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Title
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Viet Guerrillas Have the Edge on Guided Missiles
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Description
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Article published in the New York Herald Tribune about the uselessness of guided missiles against insurgents in Vietnam, page 9
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Is Format Of
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363-04826.pdf
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Identifier
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363-04826
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Date
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1965, Feb. 28
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Subject
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Mặt trận dân tộc giải phóng miền nam Việt Nam; Vietnam War, 1961-1975--Guerilla Warfare; Guided missiles; Tactics; United States. Air Force; Jungle warfare
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Location
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Saigon, South Vietnam
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Coordinates
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10.8231; 106.6311
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Is Part Of
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B4, F6
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Format
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newspaper clippings
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Is Required By
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MS 363
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Collection
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Beverly Deepe Keever, Journalism Papers
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Creator
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Keever, Beverly Deepe
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Rights
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These images are for educational use only. To inquire about usage or publication, please contact Archives & Special Collections.
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Publisher
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Archives & Special Collections, University of Nebraska-Lincoln Libraries
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Language
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English
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extracted text
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Sunday, Febt•uary 28, 1965
1
New York
liernrn
fil'tibune
Viet Guerrillas Have th Edge on Guided Missiles
By Beverly Deepe
A Special Correspondent
.
SAIGON.
.. The' batteries of g1eaming
American .guided missiles in
the northerl'l. city of Da Nang
represent perhaps one of the
most ludicrous sights and eerie
paradoxes in this country
waging a guerrilla war.
The silvery missiles .symbolize to the world the most
advanced achievements of
American military might. But
within Viet Nam they represent an admission that the
United States has neither the
political nor military means to
win the guerrilla war-but
only the · means to make · it
more expensive for the Communists to win it.
Internationally, these nonnuclear missiles symbolize
American military might in
confrontaton with the nuclear
and missile might of Moscow
and the massive ground-force
strength of Peking.
But -internally the confrontation is .siinply the guided
missile vs . .the guerrilla. Internally, the odds are still on
the side.of the guerrilla.
·
Moscow, Peking and Hanoi
have consistently agreed that
guerrilla wars as a tactic and
"wars· of liberation" as a
strategy would be the warfare
of the future . The Viet Nam
struggle was to be a showcase
of their achievements.
U. S. mil!tary officers in Viet
Nam privately concede that
this type of warfare-rather
th.an confrontation with the
Communist world-is their
main concern in Viet Nam.
Whatever the. international
reason behind . the failure of
the major Communist capitals
to· reaet dramatically to the
bombing of. North Viet Nam,
it is clear that in Viet Nam it
1s believed the Communists are
winning the guerrilla war in
the south and._ will continue to
do so.
Even the first day after the
air •strikes Saigon took the
news with nonchalant unconcern.
.
.
"We· know-the Russians an,d
Peking will .do nothing," said
one Vietnamese political observer.
"The Communists are already winning the guerrilla
war-which is the one they
want to win . And if Moscow,
Peking or Hanoi did retaliate,
it would undercut their argument.s about a war of liberation-that this is a popular
uprising of South Vietnamese
in South Viet Nam against the
South Vietnamese government
and its American supporters.
The fact that the missiles
were brought to Viet Nam 1s
in itself an admission of failure on the part of American
policymakers. After the first
bombing of North Viet Nam
over the Tonkin Gulf incident
last August, Americans protected the South Vietnamese
from retaliation by moving in
more than a squadron of B-57
jet-fighters. However, on Nov.
1, the Viet Cong guerrillas
virtually destroyed or damaged the whole squadron in a
mortar attack on the Bien
Hoa Airbase only 18 miles
from Saigon.
When the dispatch of missiles to Viet Nam was announced, one American observer wisecracked, "I wonder
how long it will be before the
Viet Cong get the missiles."
Even now, the Hawk missile
site-and even the Saigon
Airport-are considered vulnerable to Viet Cong attacks.
The guided missiles symbolize an e_ttempt by American
policymakers to super-conventionalize the guerrilla war,
or more precisely to transform
the character and dimeru;ion
of the war on the terms
America is best equipped ·to
fight.
.
Simultaneously, the Viet
Cong have been semi-conventionalizing the war on their
own terms.
In recent months they have
shifted from hit-and-run tactics by relatively small bands
of guerrillas to mobile, but
momentary frontlike warfare,
committing to battle companies and battalions equipped
with the best of American
weaponry.
Likewise, they have turned
from attacking fortified hamlets guarded by poorly trained
local defenders to striking
government district towns
protected by regular army
units.
They recently have stood
and fought against the elite
of government troops-the
paratroopers ·and marinesand as in the case · of Pleiku
and Bien Hoa the Viet Cong
have launched disastrous attacks agairu;t the biggest of
military installations. ,
But one thing is st!ll clearthe Viet Cong will not escalate
the internal struggle to the
extent of conventionalizing it
at this time. Through systematic military offeru;ives and
political subversion they will
increase the tempo, pace and
dimension of their war.
Only when it is to their advantage-and no't Washington's-will they attack with
conventionalized army divisions. They w!ll do that when
they are ready to seize power
-and then it is too late to
stop them. ·The big question is
when they will have the political alliances and military
strength to do so.
.
Any assumption that bombin·g North Viet Nam would
force Hanoi to downgrade the
war in the south appears to be
unsound. The action of Hanoi
after the August bombing of
North Vietnamese military installations was simply that the
raids were a nuisance the
north would have to live with.
A historical analysis of
Communist strategy suggests
that even six years ago Ha i
was prepared to suffer
prisals for its support of t
guerr11la movement in Sou
Viet Nam. In 1958, a sout •
ern~born Communist ca e
named Le Duan, now seer tary general of the Comm •
nist party in Hanoi, wrote
report urging that Hanoi su port not only anti-gover •
ment political activity b t
also armed military guerr111$1
in the south. Hanoi consid•
ered the report for two years
without making a decisionand the decision was made
after President Ho Chi Minh
visited Moscow and Pekinr
for conferences.
The question was not
whether to support the south•
ern guerrillas-but wheth r
Hanoi was prepared to accept
the consequences of that
commitment. Today, seven
years later, the consequences
of that decision i.; being
watched by the world.
Perhaps in the final analysis, the bombing of North Vi t
nam will be the test of Ameri•
can policymakers. For the bi •
gest question in the min
of educated Vietnamese is
whether last week's attac
are moves toward total vi •
tory or whether in the co
ing years, attacks on Nor
Viet Nam would be the mill•
tary means to strengthen t
U. S. and South Vietname
political bargaining position
the conference table.
re-
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-
Sunday, Febt•uary 28, 1965
1
New York
liernrn
fil'tibune
Viet Guerrillas Have th Edge on Guided Missiles
By Beverly Deepe
A Special Correspondent
.
SAIGON.
.. The' batteries of g1eaming
American .guided missiles in
the northerl'l. city of Da Nang
represent perhaps one of the
most ludicrous sights and eerie
paradoxes in this country
waging a guerrilla war.
The silvery missiles .symbolize to the world the most
advanced achievements of
American military might. But
within Viet Nam they represent an admission that the
United States has neither the
political nor military means to
win the guerrilla war-but
only the · means to make · it
more expensive for the Communists to win it.
Internationally, these nonnuclear missiles symbolize
American military might in
confrontaton with the nuclear
and missile might of Moscow
and the massive ground-force
strength of Peking.
But -internally the confrontation is .siinply the guided
missile vs . .the guerrilla. Internally, the odds are still on
the side.of the guerrilla.
·
Moscow, Peking and Hanoi
have consistently agreed that
guerrilla wars as a tactic and
"wars· of liberation" as a
strategy would be the warfare
of the future . The Viet Nam
struggle was to be a showcase
of their achievements.
U. S. mil!tary officers in Viet
Nam privately concede that
this type of warfare-rather
th.an confrontation with the
Communist world-is their
main concern in Viet Nam.
Whatever the. international
reason behind . the failure of
the major Communist capitals
to· reaet dramatically to the
bombing of. North Viet Nam,
it is clear that in Viet Nam it
1s believed the Communists are
winning the guerrilla war in
the south and._ will continue to
do so.
Even the first day after the
air •strikes Saigon took the
news with nonchalant unconcern.
.
.
"We· know-the Russians an,d
Peking will .do nothing," said
one Vietnamese political observer.
"The Communists are already winning the guerrilla
war-which is the one they
want to win . And if Moscow,
Peking or Hanoi did retaliate,
it would undercut their argument.s about a war of liberation-that this is a popular
uprising of South Vietnamese
in South Viet Nam against the
South Vietnamese government
and its American supporters.
The fact that the missiles
were brought to Viet Nam 1s
in itself an admission of failure on the part of American
policymakers. After the first
bombing of North Viet Nam
over the Tonkin Gulf incident
last August, Americans protected the South Vietnamese
from retaliation by moving in
more than a squadron of B-57
jet-fighters. However, on Nov.
1, the Viet Cong guerrillas
virtually destroyed or damaged the whole squadron in a
mortar attack on the Bien
Hoa Airbase only 18 miles
from Saigon.
When the dispatch of missiles to Viet Nam was announced, one American observer wisecracked, "I wonder
how long it will be before the
Viet Cong get the missiles."
Even now, the Hawk missile
site-and even the Saigon
Airport-are considered vulnerable to Viet Cong attacks.
The guided missiles symbolize an e_ttempt by American
policymakers to super-conventionalize the guerrilla war,
or more precisely to transform
the character and dimeru;ion
of the war on the terms
America is best equipped ·to
fight.
.
Simultaneously, the Viet
Cong have been semi-conventionalizing the war on their
own terms.
In recent months they have
shifted from hit-and-run tactics by relatively small bands
of guerrillas to mobile, but
momentary frontlike warfare,
committing to battle companies and battalions equipped
with the best of American
weaponry.
Likewise, they have turned
from attacking fortified hamlets guarded by poorly trained
local defenders to striking
government district towns
protected by regular army
units.
They recently have stood
and fought against the elite
of government troops-the
paratroopers ·and marinesand as in the case · of Pleiku
and Bien Hoa the Viet Cong
have launched disastrous attacks agairu;t the biggest of
military installations. ,
But one thing is st!ll clearthe Viet Cong will not escalate
the internal struggle to the
extent of conventionalizing it
at this time. Through systematic military offeru;ives and
political subversion they will
increase the tempo, pace and
dimension of their war.
Only when it is to their advantage-and no't Washington's-will they attack with
conventionalized army divisions. They w!ll do that when
they are ready to seize power
-and then it is too late to
stop them. ·The big question is
when they will have the political alliances and military
strength to do so.
.
Any assumption that bombin·g North Viet Nam would
force Hanoi to downgrade the
war in the south appears to be
unsound. The action of Hanoi
after the August bombing of
North Vietnamese military installations was simply that the
raids were a nuisance the
north would have to live with.
A historical analysis of
Communist strategy suggests
that even six years ago Ha i
was prepared to suffer
prisals for its support of t
guerr11la movement in Sou
Viet Nam. In 1958, a sout •
ern~born Communist ca e
named Le Duan, now seer tary general of the Comm •
nist party in Hanoi, wrote
report urging that Hanoi su port not only anti-gover •
ment political activity b t
also armed military guerr111$1
in the south. Hanoi consid•
ered the report for two years
without making a decisionand the decision was made
after President Ho Chi Minh
visited Moscow and Pekinr
for conferences.
The question was not
whether to support the south•
ern guerrillas-but wheth r
Hanoi was prepared to accept
the consequences of that
commitment. Today, seven
years later, the consequences
of that decision i.; being
watched by the world.
Perhaps in the final analysis, the bombing of North Vi t
nam will be the test of Ameri•
can policymakers. For the bi •
gest question in the min
of educated Vietnamese is
whether last week's attac
are moves toward total vi •
tory or whether in the co
ing years, attacks on Nor
Viet Nam would be the mill•
tary means to strengthen t
U. S. and South Vietname
political bargaining position
the conference table.
re-
sunday, 1:0,0,0,0
febt•uary 1:0,0,0,0
28, 1:0,0,0,0
1 1:0,0,0,0
1965 1:0,0,0,0
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guerrillas 1:0,0,0,0;1:0,0,0,0;1:0,0,0,0
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