Third article about Khe Sanh

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Third article about Khe Sanh

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Original title: "defense", Keever's title: "Khe Sanh Likened to Cheese in a Mousetrap", Part three of a five part series about the mood, preparedness, strategy and significance of Khe Sahn, for the Christian Science Monitor

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Draft transcripts were automatically generated via Google Document AI and are currently under review. Please report significant errors to Archives & Special Collections at archives@unl.edu.

Transcript

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zczo sag
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defense 1 (normass/deepe)
(This is the third of a series on the mood, preparedness,
strategy and significance of Khe Sanh, often termed a spectre of an
American Bien Dien Bien Phu, reminescent of the pivotal French defeat
which began fourteen years ago last week on March 13).
KHE SANH, VIETNAM, MARCH 18-The iron-clad assurance, made
by the Pentagon's joi Joint Chiefs of Staff, that Khe Sanh could be held
is beginning to crumble and rust amid the russet dust of this same tiny
thout some radical innovations here, an American defeat in
to is no longer an impossibility.
In a limited tactical sense, Khe Sanh is a sliver of cheese
R
in General West William Wew Westmoreland's giant mouseg mousetrap. It
obably wasn not planned that way, but, like Topsy, just grew like that.
Tha
Viton
this tactical pxx mission-on which the official optimism, such as
TUMBLED ors of staff--was explained by one company emmander who
Befs
Enough his unit was not authored do to do enough extensive
aptr patrolling to fulfill his mission, explained, "I guess the policy
is to wait until the Communists come and get us."
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defense 2 (normass/deepe)
simple official line of reasoning,
then
From thisp piece-of-cheese mission, Bx rather
never coherently expressed as such,
evolves: the Communists will be induced to ass
assault in massive Korean-styled
By
human waves. Even though the 6,000 Marines will be outnumbered somewhere
between four to eight tommemm times as many Communists, they will still
mig 777
gain a resounding victory because of them. Evenemen
Prew firepower.
Then,
volume of American
the Communists will be forced to negotiate
at the bargaining table on w somewhat reasonable, if not American,
terms and the war will be concluded.
a
In many ways,
the significance
of Khe Sanh as e pivotal b setpiece battle of war is the creation of
Presidential news conferences and General Westmoreland's press statements.
The Marines point out that "we never said Khe Sanh was the historio
HAVE
battlefield here"--nor as the Communists.
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defense 3 (normass/deepe)
Now the situation is beginning to change.
"Khe Sanh is no longer a place," one
American officer
lamented. "It's a mood. It's a locked-up, penned-in,
going-on mood."
what-the-hell-is-
Thus far, the Marine command at Khe Sanh has not changed; it
remains publically confident and optimistio that this four-square-mile
outpost can be held in the face even of a 50,000-man Communist onslaught.
"Of course, Khe Sanh could fall, if the Communists are will to pay
the price," one irritated Marine officer explained. "But, not if the
Americans are prepared to pay an equal price."
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defense (normass/deepe)
Likewise, the Marine troopers, some not old enough to vote,
DuRing
te the previous heavy
appear to have maintained a high morale
Communist bombardments they have absorbed. Psychologically, they talk
of being prepared for the worst.
"But
"We all think that Communists will penetrate our perimeter
wire if they assault," one lance corporal said matter-of-factly.
they won't be able to overrun the whole camp, even if it means calling
in American airstrikes and artillery on our own editio
are prepared to fight to the very last Marine."
trenchlines.
We
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defense
5
(normass/deepe)
Under this orust of Marine Corps heroism and official
confidence, however, lies a gathering to storm of concern about whether
In some cases,
even within minority circles of the official
this Marine outpost can be held in any victorious manner.
this consternation,
establishment, is approaching as one observer described,
"controlled
hysteria."
== more Rester..
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6
defense
(normass/deepe)
Five main areas of concern have been voiced recently about
developments in Khe Sanh.
First,
General Westmoreland's command has already
misjudged the timing of the so-called impending battle and also may
have misjudged the Communist strategy at Khe Sanh.
General Westmoreland
predicted in late January the Communists would escalate to their strategy
of annhiliation at Khe Sanh--instead they shifted their whole course
of the war into the cities and maintained their strategy of attrition
at Khe Sanh. No one is currently willing to predict with any conviction
MANNER
whether the Communists will attack Khe Sanh in the decisive bat of
the war
next
poment,
next month, ne
next monsoon--or never.
At this time,
the Marines can win the batol battle of Khe
The
Sanh only if there is a Communist-initiated battle--and then the odds
The Marines, at least thus far, do not appear
are up in the ar air.
capable of winning in any attrition contest with the Communists.
daily Marine losses caused by Communist attrition are visible to shape
public opinion in America, Vietnam and other countries.
however substantial they may be from American
Communist losses>
air and artillery barrages,
are kn unknown by American officials and are hidden from public scrutiny.
the Communists are now known to be attemping attempting to
DRAMAticle
tunnel under Khe Sanh; if th sucessful, they could sensationally
Likewise,
blow up areas of the Marine base,
PROVAR L
SENSAtional.
and gain alpropaganda advantage,
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defense 7 (normass/deepe)
More significant,
the Communist tactics in their attempt to
PREDICTED
annhiliate Khe Sanh, instead of duplicating a Korean-styled
are
human wave attack, ☐ more likely to be a carbon copy of
Dien Bien Phu, in which prolonged attrition by artillery beforehand,
and other surprises are
tunnelin underground tunneling mixed in with thousands of assault
troops.
all-out
Second, the balance of firepower-on which the hopes of an
Allied victory rests--is currently tilting a £20
the
towards the Communist side. There are several factors involved. The
Communists are currently escalating the quality--and presumably the quantity
HAS BE
of their firepower, so that 152 mm. artillery with a range of 18 miles ie
emplaced on the outer most peripheries of the base. And, the Communists
already
have more capabilities for escalation than the Americans, who have thrown
all their types of firepower resources into the battle, except nuclear
weapons.
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defense 8 (normass/deepe)
to
More significant,
the American firepower must at this time
be measured in volume--but Communist firepower is measured in precision;
W
American firepower must now be directed at the Communist mobile,
clandestine targets--but Communist firepower is currently directed
AllED
against theert
es fixed, known targets.
The failure to make
these pivotal distinctions in the firepower race led to the critical
miscalculation of the French command--and its tactical defeat at
Dien Bien Phu.
A microcosm of the problem problem facing American commanders.
in Khe Sanh revolves around the Communist .152 mm. artillery petoes
pieces, dug into the reverse slopes of the Co Rac mountain range in Laos,
and presumably dug in with only a narrow an aperture in which the gunpiece
SOLELY
is exposed only during firing periods. Repeated American airstrikes--
including massive area o bombing by the B-52 SAC bombers--have failed to
"We can not kill a gun," one air officer lamented.
dislodge the pieces. The only other longer-range American firepower resource-
EVEN
All artillery-is not positioned close enough to even see within range
only thE HEAVIES
HN
only
AT
TEKE BACK MTory. This is at the heaviest example of Cont
of the Communist artillery.
Communi
firepower
Lighter
which the American have been unable to counter. Communist
mortars and recoilless rifles only 300 to 500 meters from the Marine
base have also survived Allied bombing runs and artillery barrages.
Significantly,
the Marine artillery units lack some of the sophisticated
electronic, counter-ari artillery meen mechanisms of the U. S. Army and are
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defense 9 (normass/deepe)
COMMUNISTS)
"Every morning Mr. Charles' artillery gunners (the G
must say to themselves
What shall we practice on today? What about
Khe sanh?". "
#
one American officer
explained.
"Do you get the picture?" he asked.
"Khe Sanh is the
bulls-eye for their gunners in the hills all around us.
Rain, fog or
darkness doesn't interfere with their firing because they're already
The other day the we (the Marines)
SNEAK
zeroed in on every target on this base.
experimented by putting up a smoke soreme soreen in order to
helicopters,
thinking Charlie couldn't see the aircraft.
in our
But,
whenever
we do something he doesn't understand # he just fires at us anyway--and
is always on target.
"But, with our air and artillery # we need to have
visual contet sitings directed by forward observers--because we are not
as he is on us. SO,
zeroed in on him, a
the rain, fog and
night interfere with qur the accuracy of our firepower-but the hel
\these elements help to conceal Gehalte Charlie."
The officer, frustrated and half-muttering to himself,
com and in this case
continued, "Charlie (the Communists,
North Vietnamese regulars) is the biggest smart aleck I've ever seen.
Sometimes he does things just for braggadocio.
Sometimes he'll let a
land-bird (aircraft landing on runway) come in and take off without firing
a shot at it. But five minutes later Charlie drops a round in exactly
where the plane had been sitting-just to remind us he's still watching us."
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defense 10 (normass/deepe)
"It takes Charlie three minutes to spot our helicopter,
airstrips he
radio to the artillery in Laos and get the incoming round on the
"That's not a very good reaction.
concluded.
As a second-thought he added: "Technologically, we're
way ahead of Charlie. But still we're losing the war hain Khe Sanh."
Though high-ranking American officers are basing their
victory hopes on Allied finew firepower in the a battle for Khe Sanh,
even senior Marine officers realize and admit that both airpower and
DURING battle.
artillery may be limited in its maximum effectiveness. The artillery
at Khe Sanh is not bunkered or amesem
Communist firepower.
camouflaged and lies exposed to
One artillery commander, for example, was
trying to
astonished one day to find his crews laying flat on the ground,
CUADE
lay low-a single og North Vietnamese sniper.
FL
Kings rtillery
support for Khe Sanh is also directed from Camp the Marine base of Camp
Carroll, further east, and from the hill north "the hills" which control
the northwest passage into Khe Sanh proper. But, senior Marines are
already acknowledging that in case of a mussia massive assault on Khe Sanh,
the Communists will re rain at least harrassing fire on the artillery support
increasing
bases to as a means to increase their odds in the ground assault.
==more reuter
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defense 11 (normass/deepe)
American airpower is also acknowledged to have its
limitations, also for a variety of factors.
Currently, for example,
COVER
In principle,
there are
Marine officers at Khe Sanh want a continual airborne set of tactical
fighters above the base at all times--but this has not yet been
worked out with split-second coordination.
fighter aircraft "on station" near Khe Sanh at all times--but in practice,
they may be called away on immediate strikes into North Vietnam, Laos,
or even the ploilms pesimen as far south as Pleiku, thus leaving an
airborne vacuum above Khe Sanh. Battalion commanders also want immediate
sir reaction the split-second after the Communists drop a mortar round into
LINES
their position and the North Vietnamese position has been sited-but thus
around
far, despite the overwhelming amounts of air support i Khe Sanh,
to H
split-second precision demanded the leads
the
Communist targets
has not been coordinated.
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defense 12 (normass/deepe)
manufactured. Th
And senior Marines are concerned this precision may never be
man The recent decision by
Control
General Westmoreland that the U. S. Air Force start centreting the Marine
MARINES
tactical air fighters means to the unhappy means that their request for
air cover strikes must now be directed to the Seventh Air Force
in Saigon,
rather than to the Marine Air Wing in Danang-and even worse,
must first be approved by an inted intermediate Army command, rather than
STAFF
their own Marine staff command in Danang.
"In Korea, we had the same problem of the Air Force controlling
it cost us forty
the Marine aircraft," one senior Marine explained. "Then,
extra minutes in time before the fighters were supporting our ground troops.
Frankly, we'll be happy here if it costs us no more than forty minutes
over Khe Sanh "
Another officer explained,
could on turn to his dep
"The snor senior Marine general once
deputy for air in the next room and order more
airstrikes around Khe Sanh. Now, what he used to be able to demand from a
subordinate he must request from the Air Force command 250 miles away in Saigon."
#more reuter
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IN PREVIOUS WARS.
One of the chief features of the Marines has been their
integrated air-ground teams team, while the Army, for example, relies
on the Air Force for tactical support of its ground troops. (A second feature
of the Marines has been the integration of naval gunfire from o
voles into the fire support of their ground troops; but Khe Sanh
Navy
is out of range of naval gunfire-even when American America's first battleship
arrives here in September--which causes some irritation to the Marines).
tah senior Marines consider it
General Westmoreland's predominantly
Army command has me made "a deliberate alliance" with the Air Force as a
means to deprive the Marines control of their own airwing. "We don't like it
HUFFED
one bit and you can quote me on that," one senior officer explicaned, The
Marines also consider it especially dirty pool with the or when their ground
troops are pinned down in critical situation Snot only at Khe Sanh, but
all along the demilitarized zone. And even some junior Air Force officers
are amazed the es developments. "This Air Force-Marine in-fighting
a
goes back to
the budget,"
power play in Washington and who gets the biggest slice of
one Air Force officer mused. "Frankly, it makes me sick."
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defense 14 (normass/deepe)
Like the artillery support bases for Khe Sanh, the airbases
from which immediate-reaction fighters might be launched are also relatively
vulnerable to Communist rocket attacks, including the chief base of
Danang. Given the Communist coordination during their Tet offensive,
a massive ground assault on Khe Sanh could be synconi syncronized with
deliberate harrassing fires and rocket attacks on the airbases to prevent
air support from reaching Khe Sanh.
The giant B-52's are considered to require too much
pre-lanning in their missions to ✓✓ be of much immediate effect in
for precision bombing on specified ground targets during the cricial
critical fist hours of any massive grounde assault on Khe Sanhy reliable
sources report.
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have placed. y phony novel
North of the Marine Division base of Dong Ha,
electronic navigational aids in
the Communists
While
or for
the demilitarized zone, designed to lure unattentive American pilots
across the border into North Vietnam where they are shot down.
this does not present a substantial problem for the pilots,
Khe Sanh directly, it wou seems to indicate the level of sophosti
sophistication which the Communists are capable of and climbing towards.
The third main area of concern about Khe Sanh, related
to the second, is that the Allies seem to be less able to negate
COMMUNISTS that of the Allies.
Communist firepower than they are able to negate Allied
Stated positively, the Marine system of defense in Khe Sanh in-lean
SEEMS
les
teend more vulnerable that
Estimates
than the the official expectations
of Communist vulnerability.
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defense 16 (normass/deepe)
At Dien Bien Phu, and now at Khe Sanh, the Communists
concidently consistently negated heavier volumes of firepower by their
intricate zigzag trenches and tunnels, which contain the bomb-blast and
fragmentary Spry sprays of artillery and air ordin ordnance.
The Marine
so that a
trenchlines, however, are generally in a straight-line,
grenade could be rolled down one as though it were bol bowling ball.
More significant, the bunkering system of the Marines is
SUSTANED,
considered inauquate inadequate for the pinpoint firepower the Communists
are lobbing in. This is causing grave con is known to be causing increased
concern among upper-echelons of the Marine command--especially as the
theory grows that the Communists may not assault the base, but simply
to subject it to sustained artillery, rocket and mortar barrages.
my
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defense 17 (normass/deepe)
Reliable sources report that no where in the Pentagon's
Bom B -
Proot
wide inventory of bunkering and defensive systems is anything substantial
enough to do withstand a direct hit by a Communist 152 mm. artillery
round with special fusing--which isth thus far their most powerful
precision weapon evidenced in Khe Sanh.
In Khe Sanh only a limited number of concrete-reinforced
bunkers are presently in position, which would sustain less lethal
rooket fire, for example, and even these are inadquate in numbers for
the headquarters, prov precious communications systems and the medical
evacuation detachment.
Safely
As at Dien Bien Phu,
the American medical situation
Only three small
represents a microcism of the problems of the Marines.
bunkers have been available to the medical unit; two of which will hold
a third for emergency operations.
a total of 40 seriously wounded,
Sorting of patients is currently down above
ground itself or in unprotected tents.
Zu
ground,
either on the
A fourth bunker, ordered weeks
has still to arrive and be constructed.
MAINTAINED
Ike the French at
SAW
ago,
Dien Bien Phu, which had a bed capacity for only 44, but soon was to
see more than 30p wo 3000 French wounded thrust upon them,
the American
doctors are assuming that seriously wounded will be helicopter evacuated-
but already serious problems are arising
with
Simply getting the helicopter
on the ground and loading the te litter cases.
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defense 18 (normass/deepe)
especially by the American Army,
The orginal original charges made against the Marines,
that they had not dug in well enough
are no longer justified. The whole problem of adquate adq adequate
AD
but of the quality
bunkering is not aq question of depth of bunkers,
of heavy timbers anx and concrete reinforcements overhead and in front
The br
ANSVERS
RE
Zumpe
of the position. In short, it is a major engein engineering feat
EXP
demending demanding technical superii p supervision and management, plus
inordinate amounts of equipment and heavy supplies.
The critical decision, made by General Westmoreland's
Just
headquarters in Saigon, appears to revolve around concentrating
these supplies and talents on the sea-side flank of the so-called
"McNamara line", rather than on the Khe Sanh end of the line.
why this decision was made when the command six months later
inflated Khe Sanh as the decisive setpiece battle has not yet been
adq adequately explained by the American establishment in Vietnam.
From ti this basic decision numerous other factors have apparently
INABILITY
come into play-the negiligence on the part of the Marine leadership
and nightmarishi logistical
to demand that this collassal effort be made
and engineering problems that have prevented it. However,
PR
given the present situation, the Marine bunkers,
the
which contain no
drainage provisions, will be filled with water during the next monsoon-
17
chat en Rien Phu-and the Marine command
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defense 19 (normass/deepe)
Flay Conceivable
The problem of getting
OVERH Spport HAS
y kind of materials
for their bunkershed lead some of the more ingenuous Marine privates
FD
and corporals to steal parts of the aluminum runway to "borrow"
the Air Force sleds which onto which supplies are slid into Khe Sanh.
"One Morine came to me with tears in his eyes," one
"The kid was so shook up he could
Air Force sergeant exalen explained.
hardly talk. He told me his unit's tent had been burned and their old
bunker had been blown up. But, if I'd give him just two sleds,
his unit would fill all the sandbags they could find and build another
bunker.
"Well, those sleds cost the government $350 each and
areto
areto
be returned,
but I decided to give him them to him and I'd pay the
government out of my pocket later. He was so happy the tears were running
down his cheeks. The next day he told me how grateful his unit was
They had filled all their sandbags-
and wanted to do something for me .
and got their bunker builty
YES
"He told me, we got all our sandbags filled and got the
whole bunker built before dark,
but we
all had to sleep in he the dirt'."
==more reuter
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defense 20 (normass/deepe)
An American engineer, speaking privately, said:
"Khe Sanh doesn't have the elegant concrete bunkers and vast minefil
minefields that have been installed further east,
such as at Con Thien.
The whole bunkering defense system in Khe Sanh is worth nothing."
The fourth area of concern relates to the uncoorda
uncoordinated, "higgely-piggely" manner in which Khe Sanh grew like
Topsy, but was not systematically planned.
In addition, a hodge-podge
of units have been hurriedly thrust into the camp:
one Vietnamese
Ranger battalion, a Special Forces camp of several hundred fighters,
plus the American Marines, which comprise a wide/s array of staff
sections, ge engineering units and artillery, plus a small detachment
of U. S. Navy Seabees responsible for keeping the, airstrip repaired and
for COORDINAting
a small U. S. Air Force detachment to coor
S.
airplane passe manage passenger transport.
the air-drops and Tead
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defense 21 (normass/deepe)
From the main "downtown" area of the base,
the
"thumb" of the Special Forces perimeter popp pops out in one direct,
direction and the "finger" d a Marine unit fin flounders off in another
direction. Especially on the perimeter of the Vietnamese Ranger battalion,
one cardinal military principle has been violated-the Allies hold, the
PREVENTS
top of a hill knob, but not its "military orest" which allows the
from peering
Rangers to or down at the Communists tunneling undert their position
from the little gulley below.
Some of the American battalion, and company commanders,
whose units had seen heavy action previously in Vreen Vietnam,
expressed even more specific criticism and logrite worries about
the over-all defense lay-out, the capabor and the capability
of their whole base to remain glued together during the hectioness
of battle, especially if ofte
should be pulverized
A
on prie principal command' posts/
initial salvos of Communist artillery.
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defense 22 (normass/deepe)
Also,
While the Marines, either officially or privately, refuse
to complain about it, one may easily assume that Communist agents
have already penetrated the Vietnam se units already assigned to the
base.
In the case of a regular Vietnamese army battalion, for example,
Vietnamese officers acknowledge that an estimated ten per cent of their
troop strength are either Communist sympathizers or intelligence agents.
Some official American estimates of the Special Forces units run as high
COMMUNIST PENETRAY
Communist
as twenty five per cent.
==more reuter
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defense 23 (normass/deepe)
The fifth area of concern revolves around the crisis of
supplies in Khe Sanh. Two significant areas for the operation of the
cap camp lie outside the base perimeter:
supplies the camp and the drop zone.
must be secured by outgoing patrols.
the water river water which
These are in "Indian country" and
Reminescent of Guantanamo Bay
in Cuba, the water supply which fluctuates between consumption
of 8,000 to 13,000 gallons gaily can be cut off by Communist activity,
although previous attempts have been uncess unsuccessful.
At one time,
the water suppo supply on base was so critical the Marines were rationed
only one canteen of water daily and shaving which prohibited," which
delighted some of them. Currently, drinking water is un-rato
and shaving water is not rationed,
but showers are for the Marines,
though other units occasionally luxuriate in them.
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defense 24 (normass/deepe)
The drop-zone,
also outside the Marine perimeter, is the
pivotal lifeline of the whole operation and red subsistence of the
camp. Thest size of a dozen basket-ball courts, the drop-zone
continually throughout the day, in good or bad weather, receives
Thus far,
the giant para-drops of supplies which sustain the camp.
the doo drop-zone has not received one single shot of Communist
fire-but it is only a question of time before it comes ut under sustained
SOURCES Report.
attack, And when it does, the Communists will have demonstrated their
capability to place an air-tight siege around Khe Sanh.
Newsmen have been warned by General Westmoreland's headquarters
in Saigon to refrain from writing aabout about specified supply levels
designated locations.)
disAccedit D.
HT
The Risk of being.
==more reuter
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defense 25 (normass/deepe)
seems appropriate.
Despite this regulation,
one footnote to Khe Sanh
Never in the history of modern war reporting have
Western correspondents, operating without censorship,
been given access
to such freedom of movement and sources in such a tactically difficult
The Marines have placed only three requirements upon the press
situation.
Cor
BY SCARCity
in Khe Sanh:
a limit of 15 at a time, becam
TAKING
limited facilities,
a nd agreements no by the correspondents of no rpe reep repeat no aerial
ENTERING
photos of the base or enten restricted command centers.
Burt And
even these are a matter of t journalist's honor, rather than Marine
enforcement. Correspondents are allowed to visit any part of the base--
at only the risk of in Communist 'incomin' fire--and to talk with
any
American-without military escort.
to the Marines that they
so freely
whe
It is perhaps a necessary tribute
So FREELY AND FRANKLI
have displayed for pubiie, consumption their
World-w
Prank their tribulations along with their valor, at a time
Strategies
so little is known about their enemy's sto strengths and weaknesses.
==more router
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defense 26 (normass/deepe)
(Hank : Sorry I was so late in getting this to you. It
has been a grueling piece to write. In some cases where I have made
rather blanket judgments, may I say that I have the documentary
evidence and quotes to back it up, but decided for security reasons
and press restrictions to try to write the piece as conservatively as
Also, am sorry for the word length, but I think this is
possible.
the heart of the whole series, and is the most explicit analysis of the
Jochkarm
An
Teve read yet. Immemmxxmximum
feel th the last part about press coverage is
I'm I'm not convio convinced they'll bar
necessary and warranted;
women correspondents there after the shook of their other woman's
getting wounded there wears off.
Rexxa
at one time.
complicated.
Sommemexmxmmsh.xmagyarham I
hope you see fit to publish this piece in its in entirely
Tomorrow I'll file on strategy, which is also pretty
Regards Bev).
==end reuter

Date

1968, Mar. 18

Subject

Vietnam War, 1961-1975; Khe Sanh, 2nd Battle of, Vietnam, 1968; Siege warfare; United States. Marine Corps; Mặt trận dân tộc giải phóng miền nam Việt Nam; Vietnam (Democratic Republic). Quân đội

Location

Khe Sanh, South Vietnam

Coordinates

16.6193; 106.7323

Size

20 x 26 cm

Container

B9, F30

Format

dispatches

Collection Number

MS 363

Collection Title

Beverly Deepe Keever, Journalism Papers

Creator

Keever, Beverly Deepe

Collector

Keever, Beverly Deepe

Copyright Information

These images are for educational use only. To inquire about usage or publication, please contact Archives & Special Collections.

Publisher

Archives & Special Collections, University of Nebraska-Lincoln Libraries

Language

English