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derivative filename/jpeg
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363-05024 to 363-05036.pdf
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Digital Object Identifier
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363-05024 to 363-05036
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Title
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First article about friction over the American cessation of bombing North Vietnam
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Description
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Original title "diplomat", Keever's title "U.S. Argues to Seat Viet Cong at Paris Peace Talks; Saigon Government Refuses to Attend", Article draft about disagreements regarding the Paris Peace Talks, for the Christian Science Monitor, page 1-13
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AI Usage Disclosure
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Draft transcripts were automatically generated via Google Document AI and are currently under review. Please report significant errors to Archives & Special Collections at archives@unl.edu.
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Transcript
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diplomat 1 (normass/deepe)
(This is the first of a series on the dramatic American-South Vietnamese official conversations regarding the U. S. bombing halt over North Vietnam and the expanded Paris peace talks).
SAIGON, NOVEMBER 5--The government of President Nguyen Van Thieu, during (deleted) these past three weeks preceding the U. S. Presidential election, has just survived one of the most bizarre--if not scandalous--American diplomatic maneuvers in war-time history. (deleted)
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diplomat 2 (normass/deepe)
During this decisive phase of the Vietnam war, the full dimensions--and many of the facts--are just now unraveling as to the reasons President Thieu said in his bombshell speech last week-end that he would not repeat not follow the Johnson Administration in declaring a cessation of the bombing over North Vietnam and he would not repeat not send a delegation to the next session of the expanded peace talks.
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diplomat 3 (normass/deepe)
In a nutshell, the heart of the big mix-up since October 16 was that American (deleted) Ambassador Averill Harriman in Paris (deleted) in the now-famous secret (deleted) peace package deal had made a major concession to Hanoi--but in Saigon, American Ambassador Ellsworth S. Bunker misrepresented the package deal to President Thieu and the South Vietnamese government (deleted) by glossing over the major concession.
This major American concession was the seating of the National Liberation Front as a separate delegation at Paris--meaning the expanded peace talks would be a four-power conference, which Hanoi has consistently wanted but which Saigon had vowed officially for years it would never accept. In Saigon, however, Bunker had secured Thieu's agreement to go to a three-power conference--separate delegations for the U. S., the South Vietnamese government and Hanoi, with the Viet Cong (deleted) being represented as part of Hanoi's delegation. And Bunker had told (deleted) Thieu's government had both Hanoi, and Washington had (deleted) agreed to this arrangement that Saigon had long advocated. While Dean Rusk has called the seating of the National Liberation Front an essentially procedural matter--for the Saigon government it is the sum and substance of what the South Vietnamese have been fighting against for the past eight years--because it would probably paves the way for a coalition government and eventual Communist take-over in South Vietnam.
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diplomat 4 (normass/deepe)
In short, the secret peace package deal Harriman had made with Hanoi in Paris was quite different on this (deleted) essential point from what Ambassador Bunker in Saigon was telling the Thieu government.
And, to make matters even more confusing, if not (deleted) sensational, the whole American-South Vietnamese agreement for a three-power Paris conference and joint bombing-halt communique blew sky-high when Harriman in Paris contradicting Bunker by telling the South Vietnamese Ambassador Pham (deleted) Dang Lam (deleted) there that a four-power conference was indeed in the mill, that the NLF would be fully represented and that the (deleted) Thieu government knew all about in Saigon.
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diplomat 5 (normass/deepe)
This Paris episode was the pivot which touched off the week of the big (deleted) show-down in Saigon during the last week in October. On Sunday, October 27, Hanoi gave its final agreement to Harriman's package peace proposal. Then, on October (deleted) 29, the American (deleted) representatives, having already secured general agreement from the Thieu government to go to a three-power conference, began frenetically pushing the South Vietnamese to send their delegation to Paris by November 2. (deleted) Thieu had already asked Vice President Nguyen Cao Ky to head the delegation. During a Palace meeting with Bunker, the Vietnamese were in the midst of arguing that they really could not repeat not send a national delegation to Paris on five days notice and maintaining any national composure--after all it took Hanoi (deleted) one month to send a delegation to Paris.
"Then, during this (deleted) Palace meeting, the most (deleted) unbelievable (deleted) thing you ever saw happened," one informed source explained. "In came an aide who handed Thieu a cable from (deleted) Ambassador Lam in Paris. The cable said Harriman had told him a four-way peace (deleted) conference was shaping up, (deleted) and that Saigon's formula for a three-power conference had not repeat not even been considered by Washington and Hanoi." This contradicted Bunker's statement to Thieu that both Hanoi and Saigon (deleted) were in agreement on the three-way conference.
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diplomat 6 (normass/deepe)
Sheer pandemonium broke out among the Vietnamese at the (deleted) Palace, Bunker was asked to leave the room while they discussed it privately among themselves. (deleted) Even mild-mannered Prime Minister Tran Van Huong said their there must be "blatant duplicity" on the part of the Americans in this and President Thieu said obviously someone was lying. Then, the Vietnamese en masse confronted Bunker with the Paris (deleted) cable, and (deleted) being unable to satisfactorily explain the discrepancy, Bunker and party left "in funeral silence," one source said.
The American delegation returned one and half hours later with a letter President Lyndon Johnson had dictated over the phone to the American Embassy in Saigon, Nixon 's sources report. The (deleted) gist of it (deleted) said that there had been a misunderstanding, that Bunker--not Harriman in Paris--had been been (deleted) right--(deleted) and that what Bunker said in Saigon was the American policy--meaning the National Liberation Front would not be independently represented.
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diplomat 7 (normass/deepe)
In retrospect, serious observers here (deleted) postulate that one of these two things happened--or a combination of both:
1. The top American leadership as a whole--Bunker, Harriman and the White House--was double-crossing Thieu and the Saigon (deleted) by getting Thieu's agreement to show up at a three-power conference in Paris--while, in fact, once the South Vietnamese delegation arrived it would find itself enmeshed in a four-power conference, which Hanoi had wanted. This hypothesis implies that Bunker was deliberately misleading the South Vietnamese government.
2. Somewhere between Harriman, the White House and Bunker, American top-level communication and coordination got tangled up and Bunker himself knew only about eighty per cent of the peace package that Harriman had proposed in Paris. This would imply that (deleted) Bunker was acting in good faith with the Saigon government, but was not repeat not being fully informed by Harriman and the White House. On the American side, the three principal points of contact were Bunker, Harriman and the White House; in Saigon only Bunker and deputy ambassador Samuel Berger were authorized to read all the message (deleted) traffic regarding the matter, (deleted) even the head of the Central Intellegienc Intelligence Agency and General Creighton Abrams, American commander, (deleted) were largely uninformed (deleted) about written messages.
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diplomat 8 (normass/deepe)
Informed sources report that Ambassador Bunker's (deleted) position is that there was not repeat not any misunderstanding, lack of communication or coordination between himself and the White House and Harriman. The exact relationship between the three points of contact is still unknown here; (deleted) but the prevailing (deleted) mood of Vietnamese officials closely involved with the official conversation (deleted) is much more anti-Harriman and anti-Johnson than it is anti-Bunker, but (deleted) they do not repeat not believe Bunker was telling (deleted) them all he knew either. Knowledgeable sources also report that Ambassador Bunker's (deleted) position is the Vietnamese government knew all along that the National Liberation Front would be separately seated in Paris--but they Saigon officials started getting "apprehensive" (deleted) about the sitting with the NLF the closer they got to the Paris deadline--and simply backed out on Bunker.
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diplomat 9 (normass/deepe)
After the October (deleted) 29th Palace meeting of pandemonium, the Vietnamese made one final compromise proposal. On October 31--as the Communists were shelling Saigon and hours before President Johnson's bombing-halt speech, Vice President Nguyen Cao Ky proposed writing proposal joint statement that the Saigon delegation would still go to Paris--but (deleted) would hold "preliminary" (deleted) talks with the Hanoi delegation, which would include discussion on exactly what role the NLF would play in the future conference. At four in the morning--five hours before President Johnson's speech--Bunker and his party left the Palace for the (deleted) American Embassy. The Vietnamese officials stretched out for brief sleep--(deleted) Vice President Ky (deleted) flaked out on a Palace sofa, waiting for the American delegation to (deleted) return. (deleted) Two hours later--three hours before President Johnson's speech--the American return with a counter-draft in which they had dropped the significant word "preliminary." The American argument was known to be that these preliminary talks could go on for a long time and Washington wanted (deleted) quick negotiations on substance. At that point, President Thieu said he would not repeat not sign the joint communique and would not repeat not go to Paris. Three hours later President Johnson's speech came over the (deleted) American military radio in Saigon.
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diplomat 10 (normass/deepe)
President Johnson's speech (deleted) was made on Vietnamese National Day, which many Vietnamese citizen found highly insulting; Vietnamese officials met (deleted) among themselves until noon and then, although thoroughly exhausted, which through with a full schedule of diplomatic receptions and public (deleted) functions for the official holiday--just as the American airraids (deleted) "and other acts of war" were being totally halted over North Vietnam.
Thieu stayed up a good part of the night personally writing the (deleted) bombshell speech he would give the next morning (deleted) at the joint legislative session (deleted) and on Vietnamese radio and television. Shortly before (deleted) the speech, Ambassador Bunker went to the Palace to see Thieu, but Thieu instead had the Vietnamese (deleted) Foreign Minister receive him. Then, came the (deleted) bombshell speech. (deleted) The Vietnamese officials were surprised that "Washington was jolted"--as the Saigon newspaper headlines read--and "Bunker was staggered," as diplomatic sources reported.
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The diplomatic corps was predicting that Thieu (deleted) had "caved in" under the American pressure at the last minute; even ambassadors of countries with troops serving in Vietnam had been led to believe in consultations with the Americans that Saigon was in agreement--but they were not repeat not aware of the impact of the Paris cable on October 28. These ambassadors were flabbergasted at Thieu's speech--"and they've been walking around in a daze ever since," one diplomat explained.
(deleted)
After the bombshell speech, Thieu and Ky received the (deleted) legislative members at the Palace--they all marched (deleted) ten blocks to the Palace carrying flags and banners (deleted) supporting (deleted) Thieu's position. Thieu and Ky gave (deleted) all of them--more than 150 of them--a blow-by-blow description of all the secret procedings, which hastily circulated around Saigon and became, in varying versions, general public knowledge. In addition to their reports, one (deleted) thoughtful Vietnamese who (deleted) had been close to the Palace negotiations kept (deleted) the highlights of developments during the (deleted) past three weeks in a diary. These sources, (deleted) plus interviews with (deleted) pro-Western diplomats who followed (deleted) the crisis closely and American Embassy officials, are the facts that have to date come to light in Saigon upon which this report is based.
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diplomat 12 (normass/deepe)
Once the Palace version of events started circulating, it was not repeat not long before the diplomatic set and (deleted) lower-ranking members of the American community (deleted) became increasingly startled by the reports. One diplomat summarized (deleted) reactions this way:
"The whole American and diplomatic community is becoming more and more outraged at the performance of Bunker and Co. Here was a big nation steamrolling Thieu so indecently it almost became and obscenity. For once, the Sout Vietnamese (deleted) took on the under0dog role and everyone started sympathizing with them--including other Americans. Here was Harriman in Paris making a deal with Hanoi regarding the (deleted) fate of South Vietnam--and the South Vietnamese (deleted) had not repeat not even been consulted and became the last participant to (deleted) know. Isn't this some way for the Americans to treat an ally that 29,000 G. I's have already died defending.
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diplomat 12 (normass/deepe)
(deleted)
"And, here's Bunker getting Thieu's agreement to go to a three-way peace conference in Paris, but Harriman had already sold out Saigon by (deleted) giving away to Hanoi the most important thing of all--representation of the National Liberation Front.
"In (deleted) effect, the American kept saying to Thieu 'come to the (deleted) party.' (deleted) It's like the old gag (deleted) of sending out wedding invitations and as the gifts start rolling in, then everyone tells the bridegroom, who is the last to know, and urges him to get on the bandwagon. Well, Thieu was the bridegroom in this case and the last one to know (deleted) about something determining the fate of his (deleted) country. It took (deleted) a long time for him to figure out that the Americans were leading him to a sacrificial altar--and he wasn't about to follow them up the aisle."
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Date
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1968, Nov. 5
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Subject
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United States--Relations--Vietnam (Republic); Mặt trận dân tộc giải phóng miền nam Việt Nam; Vietnam War, 1961-1975--Peace; Peace treaties; Diplomacy
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Location
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Saigon, South Vietnam
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Coordinates
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10.8231; 106.6311
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Size
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20 x 26 cm
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Format
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dispatches
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Collection Number
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MS 363
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Collection Title
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Beverly Deepe Keever, Journalism Papers
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Creator
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Keever, Beverly Deepe
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Copyright Information
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These images are for educational use only. To inquire about usage or publication, please contact Archives & Special Collections.
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Publisher
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Archives & Special Collections, University of Nebraska-Lincoln Libraries
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Language
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English