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derivative filename/jpeg
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363-04798.pdf
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Digital Object Identifier
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363-04798
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Title
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Taylor Returns Today For Decisions on Viet
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Description
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Article published in the New York Herald Tribune about Ambassador Taylor's return to Washington to review the situation in Vietnam, page unknown
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AI Usage Disclosure
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Draft transcripts were automatically generated via Google Document AI and are currently under review. Please report significant errors to Archives & Special Collections at archives@unl.edu.
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Transcript
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- Page 1
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In
mis bro
Taylor Returns Today
For Decisions on Viet
By Beverly Deepe
Special Correspondent
SAIGON.
Nothing is complete,
Neither victory nor defeat.
1959, Gen, Maxwell
Taylor put that favorite
Pentagon, jingle in his book,
"The Uncertain Trumpet,"
Today, six years later, the
Ambassador
63-year-old
to
South Viet Nam returns to
Washington for what probably
will be his most crucial review
to date on the situation in
Viet Nam.
For the United States, that
situation seems to embrace
the paradoxes in the jingle
an incomplete military vic-
tory and an incomplete politi-
cal defeat.
The stepped-up bombing of
North Viet Nam and of Com-
munist Viet Cong guerrilla
positions in the South was
the "beginning of the begin-
ning of the military war, in
the view of one Vietnamese
general, But it was the "be-
ginning of the end" of the
political war.
As the U. S. displayed more
and more of its military power
it lost more and more power
on the political side-to both
the Communist subversives
and the Neutralist Buddhist
politico-priests.
"With
Taylor's forward
Strategy (of bombing North
Viet Nam
), we gained time.
We have set the Communists'
timetable back 15 to 20 years
if the Americans really want
to," one Western military ex-
pert explained.
13th of how
than half of his government is
considered under the manipu-
lation, directly or indirectly, of
those favoring neutralism-
either the Buddhist priests or
the French.
Similarly, the armed forces
leadership is split, but the gen-
erals being manipulated by the
Buddhists have seized the ini-
tiative.
CHRONOLOGY
This is the chronology of
political deterioration and
military escalation according
to reliable sources here:
On July 20, 1964, thirteen
days after Ambassador Taylor
arrived in Viet Nam, the
American-backed strongman,
Maj. Gen. Nguyen Khanh,
then Premier and now roving
ambassador, launched the of-
ficial government policy of
"Bac Tien" (march to the
north).
Gen. Taylor was irked and
assured Gen. Khanh that this
was not American policy.
No sooner had the generals
publicly patched up their dif-
ferences at a press gathering
than the Aug. 5 Tonkin Gulf
incident flared and Ameri-
can planes retaliated against
North Vietnamese military
targets.
Gen. Khanh then instituted
martial law provisions, pro-
posed a new strongman
con-
stitution
and had himself
elected President by the gen-
erals in the Military Revolu-
tionary Council. Ten days
later, he was toppled from
power by rioting Buddhists.
He later became commander-
in-chief.
"But we have gone back-
ward politically-the whole
political tide has shifted
against us. This tide must be Gen. Taylor returned to.
reversed the question is Washington in mid-November
whether it will be. This is to report on
the rapidly de-
the core of the problem facing teriorating political and mili-
Taylor and Washington."tary situation. At the same
The danger is that American time, he submitted to Presi-
jets, Marines and advisers will dent Johnson a proposal to
some day be ordered to leave escalate the war through ac-
by a
tions in both the North and
Vietnamese government.
South.
pro-Neutralist South
Even now, although the gov-
ernment of Premier Phan Huy
Quat maintains an official
anti-Communist stand, more
President Johnson report-
edly told Gen. Taylor that
the proposal could be carried
out on the condition that a
reasonable amount of politi-
cal stability was first estab-
lished in the South.
At the end of November,
Gen. Taylor returned to Sai-
gon and spent about 10 days
consulting with leaders of the
government, the armed forces,
the Buddhists, the Catholics
and the political parties. He
told the Vietnamese to rally
behind the civilian govern-
ment then headed by Pre-
mler Tran Van Huong and not
to struggle for power among
themselves. In that event he
would be able to carry out his
six-month plan for military
escalation.
The advice was quickly
ignored by Buddhist leaders
and by Gen. Khanh's support-
ers, the "young turk" generals.
The Buddhists continued
their campaign against the
Huong government, and on
Dec. 20 the generals destroyed
the legislative body, called the
High National Council.
The action of the generals
was strongly disapproved by
Gen. Taylor, and the conflict
between the Ambassador and
Gen. Khanh flared up pub-
licly.
DELAY
Then, instead of restoring
the High National Council as
Gen. Taylor wanted, the gen-
erals toppled Premier Huong
on Jan. 25. This two-month
coup further delayed Gen.
Taylor's
escalation plan,
which had been scheduled to
start at the beginning of 1965.
In early February, instead
of returning to Washington
to report on the situation,
Gen. Taylor was ordered by
President Johnson to stay on.
A delegation headed by Mc-
George Bundy, the President's
national security advisor, dis-
patched to Saigon.
On Feb. 7, the Communists
in South Viet Nam launched
a fierce assault on American
installations at Pleiku. Gen.
Taylor was given a green light
to put his plan in action even
though no official government
had been formed to replace required to bring the plan to
Premier Huong s
Then came the bombings in
North Viet Nam, the build-
up of U. S. forces including
3,500 Marines, new war ma-
terial and a plan to greatly
enlarge the South Vietnamese
armed forces.
On the political side, the
American mission is endeavor-
ing to stabilize and strengthen
the central government headed
by Premier Quat.
success.
Gen. Taylor's military and
political plan was summarized
in his speech to the Lions
Club in Saigon last Monday.
will depend upon
"It
ability to solve three basic
problems," he said.
our
"The first is to generate
sufficient trained manpower-
military, paramilitary and po-
lice to establish the neces-
sary preponderance of strength
over the growing numbers of
the Viet Cong. Related thereto
is the need to end the leader-
ship, direction and support
from North Viet Nam without
which the Viet Cong cannot
long maintain themselves.
Then there is the need for a
stable government both in
Saigon and in the provinces,
so that the resources made
available for military and
pacification operations can be
utilized to the best advan-
To bring the Vietnamese to-
gether at regional and village
levels in the countryside, the
mission is placing its hope in
the "hop-tac" (co-operation)
out last
operation worked
summer.
This is a pilot of an am-
strategic plan of
bitious
pacification around Saigon, in
which the co-operation of the
Vietnamese military and ci-
authorities at all
vilian
echelons, the Vietnamese
people and the Americans is tages."
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Date
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1965, Mar. 28
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Subject
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Taylor, Maxwell D. (Maxwell Davenport), 1901-1987; United States--Relations--Vietnam (Republic); Ambassadors
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Location
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Saigon, South Vietnam
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Coordinates
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10.8231; 106.6311
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Container
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B4, F6
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Format
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newspaper clippings
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Collection Number
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MS 363
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Collection Title
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Beverly Deepe Keever, Journalism Papers
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Creator
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Keever, Beverly Deepe
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Copyright Information
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These images are for educational use only. To inquire about usage or publication, please contact Archives & Special Collections.
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Publisher
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Archives & Special Collections, University of Nebraska-Lincoln Libraries
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Language
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English
