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derivative filename/jpeg
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363-05001 to 363-05020.pdf
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Digital Object Identifier
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363-05001 to 363-05020
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Title
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Third article about friction over the American cessation of bombing North Vietnam
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Description
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Original title: "showdown", Keever's title: "Palace Showdown Between U.S. and South Vietnamese Officials Continue as Communists Shake Saigon", Article draft about the conflict between South Vietnamese and American at a meeting in the Presidential Palace over the cessation of bombing over North Vietnam, for the Christian Science Monitor, page 1-20
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AI Usage Disclosure
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Draft transcripts were automatically generated via Google Document AI and are currently under review. Please report significant errors to Archives & Special Collections at archives@unl.edu.
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Transcript
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(This is the last of a three-part series on the dramatic American-South Vietnamese official conversations on the halting of the bombing over North Vietnam and the expanded Paris peace talks).
SAIGON, NOVEMBER 8--The final Palace showdown began as the American countdown was already underway to unilaterally cease the bombing and "other acts of war" against North Vietnam.
This Palace confrontation was to be the most dramatic, tense and (deleted) bitter meeting of all, climaxing the strong emotions and growing distrusting that had (deleted) escalated between the American and South Vietnamese representation during (deleted) the previous sessions, by now numbering more than a dozen.
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The meeting began about 11 p.m., October 31 (Saigon time)--(deleted) roughly ten hours before President Johnson's bombing-halt speech--as the Communists began shelling Saigon with Soviet-made 122 mm. rockets. President (deleted) Nguyen Van Thieu opened the meeting saying to (deleted) Ellsworth Bunker that while the American Ambassador had previously spoken of the lack of good faith--what did he think about the Communist shelling of the city.
Bunker reportedly replied lamely that the bombing over North Vietnam had not yet been halted. Thieu became angry and agitated, (deleted) retorting that the Ambassador did not repeat not make the distinction between the aggressor and the victim of aggression.
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As tension gripped the room, Vice President Nguyen Cao Ky again voiced the last minute compromise plan, attempting constructively to get the (deleted) Allies out of the increasingly (deleted) embarrassing diplomat impasse. He proposed that the Saigon government would still send a delegation to the upcoming Paris talks, but only for direct "preliminary" talks with the Communists, which would lay out the ground rules for the later substantive talks. These ground rules would include the future role of the National Liberation Front. The essence of Ky's proposal (deleted) would have shifted (deleted) the first round of Paris talks from ones on substance--as Washinton wanted--to preliminary talks, which (deleted) indicated again that the Saigon officials no repeat no longer trust the procedural arrangements the American (deleted) representatives had made, supposedly on their behalf, with the Communists in Paris.
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Ky maintained that the American representatives had not repeat not represented them correctly in Paris; other Vietnamese officials feared the Communists would use the Paris talks as "an insulting platform" to (deleted) denigrate the South Vietnamese government. The Saigon officials argued they wanted to lay out their own "ground rules" with the Communists since "we have not repeat not met the Communists ourselves". In effect, the American officials throughout the Palace (deleted) were placed in the awkward position of being the spokesman of Hanoi's views to the Saigon government, since the U. S. was serving as the middle-man contact between both (deleted) Hanoi's representatives and the Saigon officialdom.
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Then, at one dramatic moment, the discussion of the NLF being present in Paris as a separate delegation arose. Deputy Ambassador Samuel Berger--a veteran American diplomat who had recently come to Saigon from Seoul, where he worked to civilian-ized the South Korean junta and liberalized its government--turned to Thieu. Berger, in excited voice, said that if Thieu insisted on a mandate from the North Vietnamese of keeping the National Liberation Front as a separate delegation out of the Paris talks, then he doubted that even the American government could support (deleted) Thieu's demand.
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Thieu pulled out a piece of paper and began writing down Berger's sentence, saying--oh, is that correct, Mr. Ambassador. Then, in that case, it sounded as though you're the deputy (deleted) ambassador representing Hanoi instead of being the American deputy ambassador to Saigon.
In gentlemanly fashion, Ambassador Bunker said this was a misunderstanding and that Berger can not repeat not meant what he said.
Then a very heated dialogue began centering around press coverage. The American representatives had vaguely accused the Vietnamese officials of leaking stories of the Palace sessions to the Vietnamese-(deleted) press--which was contrary to agreements about secrecy of the meetings.
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Thieu again became quite (deleted) angry and sharply said there had been wild speculation in the Vietnamese-language press in Saigon for das, with each article being different, all caused because he could not repeat not tell the Vietnamese people what was happening nor could he leak stories to the press. And, furthermore, why do you tell me to "close my mouth," he asked Bunker. Look at the speculation in your own (Western) press--have you been leaking stories to them. And, he further asked Bunker, do you (deleted) tell your own President to close (deleted) his mouth. Why do you talk to me in that manner instead of letting me do my job. You always wanted freedom in press in Vietnam, he retorted to Bunker--now what more do you want.
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The Vietnamese then gave Bunker another draft text of their proposed joint communique to announce the bombing halt. It was basically the same as the previous one--except they had included the word "preliminary" talks so that the Saigon delegation to Paris could lay out (deleted) its own ground rules with Communists in Paris. (deleted)
At four in the morning--five hours before President Johnson's bombing-halt speech--Ambassador Bunker, (deleted) deputy Ambassador Berger and American (deleted) Embassy political councillor, Martin Hertz, left the Palace for the Embassy with the Vietnamese draft. The Vietnamese (deleted) observed the Americans were obviously in disagreement about the word "preliminary".
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In the interim, the Vietnamese grabbed quick catnaps while waiting for the Americans to return. Ky stretched out on a Palace sofa; other Vietnamese in the "inner" and "outer" rings of officialdom outside the discussions slept on the floor.
Two hours later, at 6 a.m.--and three hours before President Johnson's speech--the American delegation returned with a counter-draft, which had dropped the word "preliminary."
Then, Thieu said that in the case Saigon would not agree to the joint American-South Vietnamese communique declaring a bilateral agreement to cease the bombing of the North. Nor, would Saigon send a delegation to Paris under these terms, but he left open the possibility of sending one under other conditions.
Several hours later, President Johnson's speech was broadcast over the American armed forces (deleted) radio station--at 9 a.m. on November 1, Saigon time. The Vietnamese government had already words from the its own diplomat around the world that the bombing halt was imminent and Ambassador Bunker had also told before the President Johnson's speech.
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This last Palace session had taken place under sporadic (deleted) Communist shelling of Saigon, one batch of rockets landing as close as half a mile to the Presidential Palace itself. Also, the session and (deleted) President Johnson's bombing-halt speech took place on very (deleted) special, if not paradoxical, (deleted) days. October 31 was the first anniversay of Thieu's inauguration as President--a development which the American government had strongly backed as part of South Vietnam's movement towards constitutional and popularly-elected government. (deleted) A result of Thieu's election and inauguration, however, was a vicious internal (deleted) power struggle between Thieu and Vice President Nguyen Cao Ky, who had previously served as Prime Minister. For more than year, the American officialdom here tried to heal the breach between the two leaders--without success. Then, with the Palace sessions and the concerted American pressure, Thieu and Ky patched up their past differences. Ky's support was (deleted) a decisive factor in Thieu's firm stand--at a time when the American officials wanted it least. (deleted)
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It was Ky who during this time urged the Vietnamese to get united behind Thieu. At one point, he reportedly told an aide, "I no repeat no longer land my helicopter on the top of the President's bedroom (meaning on the Presidential Palace roof). I land it on the grass outside his bedroom window. If I can de-escalate, so can the rest of you."
President Johnson's speech was broadcast here on Vietnamese National Day, (deleted) establishing the anniversary (deleted) in 1963 when the (deleted) First (deleted) Republic of Viet Nam and the Ngo Dinh Diem was overthrown--a coup d'etat still (deleted) blamed on American officials (deleted) in some Vietnamese quarters.
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After the official receptions on National Day, Thieu stayed (deleted) up a portion of (deleted) that night, drafting his own (deleted) bombshell speech he would deliver the next morning at the joint session of the two-house legislature. He had told at least (deleted) one Vietnamese Cabinet minister it would be a "mild" speech. Shortly before the speech, Ambassador Bunker, called at the Palace, hoping to see Thieu again at the last minute. Instead, Thieu send Foreign Minister Tran Chanh (deleted) Thanh to (deleted) receive (deleted) Bunker.
Thieu and Ky had agreed to go in the same car to the joint session at 10 a.m., to display national unity. But, Ky overslept, waking up at 10, when he and Thieu should have been at the legislature. Ky telephoned Thieu, suggesting the President go alone. Thieu said no, that he would wait for Ky. They showed up (deleted) together roughly half an hour late, where Thieu announced his decision (deleted) to boycott the Paris (deleted) talks.
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One Vietnamese minister had once described the personalities of the two men this way: "Ky is impetuous. He says something and (deleted) then thinks about it later. Thieu thinks and thinks before making a decision--and after two weeks he decides nothing." But, this time, Thieu's decision was firmly against going to Paris on November 6.
To the diplomatic corps here and the heads of other Allied governments elsewhere, the Thieu speech came as a shock, (deleted) since many believed the American version that Thieu was in agreement with the U. S. position. The diplomats of other Allied countries with troops serving in Vietnam were reportedly "staggered and have been in a (deleted) daze every since," one diplomat said. Even the Vatican was (deleted) off caught. After President Johnson's bombing-halt speech, Pope Paul (deleted) reportedly sent cables of congratulations to Presidents Johnson and Thieu for their steps towards peace. By the time, Thieu's bombshell had dropped, it was too late for the Vatican to retrieve the missile, which arrived (deleted) at the Saigon Palace.
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The American version of (deleted) discussions inside the Palace contradict the Vietnamese (deleted) on most of the significant points. American Bunker's version is that the Americans had insisted with Hanoi on what was called the "our side-your side" (deleted) formula, under which "each side looks at itself and looks at the other side as it wishes." He specified "on our side, there would be two delegations from two sovereign governments and one delegation which we will treat as the other side. We won't recognize the NLF as an independent entity; the Communists can organize their side as they please but we don't recognize them... we can not dictate how Hanoi organizes its side."
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Bunker is known to have said that he held personal consultations on this with Thieu long before their October 16th meeting and that Thieu understood this assignment clearly. Vietnamese sources admit there were consultations on concepts for peace (deleted) negotiations between Bunker and (deleted) Thieu for some time, but the Vietnamese viewed these as (deleted) "academic sessions and general contingency planning unrelated in detail to the peace package specifics. Bunker further maintains that in his first session with Thieu, beginning at 6:45 a.m. on October 16, Thieu gave his "clear concurrence" to the American peace package and that then the American Bunker made "the suggestion to Thieu to bring other top officials and Assembly (legislative) leadership into the picture." Whether Thieu actually agreed or not in this first meeting, it is well accepted here that Thieu made (deleted) his answer contingent on his consulting other members of the Vietnamese government.
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Vietnamese sources now argue that the American officials here should have known Thieu could not repeat not have made the decision by himself on October 16, because Article 39 of the Vietnamese Constitution obliges the President to secure agreement of the two-house legislature on matters regarding war and peace.
"But, the Americans tried to steamroller the price (deleted) package through Thieu in a matter of hours the very first day," one Vietnamese explained. (deleted) It was clear "this time, the Americans did not repeat not care about the constitutional process after all they pains they had gone through to initiate it here."
Vietnamese officials and Western diplomats also believe that the American officialdom and Hanoi had made the peace package deal among (deleted) themselves first--and then presented it to Thieu, with the South Vietnamese government become the last party to know its contents which vitally effected its own future.
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Vietnamese sources in touch with the Palace discussions said the Vietnamese officials did not repeat not come to any agreement on the "our side-your side" formula because "Bunker did not care to carry the matter through. (deleted) Once he mentioned it in the Palace discussions, Ky said in effect--our side is like a soccer team. We have to have a captain and a spokesman. Who's the captain and who's the spokesman. The Americans declined to go into it and that was the end of our side-your side.
"Bunker did say," the Vietnamese source continued "that on our side, we would avoid the problem of having the NLF as a separate entity, and instead of having a triangular conference (with Hanoi, U. S. and Saigon), we would have a bilateral one (Allies versus Communists). But, the Americans had left that vague. They never went into detail. For Bunker to say there was agreement with the Vietnamese on this is at least an exaggeration. "Bunker never told us (deleted) the NLF would come to Paris as an independent delegation."
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(deleted) One pro-American diplomat assessed the confusion this way, "Bunker stretched diplomatic language to the brink without telling an outright lie."
The Bunker versions also minimizes from the significance of the (deleted) cable from Ambassador Pham Dangler (deleted) in Paris on October 29--when the Palace session turned into pandemonium, (deleted) this American version holds that. "We cleared that up later by saying there were not repeat not disagreements between Harriman and Bunker. We confirmed what Bunker had side to the South Vietnamese government. This was a difficulty in communications. Lam had not repeat not been fully informed at the discussion in Paris had no repeat no bearing on the final outcome (deleted) here (in Saigon)."
However, even Americans in a position to know said there were discrepancies between what Harriman was telling the South Vietnamese delegation in Paris and what Bunker was telling them in Saigon--and official American cable traffic at the time mentioned these discrepancies.
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Thieu had sent (deleted) a cable to Lam in Paris after his first meeting with Bunker on October 16, telling him to see Harriman and find out what was happening. "Harriman treated Lam like a pickpocket," one Vietnamese source explained. "And told him the Saigon government knew all about the deal. Lam hotfooted it to Saigon--only to find out the Thieu government was as much in the dark as he was." Lam made several Paris-Saigon trips during the three week period and in Saigon he reportedly told an associate, "Harriman did not repeat not treat me like a puppy--he treated me like a scabby dog."
(deleted) The confusion in Paris seemed to have influenced significantly Thieu's final decision. Lam's cables to the Foreign Ministry here indicate that the "our-side your side" formula never got beyond disagreements on arrangment of the Allied side. --until the pivotal cable on October 29 saying the NLF would be a separate delegation.
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Part of the over-all confusion seemd to arise because at one (deleted) time the American-South Vietnamese delegations would have been merged on "our side"--implying the Communist Hanoi-NLF delegation also would have been merged. In one of Lam's cables, he said Philip (deleted) Habib of the American delegation in Paris told him the (deleted) Allied delegation would have American and South Vietnamese co-chairman, but Harriman later contradicted this saying there would be only one chairman--and that would be an American.
(deleted) Currently in Saigon, only some of the facts--and many-splendored versions of the facts--are now in focus here. Some, such as what actually transpired in the pivotal discussions with Lam in Paris, may never be fully unraveled. For, as the Vietnamese adage goes, "History is like a river (deleted) splashing towards the sea and it never (deleted) flows back again."
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Date
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1968, Nov. 8
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Subject
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United States--Relations--Vietnam (Republic); Vietnam (Democratic Republic); Vietnam War, 1961-1975--Aerial operations; Bombing, aerial; Bombardment; Vietnam War, 1961-1975--Peace; Peace treaties
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Location
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Saigon, South Vietnam
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Coordinates
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10.8231; 106.6311
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Size
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20 x 26 cm
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Format
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dispatches
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Collection Number
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MS 363
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Collection Title
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Beverly Deepe Keever, Journalism Papers
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Creator
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Keever, Beverly Deepe
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Copyright Information
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These images are for educational use only. To inquire about usage or publication, please contact Archives & Special Collections.
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Publisher
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Archives & Special Collections, University of Nebraska-Lincoln Libraries
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Language
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English