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derivative filename/jpeg
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363-04742.pdf
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Digital Object Identifier
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363-04742
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Title
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Reds in Yellow Robes?
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Description
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Article published in the New York Herald Tribune about the potential connection between Buddhist protestors and the Việt Cộng, page 19
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Date
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1965, Mar. 14
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Subject
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Mặt trận dân tộc giải phóng miền nam Việt Nam; Vietnam War, 1961-1975--Protest movements--Vietnam (Republic); Vietnam War, 1961-1975--Religious aspects--Buddhism; Buddhism and politics--Vietnam (Republic)
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Location
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Saigon, South Vietnam
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Coordinates
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10.8231; 106.6311
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Container
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B4, F6
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Format
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newspaper clippings
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Collection Number
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MS 363
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Collection Title
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Beverly Deepe Keever, Journalism Papers
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Creator
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Keever, Beverly Deepe
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Copyright Information
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These images are for educational use only. To inquire about usage or publication, please contact Archives & Special Collections.
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Publisher
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Archives & Special Collections, University of Nebraska-Lincoln Libraries
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Language
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English
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extracted text
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Reds
By Beverly Deepe
A Special Correspondent
SAIGON.
Yes, Madame Ngo Dinh
Nhu was probably right about
the Buddhists.
But no one wlll ever know
for sure. When the lovely spitfire sister-in-law o! former
President Ngo Dinh Diem labeled the m!l!tant Buddhist
monks as "Reds In yellow
robes," she caused an internal
and international furor.
And her attacks indirectly
aided the monks- who were
later to spar)c the overthrow
of the Diem regime 16 months
ago- by making her t he symbol they needed to attack. Her
vitriolic r emarks also sabotaged the attempts at compromise between the Buddhist
militants and the President.
Still one of the most powerful- and puzzling-factors in
Vietnamese politics, the Buddhists this weekend are holding a mass conference in
Saigon to determine their
future policy and assess their
grass-roots strength.
In behind-the-scenes talks,
leading priests and · laymen
are expected to decide their
stand on key ·issues of peace
negotiations with the Communists and American intervention in South Viet Nam.
Two
prominent
priestsQuang Lien and Phap Trihave already called for the
withdrawal first of Communist guerrillas and finally
of American troops from the
country. But their views have
been repudiated by other
Buddhist leaders.
High - ranking
Buddhists
will also discuss their attitude
toward t he government of
Premier Phan Huy Quat. The
r egime has avoided answering
recen t Buddhist demands for
the release of students and
priests jailed by t he previous
government, for destruction of
police files on Buddhists and
for permission for civil servants to join Buddhist as·sociations.
The
religious
leaders also will study comprehensive reports on the
strength and sentiment o!
their followers at the village
level.
Are these men- or some of
them-"Reds in yellow robes"
or not? Observers here believe
no one will ever really know.
They would never carry Com' munist party c_a rds.
Vietnamese politics are so
obscure that a ranking Buddhist leader would never at
this time be caught in a meetin~ with Communist cadres.
the ar
•
Ill
Yellow Robes'!
Maybe Mme. Nhu Was Right
munist agents." one ex-Communist explained, "they will
selflessly sacrifice themselves
and fade into obl!vior.i once
the CCllilmunists have taken
over ."
PLAY GAME
But anti-Communist elements in Viet Nam believe the
Buddhist militants are "playing the game of the Communists" becal,\se of their past
a ctions, their present policy
and t heir "anarchistic" tendencies which have shriveled
the effectiveness of every
government since the fall of
Mr. Diem.
And wi thout an effective
competing government, the
Communist political subver sion and organization has
mushroomed in size and
str:mgth. From this viewpoint ,
the Buddhist militants ha ve
obviously aided the Viet Cong
Communists.
In the past three weeks, the
Buddhists have reached an
important turning point. Th ey
have apparently entered a new
phase . These are the new de velopmentil since the Febru ~
ary bombings of North Viet
Nam :
CIExcept for the Viet Cong
Communists,
the militant
Buddhist organization is the
most important power grouping in Viet Nam.
Their potential power now
appears to overshadow not
only the country's government
but the armed forces, which
have become since the Feb. 19
coup attempt more divided
and less politically oriented.
Neither the armed forces nor
the government appears prepared to resist the growing
strength of the Buddhists
militants.
CIDuring the Diem regime,
the militant Buddhists were a
clandestine, semi-underground
political dissident movement,
which used religious persecution as their battle cry. After
the fall of Diem, they became
a political movement of protest, which successfully neutralized or spearheaded the
toppling of each of the successive gove1nments. Now, as of
mid-February, they have become part of the government
of Premier' Phan Huy Quat-and, ha.v al...,,,4•ed a sizable
chunk
that government
throug pro-Buddhist representati
in it ... .1,
At east iriomentarily, t he
Buddhists appear to have ended their period of protests
against the government---since
they have become part of the
government. However, they
now have developed a new issue-peace. Their current appeals for peace may in the future become protests for
peace, which would again
serve to increase the Buddhist
power over the masses.
f[Durin g the 16 months following t he fall of Diem, the
Buddhists had been a third
government - operating bet ween Saigon and the political
backbone of the Viet Cong
guerrillas, the National Liberation Front.
In an important position
paper, a leading monk said
.the militant Buddhist movement; ·was against both the
Communists and the , anticommunists, whom he described as t he Catholics and
t he Americans. It was clear
from their policy that their
immediate enemy was the Saigon government and not the
Viet Cong.
MAIN LINK
the foreign press send a number of reporters to the Buddhist sermons. Each comes
back with a different version
and a different emphasis.
"Each hears what he wants to
hear," one journalist explained .
This Buddhist peace offensive is the talk of Saigon. The
Buddhists are considered pro neutrallsti: , their version of
peace closer to the Viet Cong's
than to the free world 's. Saigonese see no cohesive· anticommunist element capable
of stopping their offensive.
Since mid-February a trend
has developed to draw a
sharper line between the antiCommunist military war and
the political subversive war .
-Since the February dismissa l of Lt. Gen, Nguyen Khanh
as Commander in Chief, the
armed forces , which had been
a super-government, has less
political power. The Armed
Forces Council has taken a
tough anti-Communist stand
against the guerrillas but has
virtually ignored the subversive element.
The government of Premier
Quat has taken a tough stand
against both the Viet Cong
guerrillas and the Communist
subversives . But the government has chosen to ignore the
Buddhists as part of the subversive movement.
·
During his first press conference, the Premier interrupted one translation, took it
upon himself to become the
spokesman for the · Buddhist
position, carefully explaining
that the Buddhists were for a
" nationalistic" sort of peace .
This "soft" stand · on the
Buddhist issue is ori~ of the
mosts important developments
since the departure of Gen.
,Khanh .
Now, that they have become
a substantial part of the Saigon government, howe ver, it
would appea r timely for them
to declare war on the Communists.
But they have not. Instead
they launched their peace
offensive, which places them
in the position of rising as an
arbiter above other partiesSaigon and the Viet Cong.
It is reliably predicted that
in the coming months the
Buddhists will become the
STRUGGLE
central link between Saigon
and the Viet Cong, paving the
All last year, mostly in
way for the coalition government which the Viet Cong behind-scenes intrigue, the two
have always wanted as part of contenders for power were
their neutralization of the Gen. Kharih and the Buddhist
politico-priest, Thich (Rev .)
country.
Tri Quang'.
f[The Buddhist concept of
peace is ambiguous. One
In August, Oen . Khanh ,
Buddhist priest gives one con- then Premier and President
cept to Western and local cor- and Tri Quang coll!ded ; the
respondents only to have it priest won momentarily as
denied, cont,radicted or clari- pro-Buddhist demonstrations
fi 2 ct by another priest.
toppled Gen . Khanh from th e
Presidency .
More significant than the
official statements given to the
But Gen. Khanh, with brilpress are the sermons hich llant maneuvering, quickly re established himself as the
the Buddhist priests are giv- strongman- until Feb. 2o when
ing to the masses, their s urce pro-Buddhist generals allied
of power . No one really k 1ows themselves 'with pro-Catholi
what they say in th eir s ~ generals to vote tor his dismons.
~
mi.ssl}l.
The foreign embassle the
· . Kbanh tben......1,,...-,....,
P1 ime Minister 's offl . t
seNow t.h .. :;:
t
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and
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