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derivative filename/jpeg
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363-06794 to 363-06804.pdf
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Digital Object Identifier
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363-06794 to 363-06804
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Title
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Fifth article about Khe Sanh
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Description
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Original title: "offensive", Keever's title: "'Hemmed-In Feeling' Grips Khe Sanh", part five of a five part series about the mood, preparedness, strategy and significance of Khe Sahn, for the Christian Science Monitor
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AI Usage Disclosure
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Draft transcripts were automatically generated via Google Document AI and are currently under review. Please report significant errors to Archives & Special Collections at archives@unl.edu.
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Transcript
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2020 sag
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offensive 1 (normass/deepe)
(This is the fxmmon last of a series on the mood,
preparedness, strategy and significance of Khe Sanh).
KHE SANH, VIETNAM, March 22-Military
sources here
are unging pressing for a king-sized American offensive operation
Communists
,
around Khe Sanh--and a possible a sweep into Laos, along the sam
Ho Chi Minh invasion trail.
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zozo sag
Jy 1jp
soffensive 2 (normass/deepe)
No one here is predicting if and when either the
Ameiroa American offensive or a sweeping operation through Laos will
take place first because the political decisions for such a mog move
rest in Washington and second because, for security reasons, military
officers as a matter of practice do not di refuse to discuss future
operations.
"We thought maybe with the Secretary of Deinese Defense,
we'd be allowed to go into Laos," one source explained. "But so far
we haven't seen anything. Laos holds the key to the Communist invasion
and to their supply lines and until those supply lines are out, we're
not going to get anywhore here. Obviously, the American air raids are
taking tolls--but not enough of to make muon different. We must send
ground troops in there to make the Communists bunch up and concentrate-
then airpower will mean something."
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offensive 3 (normass/deepe)
overtones,
American
Clearly, the military options-with their ringing political
break into these three rigid categories: to retreat,
to sit, or to advance.
1. Almost all American military leaders here-the
country's frontline hawks-follow the Joint Chief of Staff
Staffs statement that Khe Sanh should be
Pentagon's Joint Chief of
held. This is true both in their official and private discussions.
II Among the
At this time, there seems to be no consideration among military leaders
to withdraw the American Marines and to abandon the northwestern
corner of Vietnam to a further Communist invasion.
officers and men in Khe Sny Sanh, the JCS recommendation is commonly
used in jest. One officer, trapped in his bunker most of the day
because of Ino omn incoming Communist artillery and mortars, mused:
"Things could be worse. Think how you'd feel if the Joint Chiefs
kadman framdam and President Johnson ha had not said Khe Sanh would be
held at all costs."
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offensive 4 (normass/deepe)
Given its political build-up by the President's and
JCS statements, Khe Sanh could probably not be abandoned without
rather widespread, adverse repercussions inside the United States
A Marine rent retreat from
and, secondarily, inside South Vietnam.
there, however, could be camouflaged, and politically su cushioned,
xxxman using them to link up with other American
by maluans
units on a search-and-destroy operation-and then being returned
to another base, rather than Khe Sanh, later.
or din
Some American civilian officials, however,
either question
Sahy Sanh.
"At General
math the strategy an
XXXXXXX
Westmoreland's headquarters the other day, I six asked
*what is so
important about Khe Sanh'," one civilian explained. "You'd have thought
the doctor's certificate about the Virgin Mary."
I'd asked to see
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offensive 5 (normass/deepe)
2.
Continuing the present course of the Marines
sitting and waiting for a Communist assault is becoming less and
+
less militarily attractive to the leadership level here, and is
hoc likely to become ad more and more difficult politically to
hold to this line. The longer the Marines must wait before
the Communists assault-when they hot to gain a stunning victory-
the more attrition of forces, material and prestige they suffer,
without the counter-balance of actually knowing how many Communists.
are being killed or wounded by the American counter-punch of air and
artillery power.
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offensive 6 (normass/deepe)
Even within recent days,
the situation here has
the drop-zone,
where
worsened markedly. For the first time,
most of the Marines urgently needed supplies and slimmer down
from parachutes, has come under sustained Communist attacky-with
soteral several hundred rounds of close-in mortars and recoilless rifles
rounds striking daily. The supply crisis was one of the crit most
critical ones faced y b the French at Dien Bien Phu-and one on which
hinged many of the other factors leading to their defeat there.
While
the Americans are not yet in such a perilous stance, because airdrops
CAN B
are still being made, the dangerous and difficult job is picking up
MA
and moving the supplies by the ground anews.
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offensive 8 (normass/deepe)
3. Unwilling to retreat and being eroded by just sitting,
some military officials
the Americans should launch a massive offensive,
argue.
"The only purpose of Khe Sanh now is as a springboard
for an offensive," one official explained. "Khe Sanh has lost its
original purpose--we are no longer stopping any invasion,
and in fact from the tops of bunkers, we can see Communist trucks
moving along Route 9 with their lin lights on. It looks like the
Los Angeles freeway.
Communist tanks arou
The canh. "When the Communists seized the Lang Vei (Special Forces
camp on astraddle Route 9 in early February), and overran Khe Sanh
district town, the mat marine base Marines were ordered to stop
patrolling, then the Communists got exactly what they wanted-
And there's an estimated 100
in to South V. THAY
to open up their roa the roads and supply trails around us without
detection and we became sitting ducks."
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offensive 7 (normass/deepe)
one
"Charlie has changed his tactics in the past few days,"
American officer explained, referring to the Communist North Vietnamese.
"Instead of simply dumping in artillery and mortars on us constantly,
he's starting to maintain a withering blanket of machine gun and riff
rifle fire across the whole base. At some times, it's virtually
impossible for anyone on in the perimeter to stand up and get
out of their holes. As Also, before, Charlie would aim in areas,
against concentrations of troops or trucks. Now, he starting to
aim at one jeep or one Marine walking along. We're increasingly getting
that hemmed-in feeling. His trenchlines are getting so close, I can
IS
could hit them with a five-iron on if this were a golf course and for
10°
the first time rex Charlie/maintained an all-night firefight with the
Fes Marines.
We've just gotten in 1000 Bru hillsmen fleeing into
Khe Sanh e from west near Laos-which means they must be have gotten the
word either something's going to happen or else more NVA are moving in."
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-initiated
The three original arguments against an American-initiated
offense offensive were first, I American troops would be fighting in
the Communist's Khe Sanh-the miniature of defn defensive fortresses
sprinkll sprinkled dispersed and sprinkled through the jungled hills;
FIND
inch High American casualties would result.
Second, it would be
better to let the Communists assault Khe Sanh, which the Marines would
be counted on holding, and then American ground troops would be rushed
in as a reaction, giving chase to the retreating Communists. Third,
if General William Westmoreland commits large numbers of American
battalions, presumably from the U. S. Army 1st Air Cavalray airmobile
division # or from the 101st Airborne Divisions then he will be in
a weak position to react if the Communists should strike again in
northern
the coastal cities, such as Hue and Quang Tri.
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offensive 10 (normass/deepe)
their
These arguments are losing some of merit, in official
eyes, now as the Marines at Ken Allies at Khe Sah Sanh must
LONGER FAND Forge.
ve waited
voong for the attack and receive heavier, deadly shellings.
Some sources argue that a major American search-and-destroy
operation around Khe Sanh would be pointless without weel sweeping (and
perhaps dan staying) across the border into Laos. The focal location of
Khe Sanh-alway
main point of criticism about Westmoreland's h
whole strategy of holding there has forced the tactical commanders into
an impoo impossible job, they argue. Khe Sanh is situated seven miles
from the Laotian B Laos on the west and 14 miles south of the
demilitarized zone and North Vietnam.
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restriot-merican
commanders
Militarily, these two political boundaries give tactical
mmmmmmmmhain in maneuvering their troops,
especially if the American airborne, for example, is used to drop behind
the enemy lines to surprise them.
SE
artillery
Communist lines
Also, sources argue, the bupply and
bases lie in Laos; the long-range Communist weapons,
used with forward observers for visible spotting, could rain heavy
mo
shells upon American ground troops,
operating around Khe Sanh, who
would not even have the trenchlihe trenchline protection offer inside the
besieged Marine base.
ug a m法麵
"Our overwhelming military presence in South Vietnam allowed
small military presence in Laos for some time," one
"without that small Laotian presence, we
military source explained.
could not have remained in South Vietnam as strong as we have. But now,
without a stronger military presence in Laos, still not be able to
hold South Vietnam. Khe Sanh is our key to the Communist invasion--
the doorway of the invasion is Laos."
A
#end reuter
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Date
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1968, Mar. 22
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Subject
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Vietnam War, 1961-1975; Khe Sanh, 2nd Battle of, Vietnam, 1968; Siege warfare; United States. Marine Corps; Mặt trận dân tộc giải phóng miền nam Việt Nam; Vietnam (Democratic Republic). Quân đội
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Location
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Khe Sanh, South Vietnam
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Coordinates
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16.6193; 106.7323
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Size
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20 x 26 cm
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Container
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B9, F32
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Format
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dispatches
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Collection Number
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MS 363
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Collection Title
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Beverly Deepe Keever, Journalism Papers
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Creator
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Keever, Beverly Deepe
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Collector
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Keever, Beverly Deepe
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Copyright Information
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These images are for educational use only. To inquire about usage or publication, please contact Archives & Special Collections.
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Publisher
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Archives & Special Collections, University of Nebraska-Lincoln Libraries
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Language
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English
