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derivative filename/jpeg
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363-04982 to 363-05000.pdf
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Digital Object Identifier
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363-04982 to 363-05000
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Title
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Second article about friction over the American cessation of bombing North Vietnam
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Description
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Original title: "palace", Keever's title: "Saigon Officials Accuse U.S. of 'Blatent Support' on Role of Viet Cong at Paris Peace Talks", Article draft about strife caused by the Paris Peace Talks, for the Christian Science Monitor, page 1-19
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AI Usage Disclosure
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Draft transcripts were automatically generated via Google Document AI and are currently under review. Please report significant errors to Archives & Special Collections at archives@unl.edu.
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Transcript
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zozo sag
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palace #1 (normass/deepe)
\second] [Three-part/
(This is the first of a series on the
dramatic American-South Vietnamese
official conversations regarding the U. S. bombing halt over North Vietnam
and the expanded Paris peace talks).
SAIGON,
NOVEMBER 7-The most decisive week of the Palace discussions
began on Sunday, October 27, when Hanoi gave its final
agreement to the
Amano American-proposed peace package.
matters were still up in the air.
and hence Presumably
Hanoi of
The Vietnamese
peso By
a draft.
But, in Saigon,
leadership was still awaiting approval by Washington
the
version of a joint communique announcing the halt of the bombing over North.
The i Saigon government representatives had ± on October 25 given the
Both drafts were variations
Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker two draft versions.
of the original communique Bunker had presented to Thieu in their first
meeting on October 16, when Thieu was expected to sign it in a matter of hours.
23,
But, by October
the Vietnamese had rejected the original American
communique, partially because of the " "imbalanced way of presenting
things,"
one
informed Vietnamese explained.
"We could on announce our
decision to end the bombing--but could not mention Hanoi's concessions in
return for it....We disapproved) saying this would Hanoi a big headstart
in propaganda at Paris and in the internal political struggle in South Vietnam."
==more reuter
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Both of the Vietnamese drafts presented October 25 attempted to straighten
out this imbalanced presentation, one implying more strongly than the other
than Hanoi had made some commitments in return for the bombing halt.
The
consisting of Ambassador a Bunker andDdeputy Ambassador
accepted only the softer version, making it sound least
American delegation,
Samuel Berger,
This "monoli
likely that Hanoi had committed itself to any concessions.
"monolithic" feature of the American delegation to resist changes and
suggestions proposed by the South Vietnamese lead the saigon officials to
✓ become increasingly suspe suspicious that the Americans had already firmed
sticking
up a
secret deal with Hanoi and were more interested in tiek to that than
they were in satisfying South Vietnamese demands for changes. One Vietnamese
who received a description of the Palace discussions wrote in his diary on
October 23:
250
"I have the impression & they (Bunker and Berger) can not budge a single
inch on these wordings (of the communique), and it means the Americans have
some sort of deal with the Communists, instead of with us. That's probably
what's happened. On our (South Vietnamese) side,
there's no sign
of giving in. I see everyone rallying more and more behind the President
for this confrontation."
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cessation
Both of these Vietnamese drafts of October 25--of which only the softer
version the American Bunker accepted and presumably sent on to Washington-
da contained the significant--and later pivotal-provision that the bombing
of the North Vietnam was jointed jointly agreed to because it
government of North Vietnam and the Republic of Vietnam will start direct and
sernios serious talks...."
"the
This crucial phrase thus set up a two-power conference in Paris between
Hanoi and Saigon, which is
was the arrage arrangement Saigon
had consistently advocated and explicitly mentioned
stated in
the
the Honolulu Communique of last July as a point of agreement between President S
Lynn Lyno Lyndon Johnson and President Thieu. But, at the Palace,
American representatives said that the U. S. government also wanted to be
present at the upcoming expanded Paris peace talks-so the South Vietnamese
Without
i representatives agreed to this would much discussion.
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Thus,
the two-way Saigon-Hanoi talks phased into triangular talks
This sentence from the
involving Hanoi, Saigon and the United States.
joint communique--and only this sentence--was taken by Bunker from the
South Vietnamese, presumably to be sent onto Washington. This became the
pivotal sentence defining the upcoming Paris talks as a three-power
conference,
explicitly
with the South Vietnamese consistently telling the Americans
delegation that the National Liberation Front could not a repeat not
나
Vietnamese
be represented as a separate delegation, but they could form an integral
part of the Hanoi delegation. And, to Western diplomats in Saigon,
government officials began explaining that not only did they want a three-power
more router
conference in Paris, but also they wanted a three-cornered a conference
table. They believed the gooe geometry of the furniture would further insure
them the NLF could men and would not repeat not be allowed
to sit seprately from the i Hanoi delegation.
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min palace 5 (nomras (normass/deepe)
An ort cavaet is needed to explain the immense important of who
talks to whom in Paris. On the surface, this is simply a procedural question
for diplomats--oxoopt that who the participants are determines the
it defines
who the aggressor was in the
substantive issues on the agonda. More essential, however
what the whole war in South Vietnam is all about--especially defining the
first place.
em affects the essential
aggressor
The question in
political undergirding on which rests the anti-Communist struggle which, has
sustained-the South Vietnamese during their eight-year war/fand is the basis.
of the Allied commitment during th
The issue involves a stream of political reasoning-sort of the
of official Allied counter-ideology to the Commmists-
which ripples on like this: the war in South Vietnam is largely a war of
aggression-with Hanoi being the aggressor. The Communist Party in South
Vietnam is a mrer mere extension of the North Vietnamese Communist Party, with
Significant
Hanoi making all the aggressive decisions in the South. The Viet Cong
are misguided, tin tricked or deceived by the Hanoi cadro into serving as
"tools for the North Vietnamese Communist Party-lience,
to the Saigon government,
the Viet Cong are criminals sort of a Mafia with tom tommy guns,
and will be dealt with accordingly by the state. The emphasis of this
argumont is that Hanoi initiated the original insurgency in the South--and by
1964, Saigon's rationale became more convincing with the direct intervention
of North Vietnamese combat units.
==more reuter
30
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palace (normass/deepe)
This anti-Communist line of reasoning also served as the official
and the subsequent
American premise for the bombing raids over North Vietnam,
introduction of American combat troops-an aggressor was being punished in
order to convince Hanoi that aggression does not repeat not pay and that they
should call off the war in the south.
if there is to be peace
the
in South,
Hence,
N
Saigon argues, the two sovereign governments of south and North
Vietnam must come to some understanding--and hence, Thieu's forethought of
getting President Johnson to comi commit the American government to this
position in the Honolulu Communique four months ao. ago.
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The Communist line of reasoning is different.
They say the war in
South Vietnam is a "war of national liberation" in which the aggressors
are the Americans,
with the Saigon government being mere puppets of the U. S.
the Americans must talk to the NLF-
If there is to be peace in South Vietnam,
and when the Americans agree to withdraw their troops,
then the South
Vietnamese people will decide their own affairs presumably on Communist
terms. Hence, they maintain anxanam the war in the South is an
The Saigon government maintains
Viet Cong Afe Insurgen
Accepted
that even if he this Communist rationale is used that the war is an
Mate
internal matter for the South Vietnamese.
internal affair then the South Vietnamese government will handle t
will
internally--but certainly not do it in the spot spotlight of an
international forum such as Paris.
==more reuter
A
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The South Vietnamese government's pres premise is thus that to allow
the NLF to sit separately in Paris is not merely a major concession by the
Allies to the Communists. It is veritable capitulation on what the war
in South Vietnam revolves around--the integrity, sovereignty and legality
of the consitutional government in halting aggress outside agen es
aggression from the outside. Saigon believes that is can only lose by
sitting with the NLF as a separate delegation--or on an equal foin
footing at Paris and what it automatically loses is a portion of its
own sovereignty and legality. Merely by sitting on an equal basis with the
NLF,
Saigon gives the Front the status of a sovereign government--which
not repeat not even Communist nations recognize it as being. Or
conversely, it substracts from the sovereignty of the Saigon government.
The South Vietnamese government automatically becomes the South Vietnamese
half-government, only half-sovering an sovereign and half-legal..
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Tris whole counter-ideology of official Allied positions--
thu
The in vast implications and ramifications on this entire Allied-and
COUNTER-
South Vietnamese--cart
on the
og ideological reUTORS
rationale the hinged
draft President Thieu presented to the Americal Ame
city. Ng
Bunker on October 25 for a tripartite conference in Paris.
It took ffour
that
days for the South Vietnamese to receive from Bunker the answer if Washington
and presumably Hanoi-agreed.
too
"Although the Americans never said and
we were to discreet to ask," one Vietnamese official explained,
assumed the Americans were exploring with Hanoi.
VEN
350
"we
In the mean time,
on Oct. 2
Hanoi had accepted the A gave its final acceptance to the American
the
proposal on October 29. On October 28, South Vietnamese
sxm Ministry received another cable from Saigon's
Foreign
ambassador in Paris, Pham Dang Lam, saying that inxaxmamm Harriman
had taken him into the Paris conference room showing him where he would sit
the South Vietnamese delegation would sit, where the interpreters would sit,
The Saigones
how he should address the Hanoi delegation. he could refer to them as
Hurl
Baner gentlement, instead of Mr. Ambassador, but please do not use swear
HARRIMAN
Sail
words Lian Vietnamese vulgarities at them Lam cabled he thought the bombing
halt would be coming soon.
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Meanwhile, in Saigon,
the South Vietnamese
together its delegation to go to Paris.
ORGANIZing
government began pulling
The Foreign Minister had already
submitted to Thieu a proposed listing of the delegation,
three
which would have
On
a former ambassador to Australia.
been headed by Senator Tran Van Lam,
October 28, the Vietnamese army colonels, part of the military section of
the Paris delegation, went to the Foreign Ministry for their visas to
Parish they were to precede the full delegation to Paris and
set up the com Paris-Saigon one of them, a signal corps officer,
At noon
set up the Paris-Saigon communications net. The next day,
was to
October 29,
Thieu had asked Vice President Nguyen Cao Ky to head the delegation to Paris;
Nally SAID
Ky weighed the decision) awhile and decided he would not head the delegation,
LEAD
but would insteaded a "task force"
behind the scenes and outside the confe
to Paris which would direct matters
envorence, conference.
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During this same period in which the South Vietnamese join draft
communique to the Americans was still a dangling, the Prime Minister
of New Zealand, Keith J. O Holyoake, arrived in Saigon on October 26
for an official four-day visit.
He met w
77S
Ky and Thieu, being
head of a country with) troops serving in Vietnam, he met with both Ky and
During his visit, word filtered out from me official New Zealanders
Thieu.
demo and from
the American Embassy too that everything was fixed.
"They were all talking
hapity happily about Thieu's going to Paris," one New Zealander told a
A friend over dinner.
in agreement;
the
A Americans and South Vietnamese are
Thieu is balking a little just to save face and because
of internal political pressures.
But everything is alright."
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But, just what Thieu and Ky were agreeing to was again specified
in in precise detail in ink, this time in the official South
Vietnamese-New Zealand joint communique issued at 7:15 p.m. Monday from
Independence Palace, at the end of Holyoake's visit. The communique
that to restore powe
not only specified, like the Honolulu Communique,
peace North Vietnam must "enter in fo good faith into serious and
direct talks with the Government of the Republic of Vietnam for the settlement
But
of the conflict. " In addition, the communique specifically bars the
NLF as a separate delegation at Paris, saying: "The Premier and the leaders
of the Republic reaffirmed that the so-called National Liberation Front
can not be considered as an independent entity distiet distinct from
North Vietnam in international peace negotiations."
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the
then at dusts on Oct. 29.
Just an hour and half before the new zealander joint communique-with-
the Polone
Offiorally
Ambassador Bunker entered to give the
word from Washington on Thieu's xpunger draft of the joint bombing
spe which specified a three-way Paris conference. three
halt communique,
Power Part
conference inelutting Hanoi, Saigon alid
He said
Washington had agreed with the communique and that everything was fine.
Ky specifically asked Bunker if Washington okayed Saigon's draft.
said yes. Ky asked if Hanoi agreed.
head in agreement and seemed pleased.
Bunker
Bunker said yes.
Ky shook his
Bunker said that the bombing halt
would be the next day--October 30--and that the expanded peace talks would
begin
being on November 2.
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"Baloney.
We can't get a national delegation to Paris in five days.
They pointed out that it
aggreed to go to Paris-but not on November 2."
took Hanoi more than a month to send its delegation to Paris after its
A rough translation of theV Vietnamese response went something like this:
We
initial acceptance!!
Vietnamese
Bunker and Berger both reportedly flew into "a rage."
officials later said they felt Washington was consciously trying to bundle
the Saigon delegat
them off to Paris before the American election on November 5.
The Vietnamese
oh
argued they had to get passports and transport-and the Americans said,
we'll take of everything. I Ky, who also ex-commander of the
Vietnamese Air Force, said the official delegation would have to e
don't worry,
use
it
Vietnamese transport, otherwise the Saigon delegation would look
HAD AQWAYS
like puppets of the Americans as the Communist said.
went on for nearly three hours."
This "fisticuffs"
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And, then it happened!
"While
we were haggling with Bunker about whether we'd go on November
2 or not," one Vietnamese who kept a brief diary of the went event explained,
AND HAND the
mmm
"an aide came in-th a cable from Lam in Paris.] (South Vietnamese consul-
general in Paris acting as official observer at the peace talks). He had had
an angry session with Phil Habib and Harriman in Paris.
DAMN
and we did
"Harriman told Lam Hanoi had not repeat not agreed to any on thing
this
and that all your pretensions are out of the world. Hanoi did not
repeat not accept your proposal (for a three-power conference)
not repeat not even ask Hanoi to as accept it. Then Harriman ended up
with that sentence Newsweek quoted correctlyyour government does not
represent all of South Vietnam, Mr. Ambassador, and you would do well
to rembe remember that.
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"Well, the faces of Thieu a nd the Vietnamese crumbled and the Palace
broke out in pandemonium. Bunker was asked to go to the next room
so the Vietnamese could talk among themselves. Everyone on the Vietnamese
side was shocked at the discrepancy between Harriman and Bunker. Even
(mild-mannered, sedate Prime Minister) Huong said this must be blatant
duplicity' on the part of the Americans. Thieu said obviously someone was
lying.
"Then we showee showed Bunker and Berger the cable from Lam. What
about this before we decide about going on 2 November 2 or not.
Bunker diplomaticlly said maybe Lam mu misunderstood Harriman. We said
Lam's English isn't very good, but Habib's French is--and no one could
misunderstand to that extent.
==more reuter
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"In funeral silence, Bunker and Berger mounted their armored car(
(autombile) back to the American Embassy. Meantime, all the Vietnamese
ordered chicken soup while waiting for the Americans to return....One and
a half hours later, they came back. Bunker handed Thieu a letter dictated
over the phone by phone by President Johnson. Johnson said it was all a
misunderstanding.
Bunker is my representative at your side in Saigon.
Everything Bunker says is right. I stand by him and my policy is what
Bunker says. "
The arrival of the NLF in Paris as a separate delegation
DOES
this
weed week did not repeat not seem to match up with the contents of President
Johnson's letter.
==more reuter
450
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The Vietnamese accused the Americans of virtually betraying them-and,
three days before President Johnson's speech halting the bombing-Thieman
mixham Vice President Ky said, trying to help out the
U. Se governmont, that Saigon should still send a delegation. But, the
delegation would talk only with the Naxi Hanol delegation in "preliminary
@ talks" the #ground sules" to arrange the" "ground rules." Since
the Vietnamese net no repeat no longer trusted the Americans arragomon
arrangements, they would make their own procedural
mgements with the
Communists. Again, pandemonium broke out in the Palace,
Berger "virtually accusing the Vietnamese of betraying them."
this time Bunker and
And, if you don't like the way the Voith agree with the Communists
agree to the ground rules, you'll come back home, Berger reportedly
asked.
"What do you think," Ky shot back.
The an explosion
With the fragments from the Palace explision explosion still in
mid-air, Bunker loft the Palace with the issues unresolved. There were
more fireworks to come.
Bond reuter
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Previousty
hinted that if Saigon dragged its feet,
then Johnson would
Berger had hi
go ahead without their joint bombing-halt communique. Thieu replied the
Vietnamese could not prevent President Johnson from doing what he wanted.
With the agents from thef
Palace explosion still
wife left the Palace with the entire issue
There were still more fireworks to come.
Bunker
The Carly MORN.99 How
yaxin mid-aire
==end reuter
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Date
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1968, Nov. 7
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Subject
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United States--Relations--Vietnam (Republic); Mặt trận dân tộc giải phóng miền nam Việt Nam; Vietnam War, 1961-1975--Peace; Peace treaties
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Location
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Saigon, South Vietnam
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Coordinates
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10.8231; 106.6311
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Size
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20 x 26 cm
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Container
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B10, F39
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Format
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dispatches
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Collection Number
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MS 363
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Collection Title
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Beverly Deepe Keever, Journalism Papers
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Creator
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Keever, Beverly Deepe
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Copyright Information
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These images are for educational use only. To inquire about usage or publication, please contact Archives & Special Collections.
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Publisher
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Archives & Special Collections, University of Nebraska-Lincoln Libraries
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Language
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English
