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derivative filename/jpeg
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363-05366 to 363-05386.pdf
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Digital Object Identifier
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363-05366 to 363-05386
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Title
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Article about a potnetial peace plan offered by South Vietnam
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Description
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Original title: "peace", Keever's title: "Saigon Officals Sketch a Constitutional Government Peace-Plan", Article draft about a potential peace plan offered by South Vietnam, for the Christian Science Monitor, page 1-21
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AI Usage Disclosure
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Draft transcripts were automatically generated via Google Document AI and are currently under review. Please report significant errors to Archives & Special Collections at archives@unl.edu.
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Transcript
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- Page 1
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ZCZC sag
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peace 1 (normass/deepe)
SAIGON, SEPTEMBER 6-On a piecemeal basis, the American-supported
Vietnamese government has been unveiling its peace formula for its own
country and citizenry.
In Vit some Vietnamese government circles, the expectations that the
ink could be dry on a peace pact for South Vietnam as early as nine
months from now--by mid-1969-or six months after the new American President
is inaugurated. That is the earliest-it could take much longer. This week,
President Nguyen Van Thieu predicted peace by 1970..
"Let's face it," one senior government official explained.
five or ten years before the last American G. I. leaves Vietnam.
"It will be
But the
beginning of an American phaseout, the beginning to the end of the shooting
war,
could be started in nine months.
--more reuter
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- Page 2
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zczc sag
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peace 2 (normass/deepe)
The government's peace formula, if implemented, would probably
represent a victory for the anti-Communists here--but a softer kind
of victory.
The government's peace formula, unraveling here since
mid-July, has shof shifted ever so slightly-in a way, from a hard-boiled
victory to an egg-shell victory.
way,
The government's plan, still not officially announced in a total
is very much in step with, but more conservative than the official
American position. In fact, the A mer American officialdom is considered
in by Vietnamese politicians to be encouraging--if not sponsoring and
prodding--the Vietnamese government in this new political direction.
At this point, not a shred of evidence exists that the Communists will
accept the Vietnamese government proposals. Even an overh overwhelming
--Bore reuter
strategio defeat of Communist forces during the expected third-wave offensive
might not convince them to accept the anti-Communist arrangement although
the chances are the Saigon regime would soften still more in secret
during the critical moment, of talking. The likely alternative for the
Communists if they reject the peace parrangement is protracted warfare--
but this is preety much of an admitio admission of military weakness, if
not defeat.
more reuter
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- Page 3
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2020 888
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peace (normans/deepe)
PACKAGE
The ba broad outlines of the Vietnamese government's peace formula
follows:
1. A complete withdrawl withdrawal of all North Vietnamese Army
fighting troops and attached political cadre; hopefully also the grouped
Southern "regroupees" would be sent back to the North. These latter
are persons born south of the 17th parallel, but who went to North
Communist North Vietnam in 1954 when Vietnam was divided; Hanoi later
used them early in the war to ro-infiltrate to their home villages to
generate and lead the insurgency and early guerrilla effort. The withdrawal
of the North Vietnamese would be an exodus of quantity, but time that
of the Souther To Southern regroupees would be equally significant as an
exodus of quality.. In roux,
the Allies will in some way and at some
time implement a phase-out or
slow-motion withdrawal of American forces,
and a partial-probably not total-reduction of strongth of the Vietnamese
government's anti-Communist armed forces, now totalling nearly 800,000.
more router
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- Page 4
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zcze sag
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peace (normass/deepe)
As important as the terms and timing of this military derivi
de-activation will be the guarantees about the implementation of the agreement.
The anti-Communists in Asia and Western diplomats constantly point to
the refusal of the North Vietnamese to withdraw from Laos according to
The South Vietnamese
the agreement of 1962 regarding that country.
government will want some concrete inspection system to make sure the
North Vietnamese not only withdraw from the South by but also that they
do not return.
thousands of Allied troops operating along the
Since
borders have been unable to stop or detect satisfactorily the fil
movements of Colm Communist troops into the South,
it is difficult to
foresee any inpsec inspection system that could adqu adequatelygur
guarantee an air-tight closure of the borders of all countries involved.
==more reuter
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- Page 5
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ZCZO S86
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peace
(normass/deepe)
2. Those Communist fighters reti remaining in the South must lay
down their weapons,
they must renounce the use of violence as a means
to overthrow the constitutional government.
President Thieu has also
publicly stated they must give up their "Communist ideology," whatever
that means. Then, they would be transformed from their current status
of outlaws to full-fledged Vietnamese citizens.
They will be allowed to express their choices at the ballot box
"
according to the principle of one-man, one-vote," which President
somewhat
Thieu officially announced as government policy in the Honolulu Communique
of two months ago. His announcement of softened the official, public
Vietnamese government position from its more rigid progran of
accepting Communist defectors.
This will be the principle accorded to
the former Communists as individuals.
the
As to the Comm present-day Communist bloc in the South,
Communist Party-called the People's Revolutionary Party-would be outlawed,
FAND
and would have to abolished, at least under its present name!
National Liberation Front as such would have to be disbanded, as such, it
could no longer remain as an
and grouping.
The
organizational entity or political structure
Theoretically, however, the same organization and
grouping could be held intact under another name and with a change in
leadership.
Theoretically,
==more reuter
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- Page 6
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2020 sac
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peace (normess/doope)
such as
Theoretically, also, a present-day Communist individual could
run for the office of President or Senator under a new party name,
the socialist new socialist party, and the latent mass organizational
support of the Communists would be thrown in support of him.
This whole
The procedures, meens, inspections and timings of elections end the
specific role of the former Communist political organizations in the
national life will be open to a whirlind of semena semantics, nuances,
subtleties and compromises in the future. In general, it is clear at
this point, that the American position is much softeror more liberal
on this point than that of the Vietnamese government. Thus far, however,
all the discussion on this point has a one-sided irrelevancy, hoever
since the Communists have not given any sign of accepting to
work within the government's constitutional framework, rather than
trying to destroy it.
An under-lying Communist assessment
may be
whether they believe they cen in the long run seize control of the
more router
or predominance in the government by working through
the constitutional process.
more reuter
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- Page 7
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zcze sag
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peace (normass/deepe)
military withdrawal of condi
In simplest terms,
VAND
the South Vietnamese governments wants the
not partial (not unconditional)
surrender of Northern and
mble the roma
C Southern Communist fighters; politically,
Communists who remain in the South and lay down their weapons
South
the Constitution provide
be
and give up the use of violence to overthrow the government are then to
absorbed or melted back into the political life of the South--specifically
within the framework of the Vietnamese constitution and within the
timeframe spelled out by that constitution. The basis of the Vietnamese
government--and the American-position is that President Thieu remains
President at least until 1971, when a re-election is held. The Vietnamese
constitution remains the basis of law; the constitution specifically
outlaws Communism, but the definition of Communism is vague and can probably
be liberally interpreted in the future. The two-house legislature remains
in office, but with during the upcoming re-elections for new seats beginning
AND
the present-day Communists will be allowed to voter
to Run for office.
next year,
PERHAPS Be Allowed
==more reuter
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- Page 8
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2020 seg
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peace
8
(normass/deepe)
The central issue in settling the future of South Vietnam
revolves around this constitutional system of government,
as distinct
from the individuals who now fill the official positions. The Communists
have advocated and are attempting to destroy this whole framework of
AND to Se
€ Powe
government the Vietnamese government and American governments want this
system and to continue, but have made the concession that
the Communists will be re-woven into the fabric of that system. The
key question is whether the Communiste or the anti-Communists win on
this essential issue; the
two positions are totally incompatible, Reconciling
and directly contradictory of ther the Communists or the anti--Communists
in the South have to accept defeat on this point.
There can be no
compromise on this issue; one side or the other has to capitulate for
the legitimacy and permanency of the constitutional geros (NVOLVES the
that the Vietnamese anti-Communists and the Americans have
fought for and all that the Communist fought to destroy.
question
Until this central
If one Vietnamese side or the other refuses to capitulate on this
become meaningless,
point, then the peace talks will either break down or
Publiette
and the war will probably continue, but at a reduced level of
intensity.
==more reuter
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- Page 9
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2020 sag
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peace (normass/deepe)
t
no
After one Vietnamese side or the other accepts defeat on this issue,
then a wide range of compromise is possible, or probaby, but this is
compromise on the subsidiary questions of degrees, meomentem.mecnuni's
mechanics, timing, conditions and guarantees.
In the broadest, most generalized terms, this peace package, if
implemented, would resemble the settlement of the American Civil War
a century ago. The defeated Dixie army was disarmed and disbanded; in
the Communist fighting machine left over after the withdrawal
Would
Vietnam,
of Northerners will not be integrated into the Vietnamese national army.
A BoliSHED."
Would BE diSARMED FIND
==more reuter
D.]
t
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- Page 10
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2020 506
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pence (o (normann/deepe)
As the
were
And, as the American Southern states were brought back, forced
to e come back, into the Unioni so the rebel areas and population
within South Vietnam will be brought back under the
Vietnamese national government's authority and into its realm.
Eventually
defeated American Southern citizens-black and white-werel given the full
rights of all other American citizens, und so the defeated Vietnamese
Would
Southern Communists--people and fightersill be given the full rights
of all the loyal Vietnamese citizens.
While the American officials rarely compare o Vietnam ponce with
the American Civil War settlement--and Vietnamese officials are largely
uninformed about American history the analogy seems accurate in its
sweep and scope, although not in multitudes of secondary points.
It seems to certain however,
because of the international spotlight on
Tammy this tiny country,
that the implementation of such a Vietnam
peace settlement--if actually ever agreed to would be meted out with
more justice and compassion than we was done during the reconstruction
of the American South.
more reuter
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- Page 11
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2020 sag
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peace
(normass/deepe)
is popular to discuss potential Vietnam peace proposals
often deserted compared to the
in terms of a coalition settlement,
Laotian variety,
but
the Vietnamese government's peace plan is much closer
CONCEPT
"
the
in formy
substance, and approach would be of orosz to
settlement of the American Civil War. Some political thinkers
have described this peace plus process as" "accommodating between
VIETNAM
In fact,
the South Communists and the anti-Communists within the South.
the more accurate description of the process is "integration, "- of the
Vomment
Communists back into the non-Communist union government.
==more reuter
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zczc sag
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peace
(normass/deepe)
Beyor D
HREE
the government's plan, four caveats seem
atmospherics and perimt perimeters
appropriate to establish the context, climate and characteristics of
peace within the South.
First, the outside/seems to view peace in Vietnam as an alternative to,
or the opposite of, the current war. That is not its the context it is
viewed here by the Vietnamese leadership on either side-the Communist or
anti-Communist camp. At this specific point in time, the war and the
peace are inspe inseparably intertwined;
victories on the battlefield
determine victories at the conference table and the shape of the future
of the South.
Peace can not be decided until events of the battlefield
have crystallized into a pinnacle of decision; at this time, this
pinnacle of decision is considered here to be the expected Communist
third-wave offensive drive into the cities. The military situation here
appears to be lumbering towards that apex of action-and, this is the
over-riding sing significance of events (or non-events)
on the
battlefield.
--more reuter
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- Page 13
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zczc sag
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peace
(normass/deepe)
That
But, after the shooting war ends and the ink has dried on a
paper settlement, peace is still considered by Vietnamese leaders
as a continuation ofD, or extension
of
the battlefield confrontation.
period for both the Communist and anti-Communist Vietnamese camps
be a real, but nebulous poftrum gyration between quasi-peace and
neo-war. At best, both sides would consider it a silent phase
of a new kind of war; at the worst, it would be a war fought, not with
guns and blood, but butter and blood. The classical Communist
terminology for this confrontation is "the political struggle"--which they
used in 1955-60 in their attempts to usurp power from the Vietnamese
9
government. The "clean" American official American word for this is
"peaceful competition." The naughty, but more accurate, terms used by
Vietnamese nationalists is Khrushchev's "peaceful cosesi co-existence."
-more reuter
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- Page 14
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ZCZC sag
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peace (normass/deepe)
would
The battlefield, shifts from the jungles to labor union halls, election
boxes, school classrooms, legislative bodies, farmer's organizations;
Would
the weaponry changes from Communist rockets and American artillery shells to
invisible subversion and counter-subversion, small-scale assassination
political
and counter-assassinations-political non-military battles with
a-military or sub-military means. In short, the temperature of the war
Romains
Would
may shift from red hot to lukewarm to cold--but it is a political
confrontation without assuarances of total tranquility for Vietnamese
Both C
citizens of any political hue. Hence, within the South, are not currently
preparing for peace--they are mobilizing for it.
-more reuter
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- Page 15
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zcze sag
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peace
(normass/deepe)
Second, in a related, but more wide-angle perspective,
to the
Vietnamese leadership of all warrying factions, peace is another means to their
respective 9 political objectives-when the shooting war has failed to
achieve them.
To both the nationalist and Communist leaderships, peace
is not a goal or end--it is another means to achieve their rep respective
ends--in the case of the Communists is is simply and still the eventual
conquestio conquest of South Vietnam--but in a more elastic time frame
For the anti-Communist leadership is
and through more invisible ways.
their politicalND
simply preserviny preserving, totally or predominantly,
economic systems, their foreign alignments and thier c their constitutional
framework of government from a Communist take-over.
--more reuter
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- Page 16
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ZCZC sag
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peace
(normass/deepe)
I
that Peis
Whether peace is believed or not.
the American national polic
goal is a crucial question from this vantage point. No one here is actually
saying-if indeed they-because of the intrac intricacies of the American
election. But, the Communist viewpoint is clear--and thus far constant-
they still view the American digt diplomacy as geared towards a
END
pseudo-peace--that peace is not an American objective, but is simply the
means through which the Americans can consolidate and reinforce the
pro-American,
anti-Communist position in the South
and subdue their own
anti-war,
see critics within the United States.
More significant
is the shift in attitude of the South Vietnamese government towards this
question-Asince the shake-down of events on the American political scene,
Poli
ST
No matter.
the anti-Communists now believe that peace is now the goal of th
whichever candidate becomes the next American President, that the
American military effort is be going to be rolled back in somewaya
And hence, the anti-Communists here are mentally, but
physically, preparing for a re-Vietnamization of all aspects of the
and in due time.
only.
war.
--more reuter
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- Page 17
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zczс sag
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peace
(normass/deepe)
Third,
All the rhetoric, passion and emotionalism of those
frenetically advocating and demanding peace for Vietnam have largely
overlooked a substantive substantitive dimension of the problem-the
South Vietnamese people. An imbalanced peace, like the war itself,
is likely to cost some South Vietnamese their lives; it is not
over a prolonged timeframe
inconceivable that the improper peace would produce a bloodbath
The peace travesty of peace would simply replace,
In the event of a Communist
nearly equalling that of the shooting war
take-over,
The TRAGEDY
even on a slow-motion basis, literally thousands of Vietnamese
identified with the anti-Communist side fear they will be assassinated or
The wel wealthy Vietnamese anti-Communists may escape abroad,
executed.
but not the thousands of soldiers,, village chiefs, secretaries and
olerk typists and news boys
washerwomen who work for the Amardee
Western community here.
fear that "our" Vietnamese will be killed in a Communist take-over
private
This
is tha constant of topic of /conversation among American
officials and Western diplomatic set-but is it is not a topic that has
percolated up the official chain of command to the echelon of American
Few here forget that during the
26-
seizure of
pac durianer,anCopropisimerdering teams carried out a bizzare bizarre
witchhunt for, anti-Communists, xxxxx including petit
Vietnamese
secretaries who worked for American governmental offices.
==more reuter
more reuter
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- Page 18
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2020 906
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peace/ 8 (normass/deepe)
On the other side of the coin, those Communists remaining in the
South would need not only the guarantee of their physical protection
and political freedom, but also a cortain amount of governmental
compassion.
Certainly,
the situation is more difficult and delict
delicate, and more patience and vision is mandatory, then the
Reconstruction days following the defeat of the South during America's
om civil war. The Thieu-luong combination probably have tho
individuel
persona
personal talents and hreadth of vision to accomplish this, but
there are too many couter countervailing pressure tugging on them
to assure to predict that this will
at the contral government level
necessarily be deno Even more oiritio critical, without substantial
pro-peace improvements, there are no assurances that what
the Saigon government aged sincerely agrees to and orders implemented
will actually be justly and fairly executed at the village and homlet
lovel. The governmont's admimini administrat, army and police structures
are currently so mangled that and twisted that top-to-bottom
implementation of policies can not necessarily be guaranteed.
more reuter
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- Page 19
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zC2c sag
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peace Normass/deepe)
The war here has been not simply passionately emotional and agonizing
for the Vietnamese, but it is stim also deeply personal.
evern family in the South
MEMBER
Virtually
ble soirs has had one on
Moreover, especially
at least one sen killed by one side or the other.
at the guerrilla-warfare level, the family knows which specific
Its
Communist cadre or government militaman killed their son or mother a
PERSonal
Revenge is
or raped the sister, or burned the down the house. Even more
FOR ONE
is the fact that is not uncommon to have
OPPOSITE
complicated, however,
sons or sons-in-laws fighting on different sides.
Son-in-law
Family
retired
One Vietnamese
government official has one on who is a general in North Vietnam,
other
his son-in-law in Saigon is an American; even family reunions
within the South will be tearful occasions and perhaps not all the
but
tears will be of joy. In short, all the hatred and spirit-of-revenge
mply
generated by the war may be unleashed by the peace without consid
Diplomatic
proper considerations of this people-factor
the settlement.
==more ruster reuter
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- Page 20
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zcze sag
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0
peace I (normass/deepe)
the
The harsh personal be heartbreak on traes of
across the South Vietnamese political spectrum is not an mimportant
factor contributing to the gidity of rigidity of official positions
ference
at any future peace table. It has been a factor for some time, but that it
es me has come into a sharper focus since the American Democratic
8T
fully Appreciated OUTSIDE VIETNAM
Republican Conventions last month. It has been discussed in sharp,
but one American
but esoteric terms in Vietnamese language newspapers,
official, speaking privately, it wrapped it up in a nutshell.
He said:
"I was appalled that in discussing Vietnam, both the Republican
and Democratic conventions viewed the Vietnamese people as faceless
non-entities. All the liberal critics of the administration
who pa preached winning the hearts and minds of the people have quickly
forgotten that hearts and minds are still involved here.
In all the speeches,
that lots of
it was only (Senator George S.) Mo Govern who conceded
Vietnamese who worked with the Americans here might be killed if the
Communists took-over-and so he said these people should be allowed to
come to the U. S. But, for everyone else, the Vietnamese are the forgotten
Some government
people." For some time, the Vietnamese, including those inte
some in
ficials
overnment, have viewed themslevas themselves as being treated
like wooden pawns in a big-power chess-game--and now the stakes are climbing
in the chess-game.
==more reuter
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- Page 21
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zC2C sag
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peace 21 (normass/deepe)
As, during the war, neither the Communists Communists nor the
anti-Communists have decisively won the hearts of the Southerners,
it remains doubtful that either side ion will
during the peace,
magnanimously mend
these broken hearts.
In this sense,
the Vietnam
wer,
like the American Civil War, may never end.
==ond reuter
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Date
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1968, Sep. 6
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Subject
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Vietnam War, 1961-1975--Peace; Vietnam (Republic)--Politics and government; Peace treaties
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Location
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Saigon, South Vietnam
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Coordinates
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10.8231; 106.6311
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Size
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20 x 26 cm
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Container
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B10, F39
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Format
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dispatches
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Collection Number
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MS 363
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Collection Title
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Beverly Deepe Keever, Journalism Papers
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Creator
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Keever, Beverly Deepe
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Copyright Information
-
These images are for educational use only. To inquire about usage or publication, please contact Archives & Special Collections.
-
Publisher
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Archives & Special Collections, University of Nebraska-Lincoln Libraries
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Language
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English