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Title
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See U.S. Raids As Basis For Stable Viet
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Description
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Article published in the New York Herald Tribune about the stablizing effect the American bombing raids on North Vietnam will have on South Vietnam, page unknown
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Is Format Of
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363-04823.pdf
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Identifier
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363-04823
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Date
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1965, Feb. 16
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Subject
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Vietnam War, 1961-1975--Aerial operations; Vietnam War, 1961-1975--United States. Air Force; Vietnam (Republic)--Politics and government; Bombardment; Bombing, aerial
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Location
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Saigon, South Vietnam
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Coordinates
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10.8231; 106.6311
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Is Part Of
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B4, F6
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Format
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newspaper clippings
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Is Required By
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MS 363
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Collection
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Beverly Deepe Keever, Journalism Papers
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Creator
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Keever, Beverly Deepe
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Rights
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These images are for educational use only. To inquire about usage or publication, please contact Archives & Special Collections.
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Publisher
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Archives & Special Collections, University of Nebraska-Lincoln Libraries
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Language
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English
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extracted text
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SEE ·u.s. RAIDS
AS BASIS FOR
STABIJE VIET
By Beverly Deepe
A. Special Correspondent
SAIGON.
The recent American bombtng raids against Communist
North Viet Nam, like the ones
in August during the Bay of
Tonkin crisis, probably will
create the proper political
climate to form a strong,
stable government in South
Viet Nam.
The gamble ls that attempts
to form the government will
not fail; as they did in August, because of mistakes such
as those by American officials
in Saigon and by then-Premier Lt. Gen. Nguyen Khanh.
Many Vietnamese and some
Western diplomats believe the
creation of this favorable
climate was the real reason
for the raids.
While this is a matter of
conjecture, it is certain that
the final solution to the long
political crisis ls seen as a
stable government with power
tlgh tly , centralized in the
hands of the anti-Communist
Armed Forces- and more specifically in the hands of a de
Gaulle-type president, Gen.
Khanh, now the .strongman
and Commander-in-Chief.
This solution was attempted following the Bay of
Tonkin 1•aids, when Gen.
K'hanh seized tihe Presidency,
But he hesitated. to name
his new government, U. S. officials in Saigon were in a
state of immobility, a power
vacuum ensued, and Buddhist
street demonstrations brought
Gen.
Khanh's
temporary
downfall.
I! Gen. Khanh's new effort
falls, hopes of defeating the
Communist Viet Cong m!litarlly or politically will virtually evaporate. But since
August the political clrcum&tance3 have changed, and
chances for success are much
,reater.
Many observers believe that
the U. S. used the Communist
attack at Plelku as a pretext
-not a reason-for bombing
North Viet Nam. The bombing plans had been decided
upon at least a year before
and had not been used in
response to the Red attack
on Bien Hoa airfield last Nov.
l. -The timing of the strikes,
the observers believe, coincided with the needs of internal political developments.
U. S. Ambassador Maxwell
D. Taylor for months in public statements had made a
strong government in Saigon
a prerequisite for bombing
North Viet Nam. The argument was that bombing was
only a half-solution and that
a strong government was
needed to prosecute the war
effectively.
Now Gen . Taylor's statements must be interpreted
only as an appeal for a stable
government. For the recent
raids were launched when Saigon was between provisional
governments. His reversal of
policy implies that the bombing ·of North Viet Nam is a
necessary condition for forming a permanent government
rather than vice versa .
The new provisional government of Dr. Phan Huy
Quat will serve until the National Congress, scheduled to
be popularly elected March 21,
names a president and ratifies a Constitution with power
resting in the president's
hands. He in turn will name
a new and, !hopefully, permanent government.
The provisional government's structure, with five
super-ministers overseeing the
Cabinet, is vaguely that of the
future permanent government ; in an imprecise sense,
it is "the Khanh government
without Khanh ."
If American blunders and
Gen. Khanh's indecisiveness
were contributing factors to
the political chaos following
the August bombing, the pblitical climate before, during
and because of last week's
bombings is perhaps a mark
of the quiet success of U. S.
officials in Saigon and of Gen.
Khanh.
The most important factor
1s that American policymakers
are more decisive than after
Tonkin, whc11 they could not
afford a political crisis-and
bloodshed 1n the streets o(
Saigon-before the U. S. Presidential election.
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-
SEE ·u.s. RAIDS
AS BASIS FOR
STABIJE VIET
By Beverly Deepe
A. Special Correspondent
SAIGON.
The recent American bombtng raids against Communist
North Viet Nam, like the ones
in August during the Bay of
Tonkin crisis, probably will
create the proper political
climate to form a strong,
stable government in South
Viet Nam.
The gamble ls that attempts
to form the government will
not fail; as they did in August, because of mistakes such
as those by American officials
in Saigon and by then-Premier Lt. Gen. Nguyen Khanh.
Many Vietnamese and some
Western diplomats believe the
creation of this favorable
climate was the real reason
for the raids.
While this is a matter of
conjecture, it is certain that
the final solution to the long
political crisis ls seen as a
stable government with power
tlgh tly , centralized in the
hands of the anti-Communist
Armed Forces- and more specifically in the hands of a de
Gaulle-type president, Gen.
Khanh, now the .strongman
and Commander-in-Chief.
This solution was attempted following the Bay of
Tonkin 1•aids, when Gen.
K'hanh seized tihe Presidency,
But he hesitated. to name
his new government, U. S. officials in Saigon were in a
state of immobility, a power
vacuum ensued, and Buddhist
street demonstrations brought
Gen.
Khanh's
temporary
downfall.
I! Gen. Khanh's new effort
falls, hopes of defeating the
Communist Viet Cong m!litarlly or politically will virtually evaporate. But since
August the political clrcum&tance3 have changed, and
chances for success are much
,reater.
Many observers believe that
the U. S. used the Communist
attack at Plelku as a pretext
-not a reason-for bombing
North Viet Nam. The bombing plans had been decided
upon at least a year before
and had not been used in
response to the Red attack
on Bien Hoa airfield last Nov.
l. -The timing of the strikes,
the observers believe, coincided with the needs of internal political developments.
U. S. Ambassador Maxwell
D. Taylor for months in public statements had made a
strong government in Saigon
a prerequisite for bombing
North Viet Nam. The argument was that bombing was
only a half-solution and that
a strong government was
needed to prosecute the war
effectively.
Now Gen . Taylor's statements must be interpreted
only as an appeal for a stable
government. For the recent
raids were launched when Saigon was between provisional
governments. His reversal of
policy implies that the bombing ·of North Viet Nam is a
necessary condition for forming a permanent government
rather than vice versa .
The new provisional government of Dr. Phan Huy
Quat will serve until the National Congress, scheduled to
be popularly elected March 21,
names a president and ratifies a Constitution with power
resting in the president's
hands. He in turn will name
a new and, !hopefully, permanent government.
The provisional government's structure, with five
super-ministers overseeing the
Cabinet, is vaguely that of the
future permanent government ; in an imprecise sense,
it is "the Khanh government
without Khanh ."
If American blunders and
Gen. Khanh's indecisiveness
were contributing factors to
the political chaos following
the August bombing, the pblitical climate before, during
and because of last week's
bombings is perhaps a mark
of the quiet success of U. S.
officials in Saigon and of Gen.
Khanh.
The most important factor
1s that American policymakers
are more decisive than after
Tonkin, whc11 they could not
afford a political crisis-and
bloodshed 1n the streets o(
Saigon-before the U. S. Presidential election.
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before 1:0,0,0,0
saigon-before 1:0,0,0,0
presi- 1:0,0,0,0
dential 1:0,0,0,0
election. 1:0,0,0,0
