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derivative filename/jpeg
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363-05119 to 363-05137.pdf
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Digital Object Identifier
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363-05119 to 363-05137
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Title
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Article about the American position going into the Paris Peace Talks
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Description
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Original title: "abrams", Keever's title: "As Boming Halt Looms, Gen. Abrams Shows Allies' Domination(?) of the Battlefield", Article draft about the American position going into the Paris Peace Talks, for the Christian Science Monitor, page 1 -18. Starts with a note from Keever to her editor for following article, page 1. The note largely adresses the importance of the article and points out the ways that Abrams and the Pentagon did not have the same perspective on peace.
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AI Usage Disclosure
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Draft transcripts were automatically generated via Google Document AI and are currently under review. Please report significant errors to Archives & Special Collections at archives@unl.edu.
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Transcript
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zcze sag
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editorial note 1 (normans/deepe)
SAIGON, OCTOBER 21-Hank:
On October 11-five days before peace
on background only
flurry broke,-I interviewed General Abrams and a name number of his
senior staff people.
Baby
all,
se serialize it.
It's more
I'm filing heavily on it and
hope you can use it beentiel, though perhaps you'll want to
Releva
reporting if it is run
although it will hold up no matter what happens on
as soon as possible,
the peace front.
I think it is very important to run the whole thing as a sort of
official, for-the-record pieco of the state of the whole war at this
exact moment and we should run as many of the quotes as possible to pin
it down. The reason is that there are differences of interpretation already
between the Pentagon and Saigon command viewpoints-differences of nuances-
but all of these i will take on controversy,
if not in the political
Gmp campaign, at least in any hit historical balance sheet.
Alot of this, such as pages twelve to fourteen, may seen as ach obscure
Revolves
and irrelevant but in fact it is this complexity that the war is nod
about. So, I hope you can run it all-though I know you've got alot of
other things in the paper. To the best of my knowledge,
last interview with Abrams Inc.
then
this was the
before the peace flurry and I suspect it
will be his last for awhile dr because everything now is too
political.
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abrams 1 (normass/deepe)
SOUN
SAIGON, OCTOBER 21-If Hanoi agrees to begin serious peace
talks on
ending the war in South Vietnam, the Allies will be dealing from a position
of considerable military strenth.
Any single bouquet for this stance of
Will. An
strength would probably go to General Creighton Abrams, the humble American
confidently
commander here, who confidently describes in war situation in the
picturesque language of the foxhole G. I.
What General Abrams and his command has done, with assists from
other Allied en troops,
jex has been to tip the military situation in
the South considerably in favor of the Allies. Perhaps the Communists,
to the
as the
world waits for their answer Allied peace-package proposals, now ponder this
AS WELL AS
та
TA
alongith the caution of Mao Tse-tung, when he wrote: "One can not win
at the conference
e table what has been lost on the battlefield."
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abrams 2 (normass/depe)
Or, in line with Hanoi's announced doctrine of "fighting while
negotiating", the Communists now face the problem that their fighting has
floundered and hence their negotiating stance is currently wobbly.
If Hanoi does not agree to being begin negotiations for peace in the
South, thefr its most probably option is to protract the war and the
Wait for
agony-but at a reduced level-as it continues to gamble on Allied concessions
D
The
from the sheer frustration and heartbreak of contining the war.
Communist Chinese have reportedly been uring urging Hanoi to protract the
while the Soviet Union is supposedly urging the North Vietnamese to
war,
negotiate for peace.
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abrams (normass/deepe)
As the world watches Vietnam dangle breathlessly--almost helplessly-
FIN
*between the beginnings of peace or the prospects of more war, the battlefield
situation takes on a potentially new dimension-the convertibility of a
mym strong military posture in South Vietnam into political bargaining
power at the conference table.
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abrams 4 (normass/deepe)
The prevailing American military viewpo8 viewpoint-currently as well
as before
last week's peace moves-was that the battlefield in South
Vietnam was the decisive pivot point, with the Paris peace talks only
reflecting this situation.
"I believe if we do well here, the Paris peace talks will take care
of themselves," one senior American officer said. "What happens in Paris
won't have anything to do with what those fellas say. What's most
important the most critical thing is hat goes on in South Vietnam. I
just think that's what it's all about."
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Re
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abrams 5 (no mass/deepe)
But,
the impact of political developments in America itself, including
the Presidential campaign and election--upon which the decisions of Paris pivot-
are far more indiscernice discerni indiscernible to General Abrams'
command here.
"I struggle to understand this thing here," the cigar-chomping general
JETNAM-
"I da really don't know (about events in the
told a military associate.
United States). I know there are problems in the United States and alot
of things are said about the war here. I've been trying to understand it.
But, which way it will go-I'm not up to that level. I do know it is important
for our government to do the best job we can here.
persevere and make progress in what the government is trying to do, the rest
If we can persevere
of that will have to take care of itself. I'm not sloughing this off-it's
just beyond us here."
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abrams
6 (normass/deepe)
The following are the other highlights of the way General Abrams
and his command looks at the war in South Vietnam.
First, while others xx are talking of Communist deekerbe
de-escalation and military restraint, the American command here believes that the
dur
L
to
Communist military effort in 1968 will be "fairly prodigious."
will
To date in 1968,
North Vietnamese infiltration into the South is greater than at that in the
four preceding years. In the first nine months of 1968, the secondary
explosions caused by American bombing of Communist war supplies in the
panhandle of North Vietnam is four and a half times greater than in the
comparable period last year. The same time-comparison of second explosions
in South Vietnam shows a five-fold increase.
Allied troops in the South
captured between five and sixteen times the number of Communist weapons, artillery,
rockets, TNT and food supplies in a caches to date in 1968 than they did in a
the comparable period last year. American casualties in 1968 are already
exceed all the losses of 1967 and the Communist and Vietnamese government
losses are even more severe.
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abrams 7 (normass/deepe)
"These figures aren't much in themselves," a senior American officer
explained. "But, they dix do
paint reliably a canvas of all-out
military effort by the North Vietnamese in 1968."
Second, the Communist military capabilities have been significantly
reduced in the past several months, and it "I would guess it would be
several months into 1969 before the enemy can really muster the wherewithal"
General Abrams has reported to
to launch another massive offensive,
his close associates.
The Massachussetts-born general, who recommended
to President Johnson against an unconditional halt of the American bombing
of the North,, adrie admits that there are "enough supplies in North Vietnam
America
to sink the place," but as long as the homin aerial and naval gunfire
missions continue north of the demam demilitarized zone, the Communists
are unable to shuttle them into tham northern half of South
Vietnam fast enough,
Military supplies into the South southern half of
the South-from the Saigon area southwards are considered by military
sources to funnel in from Cambodia, although pro-American diplomats
who visit Cambodia are skeptical that such enormous shipments could actually
be trans-shipped or tu truoked through Cambodia.
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abrams 8 (normass/deepe)
The main problem of the North North Vietnamese is the quality
of its manpower; with the present rate 1968 rate of infiltration equally
equalling the sum of the previous four years, it seems certain that the
Northax Vietnamese have delved into their older and younger age groups. Also,
perhaps as significantly, "the Communist training base andmandman has
been pulled down (to the south) to make this surge effort," a senior
officer explained,
and this affects the quantity of
quality of
both their officer corps and ordinary rifleman.
The manpower problem could be expected to have "A "an accumulative"
effect in time, "an accumulative effect," and if the bombing over the
North is continued, then "I think the possibility exists that we'll
have created the circumstances that the enemy himself will see he's on
the bad side of the equation," General Abrams has reportedly been telling
his staff officers.
นาย ทวง
No one seems certain here what happens if the bombing if ha is halted-
and a whole new equation develops.
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abrams 9 (normass/deepe)
Third, "we do not repeat not have a scrap of evidence, as General
Abrams reportedly told a staff officer--that the Communists have given
up or modified his 10 their plans for their first mode lest cummer
for his concerted Third Phase drive strategie offensive into South Vietnam's
That is not repeat not to say that the Communist might
urban areas.
never will change this strategy,
Abrams cautioned the staff officer,
"but the enemy's decision madó to go into the Phase Three of doctrinel
approach has not ropeat not yet been changed... The wer now has shifted gears
in terms of what the enemy has been able to do--but not repeat not in
terms of what he is trying to do...*
"As we've dealed with this more and more," Abrano s
told the officer,
confidently
"ra'yo become increasingly effective and the enemy
now has less capability of gaining a ty anything, including a
phys anything psychologically significant."
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abrams 10 (normass/deepe)
Fourth, much of Gee General Abramsauce success in the past several
since May has been, as he told a briefing officer, keeping the Communists
off-balance so that themem their carefully-planned battles
become "just a bad dream that never happened." The general has done this
EXPANDING
by crapading the whole spectrume of anti-Communist warfare in Vietnam.
Allied troops are now endeavoring to fight-with remarkable, localized
successes the multi-fast facets of the Communist military organization.
conventionally
This means fighting the contentionally-structured regiments and battalions-
where General Abrams' predecessor, General William C. Westmoreland,placed
Almost all
Allied emphasis to the small, hometown guerrilla bands and even the
unarmed political cadre.ndmamganthnum
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abrams 11 (normass/deepe)
By doing so,, General Abrams has raised the possibility that the
Communists may be faced with a strategio dilemma. This dilemna was
bruslely tersely summarized by a hard-charging Marine general along the
demilitarized, "If the Communist main force regiments and battalions
come down to meet us, we'll bash them again as we have before; but,
if the main force stay up in the hills, we're going to pick up the
Communist infrastructure."
This whole basio shift in the deployment of Allied troops to fight
part-time guer organized units part-time guerrillas and Communist village
chiefs as well as the organized units involves the most complicated
part of the this unorthodos unorthodox kind of war.
But, General Abrams explained it to his senior command troop
commanders in the field this way:
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abrams 12 (normass/deepe)
with the outcome of this war.
Some
"The bodycount (of dead Communist troops) does not have much to do
of the things I do think important
imam on the enemy side is that we must at pre-empt or defeat his
major military operations and second, we've a got to eliminate or
neutral or render ineffective the major portion of his infrastructure
andhis guerrillas and his infrastructure--that whole political, administrative
and para-military structure on which his whole movement depends.
"The North Vietnamese personnel and units are totally dependent
on this for their existence as well as their military operations.
neutralize
It is
far far more significant that we neutralist one thousand of these uge
guerrillas and infrastructure than that killing ten thousand North
Vietnamese soldiers. It is kind of like if they're going to attack
Saigon with the 9th Division Communist Division, one of the first things
they have to do is to havextinxima
go anhead ahead and
establish liaison with their distriot and provincial committees and arrage
in turn
who arrange for their porters and guides and then they have to build
command bunkers to run their operations from when they know they'll be under
air attack. They have to set up their dispensaries and establish chac
20:
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abrams 13 (normass/deepe)
They have to set up their dispensaries and establish caches of
weapons so that when the assault troops arrive all that's there to sustain
them for ten of or fifteen days. After all those arragome arrangements
are compes completed, then and only then-are the real fighters brought in.
So you should not rpe repeat not wait for for those arregemen arrangements
so there is a big battle. You've got to go out and break up his
commend bunkers and these things.
"In the Pineapple Plantation (a long-time, well-known Communist base
area less than 20 miles from Saigon), we found a 4000-bed hospital,
complete with refrigeration and whole blood. There were 3500 bunkers
there and 1000 of them had twentyf two-feet of concrete on top (for
protection against airstrikes and artillery).
Well,
"Well, this isn't any monkey business-this is for real. These thes
things were not repeat not built in one night. So, you should go out
and work against them and find them--that's just as mais important
as defeating a Communist battalion, in fact it is more important, because it
never winds up in a big battle with alot destruction and with these fellas
getting in with the villagers. It's just a bad dream that never happened."
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abrams 14 (normass/deepe)
The general then explains that the Communist logistical system
is not efficient enough to allow them to resupply directly from North
Her
Vietnam or Cambodia during a sustained battle, and so they have to rely
on pre-placed caches from which they can get fresh supplces supplies during
"Eis "The Communists are committed
as the battle progresses.
to this system," he explains to his senior officers. "It's an
inflexibility fam that exists for them. It's not bad--that is just
the way they have to do in things and they can not do it any other way."
I's description acantily P.Npoints.
the general's docy
operations
sotien since May,
the general had uos0110ed the whole system of Allied
when day after day the troops exploded Communist
bunkers and uncovered rice and weapons caches. This in turn has prevented
ANY
the Communists from launching the with much sucess success their
August third-wave offensive against major urban centers.
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abrams 15 (normass/deepe)
AS
But,
A
if the war turns into a big Easter-egg hunt for Allied troops
hunting out Communist bunkers and caches-ty then iem
aren't the Allies just tj running faster and faster to stay on a
treadmill,
he was asked by one officer.
ReportIDLY.
"No," General Abrams replies
D.
"I think we've to to go beyond
We have to do that selectively-
H
smashing up the enemy's main force units.
but the way to get off the treadmill is to get after the infrastructure and
his guerrillas.
for the population;
We get alot of side benefits from that-more security
more support for the Vietnamese government; a little
economic growth and a little more stuff farm stuff going to market.
Fifth,
General Abrams is encouraged by the progress the Vietnamese
Armed Forces is making; there is also an increasing trend in the field
for combined American-Vietnamese operations. He notes that some American
units even elite ones like the airborne-prefer to go on operations with the
rag-tag Regional and Popular Forces, the low-paid troops who know tge the
local areas. While the Americans act as a catylist catalyst for the
The Vietnamese to grow in confere confidence,
they also more significantly
get the Vietnamese faster reaction from American gunships, medical evaculati
evacuation gunah helicopters and artillery.
the Vietnamese troops simply have a better knack than American one in finding
And,
American commanders admit
caches.
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abrams 16 (normass/deepe)
The American command says that since August 17-when the Communist
third-wave offensive began and then fizzled-the Vietnamese armed forces
accounted for fifty one per cent of the Communist casualties and they
themselves suffered 62 per cent of all Allied casualties.
"While I don't believe in bodyoount," General Abrams told an off
a senior officer,
Vietnamese forces.
"this does show the degree of participation of the
hmmmm The Vietnamese xx have been getting out where
the enemy was, so this is a good indicator. We have to build on that.
not home yet--but it's a good mark."
We're
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abrams 17 (normnas/deepe)
The withdrawal of American troops from a Vietan is at least
officially-linked directly to the progross the Vietnamese ermed forces
makes to take over the anti-Communist war. Despite all sorts of political
by politicians and politico-gcnerals in Washington
estimates of when Amorican troops and begin the withdrawal, by General
Abrams and the American command it refuses to issue any timetable pred
estifters "It'st just a question of how successful wo are in pushing
the enemy down and & the Vietnamese armed forces up," one sonior officer
explained.
we've already taken one small, insignificant
step when we recommended that armored squadron from the United States
not rp repeat not to be sont over here and instead we recommended only
the equipment be cont. It's a small, admittedly small stena passive
it isn't sending troops home, but it is em aimed at the same thing."
steps
"In a sense,
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abrams 18 (normass/deepe)
Clore Associate.
When one afte
General Abrams if he was worried that American
troops would be withdrawa withdrawn according to a political timetable,
rather than when the Vietnamese armed forces were militarily prepared to
the mirt general reportedly answered:
take over,
"I have to worry about it, that's right, or I have to think about it,
but I'm not worried about it. Because I have to say since I've had this job,
the government has not done one damn thing to constrain mo. I the govERNI
have to live with the limits that always existed here. But, it
hasn't done one thing to constrain me or to mucker up what we have
to do and have been doing.
"Basically, I have alot of confidence in the government I'm working
for. I just think it's going to be that way. All these thinks things
lurk in the background. I'm enough of a realist to know that that things
could happen in our country to change things here.
But I don't see it
as some thing tl imminent."
END
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Date
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1968, Oct. 21
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Subject
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Vietnam War, 1961-1975--Peace; Abrams, Creighton W. (Creighton Williams), 1914-1974; Vietnam War, 1961-1975--United States; Peace treaties
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Location
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Saigon, South Vietnam
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Coordinates
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10.8231; 106.6311
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Size
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20 x 26 cm
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Container
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B10, F39
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Format
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dispatches
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Collection Number
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MS 363
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Collection Title
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Beverly Deepe Keever, Journalism Papers
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Creator
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Keever, Beverly Deepe
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Copyright Information
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These images are for educational use only. To inquire about usage or publication, please contact Archives & Special Collections.
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Publisher
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Archives & Special Collections, University of Nebraska-Lincoln Libraries
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Language
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English
