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derivative filename/jpeg
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363-04881C.pdf
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Digital Object Identifier
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363-04881C
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Title
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North Viet Nam Recruits Its Own for the Red War
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Description
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Article published in the New York Herald Tribune about recruitment tactics in the North Vietnamese military, page unknown
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AI Usage Disclosure
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Draft transcripts were automatically generated via Google Document AI and are currently under review. Please report significant errors to Archives & Special Collections at archives@unl.edu.
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Transcript
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Gen. Khanh Re-Emerges as the Strong Man
By Beverly Deepe
A Special Correspondent
SAIGON.
A year ago yesterday, Maj.
Gen. Nguyên Khanh, in his
first swift coup d'etat, entered
the Premier's office with three
stars, a modest black goatee
and a reputation for being an
expert poker player.
Today he sports four stars,
a Genghis Khan goatee plus
moustache and the air of a
winner of an important round
of political gambling.
A year ago he was the front
man for other generals and
political rivals; today he is
the behind-the-scenes strong-
man, officially Commander-
in-Chief of the Vietnamese
armed forces and chairman
of the Armed Forces Council,
which has openly become a
super-government making the
key decisions in the anti-
Communist sphere of influ-
ence in Viet Nam.
One of the surest bets in
Viet Nam is that this spring
the 37-year-old General will
be elected President with de
Gaulle-like powers-barring
an assassination.
He is, in short, the man of
the moment-but the mo-
ment in a lost year and a
losing war. Gen. Khanh is
the strongman governing a
shrinking
anti-Communist
sphere.
FULL CIRCLE
"We have now come full
circle back to January last
year," one Vietnamese poli-
tician explained.
"This year has been a rep-
etition of history-but also
the evolution of history.
There are many changes in
the year. When Khanh first
came to power, he was eager
to be a government official,
Now he still longs for these
things, but he vigorously pro-
tests he does not want them.
"He's using as a political
axiom to acquire the Pres-
idency that old French pro-
verb: 'If you follow the wom-
an, she will flee; if you re-
treat, she will follow you.'
"Khanh has learned his
political ABC's well; he's
much more mature," the
politician continued. "He
the Americans; now he's
built the image of being
mildly anti-American and a
more independent Vietnamese
leader."
came to power clinging to
During the past year Gen.
Khanh failed to lead his
nation in the anti-Commu-
nist war-a task the free
world assigned to him-but
he survived, which is all
that Viet Nam expected of
him. His policy of survival,
considering the initial odds,
was in itself a political
achievement, according to
Vietnamese observers.
When he entered the
Premier's office, American
policy was to build a strong-
man regime. Visits by De-
fense Secretary Robert S.
McNamara and Secretary of
State Dean Rusk aided this
objective.
This policy in 1964 was
only
partially successful.
During the coming months,
the policy will be continued
in an almost last-ditch at-
tempt to maintain a politi
cally stable government with
a high degree of centralized
power resting in the hands
of Gen. Khanh. The prospect
is that this plan will be im-
plemented at all costs.
Last January, as the front
man for a coalition of Right-
wing generals and political
parties, Gen. Khanh felt that
his immediate enemies were
to his rear-not the Viet
Cong Communist guerrillas
in the front line.
Now, a year later, despite
being toppled from office by
rioting students, he has in
one way or another exiled all
personal political and mili-
tary rivals and eliminated
all anti-Communist organiza-
tions that would compete for
his position.
But as Gen. Khanh's power
increased so did that of his
enemies and potential oppo-
nents. Gen. Khanh has es-
tablished for himself and
the armed forces more and
more control, but the Viet
Cong have tightened their
political-military grip on the
peasant masses and the Bud-
dhists have increaesd their
political influence on the ur-
ban masses.
"The armed forces-and
Khanh-have more and more
control over less and less ter-
ritory and fewer and fewer
people," one Vietnamese ob-
server noted.
Gen. Khan's current state
of decision is in marked con-
trast to his low point five
months ago when, in a mo-
ment of immobility, he was
unable to counter the riots
organized by the Buddhists
and political parties. They
toppled him from the Presi-
dency but enabled him to
retain a fiber of power.
Since then, he has inched
his way back into a position
of power-but simultaneously
the Buddhist political move-
ment has grown more decisive
and powerful.
TASK
The coup d'etat last week
overthrowing Premier Tran
Van Huong bestowed upon
Gen. Khanh the "task of
solving the present crisis," in
which he will again be con-
fronted with the Buddhist
leaders who had previously
engineered his downfall. But
to solve the crisis does not
mean to end it-it will mean
only to soften it.
Gen. Khanh, already adopt-
ing the role of the great
compromiser, will through
concession and counter-con-
cession, pressure and counter-
pressure, seek to contain the
power and scope of the po-
litical Buddhist monks.
Hence the unity of the na-
tion will rest, not on unity
among various religious or
regional groupings, but upon
a pofusion of checks and
balances in which factions
will be pitched against each
other rather than against
Gen. Khanh or the govern-
ment.
While containing, though
not solving, the immediate
problem of political instability
within the anti-Communist
sphere, Gen. Khanh is faced
simultaneously with the even
greater threat from his true
enemy-the Viet Cong Com-
munists, who throughout the
past year have mushroomed
in military might in the coun-
tryside and increased their
political influence nation-
wide.
Saigonese concede that
Gen. Khanh is the most cap-
able leader on the anti-Com-
munist side to wage this two-
front war. He is considered
the best politician among the
generals and the strongest
general by the politicians.
The biggest gamble of all
for Gen. Khanh is whether
the problems are too enor
mous and mimediate to solve
or to smother. The odds are
that if Gen. Khanh loses this
gamble, the Viet Cong Com-
munist will cash in mort I
the chips.
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Date
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1965, Jan. 31
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Subject
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Vietnam (Democratic Republic). Quân đội; Recruiting and enlistment; Military education; Tactics
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Location
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Saigon, South Vietnam
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Coordinates
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10.8231; 106.6311
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Container
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B186
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Format
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newspaper clippings
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Collection Number
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MS 363
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Collection Title
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Beverly Deepe Keever, Journalism Papers
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Creator
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Keever, Beverly Deepe
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Copyright Information
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These images are for educational use only. To inquire about usage or publication, please contact Archives & Special Collections.
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Publisher
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Archives & Special Collections, University of Nebraska-Lincoln Libraries
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Language
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English
