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derivative filename/jpeg
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363-04752.pdf
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Digital Object Identifier
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363-04752
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Title
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Viet Regieme's Downfall- A Step to Losing the War
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Description
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Article published in the New York Herald Tribune about the collapse of Prime Minister Phan Huy Quát's government, the increasing disunity in the military junta, and the effects this will have on the Vietnam War, pages 1 and unknown page
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Date
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1965, Jun. 13
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Subject
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Vietnam (Republic)--Politics and government; Phan Huy Quát, 1908-1979; Vietnam, 1961-1975
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Location
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District of Columbia, United States
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Coordinates
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38.8903; -77.0319
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Container
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B4, F6
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Format
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newspaper clippings
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Collection Number
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MS 363
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Collection Title
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Beverly Deepe Keever, Journalism Papers
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Creator
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Keever, Beverly Deepe
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Copyright Information
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These images are for educational use only. To inquire about usage or publication, please contact Archives & Special Collections.
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Publisher
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Archives & Special Collections, University of Nebraska-Lincoln Libraries
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Language
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English
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extracted text
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/iet
\_ Step ·to Losin the War
Neutralist Trend
Part of Red Plot
By Beverly Deepe
A Special Correspondent
WASHINGTON.
Sotrth Viet Nam's political deterioration as evidenced by the downfall of yet another governmtmt is
interpreted here as carrying the country closer to a
neutralist position.
Anti-Communist Vietnamese · sources view the
resignation of anti-Communist Premier Phan Huy
Quat and the re-emergence of a deeply divided collection of military leaders as perhaps a major turning
point.
These sources fear that important political forces
-religious and secular-in Saigon are on the verge
of making a behind-the-scenes tacit agreement
with the Communist Viet Cong :fighters and their
political organization, the National Liberation Front
(NLF), to form an official neutralist coalition government. '
I
1
Anti-Communist som•ces equate a ·negotiated
political settlement at this time with capitulation to
the Communists.
These anti-Communist sources say, however, the
fundamental . question is still whether Hanoi and the
NLF would in the near future settle for a neutralist
coalition in which they would be assured of a
controlling interest in the government.
Instead, Hanoi and the NLF may follow the
Peking line and hold out for the total defeat of the
American position. Vietnarhese security officials estimate that the Communists need at least two more
years to seize and totaily hold political power in
Viet Nam. This estimate assumes that the present
pacing of political and military deterioration remains
the same.
Since the fall of the regime of President Ngo Dinh
Diem in November, 1963, t~e effect of each successive '
Regime's Downfall-Step ·to Defeat
I
(Continued, from page one)
coup d'etat, false coup, counter-coul? an~ governme~t
crisis has brought a sharp deterioration of_ anticommunist ·morale and a diminishing of anti-Communist strength and influence.
Since the fall of Lt. Gen. Nguyen Khanh as
anti-Communist strongman neal'ly four months ago,
the anti-Communist sector has lacked a man, political
party or apparatus in which to unify the anti-Communist position. Instead, tough-line anti-Comm~ist
officers are either publicly discredited or quietly
maneuvered out of postions of power. This has affected
the government administration, security and plann~ng
from the central level in Saigon to the outlymg
provinces. '.I1his deterioration is expected to be hast_ened by this last government crisis, marked as it is
by serious disagreement among the generals themselves.
t
Durtng the past month in Saigon, the hottes
speculation among Western diplomats was whether
South Viet Nam would collapse in Chiang Kai-shek
style. French sources openly predicted it mig~~; ot~er
Western sources "did not exclude the possibility.
Then, as press reports flowed into Washington
telling of the political turmoil last ,w,e~k, . one anticommunist Vietnamese explained, 'This is goodbY,
Viet Nam· this is the end of the American dreampart I- their dream of ending Communist imperialism."
·
,
Anti-Communist Vietnamese sources do not see
the political re-emergence of the Vietnamese military
leaders as a solution, but as a symptom of the problem. These sources explain that the essence of the
political problem is the increasing Communist penetration, on the one hand into every aspect of ':i~thamese government, police, armed forces and civillan
life and no the other hand, the unwillingness of
American officials to exercise their political po~er
to combat actively the subve,r sion for fear of bemg
labeled "colonialists" and ' the inability of Saigon
anti-Communists to do so.
"The persons working for the Communist version
of neutralism have even infiltrated into the Girl
Scouts," one Vietnamese Catholic housewife explained,
as she burst into tears fearing that even the members
of her fmaily would soon be arrested or assassinated.
"These persons working for the Communists are even
moving within Catholic circles, creating divisions
among us.
"The way it works," she explained, "is like this.
Suppose you have three Catholics in the room. The
persons working for the Communists will criticize
one for being a southerner, one for befonging to a
certain politicaJl party. Pretty soon, the three Catholics
refuse to work with each other and then they start
· fighting each other. None of my family will say
anything about politics to the people we used to
cons~der our friends. We don't trust anyone any
more."
Interwoven wi.th the Catholic opposition to Prime
Minister Quat was the sectionrul differences between
southern-born Vietnamese and the largely northernborn elements within the Quat cabinet. Acting Chief
of State Phan Khac Suu, who resigned yesterday, .
was born in South Viet Nam and attracted that
segment of the population in his conflict with the
Prime Minister over a constitutional matter. During
the Quat-Suu conflict, however, pro-neutralIBts made
house-by-house visits to prominent southern-born
families, urging the Southerners "to stick together"
in opposing Mr. Quat.
--~
