-
derivative filename/jpeg
-
363-04940 to 363-04954.pdf
-
Digital Object Identifier
-
363-04940 to 363-04954
-
Title
-
Article about the Central Office for South Vietnam
-
Description
-
Original title: "COSVN", Keever's Title: "Headquarters of the Communist Party of South Vietnam (COSVN) Rules in the Deep Jungle from an Underground City of Bunkers", Article draft about the headquarters of the communist movement in South Vietnam and its purpose and activities, for the Christian Science Monitor, page 1-15
-
AI Usage Disclosure
-
Draft transcripts were automatically generated via Google Document AI and are currently under review. Please report significant errors to Archives & Special Collections at archives@unl.edu.
-
Transcript
-
--------------------
- Page 1
--------------------
B. A. Deepe
38. Vo Tanh
Saigon, Vietnam
November 16, 1968
COSVN-page 1 of zeepager
SAIGON, NOVEMBER 16--Under a roof of jungle canopy so thick "you can
never see the sun or moon," the headquarters of the Communist Party
in South Vietnam is an underground city of bunkers sprawling over a
vast acreage.
The headquarters is the vital nerve center for--and a direct
offspring of--the Communist Party in North Vietnam.
From Hanoi and
from this headquarters--called COSVN-the Communists artfully manipulate,,
dominate and command the North Vietnamese Army units in the northern half
of South Vietnam, the Southern army-commonly called the Viet Cong--and
the Southern political force called the National Liberation Front.
(More)
--------------------
- Page 2
--------------------
Deepe
COSVN page 2
75-nive
Thousands of Communist Party cadre-as well as the 30 to 40-man
ruling Central Committee-live and work in this jungled enclave situated
in C-Zone along the Cambodian border in Tayninh Prove Province,
miles northwest of Saigon. Each staff section taxique and
political bureau of the headquarters--numbering perhaps 150 men each---
lives and works in a the highly dispersed bunkers constructed six and a
ha lf feet underground and reinforced on top with jungle logs. The next
-one-hour to
staff section is so far awed away it may require as much as a three-hour
Allied airstrikes and artillery shellings
bicycle ride to reach it
have made dispersion of Communist base
complexes and bivouack areas a
general practice at this time.
"There are no houses above the ground,"
explained
one ex-Communist officer
"Most of the people sleep
who worked at COSVN for more than two years.
in hammocks; some sleep on beds made from jungle trees. Everyone puts
up nylon covers at night for protection ag
==more reuter
against the rains."
--------------------
- Page 3
--------------------
Deepe
COSVN page 3
Most of the communications between sections are made by ground-line
telephones,
LAUNDERING
for which 90 per cent of the wire has been supplied by Communist
China and the remaining ten per cent was American-made and purchased by the
Com Communists in Saigon. Water is supplied by wells, ladled up by
buckets. Most Communist cadre are responsible for lunching their own unirom
uniforms generally black or leaf-green pajama-styled peasant outs outfits;
however,
the senior central committee members, generals and colonels have
orderlies to serve them food and take care of menial tek tasks.
The thousands of cadre, commissars and military officers at COSVN
maintain a rigorous dam-to-dark schedule--the schedule is run on Hanoi time
which is an hour earlier than Saigon time. The daily schedule includes
siesta.
allotted breaks for physical exercise and a seista.
(More)
--------------------
- Page 4
--------------------
Deepe
COSVN--page 4
"At 5:30 each morning,
Hanoi time,
everyone is awakened, " said the
former Communist who did not want to be identified "because my old comrades
are after me." "After personal grooming,
there is physical exercise and
then we have a 20-minute breakfast of rice. Then, everyone works for five
siesta
hours, followed by a two-hour lunch and seisa seista period.
Then we
work for another four hours until dinner. During the day there are two
breaks for physical exercise--at 9:30 and 3:30-for 15 minutes each. Also,
after every hour of work, everyone takes a ten-minute break, no matter
how important his work is. After dinner, thos who have more work to do,
do work by the light of candles or oil lamps. Those that have finished their
work can do various things.
"Some people just walk around and chat with friends.
of cards, but not for money.
Gambling is prohibited.
Some play chess C
Some do chin-ups
on the branches of trees, or there's a small
gymnasium for volleyball,
broad jump and high jump....Once in awhile, there is a move movie or a
drama team performance for entertainment
and there is also a library for
senior cadre filled mostly with political and military books from other
Communist countries; but no books from the West.
==more
--------------------
- Page 5
--------------------
Deepe
COSVN--page 5
He continued:
" Also,
production.
every cadre is responsible for some self-sufficiency in food
All work on gardens of cucumbers, beans and lettuce and they
also grow pigs and chickens. If there's not enough meat, some are sent to
hunt for wild animals, but generally there are always three fat pigs in
Each cadre can raise as many chickens as he wants and they hunt
So, to a degree, self-sufficiency
each pene
for termite nests to feed the chickens.
is still observed, but with the intensification of bombing, production has
decreased and COSVN must buy more produce."
Before and during the Tet offensive, activity at COSVN increased
significantly.
"all the officers and cadre lost weight," the Communist
defector explained. "They had plenty to eat, but no one got enough sleep.
Everyone had to check and re-check to see if exx anything was wrong with
the plan. And,
everyone was xxx on alert by the
during the campaign,
radios or phones.
After the fighting,
everyone became less worried."
The Communist Central Committeeman commanding the Viet Cong during Tet
was General Tran Van Tra, a white-complexioned, tiny-framed Annamese who
spoke in a crystal clear voice. While Saigon was under attack,, the
general traveled from COSVN to Hoc Mon district on the outskirts of Sago
Saigon by sampan, on foot or on bicycle."
(More)
--------------------
- Page 6
--------------------
Deepe
COSVN-page 6
"General Tra was really worried during Tet," the ex-cadre who traveled
with him said. "He did not say anything about victory or defeat-but he
was worried about doing his job well. He lost alot of weight too. He,
like everyone else, worked day and night until the mission was done.
awhile during Tet, the general became nervous.
not very offten--but once in awhile.
Once in
He yelled a little bit-
He'd raise the tone of voice and
General
ay
engive
say if you do that you'll harm more your comrades-in-arms'."
hai
Tra was killed in the latter stages of the Tet offensive on the outskirt
of Saigon.
But,
none have
COSVN--an acronym for the Central Office of South Vietnam--has been
a frequent target of Allied operations military operations; many a
South Vietnamese and American commander has dreamed of "oatching COSVN"
and the top Communist leadership in the country.
yet succeeded. Heavily defended by the elite Regiment 700, equipped with
anti-aircraft weapons,
the Communist Party leadership has successfully
exo a escaped Allied capture by fleeing into a French rubber plantation
near Mimot on the Cambodian side of the border.
Current Allied
operations involving the elite 1st Air Cavalry Division,
which recently
reinforced the border provinces, are expected to make another drive
on COSVN soon.
Occasionally,
COSVN is hit by American B-52 raids, but
it requires a direct hit on the bunkering systems to cause casualties by
concussion; Allied artillery and tactical air strikes cause little worry to
COSVN.
(More)
--------------------
- Page 7
--------------------
Deepe
COSVN-page 7
COSVN at the top of the Communist Party pyramidal apex in the South-
symbolizes the great strength of a Communist organization anywhere--its
cadre system.
"For the Communists, organization is the kye," one informed
source expizi explained. "And this organization is formed by highly
motivated, well indoctrinated cadre who are meshed into a dictaoria
dictatorial apparatus for which there is no escape and for which the
West has no answer.
Not one Western politician in a 1000 understands the
great strengths of a Communist cadre system--and its great danger for the
democratic countries. It is this cadre system that will provide the means
for the Communists to seize control of South Vietnam as the American
troops begin to withdraw-and every Vietnamese nationalist knows that."
==more
--------------------
- Page 8
--------------------
Deepe
COSVN-page 8
The evolution of COSVN--or the Central Committee of the Communist
Party in the South--mirrors much of the efforts by North Vietnam's
Politburo to ignite and manage the war in the South. More specifically,
with much artistry, the Politburo in Hanoi attempted, with considerable
success, to camouflage a subtle war of aggression as a locally-inspired
insurgenoy--or a war of liberation. By mid-1964, however,
subtlties were shed with the direct intervention of North Vietnamese
Army combat units, the growing militarization of the war away from
political struggle movements and the Northernization of the Viet Cong
armed force leadership.
the
==more reuter
--------------------
- Page 9
--------------------
Deepe
COSVN--page 9
Several
The U. S. Mission in Saigon recently released a detailed document
which had been compiled through lengthy interrogation of
about COSVN,
Communist defectors,
StuDIES
as well as from masses of captured documents. This
official staffy recounts that during the Tim French Dih Indo-China
Wa F,
the whole of Vietnam was divided by the Communists into six
inter-regions.
The area of South Vietnam was covered by two of these;
these inter-regions represented the basic structure for both military and
political control of the revolutionary movement, and each was jointe
jointly commanded by a senior military officer who reported directly to
the North Vietnamese Communist Party headquarters.
In 1951, the inter-regions covering South Vietnam were phased into
the Central of Office of South Vietnam. The new Central Office was
directed by a Party Committee composed of six members.
SECRETARY
Three of these are
of current significance: Le Duan, First sectary of the North Vietnamese
Communist-or Lao Dong-Party,
President Ho Chi Minh in the Party hierarcy; Le Duc Tho, the director
of the North Vietnamese Communist Party training school until he became an
advisor to Hanoi's delegation at the Paris peace talks; and Pham Hung,
a position which makes him second only to
a
member of the North Vietnamese Politburo, a North Vietnamese deputy
premier and a recent returnee to South Vietnam to assume a she senior post
in COSVN.
==more
--------------------
- Page 10
--------------------
Deepe
COSVN-page 10
After the 1954 Goner Geneva Agreements were signed ending the French
Indo-China war and dividing Vietnam into North and South, COSVN was
dissolved as such and the inter-regions again re-instituted on a reduced
scale. Le Duan remained as head of the apparatus in the South, however,
with Pham Hung as his deputy. Le Duan was also political commissar of the
South's regional armed forces, which was commanded by Van Tien Dung,
is now chief-of-staff of the armed forces in Vietnam. North Vietnam.
Nguyen Van Vinh, now head of the North Vietnamese Communist Party's
Reunification Department, served as sect secretary to Le Duan.
ARMED
who
Party activities in the South at this time were mainly in the form of
covert "political struggle". Le Duan pressed for the parallel
development of "armed struggle." By 1958, according to a high-level
cadre and captured documents, "the majority of the Party members and o
cadres felt it was necessary to launch immediately an armed struggle."
In May 1959, the Politburo of the North Vietnamese Communist (Lao Dong)
Party announced a decision for war against the south, Following trips
by President Ho Chi Minh to Moscow and Peking to secure international
Communist support, the historic Third Party Congress of the North
Vietnamese Communist Party in the fall of 1960 paved the
way for the
Le Duan performed the most
war in the South. At that Party Congress,
important function of delivering the the political report and Le Duc
Tho delivered the report on the amendment of the party statues statutes.
Party on Congress was the curtain-raiser to the Communist Party campaign
of subversion and terror in the South.
==more
This
--------------------
- Page 11
--------------------
Deepe
COSVN page 11
The historic resolution adopted by the Third Congress on September 10
stated the intent "to liberation S liberate South Vietnam" and said "our
people there must strive to establish a united bloc of workers, peasants
and soldiers and bring into being a broad national united front directed
against the U. S.-Diem clique and based on the worker-peasant alliance."
At the same time, the Congress elected about a dozen gouth and
Central Vietnamese as secret members of the Party Central Committee in
the North. These members were subsequently assigned to the South or were
confirmed in positions of leadership already held there.
the National
One hundred and one days after the Party Congress,
Liberation Front of South Vietnam was brought into being on December
20th,
as a federation of separate associations for farmers, workers,
Two months later, a unification of
women, youth and many other groups.
insurgent forces gave birth to what is now called the South Vietnamese
Liberation Army-commonly called the Viet Cong. Later in 1961, COSVN
was re-established. Since then, all members of the COSVN executive committee
have also bee members of the Central Committee of the Lao Dong Rayma
(Communist) Party in Hanoi. In addition, most senior officers at COSVN
and the headquarters of the Liberation Army are also members of the North
Vietnamese Army's high command.
== more r
--------------------
- Page 12
--------------------
Deepe
COSVN-page 12
At the
time COSVN was re-created in 1961, it became the central
orga n of the Southern branch of the Communist Party in the North.
ti it soon became apparent to the Communists that
organization was needed--and that foreign communism,
But,
a stronger Communist
even of the Lao Dong
brand, was strategically unsound. CPR So, in late December, 1961,
NEW
a new omgituan
the People's Revolutionary Party asformsdxhamrepiaczem
Communist organization for the South was established to replace--or supplant-
the Southern branch of the Lao Dong Party in the North.
For the first months of its existence the PROP PRP continued to employ
established by its
the liaison net and other channels of communication
predecessor,
In 1963, however, there
the southern wing of the Lao Dong Party. Its pipeline into
North Vietnam was by means of the Lao Dong apparatus and the Party itself
appeared to be its chief sponsor in Hanoi.
was established a special group in Hanoi, called the Committee for
Supervision of the South, which among other things, administered the PRP.
This committee also was headed by Le Duc Tho-now serving at the Paris
peace talks.
==more
--------------------
- Page 13
--------------------
Deepe
COSVN-page 13
Publicly, North Vietnam pictured the PRP as simply an indigenous
to Northern Lao Dong
southern proletarian party. However, internally,
document turned over to the
members, Hanoi leaders explained that the PRP was simply a continuation of
the older party. A captured Lao Dong cadre d
International Control Commission by the South Vietnamese government in
1962 declared that:
"In regard to the foundation of the People's Revolutionary Party of
South Vietnam, the creation of this party is only a matter of strategy;
to deceive the enemy,
it needs to be explained within the party; and,
it i
is necessary that the new party be given the outward appearance correspond-
ing to a division of the party into two and the foundation of a new party,
so that
the enemy cannot use it in his propaganda."
Plas
Another Item stated:
"Within the party, it is no necessary to
explain that the founding of the People's Revolutionary Party has the
purpose of isolating the Americans and the Ngo Dinh Diem regime, and to
It
counter their accusations of an invasion of the South by the North.
is a
of advancing
means of supporting our sabotage of the Geneva agreement,
the plan of the South, and at the same time permitting the Front for
Liberation of the South to recruiy
recruit new adherents...."
Another portion of the curcu circular reads: "The People's
Revolutionary Party has only the appearance of an independent existence;
actually, our party is nothing but the Lao Dong Party of Vietnam, unified
from North to South under the direction of the central executive committee
of the party, the chief of which is President
Ho..."
==more reuter
--------------------
- Page 14
--------------------
Deepe
COSVN-page 14
Over the years the PRP cadres have been under instructions to
in the South, it insists to the
mute the socialist-communist theme;
Vietnamese people it is not communist but Marxist-Leninist, indicating
ideological,
philosophio but not political allegiance and implying sort of national
communism without outside ties.
However, the shift from 1 clandestine
to active communist participation in the southern struggle would seem to carry
with it certain inherent negative factors, especially with respect
to the image presented abroad.
Previous to 1962 the National Liberation
Front propagandists he had been conspicuously silent on
communism in the
south.
But,
the needs for the formation of the
OP PRP seemed to outweigh its disadvantages.
Authorities cite at least four reasons for the formation of the PRP.
First, the stated reason--the revolution needed a better engine. It
needed a tighter, more centralized organization and more effective
leadership. Second, there was a need for stronger iso ideological
itself and help hold it
content, to help explain the revolution to
together. Communism was the doctrinal cement.
communist party was unworkable.
But communism without a
Third, it was necessary better to support
Fourth, there was the fear by the
as it
Compj communist followers in the south.
North Vietnamese leadership that the revolution might turn bougeois,
continually threatened to do, especially among the provincial farmers with
The
their narrow range of interest which went little beyond land reform.
PRP formed an automatic pilot that would keep the revolution on the track and
going the whole route.
==more
--------------------
- Page 15
--------------------
Deepe
COSVN-page 15
The organizational
structure of the PRP closely resembled that
of the National Liberation Front, a requirement imposed by the fact that the
PO PRP was designed to be an integral part of the front organization.
Vertically the Communist Party structure runs,
the Central Committee downward five rounds,
Pa
like a step-ladder, from
or echelons: tile regional
Party Committee, province, district, village/hamlet and the
three-man cell.
Laterally, from
each echelon, the party
committee is enmeshed in--and the controlling element of-two other
the Viet Cong armed forces and the National Liberation Front
The functions of the PRP Central
and its satellite organizations.
structures,
Corfu Committee and its subordinate e five subordinate echelons are
three-fold: military commissar work, manipulation of the National
Liberation Front and general administration.
Thus far, the
PRP and COSVN seem to have little to do with the North Vietnamese army
units operating in South Vietnam;
apparently maintained their own exclusive chain of command directly
these North Vietnamese army elements
to Hanoi. Also, the headquarters of the Viet Cong military headquarters
which exercises command of main forces, local forces and guerrilla units,
is subordinate to COSVN, but can also apparently communicate directly
to the North Vietnamese High Command in Hanoi.
==end
-
Date
-
1968, Nov. 16
-
Subject
-
Dảng Nhân Dân Cách-Mạng; Đảng cộng sản Việt Nam. Trung ương cục miền Nam. Văn phòng; Communism--Vietnam; Mặt trận dân tộc giải phóng miền nam Việt Nam; Guerilla warfare; Vietnam War, 1961-1975--Vietnam (Democratic Republic); Đảng lao động Việt Nam
-
Location
-
Saigon, South Vietnam
-
Coordinates
-
10.8231; 106.6311
-
Size
-
20 x 26 cm
-
Container
-
B10, F39
-
Format
-
dispatches
-
Collection Number
-
MS 363
-
Collection Title
-
Beverly Deepe Keever, Journalism Papers
-
Creator
-
Keever, Beverly Deepe
-
Copyright Information
-
These images are for educational use only. To inquire about usage or publication, please contact Archives & Special Collections.
-
Publisher
-
Archives & Special Collections, University of Nebraska-Lincoln Libraries
-
Language
-
English
