-
derivative filename/jpeg
-
363-05001 to 363-05020.pdf
-
Digital Object Identifier
-
363-05001 to 363-05020
-
Title
-
Third article about friction over the American cessation of bombing North Vietnam
-
Description
-
Original title: "showdown", Keever's title: "Palace Showdown Between U.S. and South Vietnamese Officials Continue as Communists Shake Saigon", Article draft about the conflict between South Vietnamese and American at a meeting in the Presidential Palace over the cessation of bombing over North Vietnam, for the Christian Science Monitor, page 1-20
-
AI Usage Disclosure
-
Draft transcripts were automatically generated via Google Document AI and are currently under review. Please report significant errors to Archives & Special Collections at archives@unl.edu.
-
Transcript
-
--------------------
- Page 1
--------------------
zozo sag
yy nnm
showdown 1 (normass/deepe)
(This is the last of a three-part series on the dramatic American-
South Vietnamese official conversations on the halting of the bombing
over North Vietnam and the expanded Paris peace talks).
SAIGON,
NOVEMBER 8-The final Palace showdown began
as the
American countdown was already underway to unilaterally cease the bombing
and "other acts of war" against North Vietnam.
This Palace confrontation was to be the most dramatic, tense and ei
bitter meeting of all, climaxing the strong emotions and growing distrust/
Represe
that had executat escalated between the American and south Vietnamese during
the the previous sessions, now numbering more than a dozen.
more reuter
--------------------
- Page 2
--------------------
zozo sag
yy nnm
showdown 2 (normass/deepe)
The meeting began about 11 p.m., October 31, (Saigon time)-jux roughly
ten hours before President Johnson's bombing-halt speech-as the Communists
began shelling Saigon with Soviet-made A 122 mm. rockets. President
Nguyn Nguyen Van Thieu opened the meeting saying to Ambas American
that while the American Ambassador had
Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker
previously spoke of the lack of good faith-what did he think about the
Communist shelling of the city.
Bunker reportedly replied lamely that the bombing over North Vietnam
had not yet been halted. Thieu became angry and agitated, rotoring
retorting that the Ambassador did not repeat not make the distinction between
the aggressor and the victim of aggression.
==more reuter
500
--------------------
- Page 3
--------------------
2020 sag
Jy nmm
showdown 3 (normass/deepe)
As tension gripped the room, Vice President Nguyen Cao Ky
again voiced the last minute compromise plan, attempting constructively
to get the Afred Allies out of the increasingly embarrasi embarrassing
diplomat impasse. He proposed that the Saigon government would still
but only for direct
send a delegation to the upcoming Paris talks,
"preliminary" talks with the Communists,
which would lay out the ground
The essence of Ky's
rules for the later substantive talks. These ground rules would include the
future role of the National Liberation Front.
proposal shifted tire would have shifted the files the first round
of the Paris talks from ones on substance-as Washington wanted-to
preliminary talks, which indiet indicated again that the Saigon
officials no repeat no longer trusted the procedural arrangements the
American deleti representatives had made, supposedly on their behalf,
with the Communists in Paris.
==more reuter
--------------------
- Page 4
--------------------
zozo sag
yy nnm
showdown 4 (normass/deepe)
The
to
Ky maintained that the American representatives had not repeat not
other Vietnamese officials feared
represented them correctly in Paris;
the Communists would use the Paris talks as "an insulting platform"
Saigon officials
dene denigrate the South Vietnamese government.
argued they wanted to lay out their own "ground rules" with the Communists
since "we have not repeat not met the Communists ourselves".
American officials throughout the Palace discusses were placed in the
awkward position of being the spokesman of Hanoi's views to the Saigon
government, since the U. S. was serving as the middle-man contact. between
both Hanoi a Hanoi's representatives and the Saigon officialdom.
In effect, the
==more reuter
--------------------
- Page 5
--------------------
zozo sag
yy nnm
showdown 5 (normass/deepe)
Then,
Paris
the discussion of the NLF being present
where
at one dramatic moment,
as a separate delegation arose. Deputy Ambassador Samuel Berger--a veteran
American diplomat who had recently come te to Saigon from Seoul,
worked to
he civilian-ized the South Korean junta and liberalized its government-
in excited voice, said that if Thieu
turned to Thieu.
Berger,
insisted on a mandate from the North Vietnamese of keeping the National
Liberation Front as a separate delegation out of the Paris talks, then he
doubted that even the American government could support the Seigekst
Thieu's demand.
==more reuter
--------------------
- Page 6
--------------------
zC2c sag
yy nnm
showdown 6 (normass/deepe)
Thieu pulled out a piece of paper and began writing down Berger's
saying-oh, is that correct, Mr. Ambassador.
sentence,
Then, in
that case,
it sounded as though you're the deputy ambas ambassador
representing Hanoi instead of being the American deputy ambassador to
Sa igon.
In gentlemanly fashion,
Ambassador Bunker said this was a
mi sunderstanding and that Berger had not repeat not meant what he said.
Then a very heated dialogue began centering around press coverage.
The American representatives had vaguely accused the Vietnamese officials
of leaking stories of the Palace sessions to the Vietnamese-ixm
press-which was contrary to agreements about secrecy of the meetings.
==more reuter
--------------------
- Page 7
--------------------
zozo sag
Jy nnm
showdown 7 (normass/deepe)
Thieu again became quite a angry and sharply said there had been
wild speculation in the Vietnamese-language fpress in Saigon for days,
with each article being different, all caused because he could not repeat
not tell the Vietnamese people what was happening nor could he leak
stories to the press. And, furthermore, why do you tell me to "close
my mouth," he asked Bunker. Look at the speculation in your own (Western)
press have you been leaking stories to them. And, he further asked
Bunker,
his mouth.
do my job.
do you taillionym tell your own President to close S
Why do you talk to me in that manner instead of letting me
You always wanted freedom in press in Vietnam, he retorted
to Bunker now what more do you want.
==more reuter
53
--------------------
- Page 8
--------------------
zozo sag
yy nnm
showdown 8 (normass/deepe)
The Vietnamese then gave Bunker another draft text of their
proposed joint communique to announce the bombing halt.
It was basically
the same as the previous one-except they had included the word "preliminary"
ta lks
so that the Saigon delegation to Paris could lay out its own
ground rules with Communists in Paris, virich would have included discussion
on the rel
troublesome National Liberation Front delegation
At four in the morning-five hours before President Johnson's
bombing-halt speech-Ambassador Bunker and deputy Ambassador Berger and
American Bassa Embassy political councillor, Martin Hertz, left the
Palace for the Embassy with the Vietnamese draft.
observed
The Vietnamese
the Americans were obviously in disagreement about the
word "preliminary".
==more reuter
--------------------
- Page 9
--------------------
zC2c sag
yy nnm
showdown 9 (normass/deepe)
In the interim, the Vietnamese grabbed quick catnaps while waiting for
the Americans to return. Ky stretched out on a Palace sofa; other Vietnamese
in the "inner" and "outer" rings of officialdom outside the discussions
slept on the floor.
Two hours later, at 6 a.m. and three hours before President Johnson's
speech the American delegation returned with a counter-draft,
dropped the word "preliminary."
Then,
which had
Thieu said that in that case Saigon would not agree to the
joint American-South Vietnamese communique declaring a bilateral
agreement to cease the bombing of the North. Nor, would Saigon send
a delegation to Paris under these terms, but he left open the possibility
of sending one under other conditions.
Several hours later, President Johnson's speech was broadcast
over the American armed forces ration s radio station-at 9 a.m. on
November 1, Saigon time. The Vietnamese government had already
words from the its own diplomats around the world that the bombing halt
was imminent and Ambassador Bunker had also told before the President
Johnson's speech.
==more reuter
--------------------
- Page 10
--------------------
zC2c sag
yy nnm
showdown 10 (normass/deepe)
This last Palace session had taken place under sporadic Communit
Communist shelling of Saigon, one batch of rockets landing as close as
half a mile to the Presidential Palace itself. Also, the session and Presil
President Johnson's bombing-halt speech took place on a very emotional,
if not repeat not paradoxical, days. October 31 was the first
anniversay of Thieu's inauguration as President--a development which the
American government had strongly backed as part of South Vietnam's
movement towards constitutional and popularly-elected government.
achieving Thieu's election and inauguration, however, was a vicious
power
A result of
internal struggle between Thieu and Vice President Nguyen Cao Ky,
who had previously served as Prime Minister. For more than year, the
American officialdom here tried to heal the breach between the two
leaders without success.
concerted American pressure,
differences.
Then, with the Palace sessions and the.
Thieu and Ky patched up their past
a
Ky's support was the decisive factor in Thieu's firm
stand--at a time when the American officials wanted it least.
more reuter
600
--------------------
- Page 11
--------------------
ZOZO sag
yy nnm
showdown 11 (normass/deepe)
It was Ky who during this time urged the Vietnamese to get united
behind hieu. At one point, he reportedly told an aide,
"I no
repeat no longer land my helicopter on the top of the President's
Presidential.
bedroom (meaning on the Palace roof). I land it on the grass outside
his bedroom window. If I can de-escalate, so can the rest of you."
Day,
President Johnson's speech was broadcast here on Vietnamese National
established establishing the anniversary of 1963 in 1963 when
of Viet Nam
the No First Vmese Republic and the Ngo Dinh Diem was overthrown-
a coup d'état stillinen blamed on American officials by
N
in some Vietnamese quarters.
==more reuter
--------------------
- Page 12
--------------------
20 20 sag
yy nnm
showdown 12 (normass/deepe)
PA
After the official receptions on National Day,
Thieu stayed a
drafting his own spaesin bombshell speech he
portion of that night,
would deliver the next morning at the joint session of the two-house
legislature. He had told at least Vietnamese Cabinet minister it would
be a "mild"
speech.
Shortly before the speech, Ambassador Bunker,
called at the Palace, hoping to see Thieu again at the last minute. Instead,
Thieu send Foreign Minister Tran Chanh Test Thanh to reve receive
Bunker.
Thieu and Ky z had agreed to go in the same car to the joint session
at 10 am 9
to display national unity. But, Ky overslept, waking up
at 10, when he and Thieu should have been at the legislature. Ky telephoned
suggesting the President go alone.
Thieu said no,
that he would
Thieu,
wait for Ky. They showed up together roughly half an hour late, where
to Boycott
Thieu announced his decision not repeat frot to send a delegatirente Paris,
FALKS.
==more reuter
--------------------
- Page 13
--------------------
zczc sag
yy nnm
showdown 13 (normass/deepe)
One Vietnamese minister had once described the personalities of the
two men this way: "Ky is impetuous. He says something and
thinks about it later.
Thieu thinks and thinkgs before making a decision--
and after two weeks he decides nothing." But, this time, Thieu's
decision was firmly against going to Paris on November 6.
To the diplomatic corps here and the heads of other Allied governments
Nee many Behaved
elsewhere, the Thieu speech came as a shock, believing the American
version that Thieu was in agreement with the U. S. position. The diplomats
of other Allied countries with troops serving in Vietnam were reportedly
"staggered and have been in a zee daze every since," one diplomat
said. Even the Vatican was caught off caught. After President Johnson's
bombing-halt speech, Pope Paul sent cables reportedly sent cables of
congratulations to Presidents Johnson and Thieu for their steps towards
By the time,
peace.
Thieu's bombshell had dropped, it was too late for the
ab
Vatican to retrieve the missile, which arrived the Saigon Palace.
==more reuter
--------------------
- Page 14
--------------------
zozo sag
yy nnm
showdown 14 (normass/deepe)
The American version of Pale
discussions inside the Palace
contradict the Vietnamese kone on most of the significant points.
American Bunker's version is that the Americans had insisted with Hanoi
on what was called the "our side-your side" fomula formula, under which
"each side looks at is itself and looks at the other side as it wishes."
He specified "on our side, there would be two delegations from two
sovereign governments and one delegation which we will treat as the
other side. We won't recognize the NLF as an independent entity; the
Communists can organize their side as they please but we don't recognize
them...we can not dictate how Hanoi organizes its side."
==more reuter
--------------------
- Page 15
--------------------
zczo sag
Jy nnm
showdown 15 (normass/deepe)
Bunker is known to have said that he held personal consultations on
this with Thieu long before their October 16th meeting and that Thieu
understood this arrangement clearly. Vietnamese sources admit there were
consultations on concepts for peace bet negotiations between Bunker and
"academix
Thiue Thieu for some time, but the Vietnamese viewed these as
unrelato in Stail to the Pam PACKAya Spec
and general contingency planning,
Bunker further
to the American peace
"academic sessions"
maintains that in his first session with Thieu, beginning at 6:45 a.m.
on October 16, Thieu gave his "clear concurrence"
package and that then the Americans Bunker made "the suggestion to Thieu
to bring other top officials and Assembly (legislative) leadership into
the picture." Whether Thieu actually agreed or not in this first meeting,
His ANSW
it is well accepted here that Thieu made the decision contingent on
his consulting other members of the Vietnamese
government.
==more reuter
6500
--------------------
- Page 16
--------------------
Zozo sag
yy nnm
showdown 16 (normass/deepe)
Vietnamese sources now argue that the American officials here should
have known Thieu could not repeat not have made the decision by himself
on October 16, because Article 39 of the Vietnamese Constitution obliges
the President to secure agreement of the two-house legislature on matters
regarding war and peace.
"But,
the Americans tried to steamroller the peace pag-pacage
one Vietnamese
package through Thieu in a matter hours the very first day,"
explained. Eman It was clear "this time, the Americans did not repeat
not care about the constitutional process after all they pains they had
gone through to initiate it here."
Vietnamese officials and Western diplomats also believe that the
American officialdom and Hanoi had made the peace package deal among thesm
themselves first-and then presented it to Thieu, with the South Vietnamese
government become the last party to know m its contents which vitally
effected its own future.
==more reuter
--------------------
- Page 17
--------------------
zozo sag
yy nnm
showdown 17 (normass/deepe)
Vietnamese sources in touch with the Palace discussions said the
Vietnamese officials did not repeat not come to any agreement on the
"Bunker did not care to carry the
"our side your side" formula because
Once
matter through. One he mentioned it in the Palace discussions,
Ky said
in effect our side is like a soccer team. We have to have a captain
and a spokesman. Who's the captain and who's the spokesman.
Americans declined to go into it and that was the end of our side-your
side./
The
"Bunker did say," the Vietnamese source continued "that on our
side, we would avoid the problem of having the NLF as a separate eneity,,
and instead of having a triangular conference (with Hanoi, U. S. and
Saigon), we would have a bilateral one (Allies versus Communists). But,
the Americans had left that vague. They never went into detail. For
Bunker to say there was agreement with the Vietnamese on this is at least
an exaggeration. Bunker Never told us.
NLF
to Pans As
Would Come
= =more reuter
delegation.
Art
per
--------------------
- Page 18
--------------------
2020 sag
yy nnm
showdown 18 (normass/deepe)
One
"Bunker
sone pro-American diplomat assessed the confusion,
stretched diplomatic language to the brink without telling an outright lie."
com Ambassador pham DANG
The Bunker versions also minimizes the significance of the cable
from
from
Paris on October 29-when the Palace session turned into
ths Amican version Holds
pandemonium,
LA
not repeat not disagreements between Harriman and Bunker.
what Bunker had side to the South Vietnamese government.
difficulty in communications.
"We cleared that up later by saying there were
We confirmed
This was a
700
Lam had not repeat not been fully informed
and the discussion in Paris had not repeat no bearing on the final outcome
here (in Saigon)."
However, even Americans in a position to a know said there were
discrepanies between what Harriman was telling the South Vietnamese delegation
in Paris and what Bunker was telling them in Saigon--and official American
cable traffic at the time mentioned these discrepancies.
==more reuter
--------------------
- Page 19
--------------------
zcze sag
yy nnm
showdown 19 (normass/deepe)
Thieu had sent Lam a cable to Lam in Paris after his first meeting with
Bunker on October 16, telling him to see Harriman and find out what was
happening. "Harriman treated Lam like a pickpocket,"
one Vietnamese
source explained. "And told him the Saigon government knew all about the
deal. Lam hotfooted it to Saigon-only to find out the Thieu government
was as much in the dark as he was." Lam made several Paris-Saigonex trips
during the three-week period and in Saigon he reportedly told an associate,
"Harriman did not repeat not treat me like a puppy-he treated me like a
scabby dog."
The
In Paris ina dht and the consu confusion in Paris seemed to
have influenced significantly Thieu's final decision-Lam's cables to the
Foreign Ministry here indicate that the "our side-your side" formula never
got beyond disagreements on arrangment of the Allied side.--until the
pivotal cable on October 29 saying the NLF would be a separate delegation.
more reuter
--------------------
- Page 20
--------------------
zozo sag
yy nnm
showdown 20 (normass/deepe)
Part of the over-all confusion seemd to arise because at one-said
the American-South Vietnamese delegations would have been merged on "our side"-
implying the Communist Hanoi-NLF delegation also would have been merged.
one of Lam's cables, he said Philip H Habib of the American delegation
in Paris told him the Amminuman
Allied delegation
would have American and South Vietnamese co-chairman, but Harriman later
contradicted this saying there would be only one chairman-and that would be
an American.
Currently
At time in Saigon, only some of the facts--and many-splendored
versions of the facts--are now in focus here. Some, such as what actually
transpired in the pivotal if discussions with Lam in Paris, may never be
fully unraveled. For, as the Vietnamese adage goes, "History is like
SPLASHING
a river flowing towards the sea and it never flows back again."
In
==end reuter
-
Date
-
1968, Nov. 8
-
Subject
-
United States--Relations--Vietnam (Republic); Vietnam (Democratic Republic); Vietnam War, 1961-1975--Aerial operations; Bombing, aerial; Bombardment; Vietnam War, 1961-1975--Peace; Peace treaties
-
Location
-
Saigon, South Vietnam
-
Coordinates
-
10.8231; 106.6311
-
Size
-
20 x 26 cm
-
Container
-
B10, F39
-
Format
-
dispatches
-
Collection Number
-
MS 363
-
Collection Title
-
Beverly Deepe Keever, Journalism Papers
-
Creator
-
Keever, Beverly Deepe
-
Copyright Information
-
These images are for educational use only. To inquire about usage or publication, please contact Archives & Special Collections.
-
Publisher
-
Archives & Special Collections, University of Nebraska-Lincoln Libraries
-
Language
-
English
