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derivative filename/jpeg
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363-05323 to 363-05339.pdf
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Digital Object Identifier
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363-05323 to 363-05339
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Title
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Second article about credibility gaps in South Vietnam
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Description
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Original title: "canyon", Keever's title: "Communists miss 'Golden Opportunity', Shattering Credibility", Article draft about the lack of credibility of the Communists in South Vietnam, for the Christian Science Monitor, page 1-17
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AI Usage Disclosure
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Draft transcripts were automatically generated via Google Document AI and are currently under review. Please report significant errors to Archives & Special Collections at archives@unl.edu.
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Transcript
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2020 526
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canyong 1 (normass/deepo)
(This is the last of a two-part series on the proliferation of
credibility gaps in South Vietnam. This article discusses the Communist
ohama).
SAICON, SEPTEMBER 11--Compared to Washington's "in-house" credibility
the Communists in South Vietnam are facing a canyon.
They can bridge their canyon overnight by instant victory in
ash assaulting the major cities, including Saigon, during the "decisive
years of 1968." This victory during 1968 through their "goneral offensive
and gonoral uprising" is what they had promised their own troops and
cadre and had boasted of to Vietnamese anti-Communists.
Now, their
hour of decision is at hand and the prospects are not encouraging for them.
The Communists can hesitate at the brink--as they now seen to be
doing but to vacillate too long in aseulting tho major cities is to begin
tettering downwards.
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fail
But, if the Communists puo pull book from the brink andfall to
launch their offensivo-uprising into the cities, or if they fail to
fail to achieve oredible victory in doing so, they are likely to
collapse into the chasm they themselves created with the chance
excavation.
The bridge-ability of the Communist canyon is fundamentally
brinkésmanship.
It was at let the time of the Tet offonsive into the cities that
AND WASHING
Communist canyon/began dovoloping; the political-psychological shook offoot
of the Communist Tot attack: attack shattered tax Washington the American
government's credibility with the American people, gave birth to the
current
S.
"in-house" erodibility gap within the government-beta10
But, the Communist Tot attack-and their failure to achieve their
ab ambitious plan to seize power from the Vietnamese government
also began the cracks within the Communist structure that are now approaching
oby canyon-nise.
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In one sense, the Communists' credibility immediately before Tot
was so good even their enomios believed they thoms they said they
would observo a unilateral moak-long truce--the Allies believed them,
were unproD and were unpredpar unprepared when the Communists shifted
to full-scale courty cross-country warfare, which was a key factor
in the success they did achievo.
But, the Communists did not achieve the highly victory they
promised to thoir oadros, troops and supporters.
co CrackKING
Now mole
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Communist documents, captured by the Allies after Tot,
indicates
both how ambitious the Communist plan was to seize power and achieve victory
Decisive
in one country-wide swatch swathe--and how modum pivotal would be
their victory ome achieved.
The Communist troops and cadre were told the Tet "general offensive
and gonoral pre uprising" was a "once-in-a-thousand-year" opportunity.
It was the "thol eo," which translatos litorally as "time "time-opportunity
that is the historically dooisive moment, the time period in which a
long sought opportunity may become a reality, the moment to grasp the
opportunity for it may never return. "This is the time-opporum opportunity
to win total victory," the If Communist troops were told,
Nowhere in the captured documents were the troops and cadre told
Commun.STS.
there would be a second offensive and a-hide third one they-now
Now
say is in po progress,
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the Communist Party instructions for Tot-this "opoohal-making stage"-
were "to make all realize that the purpose of the revolutionary activities
conducted for many years is mainly to support this phase, in this dooisive
hour." The whole Party Communist Party oldman was to bocomo transformed
into determined-to-die" unites Communist troops wore indoctrinated to
fight until the finish until the last man.
In termo their military troops could understand, the Party instructions
cave this analogy:
"This opportunity is like an attack on an enemy post in which we
have reached the last fence and the onomy puts up a fierce resistance.
only need to make a swift assault to secure the target and gain total
We
victory,"
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The Party also promised during the Tet blow that the "enemy will be
thrown into utmost confusion. No matter how violently the enemy may
react, he can not avoid collapse. This is not only the goldon
opportunity to liberate d
ng hemlots
and villages but also an opportunity to liberate district seats, provincial
capitals and South Vietnam as a whole."
In foot,
so considono confident was the Party of success t
Docte
discussions among troops and cadre in their intensive indoctriction sessions
included these questions 1. What characteristics will exist when we
liberate the towns, 2. How should the armed forces attack the towns and
cities 3. why must we successfully carry out the civilian panel
proselyting policy when wo liberate and control towns and cities?"
So sure was the Party of success that Viet Cong provincial committees
and polioomont accompanies the troops into to battle; the provincial
committees would take over the government; the police would maintain
law and order as the Vietnamese armed forces surrendered their arms.
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However, 48 hours after the bit blits attacks, countrywide, the
Communiste had failed to liborate any of the mem major towno-czcept Hue---
although parts of many were in flames. It must be said, they came
breath-takingly close in come ways to throwing the Allies into chaos.
For example, a Communist unit infiltrated as close as 200 yards to the
residence of President Nguyen Van Thieu-they were spotted by accident when
American military police wore changing the guard. President Thiou at the
time was in My Tho visiting his wife's in-laws and evon there it was only
concentrated security by the Vietnamese 7th Division and an emergency
OR
helicopter evacuation that saved him from possible capture of death.
This could have caused mass turmoil or htio diserte 10
disintegration of the Vietnamese army of government.
Communist propagandists
during Tet said that according to "unconfirmed reports" Thieu had boon
killed,
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One of those who saw that the Communists had missed their
"once-in-a-thousand-year opporuni opportunity was Lt. Col. Tran Ven
Dec. His regiment was fighting in Go Vep district-off the edge of
Saigon's Ten Son Nhut airport. He reporteds
with determination for two days. The reinforcements promised us
aftor we had spearheaded into the target area
e any onomy was counter-attacking.
"We had been fighting
had not errived. The
I called in the sf sonior political
cadre in the Go Vap area. For years ho had been sending us reports
that the people wore for us that they hated the government and the
Americans. I asked him when the people would air uprise. He answered:
the people are terrified and are running away. They do hate the government
but they aren't going to uprise for us.'
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"That's whon I know we wore finished. I wrote a report to
COSVIT (the soni or Communist political and military command). I told than
there would be no uprising-and that we would have to re-appraise our
whole military strategy and everything else. COSVN replied that I
had misjudged the situation, that I had lost morale, that my strategic
determination and faith in the Paryt Party had broken that I had become
pessimistic and disillusioned."
Three months later, Lt. Col. Dao was again ordered by COSVN
to lead his unit into a siniler assault on Saigon. Ile decided it would
be suicide for his unit and would only lead to the further destruction of,
but not the capture of, Saigon. So, a week before the attack, he defected
to the Allios. He told the Allies of the Communist plans-and/they
COMMUNSTS
gain failed to soise Saigon, the vast majority of their units
were intercepted before reaching Saigon and other major cities.
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Explaining Lt. Col. Doo's story, one Communist analysit
analyst caid:
"The thing Westernere do not understand about Communists is that they
-have trete maintain their own private, exclusive world of modnoss.
The problem with the Communists is not that they have a credibility
capthey have a reality sop. Tiny Ivorything they do and think
is shaped by the Marxist book and by the Communist Party. If something
Do
good wrong and the book int
it is only because the cadre
do not believe enough in the Party and aren't good enough Communists.
Honoe, they need more indoctrination.
It can never be that the Party
wee wrong or that it misjudged the situation.
Sure, Col. Dao can write
a realistic report and contradict to inform the Party even if it means
contradicting the Party's strategy and political line. But, all these
reports he writes go into his del dossier-end anytime the Party wants they
to Punge
can be used at him. Avan In Dac's case, he just gave up end
defected."
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A week aftor Tet, the Communist Party line took a significant
SWOIVO. Tot, instead of being a "once-in-a-thousand-years" opportunity
became "o phase of the general offensive not a battle that lasts some
two or three days. We should be aware that this is a general offensive
launched to win final victory in a the shortest period of time, which
may, however, be three or four months."
But, three or four months later was the lay offensive--and the
majority of their troops did not even reach the major tb urban centers.
After that failure, the Party instructions began blaming the local cadre
for misinterpreting exactly what the Party had said at that Tet
was the decisive hour.
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As always,
the Party was right, but the cadre had misinterpreted it.
the policy.
In the Party's assessments of the May offensive,
a captured document
reads
"We still did not sharply and profoundly assimilate the basic lines
We did not fully
to the
there was a tendency to
of the Party's policy and strategio determination.
understand the characteristics of the new phase. From the basic assumption
that the general offensive/general uprising was a one blow affair"
realization that it was a phase of operations,
consider it as a protracer protracted struggle and a failure to to view
it as a phase of continuous offensives and uprisings which require a
positive urgonoy in gaining success every hour and overy minute."
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drop in Communist morale among troops and cadre,
Documents by the basketful have since boon captured indicating a
sharp criticisms from
superior headquarters about the "wavorings and hesitancies" of
unit commanders. The Party has sought to counteract this drop in
effectiveness with some of the most intensive indoctrination sessions of
the which may be interpreted as al sign of weeknoss in hopes of
regaining the confidence of the low-echelon fighters.
Significantly
also, the Communist troops have been forbidden to listen to Allied
REPORTS
radio broadcasts--because of the Allied 120 abort Allied victorios and the
All news of the Paris ponce talks.
BROADCASTS
Those sonior cadro who need to liston
to rebus for their missions are required to listen with earphones so that
others do not hed overhear the news.
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Now,
the Communists have a nnounced that the third offensive into
the cities has begun--but it so weak that they are now saying this is
only the "first phase of the third offensivo."
The inability to
attack Saigon vigorously in August (because the Allies captured the battle
plan) has caused their political stock to go down. The pro-Communist
sympathizers in Saigon are "depressed and one the defensive," one informed
source explained.) "The Seigon people are bored about, of hearing
about the third wave into the cap capital. It was supposed to come
inede
in August and they were to weak to get here. Now wo just believe
the third offensive when it comes to Saigon."
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During Tot, the greatest Communist military success came in Hue,
which they hold (partially hold for 25 days. But, that was their greatest
political
political setback. The shockwaves of Com Communist terrorem in fue
of Hue spread throughout Vietnam in such in a miña miniaturized version
of the the world's reaction to the Russian invasion of Czeckoslovakia.
One Vietnamese political source, from Hue described the typical
reaction of the Vietnamese:
"When the Communists first moved into Hue, they were vi very nico and
politi polite to the people. They thought they would hold the city. The
they know they could not hold it and would have to retreat. They started
mass executions and even burying people alive. They carried alot of killing
and not just to those person who deserved to be killed. They were not
Before that, people believed what the Communists / said--
s3 selective.
but after the Hue masa massacress the people became disillusioned with thom.
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"Before the Communists had promised the people they would be
treated nicely, that they could continue their jobs, that those who
cooperated with them would be welcomed, that those who had been sitting
The people believed them--because the
on the fence would be welcomed.
Communist policy was always to base their military actions on the
people's support.
The Communists had promised the government soldiers
who defected to their side would be welcomed--but instead those that did
were treated like covernment spics and given indoctrination sessions
"Now,
the thing is in ue and aigon what Communists is do
the rocketing and attocking of the cities. It shows they dh don't care
about the people. The Communists explained that they were rocketing d
government buildings and offices--but when they misq all the time and
hit the people, it means they their weapons aron't accurate enough and
they don't care about the people.
And, they gas in ground battalions
to attack the city not to capture it any more,
but just to destroy it.
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"SO,
how can we believe the Communists any more. They kept
but here the North Vietnameso
telling us this was a war of liberation,
were standing in the houses of the people of Hue. They told us
troops
that the National Liberation Front was the sole and genuine representative
of the South Vietnamese people--and they then they set up their Alliance
And
for Peace which is also supposed to represent the people of Hue.
besides, they told us there would be a truce at Tet--and instead they
destroyed the whole city of Hue."
(Hank: I've cancelled my Long An trip and will try to do en
analysis of the Taynin battle--but I doubt that I can send that fast.
Roximann I probably will not file Friday or Saturday, unless I
get my requested interviews about Tayninh) Regards Bev).
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Date
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1968, Sep. 11
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Subject
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Mặt trận dân tộc giải phóng miền nam Việt Nam; Vietnam War, 1961-1975--Mass media and the war; Public opinion
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Location
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Saigon, South Vietnam
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Coordinates
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10.8231; 106.6311
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Size
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20 x 26 cm
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Container
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B10, F39
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Format
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dispatches
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Collection Number
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MS 363
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Collection Title
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Beverly Deepe Keever, Journalism Papers
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Creator
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Keever, Beverly Deepe
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Copyright Information
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These images are for educational use only. To inquire about usage or publication, please contact Archives & Special Collections.
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Publisher
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Archives & Special Collections, University of Nebraska-Lincoln Libraries
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Language
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English
