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derivative filename/jpeg
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363-07349 to 363-07356.pdf
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Digital Object Identifier
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363-07349 to 363-07356
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Title
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Third article in the "Why Vietnam" series
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Description
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Third of a seven article series called "Why Vietnam" analyzing the importance of the Vietnam War in world politics. This article focuses on American political mistakes, for the New York Herald Tribune
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AI Usage Disclosure
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Draft transcripts were automatically generated via Google Document AI and are currently under review. Please report significant errors to Archives & Special Collections at archives@unl.edu.
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Transcript
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Goopo
articlo 3 of 7-article comico
0000 1
007 19, 1935
BAIGOD000 are the political mistakes that
high-placed sources in Daigon bellove the United States has
made during the past decade of involvocent in Viot Hon.
1. The American political posture in Viet Dan
has boon cocentially negativo, rather than positive, that
io cosentially anti-Coununtot, rather than pro-something.
The over bolning Aproccion to that the American policynakoro
are attempting to oton the side of cosmict aggroncion"
or "to teach anot a looson." This implies a atatus quo
political political position in a country that is changing
in 100 poot-colonial development, and io, indood, 2ighting
for change,*
"Nothing negative has over prevailed over something
positive," one doctorn military expert explained. One of
the most frequently aczod questions by Viotmunoso captainc
and majore on the battlefront is that are we fighting for?"
as they take one looks at the political turmoil in choir rear
area of Gaigon."
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doope
serios-article 3 of 7 article series
Page 2
Whilo sono Americans in Saigon pay come lipoorvico
to the principles of freedom and democracy, these are, ap
one American government employee explained, "hollow worde
that noon littlo in Asia. As one doctorn diplomat
expleinod, the western concepts of domocracy and groodon have
novor boon simplified and codified as have the Communist z
ideology. There are no American prinors for deneofacy an
those are Communist primore for revolution.
"Uno can not understand theco American principles
unless he has soapod the bonefits 2 of them, of coon chom
first hand," one western diplomat oxplained. Bonco, ho oxplained,
the principles in which Americans believo must be tranolatod,
demonstrated and visualisod by for the Viotannose--by the
Vietnamese government--and this hot yet to be done.
Sonce, the Siret political problem during the past
decade has been to soalico thoro is a political problem-
and to not positively.
2. The American policymaltoro view the battle in
Viot lan as principally, if not solely, a military operation,
against armed Communiot guerrillas. Shoy are operating
dramatically on one front while the Communists are operating
on six fronts-political, economic, social, cultural,
paychological and military,all integrated into ono povorful
stagon of warfare.
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doopo
cosios-article 3 of 7 articlo corios
page 3
"Suppose you loco your billfold in a darti ploco,"
one Viotnanoco provincial official explained. "But you
inoist on looking for it bore there is light bocance it is
oncior. Well, you are now looking for the Communieto in
the light place--the military field--but you never, novor
find then all--they are also whezod
refuse to look."
mel
During the past decade..1 was opont on tho
Military Acoistance Program for weapons, tonico, munition
for the Vietnamese armed forces. In addition,
vão opent
in Vietnan from American economic old Sunds. But 752 of the
economie aid was for the purpose of paying the salotos of
the national army through the counozcial import progran.
(These figuten oxcluded the salaries of american conviconon
and government officials, and all thoir operating costo,
purbos guacline, parto 2 eid action for Anonican-owned
oquinent in Anorioen units).
It's another mattor that the Vietnamese national
army was built to counter an invasion inotond of tho
Cuorrilloo, and that once the "alow motion invasion" bogan
a goar ago the army was slow in so-acting.
3. Choro io no grand, Gronatio political strategy
for winning the political var in South Viot an comparable
to the dramatic military actions.
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deope
Dorico-article 5 of 7 articlo cozion
Dago 4
The bombing raids, in North Viet Nam, have not
or connot win the political war within the Couth; but without
thoa cho vor could never have boon won--or contained--because
of the sustained influx of North Viothaneco tacopo, weapons,
and much more significant, political leadership cadre. If
the raids beve not won the was, however, they have in offoet
von cine--they have provided the time to not politically.
Sources in Saigon now hope for an enormous political
boab--or nuclear propostions--to reverso the advorce political
tido. Bonco, the military operations would not be considorod
ac ca end in thomcelves, qo is now the case, but the moans
to an ondan honest, efficient govornoont, a land of r
program for the poocanto, a omoching medical-educational
program that would escalate the nation economically and cata-
pult it socially-politically into the 20th century. Honce,
those codecos arque, the olaborate and offoetivo military
battle plans have in ogfoot given the nation timo to formulato
and implement a massive bluoprint for the political-oconomic-
social development of Viet Nam. Instead of Vietnam being
simply a military battleground, it would also become a
political chowplace.
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doopo
sosies article 3 of 7 article sosios
DACO 5
"Jo look any political imagination," one young American
govoranent civilian onployeo oxplained. "o ero fighting
acaiset povolution. How can we expect to win. It'o libo
advocating the mundoning of mother."
Goo vestora enbescador said that it was "politically
Laodniesible that 200,000 ofuegoos in the contral part of the
country-victice of an autumn flood, Communist torrosion and
friendly bombing raids--had not been made a gymbol of the
pro-erican zevolution by the Viotnapoco government.
"They
are given clarity sice and propaganda looturco--they should
be put in factorico and apartment housos to chow the world tho
bonofits of zlocing the Communiot cide
unist refugees are not give help by the government
and return to Viet Cong areas.
Another source criticised the American officialo for
not forcing the Dion rogino 30020 ago to ostablish "contere
of prosperity in which the Vietnamoso people and the outoido
world could coo the moculta of American prosonce. Ozo Western
ulibary compee doeriod the fact that for 10 yoace Anomican
han boon launching a counter-quornillas operation--get now
they had the means to revolutionise the total nature of var
itools--ho advocated that instood of billing people with mortaro
and boobs Consunist battalions could be captured by the uso
of non-lethal cao, that instead of killing the communisto,
they could be defected simply giving then a tummy ache.
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doone
cosioc-article 3 of 7 article cories
paco 6
Ono high-ranking Western official decided the fact
that toloviolon bod not boon introduced in Viotoa sa
means to relay governmont propaganda to the villagoo, to
oducate the children and to show adult filmo on bottor
Sensing cothods. Bloco then choo years ago, privato
Japanese companies made proposals for thio; the Japanese
Covoranont had tentatively offered tochnical assistance
and fundo. A tolovision station would cost half-illion
dollazo; successive Vietnamese goverments have postponed.
the Gooinion on thio; Amorican authorities appear cool to
the idea; economic plannors are oso intowosted in Japan's
contribution to a 09 million dollar bridge for the flocong
Bivez.
4. Ebo United Statoo has political pover in
Viet Sas, but chooooo not to aco 10; you at Chio tipo tho
Saigon do too woals to act with political dynamico and
offectiven000.
"We have the poor to calo naneo and Islal: fannico,
one American omplained. "But we don't do it. Wo ano still
ticozous about interforing in a nation's intorno 1 affairs."
Ono Vecton acbancados said: "The first basic foult in
the cyston, "one Western Ambassador opleinod, io : you are
too soopectful of Viotaan indepondence so you do not
intosforo in paling dociciono on great iosuoc-and in my
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Coopo
sorios-optiolo 5 of 7 article series
Dace 7
my opinion you should while inetend you are vouy particular
you poster thom on omall things of almost no importance.
This croutoo the wrong improooion and does not got the
rocules. Your instructions should be more articulate but
Iower."
American generals, colonels and captains aduit they
do not talle politics with their Vietnamese military countor-
parts; and no other amoricon agency has been given tho
responsibility of coconting all the fighting Viotmaneno
political faccions together. This is in contrast to tho
Viet Cong on at Commandot apparatus-a gorrillo de first
and foremost a politican, and thon a coldior; the Communist
political one-perhaps with only the rank of sergeant-
decicos bot villagon vill bo attacked, and the militacy
compenfor, with a rauls of major, follous his orders.
The Viot Gong military apparatus is of a secondary,
pupporting nature to the Communtat political machine; bouco
Apestona's offorts to defeat the cuorilla still has not
defeated the political subvozcivo. American advisor in the
provinces admit that even once the Communist quorrillas are
Gefeated, still the Commumist political coll infrastructure
in the village is rarely dostroyed.
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Goope
corico-article 3 of 7 article cories
DOGO O
Che introduction of now French Incoo on mainstreet
of Saigon, the increasing number of pro-noutralist
Vietnamese who have arrived from Paris, and thousands of
pro-neutralist and pro-Communist Vietnamese who have boon
solonood from prison within the past 10 months to more
important in the cubvoroivo Siold than the introduction
of Aborican combat marinos and paratroopero ia in the
counter-guerrilla military field.
*with the amount of money you are oponding in the
military fiold," ono Vietnamoco major explained, "you
could buy all the land from the landowners and give it to
the ponsanto. You could pavo Viet Nam with gold."
A.155 mm. bouitsor choll costo 970; a 500-pound
conoral purpose bomb costs $100--and tons of thon aro
ozponded daily and nightly in Viet Nam.
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Date
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1965, May 19
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Subject
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Vietnam War, 1961-1975; Strategy; United States. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam; Vietnam (Republic)--Politics and government; United States--Foreign relations--Vietnam
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Location
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Saigon, South Vietnam
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Coordinates
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10.8231; 106.6311
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Size
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20 x 26 cm
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Container
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B5, F8
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Format
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dispatches
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Collection Number
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MS 363
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Collection Title
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Beverly Deepe Keever, Journalism Papers
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Creator
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Keever, Beverly Deepe
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Collector
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Keever, Beverly Deepe
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Copyright Information
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These images are for educational use only. To inquire about usage or publication, please contact Archives & Special Collections.
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Publisher
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Archives & Special Collections, University of Nebraska-Lincoln Libraries
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Language
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English
