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derivative filename/jpeg
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363-04786.pdf
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Digital Object Identifier
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363-04786
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Title
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America's Frozen Policy- Vital Political Power Unused
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Description
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Article published in the New York Herald Tribune about criticisms of the US's actions and policy during the Vietnam War, page 2
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AI Usage Disclosure
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Draft transcripts were automatically generated via Google Document AI and are currently under review. Please report significant errors to Archives & Special Collections at archives@unl.edu.
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Transcript
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America's Frozen Policy-Vital Political Power Unused
The dramatic military actions taken by
the United States and Vietnamese against the
Communists in South Viet Nam have no
grand political counterpart. As a result, U. S.
strategy is seen solely as anti-Communist
rather than pro-something. As one Western
military expert put it: "Nothing negative has
ever prevailed over something positive."
The Herald Tribune's Beverly Deepe explains
these failures of U. S. policymakers in the
second of a six-part series on Viet Nam.
By Beverly Deepe
A Special Correspondent
SAIGON.
United States policy in South Viet Nam is frozen in
a negative posture that concentrates on military victory
while failing to produce the sort of dramatic political
strategy that would make such victory possible.
This, at least, is the opinion of highly placed sources
in Saigon who have watched the American involvement
here grow steadily for more than a decade.
In their view, the U. S. attitude is essentially anti-
Communist rather than pro-something. The overwhelming
impression is that the American policymakers are attempt-
ing "to stem the tide of Communist aggression" or "to
teach Hanoi a lesson." But this implies a political status
quo in a country that is changing in its post-colonial
development, and is, indeed, fighting for change.
"Nothing negative has ever prevailed over something
positive," the Western military expert commented. "One
of the most frequently asked questions by Vietnamese
captains and majors on the battlefront is 'What are we
fighting for?' as they look at the political turmoil in their
rear area at Saigon.'
'HOLLOW WORDS'
While some Americans in Saigon pay lip service to
the principles of freedom and democracy, these are, as
one American government employee noted, "hollow words
that mean little in Asia."
A Western diplomat argues that the Western concepts
of democracy and freedom have never been simplified and
codified as have the Communist ideology. There are no
American primers for democracy as there are Communist
primers for revolution.
"One cannot understand these American principies
unless he has reaped the benefits of them, or seen them.
first hand, the diplomat explained. Hence, he said, the
principles in which Americans believe must be translated,
demonstrated and visualized for the Vietnamese-by the
Vietnamese government-and this has yet to be done.
The main political problem during the past decade
seems to have been to realize there is a political problem
--and to act positively.
The American policymakers, however, view the battle
in Viet Nam as principally, if not solely, a military opera
tion against armed Communist guerrillas. They are oper-
ating dramatically on one front while the Communists are
operating on six fronts-political, economic, social, cul-
tural, psychological and military, all integrated into on
powerful stream of warfare.
"Suppose you lose your billfold in a dark place.
one Vietnamese provincial official explained. "But you
insist on looking for it where there is light because it is
easier. Well, you are now looking for the Communists in
the light place-the military field--but you never, never
And them all-they are also where you refuse to look."
'ECONOMIC AID'
During the past decade, $1.1 billion was spent on the
U. S Military Assistance Program for weapons. tanks
and ammunition for the Vietnamese armed forces. In addi-
tion, $2.1 billion was spent in Viet Nam from American
economic aid funds. But 75 per cent of the economic aid
was for the purpose of paying expenses of the national
army through the commercial import program.
These figures exclude the salaries of American service-
men and government officials, .and all their operating
costs, as well as gasoline, parts and ammunition for
American units.
There is also the fact that the Vietnamese national
army was built to counter a conventional invasion instead
of a guerrilla war. Once the "slow-motion invasion" began
a year ago. the army was slow in reacting.
There is no grand, dramatic political strategy for
winning the political war in South Viet Nam comparable
to the dramatic military actions.
The bombing raids on North Viet Nam have not and
cannot win the political war within the South. But without
them the war could never have been won-or contained
--because of the sustained influx of North Vietnamese
troops, weapons, and the much more significant political
leadership cadre. If the raids have not won the war,
however, they have in effect won time-they have provided
the time to act politically.
Sources in Saigon now hope for a dynamic political
maneuver to reverse the adverse political tide. They feel
the military operations then would not be considered an
end in themselves, as is now the case, but the means
to an end-an honest, efficient government, a land reform
program for the peasants, a smashing medical-educational
program that would lift the nation economically and
politically into the 20th century.
These sources argue that the elaborate and effective
military battle plans have in effect given the nation time
to formulate and implement a massive blueprint for the
In-
political-economic-social development of Viet Nam.
stead of Viet Nam being simply a military battleground. It
could also become a political showplace they maintain.
"But we lack any political imagination," one young
American government employee said. "We are fighting
against revolution. How can we expect to win? It's like
advocating the murder of mother."
One Western ambassador says as an example that it
was "politically inadmissible" that 200,000 refugees in
the central part of the country-victims of an autumn
flood. Communist terror and friendly bombing raids-
were not made a symbol of non-Communist revolution
by the Vietnamese government. "They are given charity
rice and propaganda lectures," he said. "They should be
put in factories and apartment houses to show the world
the benefits of fleeing the Communist side. Some anti-
Communist refugees are not given help by the govern-
ment, and return to Viet Cong areas."
Another source criticized the American officials for
not forcing the Diem regime years ago to establish "centers
of prosperity" in which the Vietnamese people and the
outside world could see the results of the American
presence.
WOULD INTRODUCE TV
A high-ranking Western official suggests that tele-
vision should have been widely introduced in Viet Nam
to relay government propaganda to the villages, to educate
the children and to show adult films on better farming
methods.
More than three years ago, private Japanese com-
panies made such proposals for this, and the Japanese
government has tentatively offered technical assistance
and funds. A television station would cost $500.000.
But successive Vietnamese governments have post-
poned a decision on this project and American authori-
ties appear cool to the idea. Economic planners are more
interested in Japan's contribution to a $9 million bridge
for
the Mekong River.
The U. S. has political power in Viet Nam, but chooses
not to use it. Yet at this time the Saigon regime is too
weak to act with political dynamism and effectiveness.
"We have the power to take names and to punish,"
one American explained. "But we don't do it. We are still
timorous about interfering in a nation's internal affairs."
A Western ambassador agreed. "The first basic fault
in the system," he said. "is you are too respectful of Viet
Namese independence, so you do not interfere in making
decisions on great issues-and in my opinion you should-
while instead you are very particular, you pester them on
small things of almost no importance. This creates the
wrong impression and does not get the results. Your in-
structions should be more articulate but fewer."
American generals, colonels and captains admit they
do not talk politics with their Vietnamese military coun-
terparts; and no other American agency has been given
the responsibility of cementing all the fighting Vietnamese
political factions together.
This is in contrast to the Viet Cong and the Commu-
nist apparatusa guerrilla is first and foremost a political
cadre, and after that a soldier. The Communist political
cadre perhaps with only the rank of sergeant-decides
what villages will be attacked and the military commander,
with a rank of major, follows his orders.
COMMUNISM FIRST
The Viet Cong military apparatus is of a secondary.
supporting nature to the Communist political machine.
Hence American efforts to defeat the guerillas still have
not defeated th political subvrsive. American advisers in
the Communist
the provinces admit that even when
guerrillas are defeated militarily, the Communist political
cell system in the village is rarely destroyed.
The appearance of new French faces on the main
street of Saigon, the arrival of increasing number of
pro-neutralist Vietnamese from Paris, and the release of
thousands of pro-neutralist and pro-Communist Vietna-
mese from prison within the last 18 months is more im-
portant in the subversive field than the introduction of
American combat Marines and paratroopers is in the
counter-guerrilla military field.
With the amount of money you are spending in the
military field," one Vietnamese major said. "you could
buy all the land from the landowners and give it to the
peasants. You could pave Viet Nam with gold."
A 155-mm. howitzer shell costs $70: a 500-pound
general purpose bomb costs $180-and tons of them are
expended daily and nightly in Viet Nam.
Tomorrow: Corruption in South Viet Nam.
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Date
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1965, May 31
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Subject
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United States--Relations--Vietnam (Republic); United States--Economic assistance--Vietnam (Republic); Vietnam War, 1961-1975--Campaigns, American; Public opinion; Tactics; Strategy
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Location
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Saigon, South Vietnam
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Coordinates
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10.8231; 106.6311
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Container
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B4, F6
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Format
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newspaper clippings
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Collection Number
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MS 363
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Collection Title
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Beverly Deepe Keever, Journalism Papers
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Creator
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Keever, Beverly Deepe
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Copyright Information
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These images are for educational use only. To inquire about usage or publication, please contact Archives & Special Collections.
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Publisher
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Archives & Special Collections, University of Nebraska-Lincoln Libraries
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Language
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English
