The Program the Reds Can't Fight

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363-04805.pdf
Digital Object Identifier
363-04805
Title
The Program the Reds Can't Fight
Description
Article published in the New York Herald Tribune about American-sponsored pig farming in rural Vietnam, page 2
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Draft transcripts were automatically generated via Google Document AI and are currently under review. Please report significant errors to Archives & Special Collections at archives@unl.edu.
Transcript
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Our Girl in Vict-Conclusion
JUNE 4,
1965
P2
980
The Program the Reds Can't Fight
Despite Viet Cong terrorism, government
corruption and the shortsightedness of U. S.
political strategy, there are some American-
sponsored programs in South Viet Nam
which have had beneficial impact. One of
them is a white pig distribution program:
another the establishment of agricultorn!
experimental stations. In this last of a
six-part series, the Herald Tribune's Beverly
Deepe reports on one of the brighter sides
of the U. S. involvement in South Viet Nam.
By Beverly Deepe
A Special Correspondent
SAIGON.
This is the story of the three little pigs of Viet Nam.
It is one of the most visibly effective American-spon-
sored programs in rural Viet Nam against which the
Communist Viet Cong guerrillas have many arguments
but no real answer.
In early 1962, American provincial representatives of
the Agency for International Development (AID) began
distributing improved white pigs from the Mekong Delta
throughout the entire countryside.
The program called for a package deal in which eight
bags of cement would be given to build a combination pig
sty-compost pit, while three improved pigs and American
surplus corn would be lent to the farmer.
One of the pigs would later be marketed, which would
repay the entire $50 cost of the venture; the others would
be kept for breeding.
"The pigs had a fantastic impact," one American
agricultural technician explained. "The farmers followed
the old Chinese custom and washed their pigs daily. Some
of them put red ribbons around the ears of the pigs. Al-
most all the pigs became pets for the children.
BUT WHY CEMENT?
"Of course, we had a few problems. Some of the Viet-
namese farmers had never even seen cement before and
they didn't understand why they should have a cement-
floored pig sty and compost pit when for centuries they had
moved the pig waste out on the ground.
"Some of the farmers moved their cots into the com-
post pit. Some of them put the pigs in their houses and
moved their families into the pig sty. After ali, it was
better than their dirt-floored houses.
"Some of the farmers put tiled roofs on the pig sty
with curlicues like ancient Chinese temples. They became
the new status symbols in the villages. We never could un-
derstand why they made them so elaborate.
"Then, of course, the most profitable time to sell the
pig is when he's about one year old," he continued. "But
the Vietnamese let the pigs get fatter and fatter and sell
them only when they need the money. They use the piggy
as a living bank."
He explained that at first the richer village families
got the pigs, or the friends of the local Vietnamese govern-
ment agricultural technicians. Now-three years and 40.000
pigs later-"the pigs have seeped into all levels of the
villages," he said.
"The neighbors buy little pigs from the first family to
have them. In one northern city, two years ago you wouldn't
see one improved pig a day come through the slaughter
house. Now about one-third of a day's production is the
improved breed."
He explained that the Viet Cong political cadre
attempted to sabotage the program by telling the farmers
that it was a "giveaway program" rather than a loan, so
that the farmers would not make repayment to the govern-
ment. So far, the rate of repayment has been low, but in
most cases the 18-month deadline for repayment has not
been reached.
REPAYMENTS
"The pig program doesn't make the farmer pro-govern-
ment or pro-Viet Cong," the technician explained. "But it
does expose him to the government cadre, to the govern-
ment administration and to an American veterinarian.
Maybe this is the first time in the farmer's life that the
government has done something to help him. So gradually,
it creates a better feeling for the government.
"The Viet Cong do not steal the pigs, and we have lost
very few of our pig hamlets to the Viet Cong."
In addition to the pig program, Vietnamese agricul-
tural technicians, assisted by Americans, have also started
programs to improve ducks, chickens and cattle and to
promote a wider distribution of water buffaloes, which are
used to pull the farmers' plows.
Other technicians have established experimental sta-
tions for improving rice seed (which some Vietnamese
prefer to eat rather than use for seeding).
Recently, Vietnamese agricultural agents conducted
three-day courses on improved farming techniques for
farmers during the slack season. Twenty piastres (30 cents).
was given the farmers for inches "and that really had an
impact," one American agricultural expert explained. "It
was part of our pacificati program. But the Viet Cong
even welcomed the agents into their areas to help their
farmers."
In another instance, Vietnamese government admin-
Istrators have implemented a credit-loan system whereby
farmers can buy fertilizer before the rice planting and
repay the loan after harvest. Production has more than
doubled in some areas. In other areas small irrigation
pumps have been bought on loan, making possible two or
three crops of rice a year instead of only one.
FERTILIZER ON CREDIT
The Viet Cong retort that the fertilizer will destroy the
soil; that in the first year of using fertilizer, production will
increase but in future years it will drop; that the govern-
ment will double the prices when it comes to paying the
loan, or that the government will make the farmers depend-
ent on the fertilizer year after year and then skyrocket
the prices.
"The poor Vietnamese farmer, who has a lot of super-
stition and no knowledge of chemicals, is in the dark," an
American technician said. "The Viet Cong play on the
farmer's past lack of faith in the government."
American-supported rural economic aid is scattered
in the secure "oil spots" in each of Viet Nam's 45 provinces,
which at times undercuts the impact that it has had nation-
wide.
The Communist-initiated war has produced an eco-
nomic deterioration and social upheaval in the countryside.
Young farmers are drafted instead of planting rice. Large
tracts of land are abandoned because of Viet Cong pressure.
and other large tracts, now uncultivated, could be developed
into excellent farming land.
Despite this, the standard of living has improved during
the last 10 years. Ten years ago, a bicycle was a status
symbol; now motor scooters, bicycles and busses are reg-
ularly seen in the countryside.
The nation-wide statistics on education are also impres-
sive. In 1955, 329,000 pupils attended elementary public
schools. In 1964, the number had increased to 1.5 million.
In 1964 alone, 900 new rural schools were built and
1.000 elementary education teachers were trained. A total
of 4,000 rural schools was built in the decade.
In 1955, there were 2,900 university students in Viet
Nam. By 1964, the number had increased to 20,000, with a
new university established in the northern provinces. More
than 2,500 Vietnamese students and technicians have been
sent to America through AID programs for advanced
degrees.
However, the population growth is 2.8 per cent yearly.
In the rural health field, Vietnamese villagers often
find it difficult to understand what has been prevented---
such as cholera epidemics or malaria. During the last six
years, however, the American-backed $12 million malaria-
eradication program, part of a worldwide effort, has
dropped known malaria cases from 7.22 per cent to less
than 1 per cent.
SPRAYING OF HOMES
More than one million Vietnamese farm homes are
being sprayed twice a year More than six million persons
have been directly affected by the spraying. The Viet Cong
propagandists told the villagers the spray would cause their
thatched roofs to crumble or would kill their cats and
chickens.
"The Viet Cong say the farmers don't have enough
cats to eat all the rats," one American medical expert ex-
plained, "and the rats eat rice. They use this argument
when there's a poor crop of rice and a good crop of rats-
and it's very effective with the peasants."
The malaria rate has dropped to the extent that medi-
cal experts simply keep tabs on it by collecting blood
samples.
"The Viet Cong spread the word that the Americans
were collecting Vienamese blood to give to the wounded
Americans," the medical expert continued."This even hap-
pened on the outskirts of Saigon. One American educa-
tional lecturer started to give a lecture on the taking of
these blood samples for malaria control; suddenly all the
mamas and little kids started throwing rocks at him.
"The police had to escort him out-all because of that
outlandish Viet Cong propaganda. But Vietnamese people
don't like to give blood; they are superstitious about that
and it's very strange to them."
More than 8,000 rural health workers are currently
operating in the Vietnamese countryside. Nine gleaming
white surgical suites, costing $500,000 each, have been es-
tablished throughout the country and are staffed by Ameri-
cans, Filipinos, New Zealanders, Australians and Italians.
Date
1965, Jun. 4
Subject
United States--Relations--Vietnam (Republic); United States--Economic assistance--Vietnam (Republic); United States. Agency for International Development; Swine
Location
Saigon, South Vietnam
Coordinates
10.8231; 106.6311
Container
B4, F6
Format
newspaper clippings
Collection Number
MS 363
Collection Title
Beverly Deepe Keever, Journalism Papers
Creator
Keever, Beverly Deepe
Copyright Information
These images are for educational use only. To inquire about usage or publication, please contact Archives & Special Collections.
Publisher
Archives & Special Collections, University of Nebraska-Lincoln Libraries
Language
English