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derivative filename/jpeg
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363-05280 to 363-05295.pdf
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Digital Object Identifier
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363-05280 to 363-05295
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Title
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Second article on the significance of the Communist-held elections in South Vietnam
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Description
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Original title: "victory", Keever's title: "Communists Lurch Towards 'People's Revolutionary State Power' at rice-roots Level", Article draft about Communist consolidation of power, for the Christian Science Monitor, page 1-16
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AI Usage Disclosure
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Draft transcripts were automatically generated via Google Document AI and are currently under review. Please report significant errors to Archives & Special Collections at archives@unl.edu.
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Transcript
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38, Vo Tanh
Saigon, Vietnam
September 17, 1968
Victory--Page 1
(This is the second of a series on the significance of the Communist-held (deleted) elections at the rice-roots level of South Vietnam).
SAIGON, SEPTEMBER 17--The Communist-sponsored People's Liberation Council elections represent the first decisive, overt step to "build the people's revolutionary state power" in South Vietnam's countryside.
In short, (deleted) each Communist "liberated village" with it's elected council becomes a miniature of a Communist-controlled state. In miniature, they represent (deleted) South Vietnamese Communist victory. Now the Communist strategy is to spread through-out Sout Viet Nam the same (deleted) victory--to implement their "general offensive and general uprising" as a means to seize power from the Pro-American Saigon government and to replace (deleted) that government with this own elected, (deleted) albeit Communist-dominated government.
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Deepe
Victory--page 2
For years, the Communists have fiercely attempted--and in some places succeeded--to (deleted) the non-Communist governmental apparatus (deleted) "making use of violence to overthrow the enemy state power." But, the People's Liberation Council elections in the villages this year represent the first time the Communists have taken the next logical and concrete step to replace the Saigon government's authority in local areas with their own "people's revolutionary state power." This "people's revolutionary state power" represents the culmination of their military offensive and political insurrection in a small area (deleted) mandate of the people serving as a cover to justify their seizure of power.
(deleted)
Communist documents suggest the village elections bear little resemblance to the electoral process in the Western context--they are patterned after the People's Councils in North Vietnam. Rather than an expression of the people's will, the elections are Communist-(deleted) sponsored and directed (deleted) ratifying and consolidating political power (deleted) as a means to press on towards victory from the village level upwards until the central government in Saigon is destroyed.
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Deepe
However, two central questions arise. First, can the Communists permanently hold power in these "liberated" villages (deleted) governed by the People's Liberation Councils once the powerful Allied machine switches from the strategic defensive to the strategic offensive, and carries the war into the Communist-held areas? Second, do the Communists have the military power and the politico-organizational genuis to expand their (deleted) victory plan (deleted) from Communist-held areas into large chunks of South Vietnam now governed by the anti-Communist, pro-American regime in Saigon?
--,pre
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Deepe
Victory--page 4
These People's Liberation Councils represent in certain villages--they have not announced how many--the victory of the Communists in achieving their "general uprising and general offensive." The Communist military general offensive/uprising in certain villages (or else simply the unilateral withdrawal of Allied forces from the area) has seized power from the Saigon government; the People's Liberation Councils have held and consolidated this seizure of power by introducing their own official administration--with the election by the villagers creating an aura of quasi-legitimacy for the Communist-dominated villages.
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Deepe
Victory--page 6 5
However, these People's Liberation Councils are not only the culmination of victory for the Communists in specified villages, but also become the vehicle to press for victory in "non-liberated" or "disputed" villages, towns and cities. One Communist directive specifies (deleted) in reference to the elected village governments that "it is necessary to realize this is a fighting machine and not a purely administrative machine as in peacetime." The directive makes clear that the village officials "must first be capable of performing the combat mission, because it is a revolutionary mission...."
The elections of the People's Liberation Council in the "liberated areas do not seem to change (deleted) much the facts of life in a Communist-dominated village--except perhaps to worsen it by demanding more sacrifices from the population. The Communist directive spelling out the forms and missions of the elected councils makes clear that the villagers in these areas are expected to produce even more food and to volunteer even more services, such as portering military supplies, as a means to push forward in their war effort.
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Deepe
Victory--page 6
"We must increase production and consider leadership of production as a combat mission," the Combat directive (deleted) concerning the elected village government states. "Fight while producing.... Push the resistance forward to complete victory by achieving the slogan: 'All for the front line, all for victory'."
Informed sources report these elected village "People's Liberation Councils" are identical in form, function--and even name--with those (deleted) established through-out the Vietnamese countryside as a means to defeat the French colonialists during the French Indo-China War. But, early this year was the first time the Communists sought to establish them during the war with the Allies. (Some informed sources have said in 1964--when the Communist military offensive was in full swing--similar Liberation Committee elections were sponsored by the Communists in their areas from a (deleted) single list of candidates, but the Communists have never officially acknowledged this point. If true, the Communists nonetheless disbanded the idea because of the military imbalance they suffered with the American build-up of combat troops several months later.).
--more reuter
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Deepe
Victory--page 7
Even before the election of the People's Liberation Councils this year, the Communists still held fairly tight control over the villages in their liberated areas through a "shadow government," officially called "autonomous administrative (deleted) committees." In 1964, during the dramatic military and political expansion of Communist control in the countryside, many villages fled their homes as the Communist tide swept in closer and closer to the government-controlled zones. Those that remained in the (deleted) villages as the Communists took over automatically bent to their will--"no one is going to oppose a Communist cadre with a gun in his hand," one source explained. Those villages that remained were organized systematically into village units of the National Liberation Front, with groupings for the youth, for the women, for the farmers, for the old people, (deleted) for other occupations (deleted) such as fishermen or charcoal-makers. The inner-core of the National Liberation Front at all levels was the People's Revolutionary Party, the Comminist Party in the South and an extension of the North Vietnamese Communist Party. In simplest terms, the People's Revolutionary Party (deleted) the (deleted) National Liberation Fron as its outers screene and together they (deleted) as the mechanisms to (deleted) controll virtually every aspect of the village life and virtually every segment of the village population.
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Deepe
Victory--page 8
Leaders of the youth, farmers or women's organizations were elected by their respective memberships and representives from each organization was named to run the village as the "autonomous administrative committee"--which became the "shadow government". But, the villagers did not vote to elect directly their own village government body council until the introduction of (deleted) the People's Liberation Councils earlier this year. These elections thus become a rather major and decisive step in the developmental (deleted) blueprint for a Communist take-over in the South.
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Deepe
Victory--page 9
The strategic purpose of the People's Liberation Councils is clearly defined in the 6th Resolution of the Central Office of South Vietnam--the Communist top political and military command in the South--which was probably passed in March of this year. This 6th Resolution is considered by experts to be (deleted) North Vietnamese Pary (deleted) 14th Resolution, which stressed conducting a successful (deleted) "general offensive and general uprising" in a dramatic push to final victory. These two Communist Party resolutions are significant, top-level pronouncements reviewing the past and outlining general policy guidelines and directions for the future.
The 6th Resolution of COSVN outlines the strategic (deleted) direction of the Communist (deleted) as follows:
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Deepe
Victory--page 10
"It is necessary to understand clearly that the substance of the present political struggle is not to stage demonstrations to present (deleted) petitions, but to make use of violence to overthrow the enemy state power and building the people's revolutionary state power.
"Therefore, the key problem is that of making preparations and motivating the masses to arise seethingly (in coordination with the military offensive) to annihilate cruet tyrants and wicked administrative personnel and spies, smash the puppet government and the enemy reactionary machinery, build the revolutionary state (deleted) power, and quickly develop the people's revolutionary forces...
"In towns and cities and district seats where our military forces are strong enough to enable the conquest of those places, we must resolutely motivate the masses to arise and seize the state power; in places where our military forces are not strong enough to take control, we must maintain and develop the struggle...to create conditions for the conquest of those places....
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Deepe
Victory--page 11
"In formerly or newly liberated areas, it is necessary to quickly build the revolutionary state power in motivating the masses to hold democratic elections, build combat villages and hamlets...develop popular organizations in order to improve our real stegth in all aspects and motivate contribution of manpower and material resources to support the front-line and victory."
In line with the top-level 6th Resolution for the (deleted) South, COSVN also issued on March 5 of this year (deleted) a more specific directive detailing the purpose of the People's Liberation Councils and how they were to be elected. Once the Communists have seized with the force of guns the power in their "liberated villages" then, the directive states:
"We must build up the revolutionary government so we can broaden it and establish a coalition government at the top. The problem of building state power in each place is, above all, the problem of building village and hamlet government in (deleted) liberated areas (including rural areas and a number of urban sections), an indispensable matter which we should strike to achieve positively."
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Deepe
Victory--page 12
The directive also makes explicit the pervasive influence of the People's Revolutionary Party, the Southern extension of the North Vietnamese Communist Party, not only in directing the village elections, but also in leading the village governments once elected. The COSVN directive to subordinate Communist Party branches and echelons states:
"All echelons, especially the District Party Committees and Province Party Committees, should clearly understand the requirements and the subject of establishing the village and hamlet administration in order to improve the leadership and urgently, actively achieve the tasks....
"Have plans for leadership...inspect rapidly, lead correctly and firmly establish the villages and hamlets. Do not underestimate elections in establishing the revolutionary administration...pay attention to the leadership throughout various echelons and especially the village Party branches... continue to train Party members and cadres for the administration in villages and hamlets. Help the village machinery to follow our work regulations. The Party Committee or Village Party Branch Committee must understand that the administrative task is part of their leadership responsibility...through the Party members in the liberated areas..., they must help the hamlet Party Branches or Party cells in provided leadership to the Hamlet Liberation Sections."
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Deepe
Victory--page 14
From this elected Liberation Council, ranging from 15 to 35 representatives, a smaller executive group of five to seven persons are selected to serve as the "liberation Committee." This committee serves as the permanent section of the council to carry on daily work; these committee members are assigned responsibility for (deleted) classical Communist organizational (deleted) tasks. (deleted) The president is in charge of (deleted) general and military affairs; one vice-president is in charge of security and a second vice-president is in charge of production, economy, and finance. Of the four committee members, one (deleted) acts as secretary, one is responsible for information and culture, one is assigned for education and one is for public health and social welfare.
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Deepe
Victory--Page 14
The directive also mentions in more vague (deleted) terms an indirect selection--not by balloting--in villages not completely liberated by the Communists. "In strongly disputed villages where the enemy still has posts," the directive said, "if the situation is not favorable for us to organize the people for elections, we can organize a Village People's Council, which will have the same responsibility as the Village People's Liberation Council. After setting up the army and (deleted) people's council, we should hold a meeting so we can (deleted) introduce these (deleted) representatives to the people."
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Deepe
Victory--page 16
Following People's Liberation Council elections in their "liberated" villages, the Communist strategy is then clearly to move their (deleted) (unintelligible) power, and election process up the politico-administrative (deleted) hierarchical ladder. This hierarchy graphically resembles a four-tiered wedding cake, with the village level forming the base of the cake, followed by the district level, the provincial level--and at the top tier, the central government level.
Communist radio broadcasts already claim they have jumped from elections at the village level to "liberation" elections at the district-level in (deleted) "hundreds" areas, and they also claim (deleted) several provincial level Liberation Council elections--in the An Xuyen Plantam and Pleiku areas. (deleted)
The logical extension for the Communists after more provincial level committees have been elected would be to form a "provinsional government" at the top-tier of the cake,--the central government level, (deleted) to compete with (unintelligible) the Saigon regime and then supplanting it with their own "revolutionary state power."
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Deepe
Victory--page 17
However, at this time, the Communist strategy is clearly not to do this. Their own internal assessments, written in captured documents, indicate they consider the rural-oriented National Liberation Front too weak among the urban middle and upper-class elements. Hence, they appear to have dropped the idea of forming a provisional government at the top-tier of the cake, which would escalate the status of the National Liberation Front from that of a front to that of a government.
Instead, the Communist strategy now seems to form a "coalition government" with Communist-created organizations designed to woo the support of the urban middle and upper classes, included the intellectuals. The National Liberation Front would control the countryside and the laboring classes in the cities, while the other Communist created urban organizations would woo the upper urban classes into the role of government oppositionists. Most important of these is the Alliance for National (deleted) They would these Communist (unintelligible) organizations would especially attempt to woo non-Communist, but anti-government opposition groups, such as the (deleted) militant Buddhists, who have experience in toppling a number of Saigon regimes in the past.
In parallel, the National Liberation Front plus (deleted) other Communist satellite (deleted) organizations or anti-government oppositionists would then (deleted) strive to overthrow by the use of violence the American-supported Saigon government. If successful, the Communist strategists would then form a "coalition government" with other anti-American leftists. But, this "coalition government" would be Communist dominated and would symbolize little more than distinguished American defeat.
--x end
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Date
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1968, Sep. 17
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Subject
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D?ng Nh�n D�n C�ch-M?ng; Communism--Vietnam (Republic); Mặt trận dân tộc giải phóng miền nam Việt Nam; ??ng lao ??ng Vi?t Nam; Elections
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Location
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Saigon, South Vietnam
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Coordinates
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10.8231; 106.6311
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Size
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20 x 26 cm
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Format
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dispatches
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Collection Number
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MS 363
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Collection Title
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Beverly Deepe Keever, Journalism Papers
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Creator
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Keever, Beverly Deepe
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Copyright Information
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These images are for educational use only. To inquire about usage or publication, please contact Archives & Special Collections.
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Publisher
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Archives & Special Collections, University of Nebraska-Lincoln Libraries
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Language
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English