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derivative filename/jpeg
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363-04940 to 363-04954.pdf
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Digital Object Identifier
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363-04940 to 363-04954
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Title
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Article about the Central Office for South Vietnam
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Description
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Original title: "COSVN", Keever's Title: "Headquarters of the Communist Party of South Vietnam (COSVN) Rules in the Deep Jungle from an Underground City of Bunkers", Article draft about the headquarters of the communist movement in South Vietnam and its purpose and activities, for the Christian Science Monitor, page 1-15
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AI Usage Disclosure
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Draft transcripts were automatically generated via Google Document AI and are currently under review. Please report significant errors to Archives & Special Collections at archives@unl.edu.
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Transcript
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B. A. Deepe
38, Vo Tanh
Saigon, Vietnam
November 16, 1968
COSVN--page 1 of zeepager
SAIGON, NOVEMBER 16--Under a roof of jungle canopy so thick "you can never see the sun or moon," the headquarters of the Communist Party is South Vietnam is an underground city of bunkers sprawling over a vast acreage.
The headquarters is the vital nerve center for--and a direct offspring of--the Communist Party in North Vietnam. From Hanoi and from this headquarters--called COSVN--the Communists artfully manipulate, dominate and command the North Vietnamese Army units in the northern half of South Vietnam, the Southern army--commonly called the Viet Cong--and the Southern political force called the National Liberation Front.
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Deepe
COSVN--page 2
Thousands of Communist Party cadre--as well as the 30 to 40-man ruling Central Committee--live and work in this jungled enclave situated in C-Zone along the Cambodian border in Tayninh (deleted) Province, 75 (deleted) miles northwest of Saigon. Each staff section (deleted) and political bureau of the headquarters--numbering perhaps 150 men each--lives and works in the highly dispersed bunkers constructed six and a half feet underground and reinforced on top with jungle logs. The next staff section is so far (deleted) away it may require as much as a one-hour to three-hour bicycle ride to reach it. Allied airstrikes and artillery shellings have made dispersion of Communist base (deleted) complexes and bivouack areas a general practice at this time.
"There are no houses above the ground," explained one ex-Communist officer who worked as COSVN for more than two years. "Most of the people sleep in hammocks; some sleep on beds made from jungle trees. Everyone puts up nylon covers at night for protection (deleted) against the rains."
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Deepe
COSVN--page 3
Most of the communications between sections are made by ground-line telephones, for which 90 per cent of the wire has been supplied by Communist China and the remaining ten per cent was American-made and purchased by the (deleted) Communists in Saigon. Water is supplied by wells, landing up by buckets. Most Communist cadre are responsible for (deleted) laundering their own (deleted) uniforms--generally black or leaf-green pajama-styled peasant (deleted) outfits; however, the senior central committee members, generals and colonels have orderlies to serve them food and take care of menial (deleted) tasks.
The thousand of cadre, commissars and military officers at COSVN maintain a rigorous dawn-to-dark schedule--the schedule to run on Hanoi time--which is an hour earlier than Saigon time. The daily schedule includes allotted breaks for physical exercise and a (deleted) siesta.
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Deepe
COSVN--page 4
"At 5:30 each morning, Hanoi time, everyone is awakened," said the former Communist who did not want to be identified "because my old comrades are after me." "After personal grooming, there is physical exercise and then we have a 20-minute breakfast of rice. Then, everyone works for five hours, followed by a two-hour lunch and (deleted) siesta period. Then we work for another four hours until dinner. During the day there are two breaks for physical exercise--at 9:30 and 3:30--for 15 minutes each. Also, after every hour of work, everyone takes a ten-minute break, no matter how important his work is. After dinner, those who have more work to do, do work, by the light of candles or oil lamps. Those that have finished their work can do various things.
"Some people just walk around and chat with friends. Some play chess or cards, but not for money. Gambling is prohibited. Some do chin-ups on the branches of trees, or there's a small gymnasium for volleyball, broad jump and high jump.... Once in awhile, there is a (deleted) movie or drama team performance for entertainment and there is also a library for senior cadre filled mostly in political and military books from other Communist countries; but no books from the West."
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Deepe
COSVN--page 5
He continued:
"Also, every cadre is responsible for some self-sufficiency in food production. All work on gardens of cucumbers, beans and lettuce and they also grow pigs and chickens. If there's not enough meat, some are sent to hunt for wild animals, but generally there are always three fat pigs in each pen. Each cadre can raise as many chickens as he wants and they hunt for termite nests to feed the chickens. So, to a degree, self-sufficiency is still observed, but with the intensification of bombing, production has decreased and COSVN must buy more produce."
Before and during the Tet offensive, activity at COSVN increased significantly. "all the officers and cadre lost weight," the Communist defector explained. "They had plenty to eat, but no one got enough sleep. Everyone had to check and re-check to see if (deleted) anything was wrong with the plan. And, during the campaign, everyone was (deleted) on alert by the radios or phones. After the fighting, everyone became less worried."
The Communist Central Committeeman commanding the Viet Cong during Tet was General Tran Van Tra, a white-complexioned, tiny-framed Annamese who spoke in a crystal clear voice. While Saigon was under attack, the general traveled from COSVN to Hoc Mon district on the outskirts of (deleted) Saigon by sampan, on foot or on bicycle."
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Deepe
COSVN--page 6
"General Tra was really worried during Tet," the ex-cadre who traveled with him said. "He did not say anything about victory or defeat--but he was worried about doing his job well. He lost alot of weight too. He, like everyone else, worked day and night until the mission was done. Once in awhile during Tet, the general became nervous. He yelled a little bit--not very often--but once in awhile. He'd raise the tone of voice and say 'if you do that you'll harm more your comrades-in-arms'." General Tra was (deleted) replaced by General Hoang Van Thau after May offensive.
COSVN--an acronym for the Central Office of South Vietnam--has been a frequent target of Allied (deleted) military operations; many a South Vietnamese and American commander has dreamed of "catching COSVN" and the top Communist leadership in the country. But, not have yet succeeded. Heavily defended by the elite Regiment 700, equipped with anti-aircraft weapons, the Communist Party leadership has successfully (deleted) escaped Allied capture by fleeing into a French rubber plantation near Mimot on the Cambodian side of the border. Current Allied operations involving the elite 1st Air Cavalry Division, which recently reinforced the border provinces, are expected to make another drive on COSVN soon. Occasionally, COSVN is hit by American B-52 raids, but it requires a direct hit on the bunkering systems to cause casualties by concussion; Allied artillery and tactical air strikes cause little worry to COSVN.
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Deepe
COSVN--page 7
COSVN--at the top of the Communist pyramidal apex in the South--symbolizes the great strength of a Communist organization anywhere--its cadre system.
"For the Communists, organization is the key," one informed source (deleted) explained. "And this organization is formed by highly motivated, well indoctrinated cadre who are meshed into a (deleted) dictatorial apparatus for which there is no escape and for which the West has no answer. Not one Western politician in a 1000 understands the great strengths of a Communist cadre system--and its great danger for the democratic countries. It is this cadre system that will provide the means for the Communists to seize control of South Vietnam as the American troops begin to withdraw--and every Vietnamese nationalist knows that."
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Deepe
COSVN--page 8
The evolution of COSVN--or the Central Committee of the Communist Party in the South--mirrors much of the efforts by North Vietnam's Politburo to ignite and manage the war in the South. More specifically, with much artistry, the Politburo in Hanoi attempted, with considerable success, to camouflage a subtle war of aggression as a locally-inspired insurgency--or a war of liberation. By mid-1964, however, the subtlties were shed with the direct intervention of North Vietnamese Army combat units, the growing militarization of the war away from political struggle movements in the Northernization of the Viet Cong armed force leadership.
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Deepe
COSVN--page 9
The U. S. Mission in Saigon recently released several detailed documents about COSVN, which had been compiled through lengthy interrogation of the Communist defectors, as well as from masses of captured documents. These official (deleted) studies recount that during the (deleted) French Indo-China War, the whole of Vietnam was divided by the Communists into six inter-regions. The area of South Vietnam was covered by two of these; these inter-regions represented the basic structure for both military and political control of the revolutionary movement, and each was (deleted) jointly commanded by a senior military officer who reported directly to the North Vietnamese Communist Party headquarters.
In 1951, the inter-regions covering South Vietnam were phased into the Central of Office of South Vietnam. The new Central Office was directed by a Party Committee composed of six members. Three of these are of current significance: Le Duan, First (deleted) Secretary of the North Vietnamese Communist--or Lao Dong--Party, a position which makes him second only to President Ho Chi Minh in the Party hierarcy; Le Duc Tho, the director of the North Vietnamese Communist Party training school until be became an advisor to Hanoi's delegation at the Paris peace talks; and Pham Hung, a member of the North Vietnamese Politburo, a North Vietnamese deputy premier--and a recent returnee to South Vietnam to assume a senior post in COSVN.
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Deepe
COSVN--page 10
After the 1954 (deleted) Geneva Americans were signed ending the French Indo-China war and dividing Vietnam into North and South, COSVN was dissolved as such and the inter-regions again re-instituted on a reduced scale. Le Duan remained as head of the apparatus in the South, however, with Pham Hung as his deputy. Le Duan was also political commissar of the South's regional armed forces, which was commanded by Van Tien Dung, who is now chief-of-staff of the (deleted) armed forces in (deleted) North Vietnam. Nguyen Van Vinh, now head of the North Vietnamese Communist Party's Reunification Department, served as (deleted) secretary to Le Duan.
Party activities in the South at this time were mainly in the form of covert "political struggle". Le Duan pressed for the parallel development of the "armed struggle." By 1958, according to a high-level cadre and captured documents, "the majority of the Pary members and cadres felt it was necessary to launce immediately an armed struggle." In May 1959, the Politburo of the North Vietnamese Communist (Lao Dong) Party announced a decision to for war against the south, Following trips by President Ho Chi Minh to Moscow and Peking to secure international Communist support, the historic Third Party Congress of the North Vietnamese Communist Party in the fall of 1960 paved the (deleted) way for the war in the South. At the Party Congress, Le Duan performed the most important function of delivering the political report and Le Duc Tho delivered the report on the amendment of the party (deleted) statutes. This Party Congress was the curtain-raiser to the Communist Party campaign of subversion and terror in the South.
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Deepe
COSVN--page 11
The historic resolution adopted by the Third Congress on September 10 stated the intent "to (deleted) liberate South Vietnam" and said "out people there must strive to establish a united bloc of workers, peasants and soldiers to bring into being a broad national united front directed against the U. S.-Diem clique and based on the worker-peasant alliance."
At the same time, the Congress elected about a dozen South and Central Vietnamese as secret members of the Party Central Committee in the North. These members were subsequently assigned to the South or were confirmed in positions of leadership already held there.
One hundred and one days after the Party Congress, the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam was brought into being on December 20th, as a federation of separate association for farmers, workers, women, youth and many other groups. Two months later, a unification of insurgent forces gave birth to what is now called the South Vietnamese Liberation Army--commonly called the Viet Cong. Later in 1961, COSVN was re-established. Since then, all members of the COSVN executive committee have also been members of the Central Committee of the Lao Dong (deleted) (Communist) Party in Hanoi. In addition, most senior officers at COSVN and the headquarters of the Liberation Army are also members of the North Vietnamese Army's high command.
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Deepe
COSVN--page 12
At the time COSVN was re-created in 1961, it became the central organ of the Southern branch of the Communist Party in the North. But, it soon became apparant to the Communists that a stronger Communist organization was needed--and that foreign communism, even of the Lao Dong brand, was strategically unsound. So, in late December, 1961, the People's Revolutionary Party (deleted) (PRP) a new, Communist organization for the South was established to replace--or supplant--the Southern branch of the Lao Dong Party in the North.
For the first months of its existence the (deleted) PRP continued to employ the liaison net and other channels of communication established by its predecessor, the southern wing of the Lao Dong Party. Its pipeline into North Vietnam was by means of the Lao Dong apparatus and the Party itself appeared to be its chief sponsor in Hanoi. In 1963, however, there was established a special group in Hanoi, called the Committee for Supervision of the South, which among other things, administered the PRP. This committee also was headed by Le Duc Tho--now serving (deleted) at the Paris peace talks.
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Deepe
COSVN--page 13
Publicly, North Vietnam pictured the PRP as simply an indigenous southern proletarian party. However, internally, to Northern Lao Dong members, Hanoi leaders explained that the PRP was simply a continuation of the older party. A captured Lao Dong cadre (deleted) document turned over to the International Control Commission by the South Vietnamese government in 1962 declared that:
"In regard to the foundation of the People's Revolutionary Party of South Vietnam, the creation of this party is only a matter of strategy; it needs to be explained within the party; and, to deceive the enemy, it is necessary that the new party be given the outward appearance corresponding to a division of the party into two and the foundation of a new party, so that the enemy cannot use it in his propaganda."
(deleted) It also stated: "Within the party, it is necessary to explain the founding of the People's Revolutionary Party has the purpose of isolating the Americans and the Ngo Dinh Diem regime, and to counter their accusations of an invasion of the South by the North. It is a means of supporting our sabotage of the Geneva agreement, of advancing the plan of the South, and at the same time permitting the Front for Liberation of the South to (deleted) recruit new adherents...."
Another portion of the (deleted) circular reads: "The People's Revolutionary Party has only the appearance of an independent existence; actually, our party is nothing but the Lao Dong Party of Vietnam, unified from North to South, under the direction of the central executive committee of the party, the chief of which is President Ho..."
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Deepe
COSVN--page 14
Over the years the PRP cadres have been under instructions to mute the socialist-communist theme; in the South, it insists to the Vietnamese people it is not communist but Marxist-Leninist, indicating philosophic, ideological, but not political allegiance and implying sort of national communism without outside ties. However, the shift from clandestine to active communist participation in the southern struggle would seem to carry with it certain inherent negative factors, especially with respect to the image presented abroad. Previous to 1962 the National Liberation Front propagandists (deleted) had been conspicuously silent on communism in the south. But, the needs for the formation of the (deleted) PRP seemed to outweigh its disadvantages.
Authorities cite at least four reasons for the formation of the PRP. First, the stated reason--the revolution needed a better engine. It needed a tighter, more centralized organization and more effective leadership. Second, there was a need for stronger (deleted) ideological content, to help explain the revolution to itself and help hold it together. Communism was the doctrinal cement. But communism without a communist party was unworkable. Third, it was necessary better to support (deleted) communist followers in the south. Fourth, there was the fear by the North Vietnamese leadership that the revolution might turn bougeois, as it continually threatened to do, especially among the provincial farmers with their narrow range of interest when little beyond land reform. The PRP formed an automatic pilot that would keep the revolution on the track and going the whole route.
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Deepe
COSVN--page 15
The organizational structure of the PRP closely resembled that of the National Liberation Front, a requirement imposed by the fact that the (deleted) PRP was designed to be an integral part of the front organization. Vertically the Communist Party structure runs, like a step-ladder, from the Central Committee downward five rounds, or echelons: (deleted) region, (deleted) province, district, village/hamlet and the three-man cell. Laterally, from (deleted) each echelon, the party committee is enmeshed in--and the (deleted) controlling element of--two other structures, the Viet Cong armed forces and the National Liberation Front and its satellite organization. The functions of the PRP Central (deleted) Committee and its (deleted) five subordinate echelons are three-fold: military commissar work, manipulation of the National Liberation Front and general administration. Thus far, the PRP and COSVN seem to have little to do with the North Vietnamese army units operating in South Vietnam; these North Vietnamese army elements are apparently maintain their own exclusive chain of command directly to Hanoi. Also, (deleted) the Viet Cong military headquarters which exercises command of main forces, local forces and guerrilla units, is subordinate to COSVN, but can also apparently communicate directly to the North Vietnamese High Command in Hanoi.
==end
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Date
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1968, Nov. 16
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Subject
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Dảng Nhân Dân Cách-Mạng; Đảng cộng sản Việt Nam. Trung ương cục miền Nam. Văn phòng; Communism--Vietnam; Mặt trận dân tộc giải phóng miền nam Việt Nam; Guerilla warfare; Vietnam War, 1961-1975--Vietnam (Democratic Republic); Đảng lao động Việt Nam
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Location
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Saigon, South Vietnam
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Coordinates
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10.8231; 106.6311
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Size
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20 x 26 cm
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Format
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dispatches
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Collection Number
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MS 363
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Collection Title
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Beverly Deepe Keever, Journalism Papers
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Creator
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Keever, Beverly Deepe
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Copyright Information
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These images are for educational use only. To inquire about usage or publication, please contact Archives & Special Collections.
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Publisher
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Archives & Special Collections, University of Nebraska-Lincoln Libraries
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Language
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English