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derivative filename/jpeg
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363-05119 to 363-05137.pdf
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Digital Object Identifier
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363-05119 to 363-05137
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Title
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Article about the American position going into the Paris Peace Talks
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Description
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Original title: "abrams", Keever's title: "As Boming Halt Looms, Gen. Abrams Shows Allies' Domination(?) of the Battlefield", Article draft about the American position going into the Paris Peace Talks, for the Christian Science Monitor, page 1 -18. Starts with a note from Keever to her editor for following article, page 1. The note largely adresses the importance of the article and points out the ways that Abrams and the Pentagon did not have the same perspective on peace.
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AI Usage Disclosure
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Draft transcripts were automatically generated via Google Document AI and are currently under review. Please report significant errors to Archives & Special Collections at archives@unl.edu.
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Transcript
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(deleted)
editorial note 1 (normass/deepe)
SAIGON, OCTOBER 21--Hank: On October 11--five days before peace flurry broke,--I interviewed General Abrams on background only and a (deleted) number of his senior staff people. (deleted) I'm filing heavily on it and hope you can use it (deleted) all, though perhaps you'll want to (deleted) serialize it. It's more (deleted) relevant if it is run (deleted) as soon as possible, although it will hold up no matter what happens on the peace front.
I think it is very important to run the whole thing as a sort of official, for-the-record piece (deleted) on the state of the whole war at this exact moment--and we should run as many of the quotes as possible to pin it down. The reason is that there are differences of interpretation already between the Pentagon and Saigon command viewpoints--differences of nuances--but all of these will take on controversy, if not in the political campaign, at least in (deleted) any historical balance sheet. Alot of this, such as pages twelve to fourteen, may seem (deleted) obscure and irrelevant--but in fact it is this complexity that the war (deleted) revolves around. So, I hope you can run it all--though I know you've got alot of other things in the paper. To the best of my knowledge, this was the last interview with Abrams Inc. before the peace flurry--and I suspect it will be their last for awhile (deleted) because everything now is too political.
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abrams 1 (normass/deepe)
SAIGON, OCTOBER 21--If Hanoi Soun agrees to begin serious peace talks on ending the war in South Vietnam, the Allies will be dealing from a position of considerable military strength. Any single bouquet for this stance of strength would probably go to General Creighton Williams Abrams, the humble American commander here, who confidently and cogently describes (deleted) the war situation in the picturesque language of the foxhole G.I.
What General Abrams and his command has done, with major assets from other Allied troops, has been to tip the military situation in the South considerably in favor of the Allies. Perhaps the (deleted) North Vietnamese, as the world waits for their answer (deleted) to the Allied peace package proposals, now wonder this (deleted) as well as (deleted) Communist axiom, "One can not win at the conference table what has been lost on the battlefield."
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abrams 2 (normass/deepe)
Or, in line with Hanoi's announced doctrine of "fighting while negotiating", the Communists now face the problem that their fighting has floundered and hence their negotiating stance is currently wobbly.
If Hanoi does not agree to (deleted) begin negotiations for peace in the South, (deleted) its most probable option is to protract the war and the agony--but at a reduced level--as it continues to (deleted) wait for Allied concessions gained from the sheer frustration and heartbreak of continuing the war. The Communist Chinese have reportedly been (deleted) urging Hanoi to protract the war, while the Soviet Union is supposedly urging the North Vietnamese to negotiate for peace.
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abrams 3 (normass/deepe)
As the world watches Vietnam dangle breathlessly--almost helplessly--between the beginnings of peace and the prospects of more war, the battlefield situation takes on a potentially new dimension--the convertibility of a (deleted) strong military posture in South Vietnam into political bargaining power at the conference table.
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abrams 4 (normass/deepe)
The prevailing American military (deleted) viewpoint--currently as well as before last week's peace moves--was that the battlefield in South Vietnam was the decisive pivot point, with the Paris peace talks only reflecting this situation.
"I believe if we do well here, the Paris peace talks will take care of themselves," one senior American officer said. "What happens in Paris won't have anything to do with that those fellas say. What's most important--the most critical thing--is what goes on in South Vietnam. I just think that's what it's all about."
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abrams 5 (normass/deepe)
But, the impact of political developments in America itself, including the Presidential campaign and election--upon which the decisions of Paris pivot--far more (deleted) indiscernible to General Abrams' command here.
"I struggle to understand this thing here," the cigar-chomping general reportedly told a military associate. "I really don't know (about Vietnam-related events in the United States). I know there are problems in the United States and alot of things are said about the war here. I've been trying to understand it. But, which way will it go--I'm not up to that level. I do know it is important for our government to the best job we can here. If we can (deleted) persevere and make progress in what the government is trying to do, the rest of that will have to take care of itself. I'm not sloughing this off--it's just beyond us here."
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abrams 6 (normass/deepe)
The following are the other highlights of the way General Abrams and his command looks at the war in South Vietnam. First, while others are talking of Communist (deleted) short-range de-escalation and military restraint, the American command here believes that the Communist military effort during all of 1968 will turn out to be "fairly prodigious." To date in 1968, North Vietnamese infiltration into the South is greater than (deleted) all that in the four preceding years. In the first nine months of 1968, the secondary explosions caused by American bombing of Communist war supplies in the panhandle of North Vietnam is four and a half times greater than in the comparable period last year. The same time-comparison of second explosions in South Vietnam shows a five-fold increase. Allied troops in the South captured between five and sixteen times the number of Communist weapons, artillery, rockers, TNT and food supplies in caches to date in 1968 than they did in the comparable period last year. American casualties in 1968 are already exceed all the losses of 1967 and the Communist and Vietnamese government losses are even more severe.
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abrams 7 (normass/deepe)
"These figures aren't much in themselves," a senior American officer explained. "But, they (deleted) do paint reliably a canvas of all-out military effort by the North Vietnamese in 1968."
Second, the Communist military capabilities have been significantly reduced in the past several months, and it "I would guess it would be several months into 1969 before the enemy can really muster the wherewithal" to launch another massive offensive, General Abrams has reportedly to his close associates. The Massachussetts-born general, who recommended to President Johnson against an unconditional halt to the American bombing of the North, (deleted) admits that there are "enough supplies in North Vietnam to sink the place," but as long as the (deleted) American aerial and naval gunfire missions continue north of the (deleted) demilitarized zone, the Communists are unable to shuttle them into (deleted) the northern half of South Vietnam fast enough. Military supplies into the (deleted) southern half of the South--from the Saigon area southwards--are considered by American military sources to funnel in from Cambodia, although pro-American diplomats who visit Cambodia are skeptical that such enormous shipments could actually be trans-shipped or (deleted) trucked through Cambodia.
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abrams 8 (normass/deepe)
The main problem for the (deleted) North Vietnamese is the quality of its manpower; with the present rate 1968 rate of infiltration (deleted) equalling the sum of the previous four years, it seems certain that the North Vietnamese have delved into their older and younger age groups. Also, perhaps as significantly, "the Communist training base (deleted) has been pulled down (to the South) to make this surge effort," a senior officer explained. and this affects the (deleted) quality of both their officer corps and ordinary rifleman.
The manpower problem could be expected to have (deleted) "an accumulative effect," and if the bombing over the North is continued, then "I think the possibility exists that we'll have created the circumstances that the enemy himself will see he's on the bad side of the equation," General Abrams has reportedly been telling his staff officers. (deleted)
No one seems certain here what happens if the bombing if is halted--and a whole new equation develops.
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abrams 9 (normass/deepe)
Third, "we do not repeat not have a scrap of evidence,"--as General Abrams reportedly told a staff officer--that the communists have given up or modified (deleted) their plans (deleted) first made last summer for his concerted Third Phase (deleted) strategic offensive into South Vietnam's urban areas. That is not repeat not to say that the Communist (deleted) never will change this strategy, Abrams cautioned the staff officer, "but the enemy's decision (deleted) to go into the Phase Three of this doctrinal approach has not repeat not yet been changed... the war now has shifted gears in terms of what the enemy has been able to do--but not repeat not in terms of what he is trying to do....
"As we've dealed with this more and more," Abrans (deleted) confidently told the officer, "we've become increasingly effective and the enemy now has less capability of gaining (deleted) anything, including a (deleted) anything psychologically significant."
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abrams 10 (normass/deepe)
(deleted)
Fourth, much of (deleted) General Abramssucc success (deleted) since May has been, as he told a briefing officer, keeping the Communists off-balance so that (deleted) their carefully-planned battles become "just a bad dream that never happened." The general has done this by (deleted) expanding the whole spectrum of anti-Communist warfare in Vietnam. Allied troops are now endeavoring to fight--with remarkable, localized successes--the multi-(deleted) facets of the Communist military organization. This means fighting the (deleted) conventionally-structured regiments and battalions--where General Abrams' predecessor, General William C. Westmoreland, placed almost all Allied emphasis--to fighting the small, hometown guerrilla bands and even the unarmed political cadre. (deleted)
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abrams 11 (normass/deepe)
By doing so, General Abrams has raised the possibility that the Communist may be faced with a strategic dilemma. This dilemma was (deleted) tersely summarized by a hard-charging Marine general along the demilitarized zone (unintelligible): "If the Communist main force regiments and battalions come down to meet us, we'll bash them again as we have before; but if the main force stay up in the hills, we're going to upick up the (deleted) infrastructure."
This whole basic shift in the deployment of Allied troops to fight (deleted) part-time guerrillas and Communist village chiefs as well as the organized units involves the most complicated part of the this (deleted) unorthodox kind of war.
But, General Abrams explained it to his senior command troops commanders in the field this way:
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abrams 12 (normass/deepe)
"The bodycount (of dead Communist troops) does not have much to do with the outcome of this war. (deleted) Some of the things I do think important (deleted) on the enemy side is that first we must (deleted) pre-empt or defeat his major military operations and second, we've got to eliminate or neutral or render ineffective the major portion of his (deleted) guerrillas and his infrastructure--that whole political, administrative and para-military structure on which his whole movement depends.
"The North Vietnamese personnel and units are totally dependent on this for their existence as well as their military operations. It is (deleted) far more significant that we (deleted) neutralize one thousand of these (deleted) guerrillas and infrastructure than (deleted) killing ten thousand North Vietnamese soldiers. (deleted) If they're going to attack Saigon with the 9th Division Communist Division, one of the first things they have to do is (deleted) establish liaison with their district and provincial committees and (deleted) who in turn arrange for (deleted) porters and guides (deleted) and build command bunkers to run their operations from when they know they'll be under air attack. (deleted)
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abrams 13 (normass/deepe)
(Deleted) "This set up their dispensaries and establish caches of weapons so that when the assault troops arrive all (deleted) to sustain them for ten of or fifteen days. After all (deleted) arrangements are (deleted) completed then--and only then--are the real fighters brought in. So you should not repeat not wait for (deleted) those (deleted) arrangements so there is a big battle. You've got to go out and break up (deleted) command bunkers and these things.
"In the Pineapple Plantation (a long-time, well-known Communist base area less than 20 miles from Saigon), we found a 4000-bed hospital, complete with refrigeration and whole blood. There were 3500 bunkers there and 1000 of them had (deleted) two-feet of concrete on top (for protection against airstrikes and artillery). (deleted)
"Well, this isn't any monkey business--this is for real. These (deleted) things were not repeat not built in one night. So, you should go out and work against them and find them--that's just as (deleted) important as defeating a Communist battalion. In fact it is more important, because it never winds up in a big battle with alot destruction and with these fellas getting in with the villagers. It's just a bad dream that never happened."
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abrams 14 (normass/deepe)
The general then explains that the Communist logistical system is not efficient enough to allow them to resupply directly from North Vietnam or Cambodia during the sustained battle. (deleted) Here, they (deleted) must rely on pre-placed caches from which they can get fresh (deleted) supplies (deleted) as the battle progresses. (deleted) "The Communists are committed to this system," he explains to his senior officers. "It's an inflexibility (deleted) that exists for them. It's not bad--that is just the way they have to do (deleted) things and they can not do it any other way."
(deleted)
(deleted) The general's description accurately pinpoints the whole system of Allied (deleted) operations since May, when day after day the troops exploded Communist bunkers and uncovered rice and weapons caches. This in turn has prevented the Communists from launching (deleted) with (deleted) any success their August third-wave offensive against major urban centers.
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abrams 15 (normass/deepe)
But, if the war turns into a big Easter-egg hunt (deleted) as Allied troops (deleted) search out Communist bunkers and caches--(deleted) then (deleted) aren't the Allies just (deleted) running faster and faster to stay on a treadmill, he was asked by one officer.
"No," General Abrams reportedly replied. "I think we've to to go beyond smashing up the enemy's main force units. We have to do that selectively--but the way to get off the treadmill is to get after (deleted) his infrastructure and (deleted) guerrillas. We get alot of side benefits from that--more security for the population; more support for the Vietnamese government; a little economic growth and a little more (deleted) farm stuff going to market."
Fifth, General Abrams is encouraged by the progress the Vietnamese Armed Forces is making; there is also an increasing trend in the field for combined American-Vietnamese operations. He notes that some American units--even elite ones like the airborne--prefer to go on operations with the rag-tag Regional and Popular Forces, the low-paid troops who know (deleted) the local areas. While the Americans act as a (deleted) catalyst for the (deleted) Vietnamese to grow in (deleted) confidence, they also--more significantly--get for the Vietnamese faster reaction from American gunships, medical (deleted) evacuation (deleted) helicopters and artillery. And, American commanders admit the Vietnamese troops simply have a better knack than Americans (deleted) in finding caches.
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abrams 16 (normass/deepe)
The American command says that since August 17--when the Communist third-wave offensive began and then fizzled--the Vietnamese armed forces accounted for fifty one per cent of the Communist casualties and they themselves suffered 62 per cent of all Allied casualties.
"While I don't believe in bodycount," General Abrams reportedly told an (deleted) a senior officer, "this does show the degree of participation of the Vietnamese forces. (deleted) The Vietnamese have been getting out where the enemy was, so this is a good indicator. We have to build on that. We're not home yet--but it's a good mark."
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abrams 17 (normass/deepe)
The withdrawal of American troops from Vietnam is--at least officially--linked directly to the progress the Vietnamese armed forces makes to take over the anti-Communist war. Despite all sorts of political estimates of when American troops begin can begin the withdrawal, by General Abrams and the American command refuses to issue any timetable pred (deleted). "IT's just a question of how successful we are in pushing the enemy down and the Vietnamese armed forces up," one senior officer explained. "In a sense, we've already taken one small, insignificant step when we recommended that armored squadron from the United States not repeat not to be sent over here and instead we recommended only the equipment be sent. It's a small, admittedly small step--a passive step; it isn't sending troops home, but it is aimed at the same thing."
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abrams 18 (normass/deepe)
When one (deleted) close associate asked General Abrams if he was worried that American troops would be (deleted) ordered withdrawn according to a political timetable, rather than when the Vietnamese armed forces were militarily prepared to take over, the (deleted) general reportedly answered:
"I have to worry about it, that's right, or I have to think about it, but I'm not worried about it. Because I have to say since I've had this job, the government has not done one damn thing to constrain me. (deleted) I have to live with the limits that always existed here. But, (deleted) the government hasn't done one thing to constrain me or to mucker up what we have (deleted) do end have been doing.
"Basically, I have alot of confidence in the government I'm working for. I just think it's going to be that way. All these (deleted) things lurk in the background. I'm enough of a realist to know (deleted) that things could happen in our country to change things here. But I don't see it as something (deleted) imminent."
==(deleted) end reuter
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Date
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1968, Oct. 21
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Subject
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Vietnam War, 1961-1975--Peace; Abrams, Creighton W. (Creighton Williams), 1914-1974; Vietnam War, 1961-1975--United States; Peace treaties
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Location
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Saigon, South Vietnam
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Coordinates
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10.8231; 106.6311
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Size
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20 x 26 cm
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Format
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dispatches
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Collection Number
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MS 363
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Collection Title
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Beverly Deepe Keever, Journalism Papers
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Creator
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Keever, Beverly Deepe
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Copyright Information
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These images are for educational use only. To inquire about usage or publication, please contact Archives & Special Collections.
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Publisher
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Archives & Special Collections, University of Nebraska-Lincoln Libraries
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Language
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English