Article about Ambassador Maxwell Taylor

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363-07414 to 363-07425.pdf

Digital Object Identifier

363-07414 to 363-07425

Title

Article about Ambassador Maxwell Taylor

Description

Original title: "taylor", Keever's title: "Despite Elevating[?] U.S. Military Might, Ambassador Taylor Faces Saigon's Political Quagmire", Article draft about U.S. Ambassador Taylor and his interactions with South Vietnamese politics, for the New York Herald Tribune

AI Usage Disclosure

Draft transcripts were automatically generated via Google Document AI and are currently under review. Please report significant errors to Archives & Special Collections at archives@unl.edu.

Transcript

deepe and an taylor--1 march 25, 1965 SAIGON--In 1959, General Maxwell D. Taylor wrote in his book “The Uncertain Trumpet,” a favorite Pentagon [deletion: jung] jingle: “Nothing is complete, Neither victory nor defeat.” “This week, seven years later, the sixty-three year-old Ambassador to Viet Nam returns to Washington for probably his most crucial review to date on the Viet Nam [XXXX indicating deletion] [deletion: is] situation. He is, from this vantage point, faced with the meek glimmerings of the schizophrenic paradoxes in his jingle--an incomplete military victory and an incomplete political [deletion: vic] defeat within this southern republic. (More) deepe and an taylor--2 For paradoxically, the bombing of North Viet Nam plus the internal expansion [deletion: of the war] was the “beginning of the beginning” of the military war--in the view of one Vietnamese general--but the “beginning of the end” of the political war. [deletion: For] As the United States displayed more and more of her military power she--the anti-Communist keystone--lost more and more power [deletion: of] on the political side--lost to both the Communist subversives and the pro-neutralist Buddhist politico-priests. [insertion: And] As the American policymakers became [deletion: more and more] increasingly committed militarily, they lost more [deletion: and more] a [deletion: diminishing] increasing amount of control politically. “With Taylor’s forward strategy (of bombing North Viet Nam), we gained time--we have set the Communists timetable back 15 to 20 years if the Americans really want to,” one Western military expert explained. “But we have gone backwards politically--the whole political tide has shifted against us. This tide must be reversed--the question of whether it will be. This is the core of the problem facing Taylor and Washington.” For the first time in 18 months--since the fall of Ngo Dinh Diem--American military commanders have a “we’re going to [XXXX indicating deletion] war” attitude. deepe and an taylor--3 In short, the internal danger is not a military defeat on the battlefield, but that American military jets, marines and advisors will be ordered to leave by a pro-neutralist South Vietnamese government--without a shot being fired. No one knows when that request would be made--but it would be decided by the Communists and not the Americans. Within the internal political picture, the government of Prime Minister Phan [deletion: Quy] Huy Quat is [XXXX indicating deletion] maintaining an official anti-Communist stand, but more than half of the elements in his government are considered under the manipulation, directly or indirectly, [deletion: or] proneutralist Buddhist politico-priests, [deletion: the] or the French. Similarly, the armed forces is [deletion: lacking in] split in its leadership--but [deletion: with] the [XXXX indicating deletion] generals being manipulated by the Buddhist politico-priests [insertion: [illegible]] now seizing the initiative. and turned the tide--politically--[deletion: in an] [illegible] potentially pro-neutralist position. Militarily, they are still fighting the Communist guerrilla, but politically they are [XXXX indicating deletion] being manipulated by the--instead of fighting--the proneutralist [deletion: elements] [illegible]. The danger is this [deletion: to] trend will move downward, wrecking the government’s administrative apparatus and the unity of the armed forces. For example, in a power play in Saigon the pro-Buddhist chief of police has arrested the [XXXX indicating deletion] intelligence network of an anti-Communist general. [insertion: --the military governor in Saigon] The political picture is one of forces in motion, spiraling downward. (More) deepe and an taylor--4 According to reliable reports in Saigon, neither Russia nor China have moved in military troops or air-defense missiles. Politically, Hanoi has shown no apparent willingness to negotiate, to halt its infiltration or to call off the war in the South--in fact, they have called on their Southern guerrillas to hit harder. [XXXX indicating deletion] “I could write five different--[insertion: [illegible]] convincing--[deletion: cables] a day about what Hanoi, Peking and Moscow will do,” one Western diplomat groaned. “But that’s a confused triangle all its own.” However, Western [XXXX indicating deletion] sources here believe the danger of a major confrontation with China has subsided--that is the threat of a ground war--but [deletion: that the question mark is] [illegible] whether or not the Russians will send in [deletion: air miss] air defense [deletion: mill] missiles is still an [XXXX indicating deletion] the greatest unknown. The American and South Vietnamese airforce and navy planes have been “escalating with the [deletion: escalating] escalation”--first by moving from the “tit for tat” retaliatory policy to one of striking [deletion: to] for the purpose of causing Hanoi to stop their “aggression.” One of the ten raids (as of Thursday) was launched north of the 19th parallel--and about one hundred miles south of Hanoi. The question is whether these planes will make [deletion: another] [XXXX indicating deletion] the next step in the escalation--the bombing of industrial bases--most of which lie in the Red River Delta surrounding Hanoi. If this is done, it is considered [deletion: to] [XXXX indicating deletion] probable to place these planes in direct combat with [insertion: [illegible]] MIG-15 and MIG-17 jets, estimated to number about 50. deepe and an taylor--4 According to informed diplomatic sources here, the picture in North Viet Nam is: [deletion: The] Hanoi has [XXXX indicating deletion] been evacuated of children, have increased security precautions such as digging of trenches, have signed up more than a million people in their “three readies campaign--ready to fight, ready to join the army, read to go anywhere and do anything to defend the fatherland.” But there is no indication these million have actually joined the service. There are unconfirmed reports--discounted by Western diplomatic sources, but given credence by South Vietnamese government officials--that [XXXX indicating deletion] North Vietnamese President Ho Chi Minh and leading government and party members have evacuated Hanoi and moved to a suburban area, setting up their headquarters there. deepe and an taylor--insert 4A insert [deletion: after] page [deletion: three] page after third paragraph: The regular troop strength of the People’s Army of (North) Vietnam (PAVN) is, according to South Vietnamese intelligence sources; a total of 223,000--almost the same strength of the regular forces of the wartorn South Vietnamese republic. These PAVN units are divided as follows: 14 infantry divisions, one division of artillery and anti-aircraft, 11 autonomous regiments; one regiment of the [deletion: ein] engineering corps; 2 [deletion: regime] regiments for the defense of the border areas, three regiments for the defense of the coast, four [deletion: compant] companies of PTT boats and junks. deepe and an taylor--5 This is considered [deletion: to] dangerously likely to set off a chain reaction throughout the world. “The art [XXXX indicating deletion] is to keep up this game so that you really get the North Vietnam in a state of panic--before you get the British [insertion: and Italian] government in a state of panic,” one Western observer noted. “So far that hasn’t been so successful.” According to informed observers the [XXXX indicating deletion] policy reaction of Hanoi [XXXX indicating deletion] will be to “get really cooked and use it for propaganda--as an example of American power for other underdeveloped Asian and African countries. They will be able to use this in their future ‘wars of liberation,’” one Western observer explained. Beverly Deepe and Pham Xuan An Taylor--6 This is the chronology of political deterioration and military escalation picture. According to reliable sources here: Thirteen days after Ambassador Taylor arrived in Viet Nam, on July 20, the American-backed Vietnamese strongman Major General Nguyen Khanh, the Prime Minister and now roving ambassador in the United States, launched as official government policy, the “Bac Tien” (March to the North) policy. Taylor was irked and assured Khanh and the Vietnamese that this was not American policy. The first North Vietnamese prisoners of war were captured, indicating “a slow invasion”. No sooner had Taylor and Khanh patched up their differences--officially at a press gathering [deletion: in] at a seaside resort--than the August 5th Tonkin Gulf incident flared up and American planes retaliated against North Vietnamese military targets, Khanh served champagne in his Cabinet meeting. He then instituted [deletion: a hard-line internal] martial law provisions, proposed a new strongman constitution and had himself elected as president by the generals in the military revolutionary council. [XXXX indicating deletion] Ten days later, he was toppled from power by rioting pro-Buddhists, now considered pro-neutralists. He later became commander-in-chief [deletion: , but outside the government] and Taylor [XXXX indicating deletion] returned to Washington mid-November to report the rapidly deteriorating political and military situation in Vietnam. At the same time, he submitted to President Lyndon B. Johnson a proposal to escalate the war Taylor--7 into North Vietnam as well as expanding the war in South Vietnam. President Johnson reportedly told Taylor that the proposal could be carried out on condition that a reasonable amount of political stability should be first established in the South. By the end of November 64, Ambassador Taylor returned to Saigon and spent about ten days consulting with the leaders of the Vietnamese government, the Armed Forces generals, the Buddhist and Catholic groups as well as political parties. A dinner was also offered by American general William C. Westmoreland, chief of Military Assistance Command Vietnam (M.A.C.V.), to the Vietnamese most active young generals--”the young Turks”. The purpose of this series of consultation was to tell [XXXX indicating deletion] [deletion: directly] the Vietnamese to rally behind the civilian government headed by former Prime Minister Tran Van Huong, and not to struggle for power among themselves. Then, the Ambassador would be able to carry out his six-month plan of escalation of war [XXXX indicating deletion] into North Vietnam to salvage the South Vietnam from its rapid deterioration. The advice given by Ambassador Taylor to the Vietnamese Buddhist leaders and Khanh’s young generals was quickly ignored. The Buddhists continued their campaign against Prime Minister Tran van Huong’s government with more intensity and on December 20, the generals destroyed the legislative body of the government called the High National Council. The action of the generals was strongly disapproved by Ambassador Taylor. The conflict between the Ambassador and General Nguyen Khanh flared up publicly. Taylor 8 Instead of restoring the High National Council as [deletion: the] Taylor wanted, the generals toppled [deletion: the] Huong’s government January 25, 65. Ambassador Taylor’s six-month plan to reverse the situation, scheduled to start at the beginning of 1965, was then delayed further. In early February, instead of returning to Washington to report on the internal situation in South Vietnam following the fall of Huong, Ambassador [insertion: Taylor] was ordered by President Johnson to stay on and a delegation headed by [XXXX indicating deletion] Mr. Mac George Bundy was dispatched to Saigon. On February 7, the Communists in South Vietnam took advantage of the internal political crisis and launched a fierce assault on [insertion: the] American installations [deletion: , particularly the] on the Pleiku airstrip [deletion: and American advisors barracks]. Ambassador Taylor was given a green light to enact his plan into action by President Johnson even though no official government had been formed to replace [XXXX indicating deletion] Huong. Only a caretaker government reigned. The bombing and strafing of North Vietnam continued. “Hawk” anti-aircraft missiles manned by the United States Marines Corps were brought into Da-Nang strategic airbase and the American dependents were ordered to leave South Vietnam within two weeks to “clear the decks” as measures of precaution against any types of Communist reprisals. The retaliation or tit-for-tat action against North Vietnam was escalated to bombing for reasons of general “aggression” by Hanoi. [XXXX indicating deletion] Taylor--9 To protect the United States “Hawk” missiles and the jets based in Da-Nang, 3,500 U.S. Marines were brought in. As the Communist units attempted to cut the country in half through escalation into mobile warfare tactics, two thousand [insertion: South] Korean troops were also brought into South Vietnam to relieve the Vietnamese troops from static position. New American ordnance was recently used or brought into Vietnam: “Elda” bombs which explode in the air and spread myriads of miniature arrows in a circle of about [XXXX indicating deletion] 400-yard diameter; the delaying bombs, the concentrated tear-gas, nauseous gas and sleeping-gas bombs. The United States jets were authorized to participate in the bombing and strafing the Communist guerrilla targets [insertion: with]in South Vietnam. The strength of the Vietnamese regular and paramilitary troops were authorized to be increased by one hundred thousand. For instances, about thirty new Vietnamese Army battalions,- a strength equivalent to [deletion: two] three Vietnamese divisions,- and ten more squadrons of armoured vehicles were authorized to be formed by the end of this year. New tanks M-41 equipped with 76 mm cannon were brought into South Vietnam--but were first put into practice during February 19 coup d’Etat. On the political side, the American Mission here is endeavouring to stabilize and strengthen the central government headed by Dr. Phan Huy Quat set up by General Nguyen Khanh who was [XXXX indicating deletion] ousted by his own generals who [XXXX indicating deletion] took advantage of an abortive coup d’Etat of February 19, 65. To bring the Taylor [illegible] Vietnamese together at regional and village levels in the countryside, the U.S. mission [deletion: is having a great deal of] placing its hope in the “Hop-Tac” (Co-operation) operation worked out last summer, This is the pilot case of the most ambitious strategic plan of pacification around Saigon in which the cooperation between the Vietnamese military and civilian authorities at all echelons and the Vietnamese people and the American participation is required to bring the plan to success. In general, Ambassador Taylor’s plan could be summarized by his own words in his speech delivered at the Lions Club in Saigon Monday, March 22, just six days before his [XXXX indicating deletion] announced departure to the United States for report. Ambassador Taylor said, “It will depend upon our ability to solve three basic problems. The first is to generate sufficient trained manpower, military, paramilitary and police to establish the necessary preponderance of strength over the growing numbers of the Viet Cong (Vietnamese Communist). Related thereto is the need to end the leadership, direction and support from North Vietnam without which the Viet Cong annot long maintain their insurgency. Finally, there is the problem of maintaining stable government both in Saigon and in the provinces, so that the resources made [XXXX indicating deletion] available for military and pacification operations can be utilized to the best advantages.” #

Date

1965, Mar. 25

Subject

Vietnam (Republic), 1961-1975; Vietnam (Republic)--Politics and government; Taylor, Maxwell D. (Maxwell Davenport), 1901-1987; United States--Relations--Vietnam (Republic); Ambassadors; Diplomatic and consular service

Location

Saigon, South Vietnam

Coordinates

10.8231; 106.6311

Size

20 x 26 cm

Container

B4, F10

Format

dispatches

Collection Number

MS 363

Collection Title

Beverly Deepe Keever, Journalism Papers

Creator

Keever, Beverly Deepe; Ph?m, Xuï¿½n ?n, 1927-2006

Collector

Keever, Beverly Deepe

Copyright Information

These images are for educational use only. To inquire about usage or publication, please contact Archives & Special Collections.

Publisher

Archives & Special Collections, University of Nebraska-Lincoln Libraries

Language

English

Item