Article about the outcome of the third phase of the Tet Offensive

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363-05307 to 363-05322.pdf
Digital Object Identifier
363-05307 to 363-05322
Title
Article about the outcome of the third phase of the Tet Offensive
Description
Original title: "loss", Keever's title: "Communists Lose Troops and Time in their Third Offensive", Article draft about the outcome of the third phase of the Tet Offensive, for the Christian Science Monitor, page 1-16
AI Usage Disclosure
Draft transcripts were automatically generated via Google Document AI and are currently under review. Please report significant errors to Archives & Special Collections at archives@unl.edu.
Transcript
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(deleted)
BIEN HOA, SOUTH VIETNAM, SEPTEMBER 19--The Communists have (deleted) suffered heavy casualties--and, more important, have lost time--in the first month of their third-wave, Saigon-bound offensive.
But, sources here at the headquarters of the twelve provinces surrounding Saigon (deleted) counter than Communists have not thus far been decisively defeated--and that they still plan impressive ground attacks on the capital and other (deleted) major cities throughout the country.
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In the first month of their (deleted) third-wave, the Allies have inflicted (deleted) an impressive ten-to-one (deleted) kill-ration on the Communists--ten Communists killed for every one Allied soldier killed--in the (deleted) 10-province (deleted) area surrounding Saigon. Official sources list 3019 Communists killed by bodycount--with another 2400 estimated killed. (Deleted) Allied forces operating in the area--American, Vietnamese, Koreans, Australians, New Zealanders, and Thais have suffered slightly (deleted) fewer than three hundred killed.
The Communist third-wave offensive was scheduled to hit Saigon in massive strength is early August--but the Allies captured their battle (deleted) plan. Then, the Communists (deleted) scheduled their (deleted) operations and (deleted) their offensive began on the ground on August 18 with early morning coordinated ground and indirect fire attacks in Tayninh province and Binh Long provines, (deleted) Northwest of Saigon, (deleted) and other coordinated attacks in the northern portions of the country.
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Since then, the Communists have been attempting to launch their massive ground assaults on major urban cities, their radio broadcasts have warned (deleted) Saigonese to (deleted) evacuate the "snob-hill" sections of the city, their indoctrination sessions have been (deleted) coaxing more (deleted) energy and urgency from their troops--but thus far they have been kept off-balance enough so that they have failed to make the move.
"The Communists have failed in the first month of their offensive," one Allied officer explained, "Partly because of our actions and partly because of their own weaknesses. The more we kill, the fewer they have. And we refuse to play their game. They have been launching border actions in the hopes that we'll move our brigades (deleted) away (deleted) from the cities and fight them on the borders. They are trying to draw us out of the city perimeters.
"We feel they will continue this strategy until they believe they have achieved success--or have failed to achieve success--and they (deleted) will try something else. We believe they still are attempting to attack Saigon and other cities--and they will do this when it is militarily possible."
No one is predicting when--(deleted) that will be.
"We have stopped our crystal-ball-gazing," the officer explained.
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The balance of forces in the (deleted) ten provinces surrounding Saigon is on the side of the Allies--but not heavily so, considering the nature of the sub-conventional war. The Communists maintain 72 (deleted) battalions, the basic maneuver elements, organized either as autonomous units, in regiments or in divisions. Pitched against this is 100 maneuver battalions of all Allied forces in the area. However, the (deleted) Allied battalions are heavier in numbers, and are backed up by superior (deleted) firepower and mobility. Vietnamese government regular army battalions are now (deleted) running 25 per cent over-strength--a rather historic event during this war--as newly-trained draftees from the (deleted) general mobilization program are now hitting the frontlines.
In numerical strength, the Communists are officially considered to have 23,000 to 25,000 combat and combat-support troops, (deleted) such as riflement, artillerymen and sabotage units. An additional 25,000 (deleted) "bad guys" are also in the area--local forces, porters, infrastructure and rear-(deleted) echelon support elements. (deleted) Roughly 85,000 Allied riflement are in (deleted) combat against these (deleted) Communist (deleted) forces.
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The force ratio and the numerical strength of the Communists still (deleted) their pro-Tet level, with personnel replacements filling for the (deleted) heavy casualties they have (deleted) sustained since late January. An estimated 85% percent of the Communist (deleted) in the 11 provinces comprising the Third Military Corps are estimated to be North Vietnamese Army soldiers, instead of the "home grown" Southerners.
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The (deleted) status of the current shop ground action revolves around the three Communists divisions (deleted). The Viet Cong 9th Division is (deleted) currently (deleted) based in Cambodia, but twice during the past month, it has been organized into task forces, has come across the border, (deleted) American and Vietnamese forces in (deleted) Tay Ninh province, and then retreated back (deleted) into Cambodia.
The Viet Cong 5th Division is operating in sort of a unit-to-unit face-down with three American brigades in a triangle formed by Trang Beng, Dau Tieng and Tay Ninh city--there (deleted) have been sharp actions (deleted) in this confrontation during the past month of the offensive. The U.S. Army 101st Airborne (deleted) cordoned off a Communist battalion there is two and a half weeks ago--but the Communists messed and broke through the American lines in a (deleted) hectic battle. Thirty Americans and 120 Communists were killed.
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(deleted) This Communist 5th Divison has been subjected to heavy bombardments by B-52 SAC bombers (deleted) in Tay Ninh and near the fringes of Cambodia. A (deleted) stratofortress raid on September 6 was targetted (deleted) roughly half a mile from the Cambodian border.
"Prisoners and documents from the 5th Division indicate the Communists have taken a bad beating from the B-52's" one informed source explained. "We are constantly finding (deleted) guys who said they couldn't find (deleted) anyone else from their battalion after a (deleted) raid--and so they surrender. But, maybe they don't look very hard for their battalion either."
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The Communist 7th Division is currently targeted against elements of the U.S. 1st Infantry Division in the Loc Ninh area, where heavy actions have taken place. Documents indicate this Communist division is short of food and supplies--the only one in the area suffering from this. A recent capture of an arms cache by Vietnamese Special Forces, containing enough to send a regiment into battle, would seem to hurt it even more.
(deleted)
Other than the main divisions, other Communist battalions and regiments have reamined relatively static. These sub-divisional units are considered the likely ones (deleted) to assault Saigon at the given time, with possible reinforcement from the main divisions. The decision to move these three divisions to Saigon would be politically unwise, since they are composed largely of North Vietnamese troops. Southern-born troops would be better militarily and politically.
South of Saigon, in Long An province, eight Communist autonomous battalions have been gradually (deleted) and thoroughly mauled by the U.S. Army 9th Infantry Division; three of the eight battalions have been disbanded and the surviving troops used as fillers for the remaining five battalions.
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"What the enemy is doing now is to target the 5th V. C. Communist division against our 25th Division," one officer explained. "The purpose is to get us to pull our troops out of Saigon (deleted) so their sub-divisional (deleted) local forces can attack Saigon. The second purpose is to try to render the 25th Division combat ineffective. Their tactics are heavy attacks by rocket and mortar fire, (deleted) followed by light ground (deleted) probes on American installations. They hope the Americans will come out of their defensive areas--the Communists know they (deleted) lose too many men if they rush our claymore mines and barbed wire. But, they haven't (deleted) achieved any success. The 7th North Vietnamese division is doing the same thing at Loc Ninh with the U.S. 1st Division. That's not working too well for them either."
He said that from August 25 to September 10, the Communists maintained a "stand-down", while they re-evaluated their tactics, "but the best thing they (deleted) could think (deleted) up was a re-hash of their first (deleted) Tay Ninh action. I guess they will continue with this until they either achieve success or decide they have failed."
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Despite some heavy shellings, American installations and supply depots have withstood them would without significant losses. (deleted) On September 13, the Communists dumped 1,650 rounds of (deleted) mortar and recoiless rifle fire on an American fire support base called Buoll near Tay Ninh city. (deleted) The number of shells was as heavy as the "bad days" for the American Marines at Khe Sanh, but the calibre of the rounds was much (deleted) less potent. (deleted) No Americans were killed, 17 were wounded and evacuated and there was light material damage.
(deleted)
The Communists are considered to have suffered hard from Allied operations--and they also face (unintelligible currently as their own military matters.
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The shift-over to heavy emphasis on North Vietnamese troops has brought a bundle of problems for the (deleted) Communists.
"Since early this year, (deleted) this has increasingly been a North Vietnamese war," one informed source explained. "And this has brought the Allies all sorts of goodies. This has undercut the Viet Cong appeal of nationalism and social justice--the North Vietnamese mean pure and harsh Communism to the Southerners. And the Communists have from wooing the (deleted) mass to greater use of force. Before the Viet Cong had convinced the population of the inevitability of their final victory--but now the North Vietnamese are mucking it up for them. Gradually more (deleted) South Vietnamese have weaned themselves away from the Viet Cong--this does not mean they are pro-government or pro-American--but they are now available by the Allies.
"Militarily too, the shift to a North Vietnamese war has meant many things--these troops are less familiar with the terrain and the people; the people give them less support; the North Vietnamese operate with less intelligence information than the Viet Cong; the North Vietnamese can not live off the land like the Viet Cong, but depend on cumbersome lines of supply. And finally, the North Vietnamese tend to fight a more conventional war, as distinct from the (deleted) Viet Cong's audacious manner of (deleted) agitation, propaganda, ambushes and hit-and-run guerrilla warfare. (deleted) It is much easier for the Allies to fight the North Vietnamese--(delete) this is new much more of an invasion than an insurgency."
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In addition, there are increasing (deleted) reports of frictions between North Vietnamese and indigenous Southern Communist fighters.
"The Northerners serving under (deleted) Viet Cong leadership in a Communist unit think they are abused and maltreated," one informed source explained. "We captured a document from a political officer in which the Southerners had to stop the village (deleted) population from (deleted) laughing at the Northerners and (deleted) to stop cheating them (deleted) by selling them shoddy merchandise. The Viet Cong had to explain to the people that these guys came to the South to help us."
(deleted)
He continued:
"But, the Southerners who serve under the NVA officers believe the Northerners have a superior attitude--like you (deleted) guys (the Southerners) have been goofing around for ten years down here and now we have to come down and straighten it out."
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A second major problem facing the Communists operating around Saigon (deleted) at this time is that while their numerical strength has remained constant, there has been a significant drop in the quality of their troops and their leaders.
(deleted)
"I'm seeing something that I never thought would happen," one (deleted) long-time Allied official here explained. "I never thought the enemy losses would reach a proportion that attrition would be a significant factor in this war. I never thought we'd change our tactics to fight a real night-time, rifle-war with the Communists. Well, we haven't changed our tactics--but the Communists have changed theirs. (deleted) They've brought their units from the jungles into our midst where (deleted) they are more vulnerable and they die faster. Now, I see attrition is important. Because while the Communists can replace their losses, they can not replace their leaderships. In some of these (deleted) Communist attacks. I've never seen them conducted more stupidly. When they attacked the district town of (deleted) Trang Bang, they hit all of our strongpoints and retreated across an open field. They poured in 300 mortar rounds on our bunkering system--didn't hit at all and instead ripped up an eight-room school, dispensary and some private dwellings. They didn't seem to have any real objective, the operation wasn't coordinated, they hit different points at different times. Two regional force companies held them off--there was nothing admirable about our defense--it was just a ridiculous show on the part of the enemy."
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(deleted) A military source explained the (deleted) change in the Communist battlefield this way:
"Before Tet, some of these old V. C. (Southern Viet Cong) units were so good, you'd be glad to have them in any army. But now, they don't have any push or drive. Some (deleted) newly-arrived North Vietnamese units are pretty tough customers in their first battle and they put up a good (deleted) fight, but most of them don't have (deleted) good morale after that. Before, we never found a Communist weapon (deleted) left on the battlefield--now we get ten or fifteen after good contacts. Our weapons-to-body ratio is going up.
"Now, the Communists don't have any left many of their old Southern commanders who fought against the French. I've read the personal histories of some (deleted) Viet Cong commanders--it used to take them ten or fifteen years to become a battalion commander-- just like the U. S. Army. But, now we find new (deleted) recruits who just joined the Viet Cong in February this year after Tet are squad (deleted) and platoon leaders, and in some cases, even company commanders."
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The current Communist strength is their escalation in weaponry, and in most cases, a plentiful supply of ammunition, weapons and other supplies. Informed sources say the Communists have better weapons than ever before, with more AK-47 (deleted) automatic assault rifles and AK-50's (automatic rifles) (deleted) replacing SKS semi-automatics. (deleted) Their has been a notable shift in increasing the calibre of their mortars, from 60 mm. to 82's; their recoiless rifles are being upgraded from 57 mm. to 75 mm. Americans troops are captured ammunition for 75 mm. pack howitzers--but have to yet to confirm this (deleted)--mobile artillery is in country. There is constant reports of Communist tanks near the Cambodian border areas--(deleted) but none have been confirmed in South Vietnam. The Special Forces camp in Katum, along the Cambodian border, regularly reports seeing (deleted) lights at night and hearing truck (deleted) engines on the South Vietnamese side of the border, presumably the trucking of supplies from Cambodia into War Zone C in Tay Ninh province. They generally call in (deleted) artillery on them--and occasionally (deleted) are greeted by a secondary explosion of ammunition.
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American helicopters (deleted) have in the past (deleted) reported spotting light passenger aircraft flying over from Cambodia into South Vietnam, but no aitings have been made in the past month and a half.
"The Communists (deleted) definitely have much better operations," one officer explained. "But they are not any better with them than the old ones. They just get a bigger boom."
One of the principal Communist supply points in the village of Ba Thu, roughly thirty miles directly west of Saigon on the Cambodian border. "That place looks like the V. C. equivalent of Long (deleted) Binh," one the officer explained, referring to the huge U. S. Army logistical complex outside of Saigon. "The border line between South Viet Nam and Cambodia runs right down the middle of the town."
Some sources believe a major chunk of the Communist supplies needed in the greater Saigon area are shipped into Sinhanoukville port in Cambodia, and then trucked or boated across to the Communist jungled areas on the border. Other sources believe the (deleted) northward-moving supplies are as significant as these moving out of North Vietnam through Laos. The Southern supply route from North Vietnam has reportedly been hempered in recent weeks by two severe typhoons, which has made truck movement around American craters difficult: (Hank: I will file only this (unintelligible) and will go to her, AN Friday. Bev)
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Date
1968, Sep. 18
Subject
Mặt trận dân tộc giải phóng miền nam Việt Nam; Tet Offensive, 1968; Tactics
Location
Biên Hòa, South Vietnam
Coordinates
10.9574; 106.8427
Size
20 x 26 cm
Container
B10, F39
View Folder in ArchivesSpace
Format
dispatches
Collection Number
MS 363
Collection Title
Beverly Deepe Keever, Journalism Papers
Creator
Keever, Beverly Deepe
Copyright Information
These images are for educational use only. To inquire about usage or publication, please contact Archives & Special Collections.
Publisher
Archives & Special Collections, University of Nebraska-Lincoln Libraries
Language
English