Special Correspondent
BAO TRAI, South Viet Nam
The well-coordinated Viet
Cong attack near the provincial capital here last we'ek indicates that the American plan
to pacify the provinces around
Saigon has bogged down.
Attacking only 20 miles
northwest of Saigon the fourpronged offensive of Viet Cong
battaion 506-500 to 700 men
,. -crippled two government
companies occupying the periphery of the Hop Tac (Cooperation) Plan area in Hau
· Nghia province. Viet Cong
casualities also were high.
This town (pop. 5,000) is the
capital of the province.
The Hop Tac Plan for the
pacification of the seven
Provinces around Saigon began a year ago. It calls in
the first step for the destruction of the hard-core Viet
Con~n-i_ts in the, Provinces.
But . ~ . Yiet_ C g _at~ack
I
.
1
showed this yet to be accomplished.
The second step calls for
the training of local militia
to guard: the villages while
the regular Army conducts
large-scale offensives. But,
in Provinces such as Hau
Nghia, there are few young
men in the villages whom the
government can recruit.
"We have basic problems
that are impossible for us to
-solve," one officia4 explained.
"The population is hostile to
the vietna.mese government,
since ~or decades this area has
been under viet cong control.
"The viet cong have a minimum of 2 ,500 armed fighters
in this province and can jump
to 4,0 00 men. But the vietnamese government strength is
only about 2•,0,0,0, men.
"We should have a. 10'-to-1·
force ratio of troops in our favor to defaet the viet congbut instead we some ., · es have
a 2-to_l force ratio a 1"1st us."
1
1
1
Reliable sources indicate
that in the future american
combat troops may be used
against these hard-core units.
Last week, the Viet Cong
506th battalion attacked, one
elite government Ranger battalion engaged it in a tough
day-night operation, but returned to the town of· due
lap, 20 miles from Saigin,
their command post, to set up
their night-time defense.
, "The Viet Cong knew the
Rangers had been on the operation and would sleep well
that night," an official explained. "One element of the
Viet Cong 506th battalion
crashed into the command
area post housing the headquarters company.
"The Viet Cong had overpowering force ; and rushed
directly toward and virtually
encircled the command post."
Two miles further west,
other elements of &the Viet
Cong 506th attackefci a Viet-
namese regular army company, and mortared the district town of Due Hoa and
another outpost.
"Simply in terms of government casualties, this was a
disaster," one Vietnamese officira explained, "but we also
hurt the Viet Cong badly.
"We have found 31 Viet
Cong bodies so far, and have
received intelligence reports
that the Viet Cong were bury- '
ing 50 other bodies in a distant
village. And, we think, we
killed the Viet Cong batalion
executive officer. We estimate
a total of 20 0 Viet Cong killed
or wounded because the U. S.
Air Force jets started pounding the Viet Cong as they
withdrew.
"Militarily, this engagement
was probably a stand-off; but
politically, it was a defeat.
Everytime the Viet Cong hit
one o four elite units, it takes
a long time before the population regains confidence in the
government."
