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derivative filename/jpeg
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363-05024 to 363-05036.pdf
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Digital Object Identifier
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363-05024 to 363-05036
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Title
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First article about friction over the American cessation of bombing North Vietnam
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Description
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Original title "diplomat", Keever's title "U.S. Argues to Seat Viet Cong at Paris Peace Talks; Saigon Government Refuses to Attend", Article draft about disagreements regarding the Paris Peace Talks, for the Christian Science Monitor, page 1-13
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AI Usage Disclosure
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Draft transcripts were automatically generated via Google Document AI and are currently under review. Please report significant errors to Archives & Special Collections at archives@unl.edu.
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Transcript
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zozo sag
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diplomat 1 (normass/deepe)
(This is the first of a series on the dramatic American-South Vietnamèse
official conversations regarding the U. S. bombing halt over North Vietnam
and the expanded Paris peace talks).
SAIGON,
these
NOVEMBER 5The government of President Nguyen Van Thieu,
during the past three weeks preceding the U. S. Presidential election,
has just survived one of the most bizarre--if not scandalous--American
diplomatic maneuvers in war-time history and
Prive pizate of the
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zcze sag
Jy nam
diplomat 2 (normass/deepe)
During this decisive phase of the Vietnam war, the full dimensions
and many of the facts--are just now unraveling as to the reasons President
Thieu said in his bombshell speech last week-end that he would not repeat
not follow the Johnson Administration in declaring a cessation of the
bombing over North Vietnam and he would not repeat not send a delegation
to the next session of the expanded peace talks.
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zoze sag
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diplomat 3 (normass/deepe)
In a nutshell,
the heart of the big mix-up since October 16 was that
American A Ambassador Averill Harriman in Paris had made a in
the now-famous secret pay peace p package deal had made a my major
concession to Hanoi-but in Saigon, American Ambassador Ellsworth S.
Bunker misrepresented the package deal to President Thieu and the South
B.
Vietnamese government and did not
For the major
concession.
O
This major American conĕssion was the seating of the National Liberation
Front as a separate delegation at Paris--meaning the expanded peace talks would
be a four-power conference, which Hanoi has consistently wanted but which
Saigon had vowed i officially for years it would never accept.
however,
In Saigon,
Bunker had secured Thieu's agreement to go to a three-power
conference-separate delegations for the U. S., the South Vietnamese government
and Hanoi, with the Viet Cong takin
being represented as part of
Hanoi's delegation-and Bunker had told the gen government that Hanoi,
and Washington had both agreed to this arrangement that Saigon had long
While Dean Rusk has called the seating of the National Liberation
Front an essentially procedural matter--for the Saigon government it is the
Have be
advocated.
sum and substance of what the South Vietnamese fighting against for the past
prob
would
eight years--because it gaves the way for a coalition government and eventual
Communist take-over in South Vietnam.
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diplomat 4 (normass/deepe)
In short, the
secret peace package deal Harriman had made with
Hanoi in Paris was quite different on this amitaal essential point
from what Ambassador Bunker in Saigon was telling the Thieu government.
And, to make matters even more confusing, if not se sensational,
the whole American-South Vietnamese agreement for a three-power Paris
conference and joint bombing-halt communique blew sky-high when Harriman
in Paris contradicted Bunker by telling the South Vietnamese Ambassador
Phan Lani Dang Lan the
there that a four-power conference was indeed
in the mill,
that the NLF would be fully represented and that the Thieu
government knew all about in Saigon.
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zC2c sag
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diplomat 5 (normass/deepe)
was the pivot WHICH
Slow down
This Paris episode touched off the week of the big confrontation in
On Sunday, October 27,
showdown in Saigon during the last week in October.
Then,
Hanoi gave its final agreement to Harriman's package peace proposal.
(29,
on October 20, the Americans begun representatives, having already secured
general agreement from the Thieu government to go to a three-power
conference, began frenetically pushing the South Vietnamese to send their
Txmxamingxxxhband Lamm Thieu
delegation to Paris by November 2.
had already asked Vice President Nguyen Cao Ky to head the delegation. During
a Palace meeting with Bunker, the Vietnamese were in the midst of arguing
that they really could not repeat not send a national delegation to Paris
on five days notice and maintain any national composure--after all it took
one
Hanoi two months to send a delegation to Paris.
"In came
The
"Then, during this membing Palace meeting, the most unere unbelievable
think thing you ever saw happened," one informed source explained.
an aide who handed Thieu a cable from Bam Ambassador Lam in Paris.
cable said Harriman had told him a four-way peace fe conference
up,/xm
was shaping
Segons mom and that Saigon's formula for a three-power
conference had not repeat not even been considered by Washington and Hanoi."
9
This EEE Contradicted
were
Bunker's statement to Thieu that both Hanoi and Saigon
was in agreement on the three-way conference.
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61
diplomat 5 (normass/deepe)
Sheer pandemonium broke out among the Vietnamese at the P Palace,
Bunker was asked to leave the room while they discussed it privately among
amintim Even mild-mannered Prime Minister Tran Van Huong
themselves,
said their there must be "blatant duplicity" on the part of the Americans
in this and President Thieu said obviously someone was lying. The Vietnamese 85
confronted Bunker with the Paris o cable, and Buner
en masse
being unable to satisfactorily explain the discrepancy,
Bunker and party
left "in funeral silence."
Se Sond
The American delegation returned one and half hours later with a
letter President Lyndon Johnson had dictated over the phone to
Repo
the American Embassay in Saigon, the t gist of it saying that there had
been a mas misunderstanding, and that Bunker--not Harriman in Paris-had
been been coffee right-antu
cam and that what Bunker said in Saigon
was the American policy--meaning the National Liberation Front would not be
independently represented.
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2020 sag
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diplomat
diplomat (normass/deepe)
postulats
In retrospect,
serious observers here bee that one of these two
things happened--or a combination of both:
1. The top American leadership as a whole-Bunker, Harriman and
the White House-was double-crossing Thieu and the Saigon government
an attempt attempting to get his agreement getting Thieu's agreement to
show up at a three-power conference in Paris--while, in fact, once the
EN mest
South Vietnamese delegation arrived it would find itself) in a four-power
conference, which Hanoi had wanted. This hypothesis implies that Bunker
was deliberately misleading the South Vietnamese government.
and Bunker
2. Somewhere between Harriman, the White House and Bunker, American
to top-level communication and coordination got tangled up
himself knew only about eightly per cent of the peace package that Harriman
had proposed in Paris. This would imply that Quik Bunker was acting in
not
but was not repeat being fully
On the American side,
the
good faith with the Saigon government,
informed by Harriman and the White House.
three principal points of contact were Bunker, Harriman and the White House;
in Saigon only Bunker and deputy ambassador Samuel Berger were authorized
to read all the message deaff traffic regarding the matter,
with the head
of the Central Intellegienc Intelligence Agency and General Creighton Abrams,
About Weither messo ges
were
American commander, being largely uninformed on developments.
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zcze: sag
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8/7
diplomat 7 (normass/deepe)
Informed sources report that Ambassador Bunker's publia pois position
lack of communication
is that there was not repeat not any misunderstanding,
or coordination between himself and the White House and Harriman.
exact relationship between the three points of contact is still unknown
here; boomumam but the prevailing view of Vietnamese officials closely
The
involved with the official conversations is that is much more
anti-Harriman and anti-Johnson than it is anti-Bunker, but act they
do not repeat not believe Bunker was telling the Saigon government all he
Knowledgeable sources also report that Ambassador Bunker's
knew either.
muhiam position is the Vietnamese government ne knew all along that
the National Liberation Front would be separately seated in Paris-but they
Saigon officials started getting "apprehensive" the closer they got
about the sitting with the NLF
the
and simply backed out on Bunker.
the closer they got to the Paris deadline.-
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zczc sag
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diplomat / (normass/deepe)
29th
After the October 20th Palace meeting of pandemonium, the Vietnamese
made one final compromise proposal. On co October 31-as the Communists
were shelling Saigon and hours before President Johnson's bombing-halt
speech,
Vice President Nguyen Cao Ky proposed that the Saigon delegation
would still go to Paris-but would meet maior delegatron would hold
"talks
"preliminary tans with the Hanoi delegation,
which would include
discussion on the exactly what role the NLF would play in the future
conference.
At four in the morning-five hours before President
Johnson's speech, Bunker and his party left the Palace for the Embas
American Embassy. The Vietnamese officials stretched out for brief sleep--
Poke
Viet Vice President Ky kom flaking out on a Palace sofa, waiting
for the American delegation to rett return. Two hours later, et
Two hours later--three hours before President Johnson's speech--the American
delegation returned with a counter-draft in which they had dropped the
significant word "preliminary."
The American argument was known to be
At that point,
President
that these preliminary talks & could go on for a long time and Washington
wanted egere negotiations on substance.
Thieu said he would not repeat not sign the joint communique and would
not repeat not go to Paris.
Three hours later President Johnson's speech
came over the Saigon r American military radio in Saigon.
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zcze sag
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10
diplomat 3
(normass/deepe)
WAS mode
The President Johnson's speech came on Vietnamese National Day, which
many Vietnamese citizens found highly insulting,;
Vietnamese officials
met un noon among themselves until noon and then, although thoroughly
exhausted, went through with a full schedule of diplomatic receptions and
public stonem functions
for the official holiday--just as the American
airraids overt the North re being "and other acts of war" were being
totally halted. er North VIETNAM.
Bombshell
Thieu stayed up a good part of the night personally writing the sep
speech he would give the next morning at the joint legislative session
AND
Me
batnya berore Vietnamese radio and television. Shortly before Thieu's
speech, Ambassador Bunker went to the Palace to see if Thieu, but Thieu
instead had the Vietnamese Forcing Foreign Minister receive him. Then,
came the speech bombshell speech, the Vietnamese officials were
suu surprised that the "Washington was jolted"-as the Saigon newspaper
headlines read and "Bunker was staggered," as diplomatic sources reported.
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zcze sag
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1*
diplomat (normass/deepe)
HAD Card
The diplomatic corps was predicting that Thieu would wave in under the
American pressure at the last minutes even ambassadors of countries with
troops serving in Vietnam had been ledd to believe in consultations with
the Americans that Saigon was in agreement--but they were not repeat not
aware of the impact of the Paris cable on October 28. These ambassadors
were flabbergasted at del Thieu's speech--"and they've been walking around
in a daze ever since," one diplomat explained,
After Thienia speech at the legislature
After the bombshell speech, Thieu and Ky received the two-house
Lekelere legislative members at the Palace--they all marched banners
flying about ten blocks to the Palace carrying flags and banners sup
All
supporting The Thieu's position. Thieu and Ky gave tirem
of them--more than 150 of them--a blow-by-blow description of all the secret
procedings, which hastily circulated around Saigon and became, in
varying versions, general public knowledge. In addition to their reports,
Hought frotan
HAD B
one
lawer Vietnamese who was close to the Palace negotiations kept
the highlights of developments during the three wedka past three weeks
in a diary. These sources, please plus interviews with diplom
CAS.S
pro-Western diplomats who followed developments closely and American Embassy
officials, are the facts that have to date come to light in Saigon upon
which this report is based.
#mor
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zczc sag
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12
diplomat 1 (normass/deepe)
Once the Palace version of events started circulating,
it was not
King
repeat not long before the diplomatic set and embers other members of the
American community Dear becomin more and more startled by the Fr reports.
One diplomat summarized their reactions this was way:
"The whole American and diplomatic community is becoming more and more
outraged at the performance of Bunker and Co. Here was a big nation
streamrolling Thieu so indecently it almost became an obscenity.
For once,
the South Vietnamese a took on the under-dog role and everyone started
bim sympathizing with them.
ding
Here was Harriman in Paris making a deal
with Hanoi regarding the future fate of South Vietnam--and the south Vietnamese
had had not repeat not even been consulted and became the last participant
to K know. Isn't this some way for the Americans to treat an ally that
29,000 G. I's have already died defending.
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diplomat 12 (normass/deepe)
"And, here's Bunker getting Thieu agreement to go to a three-way
peace conference in Paris, but Harriman had already sold out Saigon by
giving to Hanoi the giving away to Hanoi the most important thing of all-
representation of the National Liberation Front.
"In effect, the American kept saying to Thieu 'come to the pay
party.'
wedding of sending out wedding invitations
It's the story old at gag of It's like the old gag e
and as the gifts start rolling
who is the last to know,
in then everyone tells the bridegroom,
and
urging him to get on the bandwagon. Well, Thieu was the bridegroom
about someth
in this case and the last one to know at the fate of his hole country.
for Him
It took him a long time to figure out that the Americans were leading him
to a sacrificial altar--and he wasn't about to follow them up the aisle."
==end reuter
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Date
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1968, Nov. 5
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Subject
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United States--Relations--Vietnam (Republic); Mặt trận dân tộc giải phóng miền nam Việt Nam; Vietnam War, 1961-1975--Peace; Peace treaties; Diplomacy
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Location
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Saigon, South Vietnam
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Coordinates
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10.8231; 106.6311
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Size
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20 x 26 cm
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Container
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B10, F39
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Format
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dispatches
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Collection Number
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MS 363
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Collection Title
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Beverly Deepe Keever, Journalism Papers
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Creator
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Keever, Beverly Deepe
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Copyright Information
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These images are for educational use only. To inquire about usage or publication, please contact Archives & Special Collections.
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Publisher
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Archives & Special Collections, University of Nebraska-Lincoln Libraries
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Language
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English
