Article about a potential withdrawl from the DMZ

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363-05202 to 363-05214.pdf
Digital Object Identifier
363-05202 to 363-05214
Title
Article about a potential withdrawl from the DMZ
Description
Original title: "withdrawl", Keever's title: "At DMZ, Allies Dig Deeper for more Strife(?) of U.S. Stops Bombing North Vietnam," Article draft about the potential knock-on effects a ceasation of bombing against the North Vietnamese would have for troops along the Vietnamese DMZ, for the Christian Science Monitor, page 1-13
AI Usage Disclosure
Draft transcripts were automatically generated via Google Document AI and are currently under review. Please report significant errors to Archives & Special Collections at archives@unl.edu.
Transcript
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WITH U. S. THIRD MARINE DIVISION, ALONG THE DEMILITARIZED ZONE, VIETNAM, OCTOBER 12--The Allied defense line all along Vietnam's demilitarized zone would probably be forced to make an orderly, but strategic withdrawal southwards if the bombing of North Vietnam ceases without adequate, iron-clad guarantees of tit-for-tat de-escalation by the Communists.
This is the view of senior commanders here and in Saigon. Even if the North Vietnamese agree to the "restoration of the DMZ" (deleted) by withdrawing their ground troops from the six-mile-wide zone in return for cessation of the American "acts of war", Marine tactical commanders still would be unhappy. For, in their view, the real threat to Allied defenses along the DMZ is not a massive ground invasion through the DMZ--but is Communist artillery from North Vietnam, across the 6 six-mile-wide zone and onto American Marine, Army and Vietnamese Army (deleted) and mobile operation (deleted).
(deleted)
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One Saigon-based officer close to American commander, General Creighton W. Abrams, opened up the possibility of an Allied withdrawal along the DMZ when he said:
"You can not repeat not have Americans or Vietnamese near the DMZ with people shooting at them from north of the Ben Hai (deleted) river (which separates North and South Vietnam) and we can not shoot back. You just can not have that. We've just got to be able to shoot back. It's just a military rule and without that the situation is intolerable. You can not have Americans being shot at without letting them shoot back. You just can't run it that way."
--more reuter
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Officially, there is yet no repeat no decision (deleted) for an Allied retreat southwards in the event of a cessation of bombing over North Vietnam that would be disadvantageous to American and Vietnamese troops. "We'll make the necessary decisions when that time comes," one (deleted) high-ranking source explained. Anyhow, for (deleted) American tactical commanders along the DMZ, they know the decision will be made at much higher level than theirs.
But, these tactical commanders along the DMZ are emphatic about the following points if the bombing of North Vietnam ceases without (deleted) adequate guarantees for cessation of Communist artillery and ground movements across the zone:
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1. In its current form, the Allied defense line along the 40-mile-long DMZ clearly (deleted) would be (unintelligible) without suffering heavy personnel and material losses.
2. Hence, a (deleted) lop-sided defeat to the bombing of the North would demand a critical, strategic re-appraisal of the Allied defense line all along the DMZ.
3. In making that strategic (deleted) re-appraisal, there are only two options for the Allies--either to dig deeper or to retreat south out of the range of Communist artillery. But, even to dig deeper into bunkered positions does not strike the tactical commanders as a very probable solution--for they run the high-risk of intensive (deleted and accurate artillery bombardment reminescent of the Khe Sanh siege days.
The Allied DMZ defense line is suspended into (deleted) the three sides of a strategic box; Allied troops can not move (deleted) further east because of the South China Sea; they can not move further west or north because of the political boundaries with North Vietnam or Laos. Hence, then can only retreat south--or begin digging in deeper.
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"If the government stops the bombing, we would have to have a very careful (deleted) evaluation of our present dispositions," one tactical commander who had (deleted) already thought out (deleted) such consequences, explained. "We can't sit under bombardment from the North without hardened sites (meaning bunkering). They'd chew us up little by little. Now they can open up and we can immediately counter with (deleted) our air and artillery because we maintain constant air cover over the North.
(deleted) "Otherwise, (deleted) the Americans and Vietnamese would have to dig in deeper and take the (deleted) Communist fire as at Con Thien--or else to withdraw southwards. But, then one asks--how far south can we go? This decision would have to be made at a pretty high lever--either to stay where we are in hardened sites or to withdraw."
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Any strategic withdrawal from the DMZ would involve more than 20,000 American Marines and soldiers, plus Vietnamese infantrymen and armor, as well as (deleted) additional thousands of support-type personnel in their headquarters-logistical complexes. The withdrawal would be designed to pull these (deleted) Allied installations and units out of the range of the (deleted) Communists' whomping 130 millimeter artillery, the Communists most dependable, accurate and long-range artillery used to date. It was this artillery directed from Both North Vietnam and Laos which pounded the American Marines at the Khe Sanh combat base earlier this year.
The 130 millimeter artillery has a maximum range of 27,000 meters00or 16.2 repeat 16.2 miles. If the North Vietnamese based and continued to shoot their artillery from immediately north of the DMZ, then the Allies would be forced to withdraw from such major positions as the huge refuge resettlement and district town of Cam Lo, the massive American artillery position at Camp Carroll, the forward supply base of Dong Ha, from headquarters command areas along Route 9, and from tens of smaller outpost outposts (deleted) tapping the electronic sensors of the Mcnamara line and one hundred mobile operational (deleted) bases, which the Marines now use to enhance their heliborne mobility.
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For the Marine commanders, the (deleted) immediate significance of the bombing of North Vietnam (deleted) is that the Allies have fairly well suppressed the Communist artillery from North by quick-reaction air and artillery strikes. The tactical mechanics of suppressing Communist artillery fire revolves around constant airborne alert of small, two-seater spotter plans which kept the whole DMZ under consistent observation. Whenever Communist artillery fires, the little spotters (deleted) try to catch a glimpse of the flash and smoke (deleted) while (deleted) American ground units use the "flash-bang" system of computing roughly how long the artillery round is in the air and from the rough location that it was fired. Then American tactical aircraft as well as (deleted) artillery are within minutes (deleted) on the specific or general coordinates from which the (deleted) artillery was fired.
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"Cessation of the bombing of North Vietnam could be disasterous for us," said Maj. Gen. Raymond Davis, the Korean War Medal of Honor winner who now commands the Third Marine Division (deleted) "Most of our positions near the DMZ would be subject to Communist artillery without adequate capability for us to respond. We rely on our air observation and airstrikes to keep this Communist artillery down.
"We aren't that worried about a Communist ground push. The enemy does not have enough ground forces at this time to cause us immediate concern. But, the enemy's artillery is different. It is clearly a fact--and we have gone through this before--that when we gain the upperhand along the DMZ the enemy calls for a cessation of the bombing--and then he increases his supply and troop movements. After every ceasefire during the past three years, the Communists (deleted) have moved in their heavy artillery and we (deleted) had to go in and bomb it out. Now, if the enemy agrees not to shoot over the DMZ, it would solve part of the problem."
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During the past several (deleted) months, the Communist artillery, which once consistently raked the whole DMZ area, has been relatively quiet not only because American (deleted) tactical air and artillery firepower have reacted in split-second fashion to counter it, but also because of B-52 Strategic Air Command raids along the zone as well as because of heavy flooding and muddy roads which (deleted) prevented massive Communist replacement of supplies and destroyed artillery.
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Even if the bombing and "other acts of war" are ceased over North Vietnam, American commanders (deleted) along the DMZ are insistent they should retain the option of using unarmed air reconnaissance. "The American government can never give up their right to air reconnaissance," one Marine aviator emphasized, "and we never will. Even though Eisenhower was embarrassed by it--we still kept (deleted) our air reconnaissance going. Anyhow, everyone uses air reconnaissance every day--the Soviets are conning the United States every day with their satellites. We will just have to keep some reconnaissance of some sort over North Vietnam to see if they're massing southwards."
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For the Marine commanders, Vice President Hubert H. Humphrey's campaign speeches urging "restoration of the DMZ" by the North Vietnamese in exchange for American cessation of the bombing over the North seems extravagantly out of step with the tactical situation facing the Allies. Whether or not the Communist ground troops withdraw from the DMZ seems irrelevant to the Marine officers--the hectic battles result when the Communists push (deleted) through the DMZ into South Vietnam. Even if the Communists would (deleted) agree not to transit through the DMZ, they could still bring men and supplies in through Laos, and dump them in the rear of the Marines--behind the Allied DMZ line--or else move them further south (deleted) even as far as the greater Saigon perimeter. This would not be much of a concession by the Communists, in the eyes of the Marines. Clearly, the Marines would want all this southward flow of men and materials stopped--whether it comes straight across the DMZ or through Laos. In addition, they ant airtight a guarantees the Communist artillery bombardments across the DMZ would cease. For Marines who remember all to well the artillery poundings at Con Thien and Khe Sanh, as well as sporadic fire at almost every other installation, this (deleted) is a crucial demand.
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One other immediate, significant point of concern to the tactical commanders is the shifting monoon winds along the DMZ. Monsoon rains prevail along the (deleted) DMZ during most of the year--but the important question is whether, as the in winds shift, they are advantageous to either the Allies or to (deleted) the Communists. At this time, the southeast monsoon rains are disadvantageous for the Communists; the Laotian side of the mountains are rain-swept; their supply trails and roads are wet and in some cases the rivers that must be crossed are flooded. But, within a matter of weeks, the northeast monsoon begins, inundating the Allied-held (deleted) populated coastal plains--where are also based their logistical depots--and smothering the Marine-held mountaintops in clouds, fog and mist during most of the coming months until February or march. When these monsoons hamper Marine helicopter mobility and tactical air support, the Communist (deleted) roads and trails are in good shape for rapid trafficking. If, the Marines argue, the bombing of the North is stopped at a disadvantage to the Allies along the DMZ, then (deleted) this plus the weather would further jeopardize prospects of holding the 40-mile-long muddy line.
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Other military officers have (deleted) criticized the American cessations of the bombing over the northern portions of North Vietnam in March, just as the (deleted) weather over Hanoi-Haiphong became most favorable for Allied airstrikes--and when the Communists were in the best position to (deleted) import supplies. "The weather has consistently been a factor the Communists have (deleted) played to (deleted) their advantage and we have ignored," one senior military officer explained. "Now, (deleted) there are so many supplies in North Vietnam the country is about to sink."
--end reuter
Date
1968, Oct. 12
Subject
Vietnam War, 1961-1975--Aerial operations; United States; Bombing, aerial; Bombardment; Strategy
Location
Demilitarized Zone, Vietnam
Coordinates
16.6193, 106.7305
Size
20 x 26 cm
Container
B10, F39
View Folder in ArchivesSpace
Format
dispatches
Collection Number
MS 363
Collection Title
Beverly Deepe Keever, Journalism Papers
Creator
Keever, Beverly Deepe
Copyright Information
These images are for educational use only. To inquire about usage or publication, please contact Archives & Special Collections.
Publisher
Archives & Special Collections, University of Nebraska-Lincoln Libraries
Language
English