Second article about friction over the American cessation of bombing North Vietnam

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derivative filename/jpeg
363-04982 to 363-05000.pdf
Digital Object Identifier
363-04982 to 363-05000
Title
Second article about friction over the American cessation of bombing North Vietnam
Description
Original title: "palace", Keever's title: "Saigon Officials Accuse U.S. of 'Blatent Support' on Role of Viet Cong at Paris Peace Talks", Article draft about strife caused by the Paris Peace Talks, for the Christian Science Monitor, page 1-19
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Draft transcripts were automatically generated via Google Document AI and are currently under review. Please report significant errors to Archives & Special Collections at archives@unl.edu.
Transcript
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(This is the (deleted) second of a three-part series on the dramatic American-South Vietnamese official conversations regarding the U. S. bombing halt over North Vietnam and the expanded Paris peace talks).
SAIGON, NOVEMBER 7--The most decisive week of the Palace discussions began on Sunday, October 27, when Hanoi gave its final agreement to the (deleted) American-proposed peace package.
But, in Saigon, matters were still up in the air. The Vietnamese leadership was still awaiting approval by Washington (deleted)--and hence presumably, also by Hanoi of a draft version of a joint communique announcing the halt of the bombing over the North. The Saigon government representatives had on October 25 given (deleted) Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker two draft versions. Both drafts were variations of the original communique Bunker had presented to Thieu in their first meeting on October 16, when Thieu was expected to sign it in a matter of hours. But, by October (deleted) 23, the Vietnamese had rejected the original American communique, partially because of the (deleted) "imbalanced way of presenting things," one informed Vietnamese explained "We could (deleted) announce our decision to end the bombing--but could not mention Hanoi's concessions in return for it... We disapproved, saying this would give Hanoi a big headstart in propaganda at Paris and in the (deleted) political struggle in South Vietnam."
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Both of the Vietnamese drafts presented October 25 attempted to straighten out this imbalanced presentation, one implying more strongly than the other (deleted) that Hanoi had made some other commitments in return for the bombing halt. The American delegation, consisting of Ambassador Bunker and Deputy Ambassador Samuel Berger, accepted only the softer version, making it sound least likely that Hanoi had committed itself to any concessions. This (deleted) "monolithic" feature of the American delegation to resist changes and suggestions proposed by the South Vietnamese (deleted) the Saigon officials to become increasingly (deleted) suspicious that the Americans had already firmed up a secret deal with Hanoi and were more interested in (deleted) sticking to that than they were in satisfying South Vietnamese demands for changes. One Vietnamese who received a description of the Palace discussion wrote in his diary on October (deleted) 23:
"I have the impression (deleted) they (Bunker and Berger) can not budge a single inch on these wordings (of the communique). (deleted) It means the Americans have some sort of deal with the Communists, instead of with us. That's probably what's happened. On our (deleted) (South Vietnamese) side, there's no sign of giving in. I see everyone rallying more and more behind the President for this confrontation."
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Both of these Vietnamese drafts of October 25--of which only the softer version (deleted) Bunker accepted and presumably sent on to Washington--contained the significant--and later pivotal--provision that the bombing cessation of (deleted) North Vietnam was (deleted) jointly agreed to because (deleted) "the government of North Vietnam and of the Republic of Vietnam will start direct and (deleted) serious talks...."
This crucial phrase thus set up a two-power conference in Paris between Hanoi and Saigon, which (deleted) was the (deleted) arrangement Saigon had consistently advocated and was explicitly (deleted) stated in the Honolulu Communique of last July as a point of agreement between Presidents (deleted) Johnson and (deleted) Thieu. But, at the Palace, the American representatives said that the U. S. government also wanted to be present at the upcoming expanded Paris peace talks--so the South Vietnamese representatives agreed to this (deleted) without much discussion.
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Thus, the two-way Saigon-Hanoi talks phased into triangular talks involving Hanoi, Saigon and the United States. This sentence from the joint communique--and only this sentence--was taken by Bunker from the South Vietnamese, presumably to be sent onto Washington. This became to pivotal sentence defining the upcoming Paris talks as a three-power conference, with the South Vietnamese (deleted) explicitly telling the American delegation that the National Liberation Front could not repeat not be represented as a separate delegation, but (deleted) it could form an integral part of the Hanoi delegation. And, to Western diplomats in Saigon, Vietnamese government officials began explaining that not only did they want a three-power conference in Paris, but also they wanted a three-cornered (deleted) conference table. They believed the (deleted) geometry of the furniture would further insure them the NLF could (deleted) and would not repeat not be allowed to sit seprately from the (deleted) Hanoi delegation.
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An (deleted) caveat is needed to explain the immense importance of who talks to whom in Paris. On the surface, this is simply a procedural question for diplomats--except that who the participants are determines the substantive issues on the agenda. More essential, however, it defines what the whole war in South Vietnam is all about--(deleted) who the aggressor was in the first place. The question (deleted) affects the essential political undergirding on which rests the anti-Communist (deleted) effort of the South Vietnamese during their eight-year war and is the (deleted) foundation of the Allied commitment (deleted) to help the Southern Vietnamese.
The issue involves a stream of political reasoning--sort of (deleted) an official Allied counter-ideology to the Communists--which ripples on like this: the war in South Vietnam is largely a war of aggression--with Hanoi being the aggressor. The Communist Party in South Vietnam is a mere extension of the North Vietnamese Communist Party, with Hanoi making all the (deleted) significant decisions in the South. The Viet Cong are misguided, tricked or deceived by the Hanoi cadre into serving as "tools for the North Vietnamese Communist Party. Hence, to the Saigon government, the Viet Cong are criminals (deleted) --sort of a Mafia with (deleted) tommy guns--(deleted) must be dealt with accordingly to the state. The emphasis of this argument is that Hanoi initiated the original insurgency in the South--and by 1964, Saigon's rationale became more convincing with the direct intervention of North Vietnamese combat units.
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This anti-Communist line of reasoning also served as the official American premise for the bombing raids over North Vietnam, and the subsequent introduction of American combat troops--an aggressor was being pushed in order to convince Hanoi that aggression does not repeat not pay and that (deleted) it should call off the war in the South. Hence, if there is to be peace in the South, Saigon argues, the two sovereign governments of South and North Vietnam must come to some understanding--and hence, Thieu's forethought of getting President Johnson to (deleted) commit the American government to this position in the Honolulu Communique four months (deleted) ago.
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The Communist line of reasoning is different. They say the war in South Vietnam is a "war on national liberation" in which the aggressors are the Americans, with the Saigon government being mere puppets of the U. S. If there is to be peace in South Vietnam, the Americans must talk to the NLF--and when the Americans agree to withdraw their troops, then the South Vietnamese people will decide their own affairs, presumably on Communist terms. Hence, they maintain (deleted) the war in the South is an internal matter for the South Vietnamese. The Saigon government maintains that even if (deleted) this Communist rationale is (deleted) accepted, the Viet Cong are insurgents and the war is an internal affair--then the South Vietnamese government will handle (deleted) matters internally--but (deleted) will certainly not do it in the (deleted) spotlight of an international forum such as Paris.
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The South Vietnamese government's (deleted) premise is thus that to allow the NLF to sit separately in Paris is not merely a major concession by the Allies to the Communists. It is veritable capitulation on what the war in South Vietnam revolves around--the integrity, sovereignty and legality of the consitutional government in halting (deleted) aggression from the outside. Saigon believes that its can only lose by sitting with the NLF as a separate delegation--or on an equal (deleted) footing--at Paris and what it automatically loses is a portion of its own sovereignty and legality. Merely by sitting on an equal basis with the NLF, Saigon gives the Front the status of a sovereign government--which not repeat not even Communist recognize it as being. Or conversely, it subtracts from the sovereignty of the Saigon government. The South Vietnamese government automatically becomes the South Vietnamese half-government, only half-(deleted) sovereign and (deleted) semi-legal.
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(deleted) There, the vast implications and ramifications on this entire Allied--and South Vietnamese--(deleted) counter-ideological (deleted) rationale (deleted) hinged on the draft President Thieu presented to (deleted) Bunker on October 25, (deleted) specifying for a tripartite conference in Paris. It took four days for the South Vietnamese to receive from Bunker the answer (deleted) that Washington--and presumably Hanoi--agreed. "Although the Americans never said and (deleted) were (deleted) too discreet to ask," one Vietnamese official explained, "we assumed the Americans were exploring with Hanoi." In the meantime, on Oct. 27, Hanoi had (deleted) given its family acceptance to the American proposal on October 29. On October 28, the South Vietnamese (deleted) Foreign (deleted) Ministry received another cable from Saigon's ambassador in Paris, Pham Dang Lam, saying that (deleted) Harriman had taken him into the Paris conference room showing him where (deleted) the South Vietnamese delegation would sit, where the interpreters would sit, and how (deleted) the Saigonese should address the Hanoi delegation. (deleted) The Saigonese could refer to them as (deleted) gentlemen, instead of Mr. Ambassador, but please do not (deleted) hurl Vietnamese vulgarities at them, Harriman said. Lam cabled he thought the bombing halt would be coming soon.
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Meanwhile, in Saigon, the South Vietnamese government began (deleted) organizing its delegation to go to Paris. The Foreign Minister had already submitted to Thieu a proposed listing of the delegation, which would have been headed by Senator Tran Van Lam, a former ambassador to Australia. On October 28, (deleted) three Vietnamese army colonels, part of the military section of the Paris delegation, went to the Foreign Ministry for their visas to Paris. (deleted) They were to precede the full delegation to Paris and (deleted) one of them, a signal corps officer, was to set up the Paris-Saigon communications net. At noon the next day, October 29, Thieu (deleted) asked Vice President Nguyen Cao Ky to head the delegation to Paris; Ky weighed the decision for a while and (deleted) finally said he would not head the official delegation, but would instead (deleted) lead a "task force" to Paris which would direct matters behind the scenes, (deleted) outside the (deleted) conference.
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During this same period in which the South Vietnamese joint draft communique to the Americans was still (deleted) dangling, the Prime Minister of New Zealand, Keith J. Yo Holycake, arrived in Saigon on October 26 for an official four-day visit. (deleted) As head of a country with Allied troops serving in Vietnam, he met with both Ky and Thieu. During his visit, word filtered out from (deleted) official New Zealanders (deleted) and from the American Embassy (deleted) that everything was fixed. "They were all talking (deleted) happily about Thieu's going to Paris," one New Zealander told a (deleted) friend over dinner. (deleted) "The Americans and South Vietnamese are in agreement; Thieu is balking a little just to save (deleted) face and because of internal political pressures. But everything is alright."
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But, just what Thieu and Ky were agreeing to was again specified (deleted) in precise detail in ink, this time (deleted) in the official South Vietnamese-New Zealand joint communique issued at 7:15 p.m. Monday (Oct. 28) from Independence Palace, at the end of Holycake's visit. The communique not only specified, like the Honolulu Communique, that to restore (deleted) peace North Vietnam must "enter in good faith into serious and direct talks with the Government of the Republic of Vietnam for the settlement of the conflict." But in addition, the communique specifically bars the NLF as a separate delegation at Paris, saying: "The Premier and the leaders of the Republic reaffirmed that the so-called National Liberation Front can not be considered as an independent entity (deleted) distinct from North Vietnam in international peace negotiations."
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(Deleted) Then at dusk on Oct. 29, Ambassador Bunker entered the palace to give the word from Washington on Thieu's (deleted) draft of the joint bombing-halt communique, (deleted) which specified the three-way Paris conference. (deleted) He said Washington had agreed with the communique and that everything was fine. Ky specifically asked Bunker if Washington okayed Saigon's draft. Bunker said yes. Ky asked if Hanoi agreed. Bunker said yes. Ky shook his head in agreement and seemed pleased. Bunker said that the bombing halt would be the next day--October 30--and that the expanded peace talks would (deleted) begin on November 2.
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A rough translation of the Vietnamese response went something like this: "Baloney. We can't get a national delegation to Paris in five days. We agreed to go to Paris--but not on November 2." They pointed out that it took Hanoi more than a month to send its delegation to Paris after its initial acceptance.
Bunker and Berger both reportedly flew into "a rage." Vietnamese officials later said they felt Washinton was consciously trying to bungle (deleted) the Saigon delegation off to Paris before the American election on November 5. The Vietnamese argued they had to get passports and transport--and the Americans said, oh don't worry, we'll take of everything. (deleted) Ky, who is also ex-commander of the Vietnamese Air Force, said the official delegation would have to (deleted) use Vietnamese transport, otherwise (deleted) it would look like puppets of the Americans as the Communist had always said. This "fisticuffs" went on for nearly three hours."
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And, then it happened:
"While we were haggling with Bunker about whether we'd go on November 2 or not," one Vietnamese who kept a brief diary of the (deleted) events explained, "an aide came in (deleted) and hand them a cable from Lam is Paris. (Lam is South Vietnamese consul-general in Paris acting as official observer at the peace talks). He had had an angry session with Phil Habib and Harriman in Paris.
"Harriman told Lam Hanoi had not repeat not agreed to any (deleted) damn thing and that all your pretensions are out of (deleted) this world. Hanoi did not repeat not accept your proposal (for a three-power conference) and we did not repeat not even ask Hanoi to accept it. Then Harriman ended up with that sentence Newsweek quoted correctly--your government does not represent all of South Vietnam, Mr. Ambassador, and you would do well to (deleted) remember that.
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"Well, the faces of Thieu and the Vietnamese crumbled and the Palace broke out in pandemonium. Bunker was asked to go to the next room so the Vietnamese could talk among themselves. Everyone on the Vietnamese side was shocked at the discrepancy between Harriman and Bunker. Even (mild-mannered, sedate Prime Minister) Huong said this must be 'blatant duplicity' on the part of the Americans. Thieu said obviously someone was lying.
"Then we (deleted) showed Bunker and Berger the cable from Lam. What about this--before we decide about going on (deleted) November 2 or not. Bunker diplomaticlly said maybe Lam misunderstood Harriman. We said Lam's English isn't very good, but Habib's French is--and no one could misunderstand to that extent.
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"In funeral silence, Bunker and Berger mounted their armored car (autombile) back to the American Embassy. Meantime, all the Vietnamese ordered chicken soup while waiting for the Americans to return....One and a half hours later, they came back. Bunker handed Thieu a letter dictated over the (deleted) phone by President Johnson. Johnson said it was all a misunderstanding. Bunker is my representative at your side in Saigon. Everything Bunker says is right. I stand by him and my policy is what Bunker says."
The arrival of the NLF in Paris as a separate delegation this (deleted) week (deleted) does not repeat not seem to match up with the contents of President Johnson's letter.
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The Vietnamese accused the Americans of virtually betraying them--and, only three days before President Johnson's speech halting the bombing--(deleted) Vice President Ky said, trying to help out the U. S. government, that Saigon should still sent a delegation. But, the delegation would talk only with the Hanoi delegation in "preliminary talks" (deleted) to arrange the "ground rules." Since the Vietnamese no repeat no longer trusted the American (deleted) arrangements, they would (deleted) decide their own procedures (deleted) directly with (deleted) Hanoi. Again, pandemonium broke out in the Palace, this time Bunker and Berger "virtually accusing the Vietnamese of betraying them."
And, if you don't like the way (deleted) the Communists agree to the ground rules, you'll come back home, Berger reportedly asked.
"What do you think," Ky shot back
(deleted)
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Berger had previously hinted that if Saigon dragged its feet, then Johnson would go ahead with out their approval and the joint bombing-halt communique. Thieu replied the Vietnamese could not prevent President Johnson from doing what he wanted.
With the fragments from the Palace explosion still flying, bunker left the Palace with the entire issue (deleted) all night-session during the early morning hours with the issues still in mid-air. And, there were still more fireworks to come.
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Date
1968, Nov. 7
Subject
United States--Relations--Vietnam (Republic); Mặt trận dân tộc giải phóng miền nam Việt Nam; Vietnam War, 1961-1975--Peace; Peace treaties
Location
Saigon, South Vietnam
Coordinates
10.8231; 106.6311
Size
20 x 26 cm
Container
B10, F39
View Folder in ArchivesSpace
Format
dispatches
Collection Number
MS 363
Collection Title
Beverly Deepe Keever, Journalism Papers
Creator
Keever, Beverly Deepe
Copyright Information
These images are for educational use only. To inquire about usage or publication, please contact Archives & Special Collections.
Publisher
Archives & Special Collections, University of Nebraska-Lincoln Libraries
Language
English