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derivative filename/jpeg
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363-05280 to 363-05295.pdf
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Digital Object Identifier
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363-05280 to 363-05295
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Title
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Second article on the significance of the Communist-held elections in South Vietnam
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Description
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Original title: "victory", Keever's title: "Communists Lurch Towards 'People's Revolutionary State Power' at rice-roots Level", Article draft about Communist consolidation of power, for the Christian Science Monitor, page 1-16
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AI Usage Disclosure
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Draft transcripts were automatically generated via Google Document AI and are currently under review. Please report significant errors to Archives & Special Collections at archives@unl.edu.
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Transcript
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38, Vo Tanh
Saigon, Vietnam
September 17, 1968
Victory--page 1
(This is the second of a series on the significance of the Communist-held
elections at the rice-roots level of South Vietnam).
SAIGON, SEPTEMBER 17--The Communist-sponsored People's Liberation
Council elections represent the first decisive, overt step to "build
the people's revolutionary state power" in South Vietnam's countryside.
In short,
each Communist "liberated" village with its elected council
becomes a miniature of a Communist-controlled state. In miniature, they
in South = INN
represent the Communist victory; now the Communist strategy is to spread
through-out South Vietnam the same plan-to implement their "general
As A Ma
offensive and general uprising" to seize power from the Saigon government
Ht
and to replace the national government with this own elected, abl albeit
Communist-dominated government.
--more
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- Page 2
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Deepe
Victory page 2
For years,
the Communists have fiercely attempted--and in some places
succeeded-to overthrow the non-Communist governmental apparatus represented
in Saigon, in what they call "making use of violence to overthrow the
enemy state power.
"
But, the People's Liberation Council elections
in the villages this year represent the first time the Communists have taken the
next logical and concrete step to replace the Saigon government's authority
in local areas with their own "people's revolutionary state power." This
"people's revolutionary state power" represents the culmination of their
military offensive and political insurrection in a small area and then the
consalination political consolidation of this seizure of power from the
pro-American government in Saigon. with the electoral mandate of the people
serving as a cover to justify their seizure of power.
Communist documents suggest the village elections bear little resemblance
to the electoral process in the Western context--they are patterned after the
People's Councils in North Vietnam. Rather than an expression of the people's
will, the elections are Communist-sponr sponsored and directed as a means of
ratifying and consolidating political power from the village level upwards
as a means to press on towards victory from the village level upwards until
the central government in Saigon is destroyed.
--more
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- Page 3
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Deepe
Victory--page 3
However, two central questions arise. First, can the Communists
permanently hold power in these "liberated" villages governmen governm
governed by the People's Liberation Councils once the powerful Allied machine
switches from the strategic defensive to the strategic offensive, and carries
Second, do the Communists have the
the war into the Communist-held areas?
military power and the politico-organizational genuis to expand their veito
victory poa plan into the areas no from Communist-held areas into large
chuc chunks of South Vietnam now governed by the anti-Communist, pro-American
regime in Saigon?
--, pre
--more
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- Page 4
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Deepe
Victory--page 4
These People's Liberation Councils represent in certain villages-they
have not announced how many--the victory of the Communists in achieving their
"general uprising and general offensive." The Communist military general
offensive/ uprising in certain villages (or else simply the unilateral
withdrawal of Allied forces from the area) has seized power from the Saigon
government; the People's Liberation Councils have held and consolidated this
seizure of power by introducing their own official administration-with the
election by the villagers creating an aura of quasi-legitimacy fot for the
Communist-dominated villages.
--more
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- Page 5
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Deepe
Victory-page 6
However,
these People's Liberation Councils are not only the culmination
of victory for the Communists in specified villages, but also become the
vehicle to press for victory in "non-liberated" or "disputed" villages, towns
and cities. One Communist directive specifies thartxiblesom in reference to the
elected village governments that "it is necessary to realize this is a
fighting machine and not a purely administrative machine as in peacetime."
The directive makes clear that the elected village officials "must first be
capable of performing the combat mission, because it is a revolutionary mission..."
The elections of the People's Liberation Councils in the "liberated
areas do not seem to change the facts of 1 much the facts of life in a
Communist-dominated village-except perhaps to worsen it by demanding more
sacrifices from the population. The Communist directive spelling out the forms
and missions of the elected councils makes clear that the villagers in these
areas are expected to produce even more food and to volunteer even more services,
such as portering military supplies, as a means to push forward in their war
effort.
---more
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- Page 6
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Deepe
Victory--page 6
"We must increase production and consider leadership of production as
a combat mission," the Communist directive consder concerning the elected
village government states. "Fight while producing....Push the resistance
forward to complete victory by achieving the slogan: 'All for the front line,
all for victory'."
Informed sources report these elected village "People's Liberation
Councils" are identical in form, function-and even name-with those estab
established through-out the Vietnamese countryside as a means to defeat the
French colonialists during the French Indo-China War. But, early this
year was the first time the Communists sought to establish them during the
war with the Allies. (Some informed sources have said in 1964--when the
Communist military offensive was in full swing-similar Liberation Committee
elections were sponsored by the Communists in their areas from a sign
single list of candidates, but the Communists have never officially
acknowledged this point. If true, the Communists nonetheless disbanded
the idea because of the military imbalance they suffered with the s
American build-up of combat troops several months later.).
--more reuter
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Deepe
Victory page 7
Even before the election of the People's Liberation Councils this year,
Communists still held fairly tight control over the villages in their
liberated areas through a "shadow government," officially called "autonomous
In 1964, during the dramatic military
administrative comj committees."
and political expansion of Communist ct control in the countryside, many
villages fled their homes as the Communist tide swept in closer and closer
Those that remained in the Communist
to the government-controlled zones.
the
for the farmers, for the old people,
villaage villages as the Communists took over automatically bent to their
will--"no one is going to oppose a Communist cadre with a gun in his hand,"
one source explained. Those villagers that remained were organized
systematically into village units of the National Liberation Front, with
groupings for the youth, for the women,
sometimes for other occupational groupings such as fishermen or charcoal-makers.
The inner-core of the National Liberation Front at all levels was the
People's Revolutionary Party, the Comminist Party in the South and an
extension of the North Vietnamese Communist Party. In simplest terms,
People's Revolutionary Party directed the outer-screen National Liberation
Front as its outer screene and together they sponsored and controlled the
to guide and ctr controll
organizations of the people as the mechanisms
virtually every aspect of village life and virtually every segment of the
village population.
the
--more
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- Page 8
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Deepe
Victory-page 8
Leaders of the youth, farmers or women's organizations were elected
by their respective memberships and representives from each organization
was
named to run the village as the "autonomous administrative committee"-
which became the "shadow government".
But, the al villagers did not vote
to elect directly their own village government body council until the
introduction of the Peopel's
balloting for the People's Liberation Councils
earlier this year.
These elections thus become a rather major and decisive
step in the developmental plans of blueprint for a Communist take-over in the
South.
--more
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- Page 9
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Deepe
Victory page 9
The strategic purpose of the People's Liberation Councils is clearly
defined in the 6th Resolution of the Central Office of South Vietnam--the
Communist top political and military command in the South-which was probably
passed in March of this year. This 6th Resolution is considered by experts
These
be closely resemble its North Vietnamese Communist Party equivalent
14th Resolution, which stressed conducting a successful "gnera "general
offensive and general uprising" in a dramatic push to final victory.
two Communist Party resolutions are significant, top-level pronouncements
reviewing the past and outlining general policy guidelines and directions for
Direction
the future.
The 6th Resolution of COSVN outlines the strategic
Communist mones
directions as follows:
more
es of the
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- Page 10
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Deepe
Victory-page 10
"It is necessary to understand clearly that the substance of the
present political struggle is not to stage demonstrations to present
peiti petitions, but to make use of violence to overthrow the enemy
state power and building the people's revolutionary state power.
"Therefore, the key problem is that of making preparations and
motivating the masses to arise seethingly (in coordination with the military
offensive) to annihilate cruet tyrants and wicked administrative personnel
and spies, smash the puppet government and the enemy reactionary
machinery, build the revolutionary state poor power, and quickly develop
the people's revolutionary forces...
"In towns and cities and district seats where our military forces
are strong enough to enable the conquest of those places, we must resolutely
motivate the masses to arise and seize the state power;
military forces are not strong enough to take control,
in places where our
we must maintain
and develop the struggle...to create conditions for the conquest of those
places....
--more
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- Page 11
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Deepe
Victory-page 11
"In formerly or newly liberated areas, it is necessary to quickly
build the revolutionary state power by motivating the masses to hold democratic
build combat villages and hamlets...develop popular organizations
elections,
in order to improve our real stregth in all aspects and motivate
contribution of manpower and material resources to support the front-line
and victory."
In line with the top-level 6th Resolution for the Souht South, COSVN
also issued on March 5 of this year more s a more specific directive
detailing the purpose of the People's Liberation Councils and how they were to
be elected. Once the Communists have seized with the force of guns the power
in their "liberated villages" then, the directive states:
"We must build up the revolutionary government so we can broaden it and
establish a coalition government at the top. The problem of building state
power in each place is, above all, the problem of building village and
hamlet government in liba/a liberated areas (including rural areas and a
number of urban sections), an indispensable matter which we should
strike to achieve positively."
!--more
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- Page 12
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Deepe
Victory--page 12
The directive also makes explicit the pervasive influence of the
People's Revolutionary Party, the Southern extension of the North Vietnamese
Communist Party, not only in directing the villages elections, but also
in leading the village governments once elected. The COSVN directive to
subordinate Communist Party branches and echelons states:
"All echelons, expecially the District Party Committees and Province
Party Committees, should clearly understand the requirements and the
subject of establishing the village and hamlet administration in order to
improve the leadership and urgently, actively achieve the tasks....
"Have plans for leadership...inspect rapidly, lead correctly and firmly
establish the villages and hamlets. Do not underestimate elections in
establishing the revolutionary administration...pay attention to the leadership
throughout various echelons and especially the village Party branches...
continue to train Party members and cadres for the administration in villages
and hamlets. Help the village machinery to follow our work regulations. The
Party Committee or Village Party Branch Committee must understand that the
administrative task is part of their leadership responsibility...through the
Party members in the liberated areas...,/they must help the hamlet Party
Branches or Party cells in providing leadership to the Hamlet Liberation
Sections."
--more
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- Page 13
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Deepe
Victory-page 14
From this elected Liberation Council, ranging from 15 to 35
a smaller executive group of five to seven persons
represenatives,
are selected to serve as the "liberation Committee."
This committee
these
serves as the permanent section of the council to carry on daily work;
committee members are assigned responsibility for ce classical
Communist organizational take. tasks. One president The president is
in charge of secumitm general and military affairs; one vice-president
is in charge of security and a second vice-president is in charge of
production, economy and finance. Of the four committee members,
acts as secretary,
one da
one is responsible for information and culture,
and one is, for
assigned for education, public health and social welfare.
one is
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- Page 14
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Deepe
Victory--Page 14
The directive also mentions in more vague and complet incomplete terms
an indirect selection--not by balloting-in villages not completely liberated
by the Communists.
"In strongly disputed villages where the enemy still has
posts, the directive said, "if the situation is not favorable for us to
organize the people for elections, we can organize a Village People's Council,
which will have the same responsibility a as the Village People's Liberation
Council. After setting up the army and peopel' people's council,
we should
hold a meeting so we can intor introduce these respo representatives to the
people."
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- Page 15
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Deepe
Victory-page/6
Following People's Liberation Council elections in their "liberated"
villages,
power, AND
the Communist strategy is then clearly to move their poter-election
process up the politico-administrative hierarchial ladder. This hierarchy
graphically resembles a four-tiered wedding cake, with the village level forming
the base of the cake, followed by the district level, the provincial level-
and at the top tier, the central government level.
Communist radio broadcasts already claim they have jumped from elections
DREDS
at the village level to "liberation" elections at the district level in "several"
areas. And they claim two provincial level Liberation Council elections--in
An Xuyen and the Pleiku areas. (The Communist organization compro comprises
provinces).
The logical extension for the Communists after more provincial level committees
have been elected would be to form a "provisional government" at the top-tier of c
Comp
the cake,--the central government level, in the hopes of toppin toppling the Saigon
regime and then supplanting it with their own revolutionary state power.
---more
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- Page 16
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Deepe
Victory page 17
However, at this time, the Communist strategy is clearly not to do this.
written in captured documents, indicate they
Their own internal assessments,
rural-oriented
consider the National Liberation Front too weak among the urban middle and
upper-class elements. Hence, they appear to have dropped the idea of forming
a provisional government at the top-tier ofth the cake, which would escalate
the status of the National Liberation Front from that of a front to that of a
government.
Instead, the Communist strategy now seems to form a "coalition government"/
with Communist-created organizations designed to woo the support of the urban
middle and upper classes, including the intellectuals the National Liberation
Front would control the countryside and the laboring classes in the cities, while
the other Communist created urban organizations and alliances would woo the
Most important of these is the Alliance for National, Democratic
upper urban classes, into the role of government oppositionists. They would
TAN
THESE Communis
especially attempt to woo non-Communist,
S
but anti-government opposition groups,
such as the militer militant Buddhists, who have experience in toppling a
number of Saigon regimes in the past.
In parallel, the National Liberation Front plus these other Communist
satellite organizat or ant organizations or anti-government oppositionists would
then stive to overthrow by the use of violence the American-supported Saigon
government.
If successful, the Communist strategiste, would then form-a
"coalition government" with other anti-American leftists. But, this "coalition
government" would be Communist dominated and would symbolize little more than
ANOBUV
A
a disguised American defeat.
--- end
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Date
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1968, Sep. 17
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Subject
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D?ng Nh�n D�n C�ch-M?ng; Communism--Vietnam (Republic); Mặt trận dân tộc giải phóng miền nam Việt Nam; ??ng lao ??ng Vi?t Nam; Elections
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Location
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Saigon, South Vietnam
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Coordinates
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10.8231; 106.6311
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Size
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20 x 26 cm
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Container
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B10, F39
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Format
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dispatches
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Collection Number
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MS 363
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Collection Title
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Beverly Deepe Keever, Journalism Papers
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Creator
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Keever, Beverly Deepe
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Copyright Information
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These images are for educational use only. To inquire about usage or publication, please contact Archives & Special Collections.
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Publisher
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Archives & Special Collections, University of Nebraska-Lincoln Libraries
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Language
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English
