First article about credibility gaps in South Vietnam

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derivative filename/jpeg
363-05340 to 363-05355.pdf
Digital Object Identifier
363-05340 to 363-05355
Title
First article about credibility gaps in South Vietnam
Description
Original title: "credibility", Keever's Title: "Washington has New In-House Credibility Gap", Article draft about the lack of credibility from the White House in Vietnam, for the Chrisitian Science Monitor, page 1-16
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Draft transcripts were automatically generated via Google Document AI and are currently under review. Please report significant errors to Archives & Special Collections at archives@unl.edu.
Transcript
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credibility 1 (normass/deepe)
(This is the first of two-part series on the proliferation of credibility gaps in South Vietnam. The second article discusses the Communist chasm).
SAIGON, SEPTEMBER 11--Washington has a new credibility gap. It is as significant as the old one between the American government and the American people. This new one is "in-house"--Washington leaders no longer accept as realistic the up-in-the-clouds assessments from American officials in Saigon about (deleted) what is happening on the (deleted) ground in Vietnam.
This may be a pivotal gap, for as the Administration changes Presidents in Washington, the American leadership may be induced to make more political concessions (deleted) for peace than the Communist strength on the ground deserves--or in reverse, it may demand more (deleted) concessions from the Communists than the Allied strength on the ground warrants. This gap is deep and wide, but it may be bridge-able.
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credibility 2 (normass/deepe)
Compared to Washington's, however, the Communist credibility gap is more of a canyon. It exists within its own hierarchy, within international diplomatic circles and between the Communists and the South Vietnamese people. If President Johnson's problem is evaluating (deleted) his top-secret reports from Saigon, the essential Communist problem revolves around their low-ranking commissars and troops no longer believing in the (deleted) Communist Party leadership--which is the fountainhead of wisdom and (deleted) infallibility on their side. If the Communist Party leadership is not maintaining the trust of its cadre and troops, then (deleted) it will have--and (deleted) is having--difficulty in gaining the trust of the South Vietnamese people, whom they are attempting to woo as supporters. Diplomatically, the verbal games the Communist negotiators played in Paris on the presence of North Vietnamese troops in the South did nothing to enhance their credibility here--especially when some Saigon (deleted) housewives had even heard the Northern accents of the Hanoi troopers in Saigon when they assaulted the city in the past.
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(deleted)
Because these credibility gaps, and their predecessors, are un-bridged, the chain-reaction result has been the great aerial leap into the absurdities of the Vietnam war itself. This, in turn, has precipitated the pirouetting plunge towards peace.
One Vietnam-based American official explained the current American problem this way:
"We (Americans in Vietnam) have a helluva problem of (deleted) credibility--and our problem is in-house. The American officials here have reported too much optimism for (deleted) too long--and maybe they reported what they (deleted) thought was honest--and then suddenly (deleted) when Tet hit (the Communist offensive into the cities in January)(deleted), even Washington (deleted) began to wonder what was happening out here. This becomes a consideration in the future.
The old Vietnam Hand continued:
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"I've visited Washington seven times since 1962. The first six times Washington thought things were much better on the ground in Vietnam than I did from working here. But, I was just back recently for my seventh visit, and for the first time Washington (deleted) thinks the situation is worse out here than I do. But, if you look at the internal situation in South Vietnam now, I think there is more reason (deleted) for the Allies to be optimistic right now than at any time since 1962. The main thing is that before time was a weapon the Communists always used. Time is on our side. I see no need for (deleted) any American concessions right now because (deleted) the South Vietnamese are becoming increasingly stronger vis-a-vis the enemy. The longer the wait, the better off we are. Of course, I ignore the great public demand for peace--and this is a factor to be weighed too."
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This "in-house" credibility gap is known to be of concern to both Washington and Saigon-based American officials. Steps have been made to look into it. A (deleted) six-month, classified study of the whole (deleted) official reporting system is now underway--delving, not so much into the content or accuracy of the reports, but the volume and flow of them. Some senior Americans here concede that the sheer numbers of reports to be read each day prevents them from doing (deleted) other important aspects of their job. ("If I leave my office for two hours, I'm (deleted) flooded with reports," one said). Also, at the district and provincial levels, (deleted) American captains and young foreign service workers complain about being (deleted) ordered to ferret out so much information they can't do much else. One American provincial advisory staff of 17 members took a picture of all the (deleted) computer card reports they were asked to compile in a month. (deleted) The hundreds of (deleted) computer cards, stapled end to end obscured the whole American team standing shoulder-to-shoulder in the (deleted) picture. (deleted) "Turn off the machines!" was the response from Saigon.
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Another step being taken to bridge this credibility gap is the influx of visitors from Washington, including the White House. (deleted) Some very disquieting face-downs are known to have occurred in private between them and the Saigon-based Americans. The visitors (deleted) contended the official reports from Saigon do not match their individual on-the-spot assessments of the situation on the ground. The Saigon-based Americans counter-attack by vociferously defending their official writings. Many Saigonese are known to regard these visitors from Washington as "seven-day-wonders" who come to Vietnam with pro-conceived (deleted) notions and pre-cooked solutions. They spend a week or so traveling to the non-war areas of the country, they do not speak Vietnamese, and then they (deleted) pretend to be instant experts making infallible assessments for White House consumption.
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Between these two sets of officials seems to be move the underlying fear by the Saigonese that Washington is going to (deleted) concede too much in Paris--thus wiping out their efforts in fighting the war--while the Washington officials fear officially-reported progress has been exaggerated, that the whole American war effort is bogged down in the quagmire and that (deleted) concessions to get effect (deleted) an exit are in order.
Since journalists and other non-officials do not have access to the classified message traffic between (deleted) Saigon and Washington, the accuracy of the official reports at this time can not be judged. But, it can safely be said that official reporting has been a constant problem, involving a maze of multi-colored facets. (deleted) Some of these problems have become public knowledge here years after the event, although they were classified at the time of the happening.
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It is now known that in the early years of the war, important parts of the official reports were based on almost total lies. For example, in 1962, the orders from the General Paul D. Harkins, then commander of the American military here, to all his (deleted) subordinates were that no matter how many Viet Cong there were on the ground, there would be no more than 25,000 in official American reports. And, that was that, even though the Viet Cong were obviously (deleted) mushrooming in strength.
In other cases, high-level officers, even generals, have access to factual information on major projects, but are unwilling to (deleted) recognize them and rectify the situation. Again, in 1962, the semi-independent Rand "think-tank" agency, (deleted) contracted by the U.S. government, sent a Vietnamese-speaking American to look into the pilot project of the Vietnamese government's (deleted) strategic hamlet program (the forerunner of the pacification program). He found the government's action deplorable. The government was forcing the peasants to build their bamboo-fence defenses at a time when they worked on their tobacco fields--the village's cash crop. The villagers were not reimbursed for their bamboo, which went into the defense network, and bamboo was also a cash crop. Furthermore, government district officials, in their haste to catch up with statistical requirements of (deleted) building strategic hamlets, loaded the villages onto a truck at dawn and brought them back at dark to work on another village's defense.
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The American Rand analysist briefed General Harkins on this and warned that unless corrective action was taken the whole government program would fail. The General reportedly said, "Thank you;" no corrective action was taken--and the program failed 18 months later.
This is not unlike the current complaints of young Vietnamese-speaking American civilian officials who find the reports (deleted) they write from the provinces being discarded or toned down by their (deleted) superiors. The present (deleted) American organization for Provincial Reports is now a (deleted) civilian-military (deleted) amalgam, with the more junior civilians submitting their reports to senior military officers. Recently, one responsible for evaluations of provinces and provincial programs, supported by American funds and supplies, explained:
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"I just came back from a trip to the provinces, and since I speak Vietnamese I found out alot of dirt. It was a wrote (deleted) pessimistic report and handed it into my superior, an Army colonel. He started slashing out the pessimism.
"That's the way the Army works. It is very conservative; there's alot more careerism involved in the Army than there is professionalism. It doesn't help any colonel's career not to be able to show progress in his section--but that's not professionalism. Everyone recognizes (deleted) it's the Army's way of doing things--it is grotesquely bureaucratic you have to (deleted) affix so (deleted) tabs and resumes before the report moves up the ladder. Because the (deleted) military officers always like to show and dilute pessimism, there was always supposed to be a civilian in charge of our section--but now they've moved in this army colonel.
"I'm fed up with the whole system, but it doesn't bother me any more. I just bootleg my reports around my boss and hand it to a civilian superior to him."
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In another case, a junior (deleted) civilian officer working in a district cautioned one of his civilian (deleted) superiors in Saigon: "Whenever the American captain in our district writes a report and says there is a 'minor problem' done down here, just be advised he really means it is a 'major problem.' His attitude is he doesn't want any major problems in his district--and he's not going to report there are any."
Not only is the credibility gap evident between (deleted) Washington and Saigon. It also exists between Saigon and the provinces, and (deleted) between the provinces, and the (deleted) subordinate districts within it.
One non-government American contracted for a study by the American government recently concluded a country-wide (deleted) trip through Vietnam.
"I was appalled," he explained. "I found a great deal of bitterness and pessimism among the (deleted) Americans (deleted) at the lowest-levels in the field. They don't think their immediate superiors in the field or Saigon is doing anything to straighten out our (ital) problems. Even at the province level, the American officials live in big villas and the problems in the province look different than they do from huts in the villages and district towns.
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"One night my colleague and I visited the big spook in the province (senior American Central Intelligence Agency official). Here he was in this nice air-conditioned villa telling us that the American Marines had just killed a high-ranking Viet Cong leader, (deleted) when they could have captured him and the CIA would have (deleted) squeezed him for (deleted) good information. Well, (deleted) my mouth dropped a mile and I thought my colleague would hit the guy.
"Because we had just talked with the specific Marine unit he was referring to. In fact, the Marines discovered the Viet Cong unit hiding in a tunnel in the village; when discovered the Viet Cong opened fire and four Marines and Popular Forces were killed in the barrage. Then, the Hoi Chanh (ex-Viet Cong) operating with the Marins got into an hour-long shouting match with the Viet Cong in the tunnel, ordering and pleading with them to come out--and finally swearing with them. The Viet Cong (deleted) weren't going to surrender--they told the Marines to go to hell--and the Marines had no choice but to rout them out. And they fought to the last man. But, the CIA (deleted) spook in the provincial headquarters didn't know any of this."
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In addition, one significant change has resulted in the official release of military information to the Saigon press corps--and this has also (deleted) affected the tone of (deleted) news dispatches sent from (deleted) here. Which the changeover in command from General Westmoreland, General Creighton W. Abrams has ordered a very conservative, cautious assessment to be officially released here. His orders include making no predictions, no optimism, maximizing probability, a very narrow limits to interpretation of past events--and no politically (deleted) partisan comments or implications in (deleted) statements from any officials. In effect, he reversed the Westmoreland era of optimism, if not euphoria, and the era of wooing the Saigon press corps. Abrams view is the Saigon press are a nuisance, should be ignored--if anything the press corps can woo him. But, instead of (deleted) courtship, he is magnifying confusion; he is trying to bridge the credibility gap by talking in circles--and it doesn't work.
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Washington's current credibility gap is simply the fledging offspring of the grand-daddy one that developed during the Tet crisis early this year.
(deleted)
"Since Tet, Washington is awfully reluctant to accept reports and assessments from the field," one American official here explained, (deleted) referring to Vietnam. "Who can blame them? General Westmoreland went to Washington in November and told the government and the American people we were winning the war and (deleted) and we could begin withdrawing American troops in a year. Then, three mot months later, President Johnson gets slapped across the mouth with the Communist Tet offensive into the cities."
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But, one American official from Washington justified Westmoreland's expression of optimum optimism last fall.
"That was a magnificant P. R. (public relations) campaign by Westmoreland," he explained. "He was creating a light at the end of the tunnel--we were winning the American boys would be coming home. The real significance of the Communist Tet offensive was it shattered (deleted) the tunnel and snuffed out the light at the end of it.
"But, now we're building another light at the end of the tunnel-- (President (deleted) Nguyen Van) Thieu is an active, fighting leader, (Prime Minister Tran Van) Huong has (deleted) an image of Confucianist purity and (deleted) honesty, the Vietnamese are carrying (deleted) more and more of their share of the war and are doing it well. And, the American boys can start coming (deleted) home. That's the new light at the end of the tunnel."
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On the South Vietnamese side, however, President Thieu and his government has a credibility gap in the ultimate. (deleted) When Thieu took over power a year ago, he (deleted) inherited a state of incredibility--the Vietnamese people had been promised (deleted) so much and seen no results in the rapid (deleted) succession of governments, they no longer believe the government and in fact, expect little from it in the way of performance (deleted). President Thieu's problem is not simply bridging the (deleted) credibility gap, but creating (deleted) credibility faster than (deleted) his own government destroys it. (deleted) His gap is also (deleted) bridge-able, the bridge should be built with urgency, but it probably will not be for a long time.
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Date
1968, Sep. 11
Subject
Vietnam War, 1961-1975--United States; Vietnam War, 1961-1975--Mass media and the war; Public opinion
Location
Saigon, South Vietnam
Coordinates
10.8231; 106.6311
Size
20 x 26 cm
Container
B10, F39
View Folder in ArchivesSpace
Format
dispatches
Collection Number
MS 363
Collection Title
Beverly Deepe Keever, Journalism Papers
Creator
Keever, Beverly Deepe
Copyright Information
These images are for educational use only. To inquire about usage or publication, please contact Archives & Special Collections.
Publisher
Archives & Special Collections, University of Nebraska-Lincoln Libraries
Language
English