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derivative filename/jpeg
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363-05323 to 363-05339.pdf
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Digital Object Identifier
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363-05323 to 363-05339
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Title
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Second article about credibility gaps in South Vietnam
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Description
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Original title: "canyon", Keever's title: "Communists miss 'Golden Opportunity', Shattering Credibility", Article draft about the lack of credibility of the Communists in South Vietnam, for the Christian Science Monitor, page 1-17
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AI Usage Disclosure
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Draft transcripts were automatically generated via Google Document AI and are currently under review. Please report significant errors to Archives & Special Collections at archives@unl.edu.
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Transcript
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(This is the last of a two-part series on the proliferation of credibility gaps in South Vietnam. This article discusses the Communist chasm).
SAIGON, SEPTEMBER 11--Compared to Washington's "in-house" credibility gap, the Communists in South Vietnam, are facing a canyon.
They can bridge their canyon overnight by instant victory in (deleted) assaulting the major cities, including Saigon, during the "decisive year of 1968." This victory during 1968 through their "general offensive and general uprising" is what they had promised their own troops and cadre and had boasted of to Vietnamese anti-Communists. Now, their hour of decision is at hand and the prospects are not encouraging for them.
The Communists can hesitate at the brink--as they now seem to be doing--but to vacillate too long in assulting the major cities is to begin tettering downwards.
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But, if the Communists pull back from the brink and fail to launch their offensive-uprising into the cities, or if they (deleted) fail to achieve a credible victory in doing so, they are likely to collapse into the chasm they themselves created. (deleted) The bridge-ability of the Communist canyon is fundamentally brinksmanship.
It was at the time of the Tet offensive into the cities that Communist canyon--and Washington's gap--began developing; the political-psychological shock effect of the Communist Tet (deleted) attack shattered (deleted) the American government's credibility with the American people, and gave birth to the current (deleted) "in-house" credibility gap within the U.S. government. (deleted) But, the Communist Tet attack--and their failure to achieve their (deleted) ambitious plan to seize power from the Vietnamese government--also began the cracks within the Communist structure that are now approaching (deleted) canyon-size.
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In one sense, the Communists' credibility immediately before Tet was so good even their enemies believed them; they said they would observe a unilateral week-long truce--the Allies believed them, (deleted) and were (deleted) unprepared when the Communists shifted to full-scale (deleted) cross-country warfare, (deleted) surprise was a key factor in the success they did achieve.
But, the Communists did not achieve the (deleted) victory they promised to their cadres, troops and supporters. And now more is checking among them.
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Communist documents, captured by the Allies after Tet, indicates both how ambitious the Communist plan was--to seize power and achieve victory in one country-wide (deleted) swathe--and how (deleted) decisive would be their victory once achieved.
The Communist troops and cadre were told the Tet "general offensive and general (deleted) uprising" was a "once-in-a-thousand-year" opportunity. It was the "thoi co," which translates literally as (deleted) "time-opportunity"--that is the historically decisive moment, the time period in which a long-sought opportunity may become a reality, the moment to grasp the opportunity for it may never return. "This is the time-(deleted) opportunity to win total victory," the Communist troops were told before Tet.
Nowhere in the captured moments were the troops and cadre told there would be a second offensive and (deleted) the current third one the (deleted) Communists say is (deleted) now progress.
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The Communist Party instructions for Tet--this "epochal-making stage"--were "to make all realize that the purpose of the revolutionary activities conducted for many years in mainly to support this phase, in this decisive hour." The whole Party Communist Party (deleted) was to become transformed into "determined-to-die" units; Communist troops were indoctrinated to fight until the finish--until the last man.
In terms their military troops could understand, the Party instructions gave this analogy:
"This opportunity is like an attack on an enemy post in which we have reached the last fence and the enemy puts up a fierce resistance. We only need to make a swift assault to secure the target and gain total victory."
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The Party also promised during the Tet blow that the "enemy will be thrown into utmost confusion. No matter how violently the enemy may react, he can not avoid collapse. This is not only the golden opportunity to liberate (deleted) hamlets and villages but also an opportunity to liberate district seats, provincial capitals and South Vietnam as a whole."
In fact, so (deleted) confident was the Party of success (deleted) that discussions among troops and cadre in their intensive (deleted) indoctrination sessions including these questions: "1. What characteristics will exist when we liberate the towns, 2. How should the armed forces attack the towns and cities 3. why must we successfully carry out the civilian (deleted) proselyting policy when we liberate and control towns and cities?"
So sure was the Party of success that Viet Cong provincial committees and policemen accompanied the troops into battle; the provincial committees would take over the government; the police would maintain law and order as the Vietnamese armed forces surrendered their arms.
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However, 48 hours after the (deleted) country-wide blitz attacks, the Communists had failed to liberate any of the major towns--except Hue--although parts of many were in flames. It must be said, they came breath-takingly close in some ways to throwing the Allies into chaos. For example, a Communist unit infiltrated as close as 200 yards to the residence of President Nguyen Van Thieu--they were spotted by accident when American military police were changing the guard. President Thieu at the time was in My Tho visiting his wife's in-laws--and even there it was only concentrated security by the Vietnamese 7th Division and an emergency helicopter evacuation that saved him from possible capture or death. This could have caused mass turmoil or (deleted) disintegration of the Vietnamese army or government. Communist propagandists during Tet said that according to "unconfirmed reports" Thieu had been killed
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One of these who saw that the Communists had missed their "once-in-a-thousand-year" (deleted) opportunity was St. Col. Tran Van Dac. His regiment was fighting in Go Vap district--off the edge of Saigon's Tan Son Nhut airport. He reported: "We had been fighting with determination for two days. The reinforcements promised us after we had spearheaded into the target area had not arrived. The (deleted) enemy was counter-attacking. I called in the senior political cadre in the Go Vap area. For years he had been sending us reports that the people were for us--that they hated the government and the Americans. I asked him when the people would uprise. He answered: 'the people are terrified and are running away. They do hate the government--but they aren't going to uprise for us.'
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"That's when I knew we were finished. I wrote a report to COSVN (the senior Communist political and military command). I told them there would be no uprising--and that we would have to re-appraise our whole military strategy and everything else. COSVN replied that I had misjudged the situation, that I had lost morale, that my strategic determination and faith in the (deleted) Party had broken, and that I had become pessimistic and disillusioned."
Three months later, Lt. Col. Dac was again ordered by COSVN to lead his unit into a similar assault on Saigon. He decided it would be suicide for his unit and would only lead to the further destruction of, but not the capture of, Saigon. So, a week before the attack, defected to the Allies. He told the Allies of the Communist plans--and because the Communists again failed to seize Saigon. (deleted) The Vast majority of their units were intercepted before reaching Saigon and other major cities.
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Explaining Lt. Col. Dac's story, one Communist (deleted) analyst said:
"The thing Westerners do not understand about Communists is that they (deleted) maintain their own private, exclusive world of madness. The problem (deleted) with the Communists is not that they have a credibility gap--they have a reality gap. (deleted) Everything they do and think is shaped by the Marxist book and by the Communist Party. If something goes wrong and events do not follow the book (deleted)--it is only because the cadre do not believe enough in the Party and aren't good enough Communists. Hence, they need mor indoctrination. It can never be that the Party was wrong or that it misjudged the situation. Sur, Col. Dac can write a realistic report (deleted) to inform the Party--even if it means contradicting the Party's strategy and political line. But, all these reports he writes go to his dossier--and anytime the Party wants (deleted) it can be used (deleted) to purge him. (deleted) In Dac's case, he just gave up and defected."
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A week after Tet, the Communist Party line took a significant swerve. Tet, instead of being a "once-in-a-thousand-years" opportunity became "a phase of the general offensive--not a battle that lasts some two or three days. We should be aware that this is a general offensive launched to win final victory in the shortest period of time, which may, however, be three or four months."
But, three or four months later was the May offensive--and the majority of their troops did not even reach the major urban centers. After that failure, the Party instructions began blaming the local cadre for misinterpreting exactly what the Party had said that Tet was the decisive hour."
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As always, the Party was right, but the cadre had misinterpreted the policy.
In the Party's assessments of the May offensive, a captured document read:
"We still did not sharply and profoundly assimilate the basic lines of the Party's policy and strategic determination. We did not fully understand the characteristics of the new phase. From the basic assumption that the general offensive/general uprising was a 'one blow affair' to the realization that it was a phase of operations, there was a tendency to consider it as a (deleted) protracted struggle and a failure to view it as a phase of continuous offensives and uprisings which require a positive urgency in gaining success every hour and every minute."
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Documents by the basketful have since been captured indicating a drop in Communist morale among troops and cadre and sharp criticisms from superior headquarters about the "waverings and hesitancies" of unit commanders. The Party has sought to counteract this drop in effectiveness with some of the most intensive indoctrination sessions of the war--which may be interpreted as a (unintelligible) sign of weakness in hopes of regaining the confidence of the low-echelon fighters. Significantly, also, the Communist troops have been forbidden to listen to Allied radio broadcasts--because of the (deleted) reports of Allied victories and the news of the Paris peace talks. Those senior cadre who need to listen to (deleted) Allied broadcasts for their missions are required to listen with earphones so that others do not overhear the news.
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Now, the Communists have announced that the third offensive into the cities has begun--but it is so weak that they are now saying this is only the "first phase off the third offensive." The inability to attack Saigon vigorously in August (because the Allies captured the battle plan) has caused their political stock to go down. The pro-Communist sympathizers in Saigon are "depressed and one the defensive," one informed source explained. Some supports have fled to Paris. "The Saigon people are (deleted) bored about of hearing about the third wave into the (deleted) capital." One Vietnamese explained. "It was supposed to come in August--and they were to weak to get here. Now we will just believe the third offensive when it actually comes to Saigon."
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During Tet, the greatest Communist military success came in Hue, which they held partially held for 25 days. But, that was their greatest political setback. The political shockwaves of (deleted) the Communist (deleted) massacres in Hue spread throughout Vietnam (deleted) in a (deleted) miniaturized version of the world's reaction to the Russian invasion of Czeckoslovakia.
One Vietnamese political source from Hue described the typical reaction of the Vietnamese:
"When the Communists first moved into Hue, they were very nice and (deleted) polite to the people. They thought they would hold the city. (deleted) When they knew they could not hold it and would have to retreat, they started mass executions and even burying people alive. They carried alot of killing--and not just to those person who deserved to be killed. They were not selective. Before that, people believed that the Communists said--but after the Hue (deleted) massacres, the people became disillusioned with them.
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"Before the Communists had promised the people they would be treated nicely, that they could continue their jobs, that those who cooperated with them would be welcomed, that those who had been sitting on the fence would be welcomed. The people believed them--because the Communist policy was always to base their military actions on the people's support. The Communists had promised the government soldiers who defected to their side would be welcomed--but instead those that did were treated like government spies, (deleted) given indoctrination sessions.
"Now, the (deleted) Communists (deleted) are rocketing and attacking of the cities. It shows they don't care about the people. The Communists explained that they were rocketing (unintelligible) government buildings and offices--but when they miss the target all the time and hit the innocent people, it means their weapons aren't accurate enough and they don't care about the people. And they (deleted) throw in ground battalions to attack the cities--not to capture it any more, but just to destroy it.
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"So, how can we believe the Communists any more? They kept telling us this was a war of liberation, but here the North Vietnamese troops were standing in the houses of the people of Hue. They told us that the National Liberation Front was the sole and genuine representative of the South Vietnamese people--and (deleted) then they set up their Alliance for Peace which is also supposed to represent the people of Hue. And besides, they told us there would be a truce at Tet--and instead they destroyed the whole city of Hue."
(Hank: I've cancelled my Long An trip and will try to do an analysis of the Tayninh battle--but I doubt that I can send (deleted) it fast. (deleted) I probably will not file Friday or Saturday, unless I get my requested interviews about Tayninh. Regards Bev).
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Date
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1968, Sep. 11
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Subject
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Mặt trận dân tộc giải phóng miền nam Việt Nam; Vietnam War, 1961-1975--Mass media and the war; Public opinion
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Location
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Saigon, South Vietnam
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Coordinates
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10.8231; 106.6311
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Size
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20 x 26 cm
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Format
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dispatches
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Collection Number
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MS 363
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Collection Title
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Beverly Deepe Keever, Journalism Papers
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Creator
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Keever, Beverly Deepe
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Copyright Information
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These images are for educational use only. To inquire about usage or publication, please contact Archives & Special Collections.
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Publisher
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Archives & Special Collections, University of Nebraska-Lincoln Libraries
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Language
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English